go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies

Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.

Change-Id: I47041f06d6a0c92919eaac5d727cbc41551ed2e1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/734461
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>

acme/acme.go

@@ -31,12 +31,11 @@ import (
 	"crypto/x509/pkix"
 	"encoding/asn1"
 	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"encoding/pem"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"math/big"
+	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -471,7 +470,7 @@ func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizat
 		// while waiting for a final authorization status.
 		d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("Retry-After"))
 		if d == 0 {
-			// Given that the fastest challenges TLS-SNI and HTTP-01
+			// Given that the fastest challenges TLS-ALPN and HTTP-01
 			// require a CA to make at least 1 network round trip
 			// and most likely persist a challenge state,
 			// this default delay seems reasonable.
@@ -572,50 +571,28 @@ func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengePath(token string) string {
 }
 
 // TLSSNI01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-01 challenge response.
+// Always returns an error.
 //
-// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of the ACME spec.
-func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
-	ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
-	if err != nil {
-		return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
-	}
-	b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka))
-	h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
-	name = fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:])
-	cert, err = tlsChallengeCert([]string{name}, opt)
-	if err != nil {
-		return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
-	}
-	return cert, name, nil
+// Deprecated: This challenge type was only present in pre-standardized ACME
+// protocol drafts and is insecure for use in shared hosting environments.
+func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (tls.Certificate, string, error) {
+	return tls.Certificate{}, "", errPreRFC
 }
 
 // TLSSNI02ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-02 challenge response.
+// Always returns an error.
 //
-// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of the ACME spec.
-func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
-	b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
-	h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
-	sanA := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.token.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:])
-
-	ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
-	if err != nil {
-		return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
-	}
-	b = sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka))
-	h = hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
-	sanB := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.ka.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:])
-
-	cert, err = tlsChallengeCert([]string{sanA, sanB}, opt)
-	if err != nil {
-		return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
-	}
-	return cert, sanA, nil
+// Deprecated: This challenge type was only present in pre-standardized ACME
+// protocol drafts and is insecure for use in shared hosting environments.
+func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (tls.Certificate, string, error) {
+	return tls.Certificate{}, "", errPreRFC
 }
 
 // TLSALPN01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-ALPN-01 challenge response.
 // Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control
-// over a domain name. For more details on TLS-ALPN-01 see
-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shoemaker-acme-tls-alpn-00#section-3
+// over an identifier (either a DNS name or the textual form of an IPv4 or IPv6
+// address). For more details on TLS-ALPN-01 see
+// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8737 and https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8738
 //
 // The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
 // If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert,
@@ -623,9 +600,13 @@ func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tl
 // If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve.
 //
 // The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when
-// the server name in the TLS ClientHello matches the domain, and the special acme-tls/1 ALPN protocol
+// the server name in the TLS ClientHello matches the identifier, and the special acme-tls/1 ALPN protocol
 // has been specified.
-func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, err error) {
+//
+// Validation requests for IP address identifiers will use the reverse DNS form in the server name
+// in the TLS ClientHello since the SNI extension is not supported for IP addresses.
+// See RFC 8738 Section 6 for more information.
+func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, identifier string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, err error) {
 	ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
 	if err != nil {
 		return tls.Certificate{}, err
@@ -655,7 +636,7 @@ func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain string, opt ...CertOption)
 	}
 	tmpl.ExtraExtensions = append(tmpl.ExtraExtensions, acmeExtension)
 	newOpt = append(newOpt, WithTemplate(tmpl))
-	return tlsChallengeCert([]string{domain}, newOpt)
+	return tlsChallengeCert(identifier, newOpt)
 }
 
 // popNonce returns a nonce value previously stored with c.addNonce
@@ -709,7 +690,7 @@ func (c *Client) addNonce(h http.Header) {
 }
 
 func (c *Client) fetchNonce(ctx context.Context, url string) (string, error) {
-	r, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", url, nil)
+	r, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "HEAD", url, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
@@ -773,11 +754,15 @@ func defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate() *x509.Certificate {
 	}
 }
 
-// tlsChallengeCert creates a temporary certificate for TLS-SNI challenges
-// with the given SANs and auto-generated public/private key pair.
-// The Subject Common Name is set to the first SAN to aid debugging.
+// tlsChallengeCert creates a temporary certificate for TLS-ALPN challenges
+// for the given identifier, using an auto-generated public/private key pair.
+//
+// If the provided identifier is a domain name, it will be used as a DNS type SAN and for the
+// subject common name. If the provided identifier is an IP address it will be used as an IP type
+// SAN.
+//
 // To create a cert with a custom key pair, specify WithKey option.
-func tlsChallengeCert(san []string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) {
+func tlsChallengeCert(identifier string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) {
 	var key crypto.Signer
 	tmpl := defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate()
 	for _, o := range opt {
@@ -801,9 +786,12 @@ func tlsChallengeCert(san []string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) {
 			return tls.Certificate{}, err
 		}
 	}
-	tmpl.DNSNames = san
-	if len(san) > 0 {
-		tmpl.Subject.CommonName = san[0]
+
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(identifier); ip != nil {
+		tmpl.IPAddresses = []net.IP{ip}
+	} else {
+		tmpl.DNSNames = []string{identifier}
+		tmpl.Subject.CommonName = identifier
 	}
 
 	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, key.Public(), key)
@@ -816,11 +804,5 @@ func tlsChallengeCert(san []string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) {
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// encodePEM returns b encoded as PEM with block of type typ.
-func encodePEM(typ string, b []byte) []byte {
-	pb := &pem.Block{Type: typ, Bytes: b}
-	return pem.EncodeToMemory(pb)
-}
-
 // timeNow is time.Now, except in tests which can mess with it.
 var timeNow = time.Now

acme/acme_test.go

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"crypto/rsa"
-	"crypto/tls"
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"crypto/x509/pkix"
 	"encoding/base64"
@@ -22,8 +21,6 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"reflect"
-	"sort"
-	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -692,71 +689,6 @@ func TestLinkHeader(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestTLSSNI01ChallengeCert(t *testing.T) {
-	const (
-		token = "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA"
-		// echo -n <token.testKeyECThumbprint> | shasum -a 256
-		san = "dbbd5eefe7b4d06eb9d1d9f5acb4c7cd.a27d320e4b30332f0b6cb441734ad7b0.acme.invalid"
-	)
-
-	tlscert, name, err := newTestClient().TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	if n := len(tlscert.Certificate); n != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("len(tlscert.Certificate) = %d; want 1", n)
-	}
-	cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(tlscert.Certificate[0])
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if len(cert.DNSNames) != 1 || cert.DNSNames[0] != san {
-		t.Fatalf("cert.DNSNames = %v; want %q", cert.DNSNames, san)
-	}
-	if cert.DNSNames[0] != name {
-		t.Errorf("cert.DNSNames[0] != name: %q vs %q", cert.DNSNames[0], name)
-	}
-	if cn := cert.Subject.CommonName; cn != san {
-		t.Errorf("cert.Subject.CommonName = %q; want %q", cn, san)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestTLSSNI02ChallengeCert(t *testing.T) {
-	const (
-		token = "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA"
-		// echo -n evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA | shasum -a 256
-		sanA = "7ea0aaa69214e71e02cebb18bb867736.09b730209baabf60e43d4999979ff139.token.acme.invalid"
-		// echo -n <token.testKeyECThumbprint> | shasum -a 256
-		sanB = "dbbd5eefe7b4d06eb9d1d9f5acb4c7cd.a27d320e4b30332f0b6cb441734ad7b0.ka.acme.invalid"
-	)
-
-	tlscert, name, err := newTestClient().TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	if n := len(tlscert.Certificate); n != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("len(tlscert.Certificate) = %d; want 1", n)
-	}
-	cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(tlscert.Certificate[0])
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	names := []string{sanA, sanB}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(cert.DNSNames, names) {
-		t.Fatalf("cert.DNSNames = %v;\nwant %v", cert.DNSNames, names)
-	}
-	sort.Strings(cert.DNSNames)
-	i := sort.SearchStrings(cert.DNSNames, name)
-	if i >= len(cert.DNSNames) || cert.DNSNames[i] != name {
-		t.Errorf("%v doesn't have %q", cert.DNSNames, name)
-	}
-	if cn := cert.Subject.CommonName; cn != sanA {
-		t.Errorf("CommonName = %q; want %q", cn, sanA)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestTLSALPN01ChallengeCert(t *testing.T) {
 	const (
 		token   = "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA"
@@ -813,6 +745,7 @@ func TestTLSChallengeCertOpt(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
+	domain := "example.com"
 	tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
 		SerialNumber: big.NewInt(2),
 		Subject:      pkix.Name{Organization: []string{"Test"}},
@@ -821,52 +754,43 @@ func TestTLSChallengeCertOpt(t *testing.T) {
 	opts := []CertOption{WithKey(key), WithTemplate(tmpl)}
 
 	client := newTestClient()
-	cert1, _, err := client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert("token", opts...)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	cert2, _, err := client.TLSSNI02ChallengeCert("token", opts...)
+	cert, err := client.TLSALPN01ChallengeCert("token", domain, opts...)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 
-	for i, tlscert := range []tls.Certificate{cert1, cert2} {
-		// verify generated cert private key
-		tlskey, ok := tlscert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
-		if !ok {
-			t.Errorf("%d: tlscert.PrivateKey is %T; want *rsa.PrivateKey", i, tlscert.PrivateKey)
-			continue
-		}
-		if tlskey.D.Cmp(key.D) != 0 {
-			t.Errorf("%d: tlskey.D = %v; want %v", i, tlskey.D, key.D)
-		}
-		// verify generated cert public key
-		x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(tlscert.Certificate[0])
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Errorf("%d: %v", i, err)
-			continue
-		}
-		tlspub, ok := x509Cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
-		if !ok {
-			t.Errorf("%d: x509Cert.PublicKey is %T; want *rsa.PublicKey", i, x509Cert.PublicKey)
-			continue
-		}
-		if tlspub.N.Cmp(key.N) != 0 {
-			t.Errorf("%d: tlspub.N = %v; want %v", i, tlspub.N, key.N)
-		}
-		// verify template option
-		sn := big.NewInt(2)
-		if x509Cert.SerialNumber.Cmp(sn) != 0 {
-			t.Errorf("%d: SerialNumber = %v; want %v", i, x509Cert.SerialNumber, sn)
-		}
-		org := []string{"Test"}
-		if !reflect.DeepEqual(x509Cert.Subject.Organization, org) {
-			t.Errorf("%d: Subject.Organization = %+v; want %+v", i, x509Cert.Subject.Organization, org)
-		}
-		for _, v := range x509Cert.DNSNames {
-			if !strings.HasSuffix(v, ".acme.invalid") {
-				t.Errorf("%d: invalid DNSNames element: %q", i, v)
-			}
+	// verify generated cert private key
+	tlskey, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("tlscert.PrivateKey is %T; want *rsa.PrivateKey", cert.PrivateKey)
+	}
+	if tlskey.D.Cmp(key.D) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("tlskey.D = %v; want %v", tlskey.D, key.D)
+	}
+	// verify generated cert public key
+	x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	tlspub, ok := x509Cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("x509Cert.PublicKey is %T; want *rsa.PublicKey", x509Cert.PublicKey)
+	}
+	if tlspub.N.Cmp(key.N) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("tlspub.N = %v; want %v", tlspub.N, key.N)
+	}
+	// verify template option
+	sn := big.NewInt(2)
+	if x509Cert.SerialNumber.Cmp(sn) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("SerialNumber = %v; want %v", x509Cert.SerialNumber, sn)
+	}
+	org := []string{"Test"}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(x509Cert.Subject.Organization, org) {
+		t.Errorf("Subject.Organization = %+v; want %+v", x509Cert.Subject.Organization, org)
+	}
+	for _, v := range x509Cert.DNSNames {
+		if v != domain {
+			t.Errorf("invalid DNSNames element: %q", v)
 		}
 	}
 }

acme/autocert/autocert.go

@@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ type Manager struct {
 	// RenewBefore optionally specifies how early certificates should
 	// be renewed before they expire.
 	//
-	// If zero, they're renewed 30 days before expiration.
+	// If zero, they're renewed at the lesser of 30 days or
+	// 1/3 of the certificate lifetime.
 	RenewBefore time.Duration
 
 	// Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration
@@ -464,7 +465,7 @@ func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error
 		leaf: cert.Leaf,
 	}
 	m.state[ck] = s
-	m.startRenew(ck, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
+	m.startRenew(ck, s.key, s.leaf.NotBefore, s.leaf.NotAfter)
 	return cert, nil
 }
 
@@ -610,7 +611,7 @@ func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate,
 	}
 	state.cert = der
 	state.leaf = leaf
-	m.startRenew(ck, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
+	m.startRenew(ck, state.key, state.leaf.NotBefore, state.leaf.NotAfter)
 	return state.tlscert()
 }
 
@@ -908,7 +909,7 @@ func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string {
 //
 // The key argument is a certificate private key.
 // The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter).
-func (m *Manager) startRenew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
+func (m *Manager) startRenew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, notBefore, notAfter time.Time) {
 	m.renewalMu.Lock()
 	defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
 	if m.renewal[ck] != nil {
@@ -920,7 +921,7 @@ func (m *Manager) startRenew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
 	}
 	dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, ck: ck, key: key}
 	m.renewal[ck] = dr
-	dr.start(exp)
+	dr.start(notBefore, notAfter)
 }
 
