The standard library context package has been available since Go 1.7,
and the Go build dashboard (build.golang.org) only tests master and
the past two releases.
Also, the acme package makes no backwards compatibility guarantees,
not that I expect this to influence many people.
Change-Id: Ia1a294212e1e531f28f53cd954d4743a64611cab
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/39272
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Vaghin <ddos@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
This change breaks existing behavior.
Before, a missing ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback would cause host key
checking to be disabled. In this configuration, establishing a
connection to any host just works, so today, most SSH client code in
the wild does not perform any host key checks.
This makes it easy to perform a MITM attack:
* SSH installations that use keyboard-interactive or password
authentication can be attacked with MITM, thereby stealing
passwords.
* Clients that use public-key authentication with agent forwarding are
also vulnerable: the MITM server could allow the login to succeed, and
then immediately ask the agent to authenticate the login to the real
server.
* Clients that use public-key authentication without agent forwarding
are harder to attack unnoticedly: an attacker cannot authenticate the
login to the real server, so it cannot in general present a convincing
server to the victim.
Now, a missing HostKeyCallback will cause the handshake to fail. This
change also provides InsecureIgnoreHostKey() and FixedHostKey(key) as
ready made host checkers.
A simplistic parser for OpenSSH's known_hosts file is given as an
example. This change does not provide a full-fledged parser, as it
has complexity (wildcards, revocation, hashed addresses) that will
need further consideration.
When introduced, the host checking feature maintained backward
compatibility at the expense of security. We have decided this is not
the right tradeoff for the SSH library.
Fixesgolang/go#19767
Change-Id: I45fc7ba9bd1ea29c31ec23f115cdbab99913e814
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/38701
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
cryptobyte is a helper library for building and parsing byte strings,
specifically for TLS and ASN.1.
Change-Id: I046b94773f6781153784c79f3d81e6d464eaebe0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/36123
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
This is the test that I use to sanity-check significant changes to the
package, thus it's probably worth checking it in. Since it's very slow,
it's disabled by default.
(Note that while it stands a good chance of catching errors in 32-bit
implementations, no amount of random testing is going to get useful
coverage for 64-bit implementations. Thus it really is just a sanity
check, despite the long run-time.)
Change-Id: I95b321eec6f3026dafbbc157a7ef35a27e88d247
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/36566
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
The test was assuming that the OCSP creation wouldn't cross a minute
boundary, which is flakey nonsense. Instead assert that the timestamp in
the OCSP response is within an hour of when we check it.
Change-Id: I3c822b738e9b04385319eb29a1cd275dc2ed112e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/36648
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Before this change, every JWS-signed request was preceded
by a HEAD request to fetch a fresh nonce.
The Client is now able to collect nonce values
from server responses and use them for future requests.
Additionally, this change also makes sure the client propagates
any error encountered during a fresh nonce fetch.
Fixesgolang/go#18428.
Change-Id: I33d21b450351cf4d98e72ee6c8fa654e9554bf92
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/36514
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The previous attempt would fail in the following scenario:
* select picks "first" kex from requestKex
* read loop receives a remote kex, posts on requestKex (which is now
empty) [*] for sending out a response, and sends pendingKex on startKex.
* select picks pendingKex from startKex, and proceeds to run the key
exchange.
* the posting on requestKex in [*] now triggers a second key exchange.
Fixes#18861.
Change-Id: I443e82f1d04c7f17d1485fdb87072b9feec26aa8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/36055
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
The ssh tests currently require 127.0.0.1 to work which isn't
necessarily available everywhere. To fix the source-address tests,
support comma-separated source-address values per the PROTOCOL.certkeys
file:
Comma-separated list of source addresses
from which this certificate is accepted
for authentication. Addresses are
specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn
or hhhh::hhhh/nn).
If this option is not present then
certificates may be presented from any
source address.
Change-Id: I87536ff81ffa005c073da103021ebc0dfb12b620
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/36110
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com>
Since encryption messes up the packets, the wrongly retained packets
look like noise and cause application protocol errors or panics in the
SSH library.
This normally triggers very rarely: the mandatory key exchange doesn't
have parallel writes, so this failure condition would be setup on the
first key exchange, take effect only after the second key exchange.
Fortunately, the tests against openssh exercise this. This change adds
also adds a unittest.
Fixes#18850.