 // stopRenew stops all currently running cert renewal timers.
@@ -1028,13 +1029,6 @@ func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy {
 	return defaultHostPolicy
 }
 
-func (m *Manager) renewBefore() time.Duration {
-	if m.RenewBefore > renewJitter {
-		return m.RenewBefore
-	}
-	return 720 * time.Hour // 30 days
-}
-
 func (m *Manager) now() time.Time {
 	if m.nowFunc != nil {
 		return m.nowFunc()

acme/autocert/autocert_test.go

@@ -561,9 +561,9 @@ func TestHTTPHandlerDefaultFallback(t *testing.T) {
 		{"GET", "http://example.org/foo?a=b", 302, "https://example.org/foo?a=b"},
 		{"GET", "http://example.org:80/foo?a=b", 302, "https://example.org:443/foo?a=b"},
 		{"GET", "http://example.org:80/foo%20bar", 302, "https://example.org:443/foo%20bar"},
-		{"GET", "http://[2602:d1:xxxx::c60a]:1234", 302, "https://[2602:d1:xxxx::c60a]:443/"},
-		{"GET", "http://[2602:d1:xxxx::c60a]", 302, "https://[2602:d1:xxxx::c60a]/"},
-		{"GET", "http://[2602:d1:xxxx::c60a]/foo?a=b", 302, "https://[2602:d1:xxxx::c60a]/foo?a=b"},
+		{"GET", "http://[2602:d1:abcd::c60a]:1234", 302, "https://[2602:d1:abcd::c60a]:443/"},
+		{"GET", "http://[2602:d1:abcd::c60a]", 302, "https://[2602:d1:abcd::c60a]/"},
+		{"GET", "http://[2602:d1:abcd::c60a]/foo?a=b", 302, "https://[2602:d1:abcd::c60a]/foo?a=b"},
 		{"HEAD", "http://example.org", 302, "https://example.org/"},
 		{"HEAD", "http://example.org/foo", 302, "https://example.org/foo"},
 		{"HEAD", "http://example.org/foo/bar/", 302, "https://example.org/foo/bar/"},

acme/autocert/internal/acmetest/ca.go

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func (ca *CAServer) URL() string {
 	return ca.url
 }
 
-// Roots returns a pool cointaining the CA root.
+// Roots returns a pool containing the CA root.
 func (ca *CAServer) Roots() *x509.CertPool {
 	if ca.url == "" {
 		panic("Roots called before Start")
@@ -782,15 +782,3 @@ func decodePayload(v interface{}, r io.Reader) error {
 func challengeToken(domain, challType string, authzID int) string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("token-%s-%s-%d", domain, challType, authzID)
 }
-
-func unique(a []string) []string {
-	seen := make(map[string]bool)
-	var res []string
-	for _, s := range a {
-		if s != "" && !seen[s] {
-			seen[s] = true
-			res = append(res, s)
-		}
-	}
-	return res
-}

acme/autocert/renewal.go

@@ -11,9 +11,6 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )
 
-// renewJitter is the maximum deviation from Manager.RenewBefore.
-const renewJitter = time.Hour
-
 // domainRenewal tracks the state used by the periodic timers
 // renewing a single domain's cert.
 type domainRenewal struct {
@@ -30,13 +27,13 @@ type domainRenewal struct {
 // defined by the certificate expiration time exp.
 //
 // If the timer is already started, calling start is a noop.
-func (dr *domainRenewal) start(exp time.Time) {
+func (dr *domainRenewal) start(notBefore, notAfter time.Time) {
 	dr.timerMu.Lock()
 	defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
 	if dr.timer != nil {
 		return
 	}
-	dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(dr.next(exp), dr.renew)
+	dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(dr.next(notBefore, notAfter), dr.renew)
 }
 
 // stop stops the cert renewal timer and waits for any in-flight calls to renew
@@ -79,7 +76,7 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) renew() {
 	// TODO: rotate dr.key at some point?
 	next, err := dr.do(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
-		next = renewJitter / 2
+		next = time.Hour / 2
 		next += time.Duration(pseudoRand.int63n(int64(next)))
 	}
 	testDidRenewLoop(next, err)
@@ -107,8 +104,8 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) {
 	// a race is likely unavoidable in a distributed environment
 	// but we try nonetheless
 	if tlscert, err := dr.m.cacheGet(ctx, dr.ck); err == nil {
-		next := dr.next(tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter)
-		if next > dr.m.renewBefore()+renewJitter {
+		next := dr.next(tlscert.Leaf.NotBefore, tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter)
+		if next > 0 {
 			signer, ok := tlscert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
 			if ok {
 				state := &certState{
@@ -139,18 +136,23 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) {
 		return 0, err
 	}
 	dr.updateState(state)
-	return dr.next(leaf.NotAfter), nil
+	return dr.next(leaf.NotBefore, leaf.NotAfter), nil
 }
 
-func (dr *domainRenewal) next(expiry time.Time) time.Duration {
-	d := expiry.Sub(dr.m.now()) - dr.m.renewBefore()
-	// add a bit of randomness to renew deadline
-	n := pseudoRand.int63n(int64(renewJitter))
-	d -= time.Duration(n)
-	if d < 0 {
-		return 0
+// next returns the wait time before the next renewal should start.
+// If manager.RenewBefore is set, it uses that capped at 30 days,
+// otherwise it uses a default of 1/3 of the cert lifetime.
+// It builds in a jitter of 10% of the renew threshold, capped at 1 hour.
+func (dr *domainRenewal) next(notBefore, notAfter time.Time) time.Duration {
+	threshold := min(notAfter.Sub(notBefore)/3, 30*24*time.Hour)
+	if dr.m.RenewBefore > 0 {
+		threshold = min(dr.m.RenewBefore, 30*24*time.Hour)
 	}
-	return d
+	maxJitter := min(threshold/10, time.Hour)
+	jitter := pseudoRand.int63n(int64(maxJitter))
+	renewAt := notAfter.Add(-(threshold - time.Duration(jitter)))
+	renewWait := renewAt.Sub(dr.m.now())
+	return max(0, renewWait)
 }
 
 var testDidRenewLoop = func(next time.Duration, err error) {}

acme/autocert/renewal_test.go

@@ -17,27 +17,60 @@ import (
 
 func TestRenewalNext(t *testing.T) {
 	now := time.Now()
-	man := &Manager{
-		RenewBefore: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
-		nowFunc:     func() time.Time { return now },
-	}
-	defer man.stopRenew()
+	nowFn := func() time.Time { return now }
 	tt := []struct {
-		expiry   time.Time
-		min, max time.Duration
+		name        string
+		renewBefore time.Duration // arg to Manager
+		// leaf cert validity
+		notBefore time.Time
+		validFor  time.Duration
+		// wait time
+		waitMin, waitMax time.Duration
 	}{
-		{now.Add(90 * 24 * time.Hour), 83*24*time.Hour - renewJitter, 83 * 24 * time.Hour},
-		{now.Add(time.Hour), 0, 1},
-		{now, 0, 1},
-		{now.Add(-time.Hour), 0, 1},
+		{"default renewal, 1h cert, valid",
+			0, now, time.Hour, 40 * time.Minute, 50 * time.Minute},
+		{"default renewal, 1h cert, should renew",
+			0, now.Add(-50 * time.Minute), time.Hour, 0, 0},
+		{"default renewal, 1h cert, expired",
+			0, now.Add(-400 * 24 * time.Hour), time.Hour, 0, 0},
+		{"default renewal, 6d cert, valid",
+			0, now, 6 * 24 * time.Hour, 4 * 24 * time.Hour, (4*24 + 1) * time.Hour},
+		{"default renewal, 6d cert, should renew",
+			0, now.Add(-5 * 24 * time.Hour), 6 * 24 * time.Hour, 0, 0},
+		{"default renewal, 6d cert, expired",
+			0, now.Add(-400 * 24 * time.Hour), 6 * 24 * time.Hour, 0, 0},
+		{"default renewal, 90d cert, valid",
+			0, now, 90 * 24 * time.Hour, 60 * 24 * time.Hour, (60*24 + 1) * time.Hour},
+		{"default renewal, 90d cert, should renew",
+			0, now.Add(-70 * 24 * time.Hour), 90 * 24 * time.Hour, 0, 0},
+		{"default renewal, 90d cert, expired",
+			0, now.Add(-400 * 24 * time.Hour), 90 * 24 * time.Hour, 0, 0},
+		{"default renewal, 398d cert, valid",
+			0, now, 398 * 24 * time.Hour, (368 * 24) * time.Hour, (368*24 + 1) * time.Hour},
+		{"default renewal, 398d cert, should renew",
+			0, now.Add(-378 * 24 * time.Hour), 398 * 24 * time.Hour, 0, 0},
+		{"default renewal, 398d cert, expired",
+			0, now.Add(-400 * 24 * time.Hour), 398 * 24 * time.Hour, 0, 0},
+		{"7d renewal, 90d cert, valid",
+			7 * 24 * time.Hour, now, 90 * 24 * time.Hour, 83 * 24 * time.Hour, (83*24 + 1) * time.Hour},
+		{"7d renewal, 90d cert, should not renew",
+			7 * 24 * time.Hour, now.Add(-70 * 24 * time.Hour), 90 * 24 * time.Hour, 13 * 24 * time.Hour, (13*24 + 1) * time.Hour},
+		{"7d renewal, 90d cert, should renew",
+			7 * 24 * time.Hour, now.Add(-85 * 24 * time.Hour), 90 * 24 * time.Hour, 0, 0},
+		{"7d renewal, 90d cert, expired",
+			7 * 24 * time.Hour, now.Add(-400 * 24 * time.Hour), 90 * 24 * time.Hour, 0, 0},
 	}
 
-	dr := &domainRenewal{m: man}
-	for i, test := range tt {
-		next := dr.next(test.expiry)
-		if next < test.min || test.max < next {
-			t.Errorf("%d: next = %v; want between %v and %v", i, next, test.min, test.max)
-		}
+	for _, test := range tt {
+		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			dr := &domainRenewal{m: &Manager{RenewBefore: test.renewBefore, nowFunc: nowFn}}
+			defer dr.m.stopRenew()
+
+			next := dr.next(test.notBefore, test.notBefore.Add(test.validFor))
+			if next < test.waitMin || next > test.waitMax {
+				t.Errorf("expected wait time: %v <= %v <= %v", test.waitMin, next, test.waitMax)
+			}
+		})
 	}
 }
 
@@ -239,7 +272,7 @@ func TestRenewFromCacheAlreadyRenewed(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// trigger renew
-	man.startRenew(exampleCertKey, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
+	man.startRenew(exampleCertKey, s.key, s.leaf.NotBefore, s.leaf.NotAfter)
 	<-renewed
 	func() {
 		man.renewalMu.Lock()

acme/http.go

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ func wantStatus(codes ...int) resOkay {
 func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Response, error) {
 	retry := c.retryTimer()
 	for {
-		req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
+		req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ func (c *Client) postNoRetry(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string,
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, nil, err
 	}
-	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url, bytes.NewReader(b))
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", url, bytes.NewReader(b))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, nil, err
 	}

acme/pebble_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,809 @@
+// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package acme_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
+)
+
+const (
+	// pebbleModVersion is the module version used for Pebble and Pebble's
+	// challenge test server. It is ignored if `-pebble-local-dir` is provided.
+	pebbleModVersion = "v2.7.0"
+	// startingPort is the first port number used for binding interface
+	// addresses. Each call to takeNextPort() will increment a port number
+	// starting at this value.
+	startingPort = 5555
+)
+
+var (
+	pebbleLocalDir = flag.String(
+		"pebble-local-dir",
+		"",
+		"Local Pebble to use, instead of fetching from source",
+	)
+	nextPort atomic.Uint32
+)
+
+func init() {
+	nextPort.Store(startingPort)
+}
+
+func TestWithPebble(t *testing.T) {
+	// We want to use process groups w/ syscall.Kill, and the acme package
+	// is very platform-agnostic, so skip on non-Linux.
+	if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
+		t.Skip("skipping pebble tests on non-linux OS")
+	}
+
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("skipping pebble tests in short mode")
+	}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		challSrv func(*environment) (challengeServer, string)
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "TLSALPN01-Issuance",
+			challSrv: func(env *environment) (challengeServer, string) {
+				bindAddr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", env.config.TLSPort)
+				return newChallTLSServer(bindAddr), bindAddr
+			},
+		},
+
+		{
+			name: "HTTP01-Issuance",
+			challSrv: func(env *environment) (challengeServer, string) {
+				bindAddr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", env.config.HTTPPort)
+				return newChallHTTPServer(bindAddr), bindAddr
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			env := startPebbleEnvironment(t, nil)
+			challSrv, challSrvAddr := tt.challSrv(&env)
+			challSrv.Run()
+
+			t.Cleanup(func() {
+				challSrv.Shutdown()
+			})
+
+			waitForServer(t, challSrvAddr)
+			testIssuance(t, &env, challSrv)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// challengeServer abstracts over the details of running a challenge response
+// server for some supported acme.Challenge type. Responses are provisioned
+// during the test issuance process to be presented to the ACME server's
+// validation authority.
+type challengeServer interface {
+	Run()
+	Shutdown() error
+	Supported(chal *acme.Challenge) bool
+	Provision(client *acme.Client, ident acme.AuthzID, chal *acme.Challenge) error
+}
+
+// challTLSServer is a simple challenge response server that listens for TLS
+// connections on a specific port and if they are TLS-ALPN-01 challenge
+// requests, completes the handshake using the configured challenge response
+// certificate for the SNI value provided.
+type challTLSServer struct {
+	*http.Server
+	// mu protects challCerts.
+	mu sync.RWMutex
+	// challCerts is a map from SNI domain name to challenge response certificate.
+	challCerts map[string]*tls.Certificate
+}
+
+// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8737#section-4
+const acmeTLSAlpnProtocol = "acme-tls/1"
+
+func newChallTLSServer(address string) *challTLSServer {
+	challServer := &challTLSServer{Server: &http.Server{
+		Addr:         address,
+		ReadTimeout:  5 * time.Second,
+		WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
+	}, challCerts: make(map[string]*tls.Certificate)}
+
+	// Configure the server to support the TLS-ALPN-01 challenge protocol
+	// and to use a callback for selecting the handshake certificate.
+	challServer.Server.TLSConfig = &tls.Config{
+		NextProtos:     []string{acmeTLSAlpnProtocol},
+		GetCertificate: challServer.getCertificate,
+	}
+
+	return challServer
+}
+
+func (c *challTLSServer) Shutdown() error {
+	log.Printf("challTLSServer: shutting down")
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10)
+	defer cancel()
+	return c.Server.Shutdown(ctx)
+}
+
+func (c *challTLSServer) Run() {
+	go func() {
+		// Note: certFile and keyFile are empty because our config uses a
+		// GetCertificate callback.
+		if err := c.Server.ListenAndServeTLS("", ""); err != nil {
+			if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
+				log.Printf("challTLSServer error: %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+}
+
+func (c *challTLSServer) Supported(chal *acme.Challenge) bool {
+	return chal.Type == "tls-alpn-01"
+}
+
+func (c *challTLSServer) Provision(client *acme.Client, ident acme.AuthzID, chal *acme.Challenge) error {
+	respCert, err := client.TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(chal.Token, ident.Value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("challTLSServer: failed to generate challlenge response cert for %s: %w",
+			ident.Value, err)
+	}
+
+	log.Printf("challTLSServer: setting challenge response certificate for %s", ident.Value)
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	c.challCerts[ident.Value] = &respCert
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *challTLSServer) getCertificate(clientHello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
+	// Verify the request looks like a TLS-ALPN-01 challenge request.
+	if len(clientHello.SupportedProtos) != 1 || clientHello.SupportedProtos[0] != acmeTLSAlpnProtocol {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"challTLSServer: non-TLS-ALPN-01 challenge request received with SupportedProtos: %s",
+			clientHello.SupportedProtos)
+	}
+
+	serverName := clientHello.ServerName
+
+	// TLS-ALPN-01 challenge requests for IP addresses are encoded in the SNI
+	// using the reverse-DNS notation. See RFC 8738 Section 6:
+	//   https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8738.html#section-6
+	if strings.HasSuffix(serverName, ".in-addr.arpa") {
+		serverName = strings.TrimSuffix(serverName, ".in-addr.arpa")
+		parts := strings.Split(serverName, ".")
+		for i, j := 0, len(parts)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
+			parts[i], parts[j] = parts[j], parts[i]
+		}
+		serverName = strings.Join(parts, ".")
+	}
+
+	log.Printf("challTLSServer: selecting certificate for request from %s for %s",
+		clientHello.Conn.RemoteAddr(), serverName)
+
+	c.mu.RLock()
+	defer c.mu.RUnlock()
+	cert := c.challCerts[serverName]
+	if cert == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("challTLSServer: no challenge response certificate configured for %s", serverName)
+	}
+
+	return cert, nil
+}
+
+// challHTTPServer is a simple challenge response server that listens for HTTP
+// connections on a specific port and if they are HTTP-01 challenge requests,
+// serves the challenge response key authorization.
+type challHTTPServer struct {
+	*http.Server
+	// mu protects challMap
+	mu sync.RWMutex
+	// challMap is a mapping from request path to response body.
+	challMap map[string]string
+}
+
+func newChallHTTPServer(address string) *challHTTPServer {
+	challServer := &challHTTPServer{
+		Server: &http.Server{
+			Addr:         address,
+			ReadTimeout:  5 * time.Second,
+			WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
+		},
+		challMap: make(map[string]string),
+	}
+
+	challServer.Server.Handler = challServer
+
+	return challServer
+}
+
+func (c *challHTTPServer) Supported(chal *acme.Challenge) bool {
+	return chal.Type == "http-01"
+}
+
+func (c *challHTTPServer) Provision(client *acme.Client, ident acme.AuthzID, chall *acme.Challenge) error {
+	path := client.HTTP01ChallengePath(chall.Token)
+	body, err := client.HTTP01ChallengeResponse(chall.Token)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate HTTP-01 challenge response for %v challenge %s token %s: %w",
+			ident, chall.URI, chall.Token, err)
+	}
+
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	log.Printf("challHTTPServer: setting challenge response for %s", path)
+	c.challMap[path] = body
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *challHTTPServer) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	log.Printf("challHTTPServer: handling %s to %s from %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.RemoteAddr)
+	if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
+		http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+		return
+	}
+
+	c.mu.RLock()
+	defer c.mu.RUnlock()
+	response, exists := c.challMap[r.URL.Path]
+
+	if !exists {
+		http.NotFound(w, r)
+		return
+	}
+
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
+	w.Write([]byte(response))
+}
+
+func (c *challHTTPServer) Shutdown() error {
+	log.Printf("challHTTPServer: shutting down")
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	return c.Server.Shutdown(ctx)
+}
+
+func (c *challHTTPServer) Run() {
+	go func() {
+		if err := c.Server.ListenAndServe(); err != nil {
+			if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
+				log.Printf("challHTTPServer error: %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+}
+
+func testIssuance(t *testing.T, env *environment, challSrv challengeServer) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	// Bound the total issuance process by a timeout of 60 seconds.
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	// Create a new ACME account.
+	client := env.client
+	acct, err := client.Register(ctx, &acme.Account{}, acme.AcceptTOS)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to register account: %v", err)
+	}
+	if acct.Status != acme.StatusValid {
+		t.Fatalf("expected new account status to be valid, got %v", acct.Status)
+	}
+	log.Printf("registered account: %s", acct.URI)
+
+	// Create a new order for some example identifiers
+	identifiers := []acme.AuthzID{
+		{
+			Type:  "dns",
+			Value: "example.com",
+		},
+		{
+			Type:  "dns",
+			Value: "www.example.com",
+		},
+		{
+			Type:  "ip",
+			Value: "127.0.0.1",
+		},
+	}
+	order, err := client.AuthorizeOrder(ctx, identifiers)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create order for %v: %v", identifiers, err)
+	}
+	if order.Status != acme.StatusPending {
+		t.Fatalf("expected new order status to be pending, got %v", order.Status)
+	}
+	orderURL := order.URI
+	log.Printf("created order: %v", orderURL)
+
+	// For each pending authz provision a supported challenge type's response
+	// with the test challenge server, and tell the ACME server to verify it.
+	for _, authzURL := range order.AuthzURLs {
+		authz, err := client.GetAuthorization(ctx, authzURL)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("failed to get order %s authorization %s: %v",
+				orderURL, authzURL, err)
+		}
+
+		if authz.Status != acme.StatusPending {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		for _, challenge := range authz.Challenges {
+			if challenge.Status != acme.StatusPending || !challSrv.Supported(challenge) {
+				continue
+			}
+
+			if err := challSrv.Provision(client, authz.Identifier, challenge); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("failed to provision challenge %s: %v", challenge.URI, err)
+			}
+
+			_, err = client.Accept(ctx, challenge)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("failed to accept order %s challenge %s: %v",
+					orderURL, challenge.URI, err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Wait for the order to become ready for finalization.
+	order, err = client.WaitOrder(ctx, order.URI)
+	if err != nil {
+		var orderErr *acme.OrderError
+		if errors.Is(err, orderErr) {
+			t.Fatalf("failed to wait for order %s: %s: %s", orderURL, err, orderErr.Problem)
+		} else {
+			t.Fatalf("failed to wait for order %s: %s", orderURL, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if order.Status != acme.StatusReady {
+		t.Fatalf("expected order %s status to be ready, got %v",
+			orderURL, order.Status)
+	}
+
+	// Generate a certificate keypair and a CSR for the order identifiers.
+	certKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to generate certificate key: %v", err)
+	}
+	var dnsNames []string
+	var ipAddresses []net.IP
+	for _, ident := range identifiers {
+		switch ident.Type {
+		case "dns":
+			dnsNames = append(dnsNames, ident.Value)
+		case "ip":
+			ipAddresses = append(ipAddresses, net.ParseIP(ident.Value))
+		default:
+			t.Fatalf("unsupported identifier type: %s", ident.Type)
+		}
+	}
+	csrDer, err := x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, &x509.CertificateRequest{
+		DNSNames:    dnsNames,
+		IPAddresses: ipAddresses,
+	}, certKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create CSR: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Finalize the order by creating a certificate with our CSR.
+	chain, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, order.FinalizeURL, csrDer, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to finalize order %s with finalize URL %s: %v",
+			orderURL, order.FinalizeURL, err)
+	}
+
+	// Split the chain into the leaf and any intermediates.
+	leaf := chain[0]
+	intermediatesDER := chain[1:]
+	leafCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(leaf)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to parse order %s leaf certificate: %v", orderURL, err)
+	}
+	intermediates := x509.NewCertPool()
+	for i, intermediateDER := range intermediatesDER {
+		intermediate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(intermediateDER)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("failed to parse intermediate %d: %v", i, err)
+		}
+		intermediates.AddCert(intermediate)
+	}
+
+	// Verify there is a valid path from the leaf certificate to Pebble's
+	// issuing root using the provided intermediate certificates.
+	roots, err := env.RootCert()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to get Pebble issuer root certs: %v", err)
+	}
+	paths, err := leafCert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{
+		Intermediates: intermediates,
+		Roots:         roots,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to verify order %s leaf certificate: %v", orderURL, err)
+	}
+	log.Printf("verified %d path(s) from issued leaf certificate to Pebble root CA", len(paths))
+
+	// Also verify that the leaf cert is valid for each of the DNS names
+	// and IP addresses from our order's identifiers.
+	for _, name := range dnsNames {
+		if err := leafCert.VerifyHostname(name); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("failed to verify order %s leaf certificate for order DNS name %s: %v",
+				orderURL, name, err)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, ip := range ipAddresses {
+		if err := leafCert.VerifyHostname(ip.String()); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("failed to verify order %s leaf certificate for order IP address %s: %v",
+				orderURL, ip, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+type environment struct {
+	config *environmentConfig
+	client *acme.Client
+}
+
+// RootCert returns the Pebble CA's primary issuing hierarchy root certificate.
+// This is generated randomly at each startup and can be used to verify
+// certificate chains issued by Pebble's ACME interface. Note that this
+// is separate from the static root certificate used by the Pebble ACME
+// HTTPS interface.
+func (e *environment) RootCert() (*x509.CertPool, error) {
+	// NOTE: in the future we may want to consider the alternative chains
+	// 		 returned as Link alternative headers.
+	rootURL := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/roots/0", e.config.pebbleConfig.ManagementListenAddress)
+	resp, err := e.client.HTTPClient.Get(rootURL)
+	if err != nil || resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to GET Pebble root CA from %s: %v", rootURL, err)
+	}
+
+	roots := x509.NewCertPool()
+	rootPEM, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse Pebble root CA PEM: %v", err)
+	}
+	rootDERBlock, _ := pem.Decode(rootPEM)
+	rootCA, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rootDERBlock.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse Pebble root CA DER: %v", err)
+	}
+	roots.AddCert(rootCA)
+
+	return roots, nil
+}
+
+// environmentConfig describes the Pebble configuration, and configuration
+// shared between pebble and pebble-challtestsrv.
+type environmentConfig struct {
+	pebbleConfig
+	dnsPort uint32
+}
+
+// defaultConfig returns an environmentConfig populated with default values.
+// The provided pebbleDir is used to specify certificate/private key paths
+// for the HTTPS ACME interface.
+func defaultConfig(pebbleDir string) environmentConfig {
+	return environmentConfig{
+		pebbleConfig: pebbleConfig{
+			ListenAddress:                  fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", takeNextPort()),
+			ManagementListenAddress:        fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", takeNextPort()),
+			HTTPPort:                       takeNextPort(),
+			TLSPort:                        takeNextPort(),
+			Certificate:                    fmt.Sprintf("%s/test/certs/localhost/cert.pem", pebbleDir),
+			PrivateKey:                     fmt.Sprintf("%s/test/certs/localhost/key.pem", pebbleDir),
+			OCSPResponderURL:               "",
+			ExternalAccountBindingRequired: false,
+			ExternalAccountMACKeys:         make(map[string]string),
+			DomainBlocklist:                []string{"blocked-domain.example"},
+			Profiles: map[string]struct {
+				Description    string
+				ValidityPeriod uint64
+			}{
+				"default": {
+					Description:    "default profile",
+					ValidityPeriod: 3600,
+				},
+			},
+			RetryAfter: struct {
+				Authz int
+				Order int
+			}{
+				3,
+				5,
+			},
+		},
+		dnsPort: takeNextPort(),
+	}
+}
+
+// pebbleConfig matches the JSON structure of the Pebble configuration file.
+type pebbleConfig struct {
+	ListenAddress                  string
+	ManagementListenAddress        string
+	HTTPPort                       uint32
+	TLSPort                        uint32
+	Certificate                    string
+	PrivateKey                     string
+	OCSPResponderURL               string
+	ExternalAccountBindingRequired bool
+	ExternalAccountMACKeys         map[string]string
+	DomainBlocklist                []string
+	Profiles                       map[string]struct {
+		Description    string
+		ValidityPeriod uint64
+	}
+	RetryAfter struct {
+		Authz int
+		Order int
+	}
+}
+
+func takeNextPort() uint32 {
+	return nextPort.Add(1) - 1
+}
+
+// startPebbleEnvironment is a test helper that spawns Pebble and Pebble
+// challenge test server processes based on the provided environmentConfig. The
+// processes will be torn down when the test ends.
+func startPebbleEnvironment(t *testing.T, config *environmentConfig) environment {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var pebbleDir string
+	if *pebbleLocalDir != "" {
+		pebbleDir = *pebbleLocalDir
+	} else {
+		pebbleDir = fetchModule(t, "github.com/letsencrypt/pebble/v2", pebbleModVersion)
+	}
+
+	binDir := prepareBinaries(t, pebbleDir)
+
+	if config == nil {
+		cfg := defaultConfig(pebbleDir)
+		config = &cfg
+	}
+
+	marshalConfig := struct {
+		Pebble pebbleConfig
+	}{
+		Pebble: config.pebbleConfig,
+	}
+
+	configData, err := json.Marshal(marshalConfig)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to marshal config: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	configFile, err := os.CreateTemp("", "pebble-config-*.json")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create temp config file: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { os.Remove(configFile.Name()) })
+
+	if _, err := configFile.Write(configData); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to write config file: %v", err)
+	}
+	configFile.Close()
+
+	log.Printf("pebble dir: %s", pebbleDir)
+	log.Printf("config file: %s", configFile.Name())
+
+	// Spawn the Pebble CA server. It answers ACME requests and performs
+	// outbound validations. We configure it to use a mock DNS server that
+	// always answers 127.0.0.1 for all A queries so that validation
+	// requests for any domain name will resolve to our local challenge
+	// server instances.
+	spawnServerProcess(t, binDir, "pebble", "-config", configFile.Name(),
+		"-dnsserver", fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", config.dnsPort),
+		"-strict")
+
+	// Spawn the Pebble challenge test server. We'll use it to mock DNS
+	// responses but disable all the other interfaces. We want to stand
+	// up our own challenge response servers for TLS-ALPN-01,
+	// etc.
+	// Note: we specify -defaultIPv6 "" so that no AAAA records are served.
+	// The LUCI CI runners have issues with IPv6 connectivity on localhost.
+	spawnServerProcess(t, binDir, "pebble-challtestsrv",
+		"-dns01", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", config.dnsPort),
+		"-defaultIPv6", "",
+		"-management", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", takeNextPort()),
+		"-doh", "",
+		"-http01", "",
+		"-tlsalpn01", "",
+		"-https01", "")
+
+	waitForServer(t, config.pebbleConfig.ListenAddress)
+	waitForServer(t, fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", config.dnsPort))
+
+	log.Printf("pebble environment ready")
+
+	// Construct a cert pool that contains the CA certificate used by the ACME
+	// interface's certificate chain. This is separate from the issuing
+	// hierarchy and is used for the ACME client to interact with the ACME
+	// interface without cert verification error.
+	caCertPath := filepath.Join(pebbleDir, "test/certs/pebble.minica.pem")
+	caCert, err := os.ReadFile(caCertPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to read CA certificate %s: %v", caCertPath, err)
+	}
+	caCertPool := x509.NewCertPool()
+	if !caCertPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCert) {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to parse CA certificate %s", caCertPath)
+	}
+	httpClient := &http.Client{
+		Transport: &http.Transport{
+			TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{
+				RootCAs: caCertPool,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	// Create an ACME account keypair/client and verify it can discover
+	// the Pebble server's ACME directory without error.
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to generate account key: %v", err)
+	}
+	client := &acme.Client{
+		Key:          key,
+		HTTPClient:   httpClient,
+		DirectoryURL: fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/dir", config.ListenAddress),
+	}
+	_, err = client.Discover(context.TODO())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to discover ACME directory: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return environment{
+		config: config,
+		client: client,
+	}
+}
+
+func waitForServer(t *testing.T, addr string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
+		if conn, err := net.Dial("tcp", addr); err == nil {
+			conn.Close()
+			return
+		}
+		time.Sleep(time.Duration(i*100) * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("failed to connect to %q after 20 tries", addr)
+}
+
+// fetchModule fetches the module at the given version and returns the directory
+// containing its source tree. It skips the test if fetching modules is not
+// possible in this environment.
+//
+// Copied from the stdlib cryptotest.FetchModule and adapted to not rely on the
+// stdlib internal testenv package.
+func fetchModule(t *testing.T, module, version string) string {
+	// If the default GOMODCACHE doesn't exist, use a temporary directory
+	// instead. (For example, run.bash sets GOPATH=/nonexist-gopath.)
+	out, err := exec.Command("go", "env", "GOMODCACHE").Output()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("go env GOMODCACHE: %v\n%s", err, out)
+		if ee, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok {
+			t.Logf("%s", ee.Stderr)
+		}
+		t.FailNow()
+	}
+	modcacheOk := false
+	if gomodcache := string(bytes.TrimSpace(out)); gomodcache != "" {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(gomodcache); err == nil {
+			modcacheOk = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !modcacheOk {
+		t.Setenv("GOMODCACHE", t.TempDir())
+		// Allow t.TempDir() to clean up subdirectories.
+		t.Setenv("GOFLAGS", os.Getenv("GOFLAGS")+" -modcacherw")
+	}
+
+	t.Logf("fetching %s@%s\n", module, version)
+
+	output, err := exec.Command("go", "mod", "download", "-json", module+"@"+version).CombinedOutput()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to download %s@%s: %s\n%s\n", module, version, err, output)
+	}
+	var j struct {
+		Dir string
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(output, &j); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to parse 'go mod download': %s\n%s\n", err, output)
+	}
+
+	return j.Dir
+}
+
+func prepareBinaries(t *testing.T, pebbleDir string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	// We don't want to build in the module cache dir, which might not be
+	// writable or to pollute the user's clone with binaries if pebbleLocalDir
+	// is used.
+	binDir := t.TempDir()
+
+	build := func(cmd string) {
+		log.Printf("building %s", cmd)
+		buildCmd := exec.Command(
+			"go",
+			"build", "-o", filepath.Join(binDir, cmd), "-mod", "mod", "./cmd/"+cmd)
+		buildCmd.Dir = pebbleDir
+		output, err := buildCmd.CombinedOutput()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("failed to build %s: %s\n%s\n", cmd, err, output)
+		}
+	}
+
+	build("pebble")
+	build("pebble-challtestsrv")
+
+	return binDir
+}
+
+func spawnServerProcess(t *testing.T, dir string, cmd string, args ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+
+	cmdInstance := exec.Command("./"+cmd, args...)
+	cmdInstance.Dir = dir
+	cmdInstance.Stdout = &stdout
+	cmdInstance.Stderr = &stderr
+
+	if err := cmdInstance.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to start %s: %v", cmd, err)
+	}
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		cmdInstance.Process.Kill()
+		cmdInstance.Wait()
+
+		if t.Failed() || testing.Verbose() {
+			t.Logf("=== %s output ===", cmd)
+			if stdout.Len() > 0 {
+				t.Logf("stdout:\n%s", strings.TrimSpace(stdout.String()))
+			}
+			if stderr.Len() > 0 {
+				t.Logf("stderr:\n%s", strings.TrimSpace(stderr.String()))
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}