Change-Id: I656c8b94bfb265831daa118f4d614a2f0c65d2af
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/36056
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Often intermediate results of poly1305 calculations are only reduced to
the range [0, 2^130). These new test vectors exercise the code that
reduces the final output to the range [0, 2^130-5).
This improves the test coverage of CL 35294 and CL 32812.
Change-Id: Ifd2f64d4668c08a396ed81db3e88969a49baf777
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/35918
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <munday@ca.ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
1) Always force a key exchange if we exchange 2^31 packets. In the past
this might not happen if RekeyThreshold was set to a very large
interval.
2) Follow recommendations from RFC 4344 for block ciphers. For AES, we
can encrypt 2^(blocksize/4) blocks under the same keys.
On modern hardware, the previous default of 1Gb could force a key
exchange within ~10 seconds. Since the key exchange takes 3 roundtrips
(send kex init, send DH init, send NEW_KEYS), this is relatively
expensive on high-latency links.
Change-Id: I1297124a307c541b7bf22d814d136ec0c6d8ed97
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/35410
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
The initial kex is started from both sides simultaneously, and before,
we could consume the the incoming kex request before we consumed from
our internal channel. This would result in initiating a key exchange
just after completing the initial one, which is not only an extra
delay, but also an error when using OpenSSH (OpenSSH does not support
key exchanges during user authentication).
Change-Id: Ia7e0748ea2bca80ae97d187bcf2931ab6422276b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/35851
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Due to a missing return, corrupt TLV data would cause an infinite loop
that consumes memory, eventually crashing the process.
Thanks to Ivan Markin for pointing this out.
Change-Id: Iaaf7c5f7ce911d3e542b86f6b942b15e2ccbdf3b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/35247
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
This serves as a basic sanity check and also prevents malformed private
keys from setting P=0 and consuming large amounts of CPU and memory in
the Exp call.
Change-Id: Ife22069b989a7347d8deaaf13030df82ee59e87b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/35246
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Use channels and a dedicated write loop for managing the rekeying
process. This lets us collect packets to be written while a key
exchange is in progress.
Previously, the read loop ran the key exchange, and writers would
block if a key exchange was going on. If a reader wrote back a packet
while processing a read packet, it could block, stopping the read
loop, thus causing a deadlock. Such coupled read/writes are inherent
with handling requests that want a response (eg. keepalive,
opening/closing channels etc.). The buffered channels (most channels
have capacity 16) papered over these problems, but under load SSH
connections would occasionally deadlock.
Fixes#18439.
Change-Id: I7c14ff4991fa3100a5d36025125d0cf1119c471d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/35012
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
This change detects BMI2 usability as an additional condition
to examine the usability of AVX2 version algorithm, fixes
the crash on the platfrom which supports AVX2 but not support BMI2.
Change-Id: I5438d4ec84265c79a51c1439265a33b1be04878a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/34852
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
ResponderID is unmarshalled into either ResponderName or
ResponderKeyHash depending on which one is present.
Fixesgolang/go#14971.
Change-Id: I5ba602753d81835da531321e94898408395068dd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/34380
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Currently, autocert.Manager always generates EC-based certificates.
This change adds an optional field forcing the Manager to use RSA
instead.
An alternative idea, a "double" certificate, where the Manager
presents either RSA or EC certificate based on client's compatibility,
doesn't seem to be worth the implementation time given the constant
increase in Elliptic Curve cryptography.
Fixesgolang/go#17744
Change-Id: Idc68abfc698bcff4aad99715baefc06f8fae50ad
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/34570
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
A net.IP may be represented by both by a 4 as well as a 16 byte long
byte slice. Because of this, it is not safe to compare IP addresses
using bytes.Equal as the same IP address using a different internal
representation will produce mismatches.
Change-Id: I0d228771cf363ccfb9532f8bc2a2fc8eff61f6e9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/34450
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Brad Fitzpatrick
Han-Wen Nienhuys
Fredrik Forsmo
Martin Kreichgauer
Andreas Auernhammer
Adam Langley
Alex Vaghin
MiLk
Heschi Kreinick
Russ Cox
Michael Munday
Paul Querna
Alex Brainman
Shenghou Ma
Andrew Gerrand
Peter Morjan
Lion Yang
Joe Tsai
Mikio Hara
Péter Szilágyi