acme/rfc8555.go

@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ func (c *Client) AuthorizeOrder(ctx context.Context, id []AuthzID, opt ...OrderO
 	return responseOrder(res)
 }
 
-// GetOrder retrives an order identified by the given URL.
+// GetOrder retrieves an order identified by the given URL.
 // For orders created with AuthorizeOrder, the url value is Order.URI.
 //
 // If a caller needs to poll an order until its status is final,
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ func (c *Client) WaitOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) {
 		case err != nil:
 			// Skip and retry.
 		case o.Status == StatusInvalid:
-			return nil, &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status}
+			return nil, &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status, Problem: o.Error}
 		case o.Status == StatusReady || o.Status == StatusValid:
 			return o, nil
 		}
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ func (c *Client) CreateOrderCert(ctx context.Context, url string, csr []byte, bu
 	}
 	// The only acceptable status post finalize and WaitOrder is "valid".
 	if o.Status != StatusValid {
-		return nil, "", &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status}
+		return nil, "", &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status, Problem: o.Error}
 	}
 	crt, err := c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, o.CertURL, bundle)
 	return crt, o.CertURL, err

acme/rfc8555_test.go

@@ -885,11 +885,17 @@ func TestRFC_WaitOrderError(t *testing.T) {
 	s.handle("/orders/1", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		w.Header().Set("Location", s.url("/orders/1"))
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-		s := StatusPending
 		if count > 0 {
-			s = StatusInvalid
+			// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8555#section-7.3.3
+			errorData := `{
+				"type": "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:userActionRequired",
+				"detail": "Terms of service have changed",
+				"instance": "https://example.com/acme/agreement/?token=W8Ih3PswD-8"
+			}`
+			fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status": %q, "error": %s}`, StatusInvalid, errorData)
+		} else {
+			fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status": %q}`, StatusPending)
 		}
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status": %q}`, s)
 		count++
 	})
 	s.start()
@@ -910,6 +916,13 @@ func TestRFC_WaitOrderError(t *testing.T) {
 	if e.Status != StatusInvalid {
 		t.Errorf("e.Status = %q; want %q", e.Status, StatusInvalid)
 	}
+	if e.Problem == nil {
+		t.Errorf("e.Problem = nil")
+	}
+	expectedProbType := "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:userActionRequired"
+	if e.Problem.ProblemType != expectedProbType {
+		t.Errorf("e.Problem.ProblemType = %q; want %q", e.Problem.ProblemType, expectedProbType)
+	}
 }
 
 func TestRFC_CreateOrderCert(t *testing.T) {

acme/types.go

@@ -154,13 +154,16 @@ func (a *AuthorizationError) Error() string {
 
 // OrderError is returned from Client's order related methods.
 // It indicates the order is unusable and the clients should start over with
-// AuthorizeOrder.
+// AuthorizeOrder. A Problem description may be provided with details on
+// what caused the order to become unusable.
 //
 // The clients can still fetch the order object from CA using GetOrder
 // to inspect its state.
 type OrderError struct {
 	OrderURL string
 	Status   string
+	// Problem is the error that occurred while processing the order.
+	Problem *Error
 }
 
 func (oe *OrderError) Error() string {
@@ -619,7 +622,7 @@ func (*certOptKey) privateCertOpt() {}
 //
 // In TLS ChallengeCert methods, the template is also used as parent,
 // resulting in a self-signed certificate.
-// The DNSNames field of t is always overwritten for tls-sni challenge certs.
+// The DNSNames or IPAddresses fields of t are always overwritten for tls-alpn challenge certs.
 func WithTemplate(t *x509.Certificate) CertOption {
 	return (*certOptTemplate)(t)
 }

argon2/argon2.go

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 // Argon2 was selected as the winner of the Password Hashing Competition and can
 // be used to derive cryptographic keys from passwords.
 //
-// For a detailed specification of Argon2 see [1].
+// For a detailed specification of Argon2 see [argon2-specs.pdf].
 //
 // If you aren't sure which function you need, use Argon2id (IDKey) and
 // the parameter recommendations for your scenario.
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 // It uses data-independent memory access, which is preferred for password
 // hashing and password-based key derivation. Argon2i requires more passes over
 // memory than Argon2id to protect from trade-off attacks. The recommended
-// parameters (taken from [2]) for non-interactive operations are time=3 and to
+// parameters (taken from [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]) for non-interactive operations are time=3 and to
 // use the maximum available memory.
 //
 // # Argon2id
@@ -27,11 +27,11 @@
 // half of the first iteration over the memory and data-dependent memory access
 // for the rest. Argon2id is side-channel resistant and provides better brute-
 // force cost savings due to time-memory tradeoffs than Argon2i. The recommended
-// parameters for non-interactive operations (taken from [2]) are time=1 and to
+// parameters for non-interactive operations (taken from [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]) are time=1 and to
 // use the maximum available memory.
 //
-// [1] https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2/blob/master/argon2-specs.pdf
-// [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-03#section-9.3
+// [argon2-specs.pdf]: https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2/blob/master/argon2-specs.pdf
+// [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9106.html#section-7.3
 package argon2
 
 import (
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ const (
 //
 //	key := argon2.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 3, 32*1024, 4, 32)
 //
-// The draft RFC recommends[2] time=3, and memory=32*1024 is a sensible number.
+// [RFC 9106 Section 7.3] recommends time=3, and memory=32*1024 as a sensible number.
 // If using that amount of memory (32 MB) is not possible in some contexts then
 // the time parameter can be increased to compensate.
 //
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ const (
 // adjusted to the number of available CPUs. The cost parameters should be
 // increased as memory latency and CPU parallelism increases. Remember to get a
 // good random salt.
+//
+// [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9106.html#section-7.3
 func Key(password, salt []byte, time, memory uint32, threads uint8, keyLen uint32) []byte {
 	return deriveKey(argon2i, password, salt, nil, nil, time, memory, threads, keyLen)
 }
@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ func Key(password, salt []byte, time, memory uint32, threads uint8, keyLen uint3
 //
 //	key := argon2.IDKey([]byte("some password"), salt, 1, 64*1024, 4, 32)
 //
-// The draft RFC recommends[2] time=1, and memory=64*1024 is a sensible number.
+// [RFC 9106 Section 7.3] recommends time=1, and memory=64*1024 as a sensible number.
 // If using that amount of memory (64 MB) is not possible in some contexts then
 // the time parameter can be increased to compensate.
 //
@@ -93,6 +95,8 @@ func Key(password, salt []byte, time, memory uint32, threads uint8, keyLen uint3
 // adjusted to the numbers of available CPUs. The cost parameters should be
 // increased as memory latency and CPU parallelism increases. Remember to get a
 // good random salt.
+//
+// [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9106.html#section-7.3
 func IDKey(password, salt []byte, time, memory uint32, threads uint8, keyLen uint32) []byte {
 	return deriveKey(argon2id, password, salt, nil, nil, time, memory, threads, keyLen)
 }

bcrypt/bcrypt.go

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func (ih InvalidHashPrefixError) Error() string {
 type InvalidCostError int
 
 func (ic InvalidCostError) Error() string {
-	return fmt.Sprintf("crypto/bcrypt: cost %d is outside allowed range (%d,%d)", int(ic), MinCost, MaxCost)
+	return fmt.Sprintf("crypto/bcrypt: cost %d is outside allowed inclusive range %d..%d", int(ic), MinCost, MaxCost)
 }
 
 const (

blake2b/blake2x.go

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ import (
 
 // XOF defines the interface to hash functions that
 // support arbitrary-length output.
+//
+// New callers should prefer the standard library [hash.XOF].
 type XOF interface {
 	// Write absorbs more data into the hash's state. It panics if called
 	// after Read.
@@ -47,6 +49,8 @@ const maxOutputLength = (1 << 32) * 64
 //
 // A non-nil key turns the hash into a MAC. The key must between
 // zero and 32 bytes long.
+//
+// The result can be safely interface-upgraded to [hash.XOF].
 func NewXOF(size uint32, key []byte) (XOF, error) {
 	if len(key) > Size {
 		return nil, errKeySize
@@ -93,6 +97,10 @@ func (x *xof) Clone() XOF {
 	return &clone
 }
 
+func (x *xof) BlockSize() int {
+	return x.d.BlockSize()
+}
+
 func (x *xof) Reset() {
 	x.cfg[0] = byte(Size)
 	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(x.cfg[4:], uint32(Size)) // leaf length

blake2b/go125.go

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build go1.25
+
+package blake2b
+
+import "hash"
+
+var _ hash.XOF = (*xof)(nil)

chacha20/chacha_arm64.s

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ loop:
 	MOVD	$NUM_ROUNDS, R21
 	VLD1	(R11), [V30.S4, V31.S4]
 
-	// load contants
+	// load constants
 	// VLD4R (R10), [V0.S4, V1.S4, V2.S4, V3.S4]
 	WORD	$0x4D60E940
 

chacha20poly1305/_asm/chacha20poly1305_amd64_asm.go

@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ func hashADDone() {
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-// Implements the following function fignature:
+// Implements the following function signature:
 //
 //	func chacha20Poly1305Open(dst []byte, key []uint32, src []byte, ad []byte) bool
 func chacha20Poly1305Open() {
@@ -2967,7 +2967,7 @@ func openAVX2Tail512HashEnd() {
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-// Implements the following function fignature:
+// Implements the following function signature:
 //
 //	func chacha20Poly1305Seal(dst []byte, key []uint32, src, ad []byte)
 func chacha20Poly1305Seal() {

chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305.go

@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ type chacha20poly1305 struct {
 
 // New returns a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD that uses the given 256-bit key.
 func New(key []byte) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
+	if fips140Enforced() {
+		return nil, errors.New("chacha20poly1305: use of ChaCha20Poly1305 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
+	}
 	if len(key) != KeySize {
 		return nil, errors.New("chacha20poly1305: bad key length")
 	}

chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.go

@@ -56,7 +56,10 @@ func (c *chacha20poly1305) seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []
 
 	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+16)
 	if alias.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) {
-		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap")
+		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap of output and input")
+	}
+	if alias.AnyOverlap(out, additionalData) {
+		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap of output and additional data")
 	}
 	chacha20Poly1305Seal(out[:], state[:], plaintext, additionalData)
 	return ret
@@ -73,7 +76,10 @@ func (c *chacha20poly1305) open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) (
 	ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-16]
 	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
 	if alias.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
-		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap")
+		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap of output and input")
+	}
+	if alias.AnyOverlap(out, additionalData) {
+		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap of output and additional data")
 	}
 	if !chacha20Poly1305Open(out, state[:], ciphertext, additionalData) {
 		for i := range out {

chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_generic.go

@@ -31,7 +31,10 @@ func (c *chacha20poly1305) sealGeneric(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []b
 	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+poly1305.TagSize)
 	ciphertext, tag := out[:len(plaintext)], out[len(plaintext):]
 	if alias.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) {
-		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap")
+		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap of output and input")
+	}
+	if alias.AnyOverlap(out, additionalData) {
+		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap of output and additional data")
 	}
 
 	var polyKey [32]byte
@@ -67,7 +70,10 @@ func (c *chacha20poly1305) openGeneric(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []
 
 	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
 	if alias.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
-		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap")
+		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap of output and input")
+	}
+	if alias.AnyOverlap(out, additionalData) {
+		panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap of output and additional data")
 	}
 	if !p.Verify(tag) {
 		for i := range out {

chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_test.go

@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ func TestRandom(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Run("X", func(t *testing.T) { f(t, NonceSizeX) })
 }
 
-func benchamarkChaCha20Poly1305Seal(b *testing.B, buf []byte, nonceSize int) {
+func benchmarkChaCha20Poly1305Seal(b *testing.B, buf []byte, nonceSize int) {
 	b.ReportAllocs()
 	b.SetBytes(int64(len(buf)))
 
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ func benchamarkChaCha20Poly1305Seal(b *testing.B, buf []byte, nonceSize int) {
 	}
 }
 
-func benchamarkChaCha20Poly1305Open(b *testing.B, buf []byte, nonceSize int) {
+func benchmarkChaCha20Poly1305Open(b *testing.B, buf []byte, nonceSize int) {
 	b.ReportAllocs()
 	b.SetBytes(int64(len(buf)))
 
@@ -204,17 +204,17 @@ func benchamarkChaCha20Poly1305Open(b *testing.B, buf []byte, nonceSize int) {
 func BenchmarkChacha20Poly1305(b *testing.B) {
 	for _, length := range []int{64, 1350, 8 * 1024} {
 		b.Run("Open-"+strconv.Itoa(length), func(b *testing.B) {
-			benchamarkChaCha20Poly1305Open(b, make([]byte, length), NonceSize)
+			benchmarkChaCha20Poly1305Open(b, make([]byte, length), NonceSize)
 		})
 		b.Run("Seal-"+strconv.Itoa(length), func(b *testing.B) {
-			benchamarkChaCha20Poly1305Seal(b, make([]byte, length), NonceSize)
+			benchmarkChaCha20Poly1305Seal(b, make([]byte, length), NonceSize)
 		})
 
 		b.Run("Open-"+strconv.Itoa(length)+"-X", func(b *testing.B) {
-			benchamarkChaCha20Poly1305Open(b, make([]byte, length), NonceSizeX)
+			benchmarkChaCha20Poly1305Open(b, make([]byte, length), NonceSizeX)
 		})
 		b.Run("Seal-"+strconv.Itoa(length)+"-X", func(b *testing.B) {
-			benchamarkChaCha20Poly1305Seal(b, make([]byte, length), NonceSizeX)
+			benchmarkChaCha20Poly1305Seal(b, make([]byte, length), NonceSizeX)
 		})
 	}
 }

chacha20poly1305/fips140only_compat.go

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build !go1.26
+
+package chacha20poly1305
+
+func fips140Enforced() bool { return false }

chacha20poly1305/fips140only_go1.26.go

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build go1.26
+
+package chacha20poly1305
+
+import "crypto/fips140"
+
+func fips140Enforced() bool { return fips140.Enforced() }

chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go

@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ type xchacha20poly1305 struct {
 // preferred when nonce uniqueness cannot be trivially ensured, or whenever
 // nonces are randomly generated.
 func NewX(key []byte) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
+	if fips140Enforced() {
+		return nil, errors.New("chacha20poly1305: use of ChaCha20Poly1305 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
+	}
 	if len(key) != KeySize {
 		return nil, errors.New("chacha20poly1305: bad key length")
 	}

curve25519/curve25519.go

@@ -3,11 +3,14 @@
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
 // Package curve25519 provides an implementation of the X25519 function, which
-// performs scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve known as Curve25519.
-// See RFC 7748.
+// performs scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve known as Curve25519
+// according to [RFC 7748].
 //
-// This package is a wrapper for the X25519 implementation
-// in the crypto/ecdh package.
+// The curve25519 package is a wrapper for the X25519 implementation in the
+// crypto/ecdh package. It is [frozen] and is not accepting new features.
+//
+// [RFC 7748]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7748
+// [frozen]: https://go.dev/wiki/Frozen
 package curve25519
 
 import "crypto/ecdh"
@@ -36,7 +39,7 @@ func ScalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) {
 	curve := ecdh.X25519()
 	priv, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(scalar[:])
 	if err != nil {
-		panic("curve25519: internal error: scalarBaseMult was not 32 bytes")
+		panic("curve25519: " + err.Error())
 	}
 	copy(dst[:], priv.PublicKey().Bytes())
 }

ed25519/ed25519.go

@@ -2,16 +2,19 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
-// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm. See
-// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/.
+// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm.
 //
 // These functions are also compatible with the “Ed25519” function defined in
-// RFC 8032. However, unlike RFC 8032's formulation, this package's private key
+// [RFC 8032]. However, unlike RFC 8032's formulation, this package's private key
 // representation includes a public key suffix to make multiple signing
 // operations with the same key more efficient. This package refers to the RFC
 // 8032 private key as the “seed”.
 //
-// This package is a wrapper around the standard library crypto/ed25519 package.
+// The ed25519 package is a wrapper for the Ed25519 implementation in the
+// crypto/ed25519 package. It is [frozen] and is not accepting new features.
+//
+// [RFC 8032]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032
+// [frozen]: https://go.dev/wiki/Frozen
 package ed25519
 
 import (

go.mod

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 module golang.org/x/crypto
 
-go 1.23.0
+go 1.24.0
 
 require (
-	golang.org/x/net v0.21.0 // tagx:ignore
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0
-	golang.org/x/term v0.32.0
+	golang.org/x/net v0.48.0 // tagx:ignore
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0
+	golang.org/x/term v0.39.0
 )
 
-require golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 // indirect
+require golang.org/x/text v0.33.0 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-golang.org/x/net v0.21.0 h1:AQyQV4dYCvJ7vGmJyKki9+PBdyvhkSd8EIx/qb0AYv4=
-golang.org/x/net v0.21.0/go.mod h1:bIjVDfnllIU7BJ2DNgfnXvpSvtn8VRwhlsaeUTyUS44=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0 h1:q3i8TbbEz+JRD9ywIRlyRAQbM0qF7hu24q3teo2hbuw=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0/go.mod h1:BJP2sWEmIv4KK5OTEluFJCKSidICx8ciO85XgH3Ak8k=
-golang.org/x/term v0.32.0 h1:DR4lr0TjUs3epypdhTOkMmuF5CDFJ/8pOnbzMZPQ7bg=
-golang.org/x/term v0.32.0/go.mod h1:uZG1FhGx848Sqfsq4/DlJr3xGGsYMu/L5GW4abiaEPQ=
-golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 h1:qVyWApTSYLk/drJRO5mDlNYskwQznZmkpV2c8q9zls4=
-golang.org/x/text v0.25.0/go.mod h1:WEdwpYrmk1qmdHvhkSTNPm3app7v4rsT8F2UD6+VHIA=
+golang.org/x/net v0.48.0 h1:zyQRTTrjc33Lhh0fBgT/H3oZq9WuvRR5gPC70xpDiQU=
+golang.org/x/net v0.48.0/go.mod h1:+ndRgGjkh8FGtu1w1FGbEC31if4VrNVMuKTgcAAnQRY=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0 h1:DBZZqJ2Rkml6QMQsZywtnjnnGvHza6BTfYFWY9kjEWQ=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks=
+golang.org/x/term v0.39.0 h1:RclSuaJf32jOqZz74CkPA9qFuVTX7vhLlpfj/IGWlqY=
+golang.org/x/term v0.39.0/go.mod h1:yxzUCTP/U+FzoxfdKmLaA0RV1WgE0VY7hXBwKtY/4ww=
+golang.org/x/text v0.33.0 h1:B3njUFyqtHDUI5jMn1YIr5B0IE2U0qck04r6d4KPAxE=
+golang.org/x/text v0.33.0/go.mod h1:LuMebE6+rBincTi9+xWTY8TztLzKHc/9C1uBCG27+q8=

internal/wycheproof/rsa_pss_test.go

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ func TestRsaPss(t *testing.T) {
 			}
 			// Run all the tests twice: the first time with the salt length
 			// as PSSSaltLengthAuto, and the second time with the salt length
-			// explictily set to tg.SLen.
+			// explicitly set to tg.SLen.
 			for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
 				for _, sig := range tg.Tests {
 					h.Reset()

nacl/auth/auth.go

@@ -2,25 +2,16 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
-/*
-Package auth authenticates a message using a secret key.
-
-The Sum function, viewed as a function of the message for a uniform random
-key, is designed to meet the standard notion of unforgeability. This means
-that an attacker cannot find authenticators for any messages not authenticated
-by the sender, even if the attacker has adaptively influenced the messages
-authenticated by the sender. For a formal definition see, e.g., Section 2.4
-of Bellare, Kilian, and Rogaway, "The security of the cipher block chaining
-message authentication code," Journal of Computer and System Sciences 61 (2000),
-362–399; http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/cbc.html.
-
-auth does not make any promises regarding "strong" unforgeability; perhaps
-one valid authenticator can be converted into another valid authenticator for
-the same message. NaCl also does not make any promises regarding "truncated
-unforgeability."
-
-This package is interoperable with NaCl: https://nacl.cr.yp.to/auth.html.
-*/
+// Package auth authenticates a message using a secret key.
+//
+// This package is interoperable with [NaCl].
+//
+// The auth package is essentially a wrapper for HMAC-SHA-512 (implemented by
+// crypto/hmac and crypto/sha512), truncated to 32 bytes. It is [frozen] and is
+// not accepting new features.
+//
+// [NaCl]: https://nacl.cr.yp.to/auth.html
+// [frozen]: https://go.dev/wiki/Frozen
 package auth
 
 import (

nacl/box/box_test.go

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ func TestSealOpenAnonymous(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("expected out to be unchanged")
 	}
 	if !bytes.HasPrefix(box, orig) {
-		t.Fatal("expected out to be coppied to returned slice")
+		t.Fatal("expected out to be copied to returned slice")
 	}
 	_, ok = OpenAnonymous(nil, box[len(out):], publicKey, privateKey)
 	if !ok {

nacl/sign/sign.go

@@ -4,20 +4,15 @@
 
 // Package sign signs small messages using public-key cryptography.
 //
-// Sign uses Ed25519 to sign messages. The length of messages is not hidden.
-// Messages should be small because:
-// 1. The whole message needs to be held in memory to be processed.
-// 2. Using large messages pressures implementations on small machines to process
-// plaintext without verifying the signature. This is very dangerous, and this API
-// discourages it, but a protocol that uses excessive message sizes might present
-// some implementations with no other choice.
-// 3. Performance may be improved by working with messages that fit into data caches.
-// Thus large amounts of data should be chunked so that each message is small.
+// This package is interoperable with [libsodium], as well as [TweetNaCl].
 //
-// This package is not interoperable with the current release of NaCl
-// (https://nacl.cr.yp.to/sign.html), which does not support Ed25519 yet. However,
-// it is compatible with the NaCl fork libsodium (https://www.libsodium.org), as well
-// as TweetNaCl (https://tweetnacl.cr.yp.to/).
+// The sign package is essentially a wrapper for the Ed25519 signature
+// algorithm (implemented by crypto/ed25519). It is [frozen] and is not accepting
+// new features.
+//
+// [libsodium]: https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/public-key_cryptography/public-key_signatures
+// [TweetNaCl]: https://tweetnacl.cr.yp.to/
+// [frozen]: https://go.dev/wiki/Frozen
 package sign
 
 import (

nacl/sign/sign_test.go

@@ -69,6 +69,6 @@ func TestGenerateSignOpen(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	if !bytes.Equal(message, testMessage) {
-		t.Fatalf("verified message does not match signed messge, got\n%x\n, expected\n%x", message, testMessage)
+		t.Fatalf("verified message does not match signed message, got\n%x\n, expected\n%x", message, testMessage)
 	}
 }

openpgp/packet/opaque_test.go

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestOpaqueParseReason(t *testing.T) {
 	const expectedBad = 3
 	// Test post-conditions, make sure we actually parsed packets as expected.
 	if badPackets != expectedBad {
-		t.Errorf("unexpected # unparseable packets: %d (want %d)", badPackets, expectedBad)
+		t.Errorf("unexpected # unparsable packets: %d (want %d)", badPackets, expectedBad)
 	}
 	if uid == nil {
 		t.Errorf("failed to find expected UID in unsupported keyring")

openpgp/s2k/s2k.go

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ func (c *Config) hash() crypto.Hash {
 
 func (c *Config) encodedCount() uint8 {
 	if c == nil || c.S2KCount == 0 {
-		return 96 // The common case. Correspoding to 65536
+		return 96 // The common case. Corresponding to 65536
 	}
 
 	i := c.S2KCount

otr/otr.go

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@
 // The version of OTR implemented by this package has been deprecated
 // (https://bugs.otr.im/lib/libotr/issues/140). An implementation of OTRv3 is
 // available at https://github.com/coyim/otr3.
+//
+// The otr package is [frozen] and is not accepting new features.
+//
+// [frozen]: https://go.dev/wiki/Frozen
 package otr
 
 import (

otr/otr_test.go

@@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ const libOTRPrivateKey = `(privkeys
  (account
 (name "foo@example.com")
 (protocol prpl-jabber)
-(private-key 
- (dsa 
+(private-key
+ (dsa
   (p #00FC07ABCF0DC916AFF6E9AE47BEF60C7AB9B4D6B2469E436630E36F8A489BE812486A09F30B71224508654940A835301ACC525A4FF133FC152CC53DCC59D65C30A54F1993FE13FE63E5823D4C746DB21B90F9B9C00B49EC7404AB1D929BA7FBA12F2E45C6E0A651689750E8528AB8C031D3561FECEE72EBB4A090D450A9B7A857#)
   (q #00997BD266EF7B1F60A5C23F3A741F2AEFD07A2081#)
   (g #535E360E8A95EBA46A4F7DE50AD6E9B2A6DB785A66B64EB9F20338D2A3E8FB0E94725848F1AA6CC567CB83A1CC517EC806F2E92EAE71457E80B2210A189B91250779434B41FC8A8873F6DB94BEA7D177F5D59E7E114EE10A49CFD9CEF88AE43387023B672927BA74B04EB6BBB5E57597766A2F9CE3857D7ACE3E1E3BC1FC6F26#)
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ func TestAgainstLibOTR(t *testing.T) {
 	// This test requires otr.c.test to be built as /tmp/a.out.
 	// If enabled, this tests runs forever performing OTR handshakes in a
 	// loop.
-	return
+	t.Skip("This test requires otr.c.test to be built as /tmp/a.out")
 
 	alicePrivateKey, _ := hex.DecodeString(alicePrivateKeyHex)
 	var alice Conversation

pkcs12/pkcs12.go

@@ -4,12 +4,16 @@
 
 // Package pkcs12 implements some of PKCS#12.
 //
-// This implementation is distilled from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292
-// and referenced documents. It is intended for decoding P12/PFX-stored
-// certificates and keys for use with the crypto/tls package.
+// This implementation is distilled from [RFC 7292] and referenced documents.
+// It is intended for decoding P12/PFX-stored certificates and keys for use
+// with the crypto/tls package.
 //
-// This package is frozen. If it's missing functionality you need, consider
-// an alternative like software.sslmate.com/src/go-pkcs12.
+// The pkcs12 package is [frozen] and is not accepting new features.
+// If it's missing functionality you need, consider an alternative like
+// software.sslmate.com/src/go-pkcs12.
+//
+// [RFC 7292]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7292
+// [frozen]: https://go.dev/wiki/Frozen
 package pkcs12
 
 import (

salsa20/salsa/hsalsa20.go

@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
 // Package salsa provides low-level access to functions in the Salsa family.
+//
+// Deprecated: this package exposes unsafe low-level operations. New applications
+// should consider using the AEAD construction in golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305
+// instead. Existing users should migrate to golang.org/x/crypto/salsa20.
 package salsa
 
 import "math/bits"

sha3/_asm/go.mod

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-module sha3/_asm
-
-go 1.22
-
-require (
-	github.com/mmcloughlin/avo v0.6.0
-	golang.org/x/crypto v0.33.0
-)
-
-require (
-	golang.org/x/mod v0.19.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/sync v0.7.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.30.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/tools v0.23.0 // indirect
-)

sha3/_asm/go.sum

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-github.com/mmcloughlin/avo v0.6.0 h1:QH6FU8SKoTLaVs80GA8TJuLNkUYl4VokHKlPhVDg4YY=
-github.com/mmcloughlin/avo v0.6.0/go.mod h1:8CoAGaCSYXtCPR+8y18Y9aB/kxb8JSS6FRI7mSkvD+8=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.33.0 h1:IOBPskki6Lysi0lo9qQvbxiQ+FvsCC/YWOecCHAixus=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.33.0/go.mod h1:bVdXmD7IV/4GdElGPozy6U7lWdRXA4qyRVGJV57uQ5M=
-golang.org/x/mod v0.19.0 h1:fEdghXQSo20giMthA7cd28ZC+jts4amQ3YMXiP5oMQ8=
-golang.org/x/mod v0.19.0/go.mod h1:hTbmBsO62+eylJbnUtE2MGJUyE7QWk4xUqPFrRgJ+7c=
-golang.org/x/sync v0.7.0 h1:YsImfSBoP9QPYL0xyKJPq0gcaJdG3rInoqxTWbfQu9M=
-golang.org/x/sync v0.7.0/go.mod h1:Czt+wKu1gCyEFDUtn0jG5QVvpJ6rzVqr5aXyt9drQfk=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.30.0 h1:QjkSwP/36a20jFYWkSue1YwXzLmsV5Gfq7Eiy72C1uc=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.30.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
-golang.org/x/tools v0.23.0 h1:SGsXPZ+2l4JsgaCKkx+FQ9YZ5XEtA1GZYuoDjenLjvg=
-golang.org/x/tools v0.23.0/go.mod h1:pnu6ufv6vQkll6szChhK3C3L/ruaIv5eBeztNG8wtsI=

sha3/_asm/keccakf_amd64_asm.go

@@ -1,438 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
-// domain sources at https://github.com/gvanas/KeccakCodePackage
-
-package main
-
-import (
-	. "github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/build"
-	. "github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/operand"
-	. "github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/reg"
-	_ "golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
-)
-
-//go:generate go run . -out ../keccakf_amd64.s -pkg sha3
-
-// Round Constants for use in the ι step.
-var RoundConstants = [24]uint64{
-	0x0000000000000001,
-	0x0000000000008082,
-	0x800000000000808A,
-	0x8000000080008000,
-	0x000000000000808B,
-	0x0000000080000001,
-	0x8000000080008081,
-	0x8000000000008009,
-	0x000000000000008A,
-	0x0000000000000088,
-	0x0000000080008009,
-	0x000000008000000A,
-	0x000000008000808B,
-	0x800000000000008B,
-	0x8000000000008089,
-	0x8000000000008003,
-	0x8000000000008002,
-	0x8000000000000080,
-	0x000000000000800A,
-	0x800000008000000A,
-	0x8000000080008081,
-	0x8000000000008080,
-	0x0000000080000001,
-	0x8000000080008008,
-}
-
-var (
-	// Temporary registers
-	rT1 GPPhysical = RAX
-
-	// Round vars
-	rpState = Mem{Base: RDI}
-	rpStack = Mem{Base: RSP}
-
-	rDa = RBX
-	rDe = RCX
-	rDi = RDX
-	rDo = R8
-	rDu = R9
-
-	rBa = R10
-	rBe = R11
-	rBi = R12
-	rBo = R13
-	rBu = R14
-
-	rCa = RSI
-	rCe = RBP
-	rCi = rBi
-	rCo = rBo
-	rCu = R15
-)
-
-const (
-	_ba = iota * 8
-	_be
-	_bi
-	_bo
-	_bu
-	_ga
-	_ge
-	_gi
-	_go
-	_gu
-	_ka
-	_ke
-	_ki
-	_ko
-	_ku
-	_ma
-	_me
-	_mi
-	_mo
-	_mu
-	_sa
-	_se
-	_si
-	_so
-	_su
-)
-
-func main() {
-	Package("golang.org/x/crypto/sha3")
-	ConstraintExpr("amd64,!purego,gc")
-	keccakF1600()
-	Generate()
-}
-
-func MOVQ_RBI_RCE() { MOVQ(rBi, rCe) }
-func XORQ_RT1_RCA() { XORQ(rT1, rCa) }
-func XORQ_RT1_RCE() { XORQ(rT1, rCe) }
-func XORQ_RBA_RCU() { XORQ(rBa, rCu) }
-func XORQ_RBE_RCU() { XORQ(rBe, rCu) }
-func XORQ_RDU_RCU() { XORQ(rDu, rCu) }
-func XORQ_RDA_RCA() { XORQ(rDa, rCa) }
-func XORQ_RDE_RCE() { XORQ(rDe, rCe) }
-
-type ArgMacro func()
-
-func mKeccakRound(
-	iState, oState Mem,
-	rc U64,
-	B_RBI_RCE, G_RT1_RCA, G_RT1_RCE, G_RBA_RCU,
-	K_RT1_RCA, K_RT1_RCE, K_RBA_RCU, M_RT1_RCA,
-	M_RT1_RCE, M_RBE_RCU, S_RDU_RCU, S_RDA_RCA,
-	S_RDE_RCE ArgMacro,
-) {
-	Comment("Prepare round")
-	MOVQ(rCe, rDa)
-	ROLQ(Imm(1), rDa)
-
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_bi), rCi)
-	XORQ(iState.Offset(_gi), rDi)
-	XORQ(rCu, rDa)
-	XORQ(iState.Offset(_ki), rCi)
-	XORQ(iState.Offset(_mi), rDi)
-	XORQ(rDi, rCi)
-
-	MOVQ(rCi, rDe)
-	ROLQ(Imm(1), rDe)
-
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_bo), rCo)
-	XORQ(iState.Offset(_go), rDo)
-	XORQ(rCa, rDe)
-	XORQ(iState.Offset(_ko), rCo)
-	XORQ(iState.Offset(_mo), rDo)
-	XORQ(rDo, rCo)
-
-	MOVQ(rCo, rDi)
-	ROLQ(Imm(1), rDi)
-
-	MOVQ(rCu, rDo)
-	XORQ(rCe, rDi)
-	ROLQ(Imm(1), rDo)
-
-	MOVQ(rCa, rDu)
-	XORQ(rCi, rDo)
-	ROLQ(Imm(1), rDu)
-
-	Comment("Result b")
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_ba), rBa)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_ge), rBe)
-	XORQ(rCo, rDu)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_ki), rBi)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_mo), rBo)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_su), rBu)
-	XORQ(rDe, rBe)
-	ROLQ(Imm(44), rBe)
-	XORQ(rDi, rBi)
-	XORQ(rDa, rBa)
-	ROLQ(Imm(43), rBi)
-
-	MOVQ(rBe, rCa)
-	MOVQ(rc, rT1)
-	ORQ(rBi, rCa)
-	XORQ(rBa, rT1)
-	XORQ(rT1, rCa)
-	MOVQ(rCa, oState.Offset(_ba))
-
-	XORQ(rDu, rBu)
-	ROLQ(Imm(14), rBu)
-	MOVQ(rBa, rCu)
-	ANDQ(rBe, rCu)
-	XORQ(rBu, rCu)
-	MOVQ(rCu, oState.Offset(_bu))
-
-	XORQ(rDo, rBo)
-	ROLQ(Imm(21), rBo)
-	MOVQ(rBo, rT1)
-	ANDQ(rBu, rT1)
-	XORQ(rBi, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_bi))
-
-	NOTQ(rBi)
-	ORQ(rBa, rBu)
-	ORQ(rBo, rBi)
-	XORQ(rBo, rBu)
-	XORQ(rBe, rBi)
-	MOVQ(rBu, oState.Offset(_bo))
-	MOVQ(rBi, oState.Offset(_be))
-	B_RBI_RCE()
-
-	Comment("Result g")
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_gu), rBe)
-	XORQ(rDu, rBe)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_ka), rBi)
-	ROLQ(Imm(20), rBe)
-	XORQ(rDa, rBi)
-	ROLQ(Imm(3), rBi)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_bo), rBa)
-	MOVQ(rBe, rT1)
-	ORQ(rBi, rT1)
-	XORQ(rDo, rBa)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_me), rBo)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_si), rBu)
-	ROLQ(Imm(28), rBa)
-	XORQ(rBa, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_ga))
-	G_RT1_RCA()
-
-	XORQ(rDe, rBo)
-	ROLQ(Imm(45), rBo)
-	MOVQ(rBi, rT1)
-	ANDQ(rBo, rT1)
-	XORQ(rBe, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_ge))
-	G_RT1_RCE()
-
-	XORQ(rDi, rBu)
-	ROLQ(Imm(61), rBu)
-	MOVQ(rBu, rT1)
-	ORQ(rBa, rT1)
-	XORQ(rBo, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_go))
-
-	ANDQ(rBe, rBa)
-	XORQ(rBu, rBa)
-	MOVQ(rBa, oState.Offset(_gu))
-	NOTQ(rBu)
-	G_RBA_RCU()
-
-	ORQ(rBu, rBo)
-	XORQ(rBi, rBo)
-	MOVQ(rBo, oState.Offset(_gi))
-
-	Comment("Result k")
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_be), rBa)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_gi), rBe)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_ko), rBi)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_mu), rBo)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_sa), rBu)
-	XORQ(rDi, rBe)
-	ROLQ(Imm(6), rBe)
-	XORQ(rDo, rBi)
-	ROLQ(Imm(25), rBi)
-	MOVQ(rBe, rT1)
-	ORQ(rBi, rT1)
-	XORQ(rDe, rBa)
-	ROLQ(Imm(1), rBa)
-	XORQ(rBa, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_ka))
-	K_RT1_RCA()
-
-	XORQ(rDu, rBo)
-	ROLQ(Imm(8), rBo)
-	MOVQ(rBi, rT1)
-	ANDQ(rBo, rT1)
-	XORQ(rBe, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_ke))
-	K_RT1_RCE()
-
-	XORQ(rDa, rBu)
-	ROLQ(Imm(18), rBu)
-	NOTQ(rBo)
-	MOVQ(rBo, rT1)
-	ANDQ(rBu, rT1)
-	XORQ(rBi, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_ki))
-
-	MOVQ(rBu, rT1)
-	ORQ(rBa, rT1)
-	XORQ(rBo, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_ko))
-
-	ANDQ(rBe, rBa)
-	XORQ(rBu, rBa)
-	MOVQ(rBa, oState.Offset(_ku))
-	K_RBA_RCU()
-
-	Comment("Result m")
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_ga), rBe)
-	XORQ(rDa, rBe)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_ke), rBi)
-	ROLQ(Imm(36), rBe)
-	XORQ(rDe, rBi)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_bu), rBa)
-	ROLQ(Imm(10), rBi)
-	MOVQ(rBe, rT1)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_mi), rBo)
-	ANDQ(rBi, rT1)
-	XORQ(rDu, rBa)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_so), rBu)
-	ROLQ(Imm(27), rBa)
-	XORQ(rBa, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_ma))
-	M_RT1_RCA()
-
-	XORQ(rDi, rBo)
-	ROLQ(Imm(15), rBo)
-	MOVQ(rBi, rT1)
-	ORQ(rBo, rT1)
-	XORQ(rBe, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_me))
-	M_RT1_RCE()
-
-	XORQ(rDo, rBu)
-	ROLQ(Imm(56), rBu)
-	NOTQ(rBo)
-	MOVQ(rBo, rT1)
-	ORQ(rBu, rT1)
-	XORQ(rBi, rT1)
-	MOVQ(rT1, oState.Offset(_mi))
-
-	ORQ(rBa, rBe)
-	XORQ(rBu, rBe)
-	MOVQ(rBe, oState.Offset(_mu))
-
-	ANDQ(rBa, rBu)
-	XORQ(rBo, rBu)
-	MOVQ(rBu, oState.Offset(_mo))
-	M_RBE_RCU()
-
-	Comment("Result s")
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_bi), rBa)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_go), rBe)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_ku), rBi)
-	XORQ(rDi, rBa)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_ma), rBo)
-	ROLQ(Imm(62), rBa)
-	XORQ(rDo, rBe)
-	MOVQ(iState.Offset(_se), rBu)
-	ROLQ(Imm(55), rBe)
-
-	XORQ(rDu, rBi)
-	MOVQ(rBa, rDu)
-	XORQ(rDe, rBu)
-	ROLQ(Imm(2), rBu)
-	ANDQ(rBe, rDu)
-	XORQ(rBu, rDu)
-	MOVQ(rDu, oState.Offset(_su))
-
-	ROLQ(Imm(39), rBi)
-	S_RDU_RCU()
-	NOTQ(rBe)
-	XORQ(rDa, rBo)
-	MOVQ(rBe, rDa)
-	ANDQ(rBi, rDa)
-	XORQ(rBa, rDa)
-	MOVQ(rDa, oState.Offset(_sa))
-	S_RDA_RCA()
-
-	ROLQ(Imm(41), rBo)
-	MOVQ(rBi, rDe)
-	ORQ(rBo, rDe)
-	XORQ(rBe, rDe)
-	MOVQ(rDe, oState.Offset(_se))
-	S_RDE_RCE()
-
-	MOVQ(rBo, rDi)
-	MOVQ(rBu, rDo)
-	ANDQ(rBu, rDi)
-	ORQ(rBa, rDo)
-	XORQ(rBi, rDi)
-	XORQ(rBo, rDo)
-	MOVQ(rDi, oState.Offset(_si))
-	MOVQ(rDo, oState.Offset(_so))
-}
-
-// keccakF1600 applies the Keccak permutation to a 1600b-wide
-// state represented as a slice of 25 uint64s.
-func keccakF1600() {
-	Implement("keccakF1600")
-	AllocLocal(200)
-
-	Load(Param("a"), rpState.Base)
-
-	Comment("Convert the user state into an internal state")
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_be))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_bi))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_go))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_ki))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_mi))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_sa))
-
-	Comment("Execute the KeccakF permutation")
-	MOVQ(rpState.Offset(_ba), rCa)
-	MOVQ(rpState.Offset(_be), rCe)
-	MOVQ(rpState.Offset(_bu), rCu)
-
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_ga), rCa)
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_ge), rCe)
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_gu), rCu)
-
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_ka), rCa)
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_ke), rCe)
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_ku), rCu)
-
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_ma), rCa)
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_me), rCe)
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_mu), rCu)
-
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_sa), rCa)
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_se), rCe)
-	MOVQ(rpState.Offset(_si), rDi)
-	MOVQ(rpState.Offset(_so), rDo)
-	XORQ(rpState.Offset(_su), rCu)
-
-	for i, rc := range RoundConstants[:len(RoundConstants)-1] {
-		var iState, oState Mem
-		if i%2 == 0 {
-			iState, oState = rpState, rpStack
-		} else {
-			iState, oState = rpStack, rpState
-		}
-		mKeccakRound(iState, oState, U64(rc), MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE)
-	}
-	mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, U64(RoundConstants[len(RoundConstants)-1]), NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP)
-
-	Comment("Revert the internal state to the user state")
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_be))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_bi))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_go))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_ki))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_mi))
-	NOTQ(rpState.Offset(_sa))
-
-	RET()
-}

sha3/allocations_test.go

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-//go:build !noopt
-
-package sha3_test
-
-import (
-	"runtime"
-	"testing"
-
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
-)
-
-var sink byte
-
-func TestAllocations(t *testing.T) {
-	want := 0.0
-
-	if runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" {
-		// On s390x the returned hash.Hash is conditional so it escapes.
-		want = 3.0
-	}
-
-	t.Run("New", func(t *testing.T) {
-		if allocs := testing.AllocsPerRun(10, func() {
-			h := sha3.New256()
-			b := []byte("ABC")
-			h.Write(b)
-			out := make([]byte, 0, 32)
-			out = h.Sum(out)
-			sink ^= out[0]
-		}); allocs > want {
-			t.Errorf("expected zero allocations, got %0.1f", allocs)
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("NewShake", func(t *testing.T) {
-		if allocs := testing.AllocsPerRun(10, func() {
-			h := sha3.NewShake128()
-			b := []byte("ABC")
-			h.Write(b)
-			out := make([]byte, 0, 32)
-			out = h.Sum(out)
-			sink ^= out[0]
-			h.Read(out)
-			sink ^= out[0]
-		}); allocs > want {
-			t.Errorf("expected zero allocations, got %0.1f", allocs)
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("Sum", func(t *testing.T) {
-		if allocs := testing.AllocsPerRun(10, func() {
-			b := []byte("ABC")
-			out := sha3.Sum256(b)
-			sink ^= out[0]
-		}); allocs > want {
-			t.Errorf("expected zero allocations, got %0.1f", allocs)
-		}
-	})
-}

sha3/doc.go

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-// Package sha3 implements the SHA-3 fixed-output-length hash functions and
-// the SHAKE variable-output-length hash functions defined by FIPS-202.
-//
-// All types in this package also implement [encoding.BinaryMarshaler],
-// [encoding.BinaryAppender] and [encoding.BinaryUnmarshaler] to marshal and
-// unmarshal the internal state of the hash.
-//
-// Both types of hash function use the "sponge" construction and the Keccak
-// permutation. For a detailed specification see http://keccak.noekeon.org/
-//
-// # Guidance
-//
-// If you aren't sure what function you need, use SHAKE256 with at least 64
-// bytes of output. The SHAKE instances are faster than the SHA3 instances;
-// the latter have to allocate memory to conform to the hash.Hash interface.
-//
-// If you need a secret-key MAC (message authentication code), prepend the
-// secret key to the input, hash with SHAKE256 and read at least 32 bytes of
-// output.
-//
-// # Security strengths
-//
-// The SHA3-x (x equals 224, 256, 384, or 512) functions have a security
-// strength against preimage attacks of x bits. Since they only produce "x"
-// bits of output, their collision-resistance is only "x/2" bits.
-//
-// The SHAKE-256 and -128 functions have a generic security strength of 256 and
-// 128 bits against all attacks, provided that at least 2x bits of their output
-// is used.  Requesting more than 64 or 32 bytes of output, respectively, does
-// not increase the collision-resistance of the SHAKE functions.
-//
-// # The sponge construction
-//
-// A sponge builds a pseudo-random function from a public pseudo-random
-// permutation, by applying the permutation to a state of "rate + capacity"
-// bytes, but hiding "capacity" of the bytes.
-//
-// A sponge starts out with a zero state. To hash an input using a sponge, up
-// to "rate" bytes of the input are XORed into the sponge's state. The sponge
-// is then "full" and the permutation is applied to "empty" it. This process is
-// repeated until all the input has been "absorbed". The input is then padded.
-// The digest is "squeezed" from the sponge in the same way, except that output
-// is copied out instead of input being XORed in.
-//
-// A sponge is parameterized by its generic security strength, which is equal
-// to half its capacity; capacity + rate is equal to the permutation's width.
-// Since the KeccakF-1600 permutation is 1600 bits (200 bytes) wide, this means
-// that the security strength of a sponge instance is equal to (1600 - bitrate) / 2.
-//
-// # Recommendations
-//
-// The SHAKE functions are recommended for most new uses. They can produce
-// output of arbitrary length. SHAKE256, with an output length of at least
-// 64 bytes, provides 256-bit security against all attacks.  The Keccak team
-// recommends it for most applications upgrading from SHA2-512. (NIST chose a
-// much stronger, but much slower, sponge instance for SHA3-512.)
-//
-// The SHA-3 functions are "drop-in" replacements for the SHA-2 functions.
-// They produce output of the same length, with the same security strengths
-// against all attacks. This means, in particular, that SHA3-256 only has
-// 128-bit collision resistance, because its output length is 32 bytes.
-package sha3

sha3/hashes.go

@@ -2,127 +2,94 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
+// Package sha3 implements the SHA-3 hash algorithms and the SHAKE extendable
+// output functions defined in FIPS 202.
+//
+// Most of this package is a wrapper around the crypto/sha3 package in the
+// standard library. The only exception is the legacy Keccak hash functions.
 package sha3
 
-// This file provides functions for creating instances of the SHA-3
-// and SHAKE hash functions, as well as utility functions for hashing
-// bytes.
-
 import (
-	"crypto"
+	"crypto/sha3"
 	"hash"
 )
 
 // New224 creates a new SHA3-224 hash.
 // Its generic security strength is 224 bits against preimage attacks,
 // and 112 bits against collision attacks.
+//
+// It is a wrapper for the [sha3.New224] function in the standard library.
+//
+//go:fix inline
 func New224() hash.Hash {
-	return new224()
+	return sha3.New224()
 }
 
 // New256 creates a new SHA3-256 hash.
 // Its generic security strength is 256 bits against preimage attacks,
 // and 128 bits against collision attacks.
+//
+// It is a wrapper for the [sha3.New256] function in the standard library.
+//
+//go:fix inline
 func New256() hash.Hash {
-	return new256()
+	return sha3.New256()
 }
 
 // New384 creates a new SHA3-384 hash.
 // Its generic security strength is 384 bits against preimage attacks,
 // and 192 bits against collision attacks.
+//
+// It is a wrapper for the [sha3.New384] function in the standard library.
+//
+//go:fix inline
 func New384() hash.Hash {
-	return new384()
+	return sha3.New384()
 }
 
 // New512 creates a new SHA3-512 hash.
 // Its generic security strength is 512 bits against preimage attacks,
 // and 256 bits against collision attacks.
+//
+// It is a wrapper for the [sha3.New512] function in the standard library.
+//
+//go:fix inline
 func New512() hash.Hash {
-	return new512()
-}
-
-func init() {
-	crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.SHA3_224, New224)
-	crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.SHA3_256, New256)
-	crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.SHA3_384, New384)
-	crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.SHA3_512, New512)
-}
-
-const (
-	dsbyteSHA3   = 0b00000110
-	dsbyteKeccak = 0b00000001
-	dsbyteShake  = 0b00011111
-	dsbyteCShake = 0b00000100
-
-	// rateK[c] is the rate in bytes for Keccak[c] where c is the capacity in
-	// bits. Given the sponge size is 1600 bits, the rate is 1600 - c bits.
-	rateK256  = (1600 - 256) / 8
-	rateK448  = (1600 - 448) / 8
-	rateK512  = (1600 - 512) / 8
-	rateK768  = (1600 - 768) / 8
-	rateK1024 = (1600 - 1024) / 8
-)
-
-func new224Generic() *state {
-	return &state{rate: rateK448, outputLen: 28, dsbyte: dsbyteSHA3}
-}
-
-func new256Generic() *state {
-	return &state{rate: rateK512, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: dsbyteSHA3}
-}
-
-func new384Generic() *state {
-	return &state{rate: rateK768, outputLen: 48, dsbyte: dsbyteSHA3}
-}
-
-func new512Generic() *state {
-	return &state{rate: rateK1024, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: dsbyteSHA3}
-}
-
-// NewLegacyKeccak256 creates a new Keccak-256 hash.
-//
-// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing cryptosystem
-// that uses non-standard padding. All other users should use New256 instead.
-func NewLegacyKeccak256() hash.Hash {
-	return &state{rate: rateK512, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: dsbyteKeccak}
-}
-
-// NewLegacyKeccak512 creates a new Keccak-512 hash.
-//
-// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing cryptosystem
-// that uses non-standard padding. All other users should use New512 instead.
-func NewLegacyKeccak512() hash.Hash {
-	return &state{rate: rateK1024, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: dsbyteKeccak}
+	return sha3.New512()
 }
 
 // Sum224 returns the SHA3-224 digest of the data.
-func Sum224(data []byte) (digest [28]byte) {
-	h := New224()
-	h.Write(data)
-	h.Sum(digest[:0])
-	return
+//
+// It is a wrapper for the [sha3.Sum224] function in the standard library.
+//
+//go:fix inline
+func Sum224(data []byte) [28]byte {
+	return sha3.Sum224(data)
 }
 
 // Sum256 returns the SHA3-256 digest of the data.
-func Sum256(data []byte) (digest [32]byte) {
-	h := New256()
-	h.Write(data)
-	h.Sum(digest[:0])
-	return
+//
+// It is a wrapper for the [sha3.Sum256] function in the standard library.
+//
+//go:fix inline
+func Sum256(data []byte) [32]byte {
+	return sha3.Sum256(data)
 }
 
 // Sum384 returns the SHA3-384 digest of the data.
-func Sum384(data []byte) (digest [48]byte) {
-	h := New384()
-	h.Write(data)
-	h.Sum(digest[:0])
-	return
+//
+// It is a wrapper for the [sha3.Sum384] function in the standard library.
+//
+//go:fix inline
+func Sum384(data []byte) [48]byte {
+	return sha3.Sum384(data)
 }
 
 // Sum512 returns the SHA3-512 digest of the data.
-func Sum512(data []byte) (digest [64]byte) {
-	h := New512()
-	h.Write(data)
-	h.Sum(digest[:0])
-	return
+//
+// It is a wrapper for the [sha3.Sum512] function in the standard library.
+//
+//go:fix inline
+func Sum512(data []byte) [64]byte {
+	return sha3.Sum512(data)
 }

sha3/hashes_noasm.go

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-//go:build !gc || purego || !s390x
-
-package sha3
-
-func new224() *state {
-	return new224Generic()
-}
-
-func new256() *state {
-	return new256Generic()
-}
-
-func new384() *state {
-	return new384Generic()
-}
-
-func new512() *state {
-	return new512Generic()
-}

sha3/keccakf_amd64.go

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-//go:build amd64 && !purego && gc
-
-package sha3
-
-// This function is implemented in keccakf_amd64.s.
-
-//go:noescape
-
-func keccakF1600(a *[25]uint64)

sha3/legacy_hash.go

@@ -4,15 +4,46 @@
 
 package sha3
 
+// This implementation is only used for NewLegacyKeccak256 and
+// NewLegacyKeccak512, which are not implemented by crypto/sha3.
+// All other functions in this package are wrappers around crypto/sha3.
+
 import (
 	"crypto/subtle"
 	"encoding/binary"
 	"errors"
+	"hash"
 	"unsafe"
 
 	"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
 )
 
+const (
+	dsbyteKeccak = 0b00000001
+
+	// rateK[c] is the rate in bytes for Keccak[c] where c is the capacity in
+	// bits. Given the sponge size is 1600 bits, the rate is 1600 - c bits.
+	rateK256  = (1600 - 256) / 8
+	rateK512  = (1600 - 512) / 8
+	rateK1024 = (1600 - 1024) / 8
+)
+
+// NewLegacyKeccak256 creates a new Keccak-256 hash.
+//
+// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing cryptosystem
+// that uses non-standard padding. All other users should use New256 instead.
+func NewLegacyKeccak256() hash.Hash {
+	return &state{rate: rateK512, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: dsbyteKeccak}
+}
+
+// NewLegacyKeccak512 creates a new Keccak-512 hash.
+//
+// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing cryptosystem
+// that uses non-standard padding. All other users should use New512 instead.
+func NewLegacyKeccak512() hash.Hash {
+	return &state{rate: rateK1024, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: dsbyteKeccak}
+}
+
 // spongeDirection indicates the direction bytes are flowing through the sponge.
 type spongeDirection int
 
@@ -173,12 +204,9 @@ func (d *state) Sum(in []byte) []byte {
 }
 
 const (
-	magicSHA3   = "sha\x08"
-	magicShake  = "sha\x09"
-	magicCShake = "sha\x0a"
 	magicKeccak = "sha\x0b"
 	// magic || rate || main state || n || sponge direction
-	marshaledSize = len(magicSHA3) + 1 + 200 + 1 + 1
+	marshaledSize = len(magicKeccak) + 1 + 200 + 1 + 1
 )
 
 func (d *state) MarshalBinary() ([]byte, error) {
@@ -187,12 +215,6 @@ func (d *state) MarshalBinary() ([]byte, error) {
 
 func (d *state) AppendBinary(b []byte) ([]byte, error) {
 	switch d.dsbyte {
-	case dsbyteSHA3:
-		b = append(b, magicSHA3...)
-	case dsbyteShake:
-		b = append(b, magicShake...)
-	case dsbyteCShake:
-		b = append(b, magicCShake...)
 	case dsbyteKeccak:
 		b = append(b, magicKeccak...)
 	default:
@@ -210,12 +232,9 @@ func (d *state) UnmarshalBinary(b []byte) error {
 		return errors.New("sha3: invalid hash state")
 	}
 
-	magic := string(b[:len(magicSHA3)])
-	b = b[len(magicSHA3):]
+	magic := string(b[:len(magicKeccak)])
+	b = b[len(magicKeccak):]
 	switch {
-	case magic == magicSHA3 && d.dsbyte == dsbyteSHA3:
-	case magic == magicShake && d.dsbyte == dsbyteShake:
-	case magic == magicCShake && d.dsbyte == dsbyteCShake:
 	case magic == magicKeccak && d.dsbyte == dsbyteKeccak:
 	default:
 		return errors.New("sha3: invalid hash state identifier")

sha3/legacy_keccakf.go

@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
-//go:build !amd64 || purego || !gc
-
 package sha3
 
+// This implementation is only used for NewLegacyKeccak256 and
+// NewLegacyKeccak512, which are not implemented by crypto/sha3.
+// All other functions in this package are wrappers around crypto/sha3.
+
 import "math/bits"
 
 // rc stores the round constants for use in the ι step.

sha3/sha3_s390x.go

@@ -1,303 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-//go:build gc && !purego
-
-package sha3
-
-// This file contains code for using the 'compute intermediate
-// message digest' (KIMD) and 'compute last message digest' (KLMD)
-// instructions to compute SHA-3 and SHAKE hashes on IBM Z.
-
-import (
-	"hash"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
-)
-
-// codes represent 7-bit KIMD/KLMD function codes as defined in
-// the Principles of Operation.
-type code uint64
-
-const (
-	// function codes for KIMD/KLMD
-	sha3_224  code = 32
-	sha3_256       = 33
-	sha3_384       = 34
-	sha3_512       = 35
-	shake_128      = 36
-	shake_256      = 37
-	nopad          = 0x100
-)
-
-// kimd is a wrapper for the 'compute intermediate message digest' instruction.
-// src must be a multiple of the rate for the given function code.
-//
-//go:noescape
-func kimd(function code, chain *[200]byte, src []byte)
-
-// klmd is a wrapper for the 'compute last message digest' instruction.
-// src padding is handled by the instruction.
-//
-//go:noescape
-func klmd(function code, chain *[200]byte, dst, src []byte)
-
-type asmState struct {
-	a         [200]byte       // 1600 bit state
-	buf       []byte          // care must be taken to ensure cap(buf) is a multiple of rate
-	rate      int             // equivalent to block size
-	storage   [3072]byte      // underlying storage for buf
-	outputLen int             // output length for full security
-	function  code            // KIMD/KLMD function code
-	state     spongeDirection // whether the sponge is absorbing or squeezing
-}
-
-func newAsmState(function code) *asmState {
-	var s asmState
-	s.function = function
-	switch function {
-	case sha3_224:
-		s.rate = 144
-		s.outputLen = 28
-	case sha3_256:
-		s.rate = 136
-		s.outputLen = 32
-	case sha3_384:
-		s.rate = 104
-		s.outputLen = 48
-	case sha3_512:
-		s.rate = 72
-		s.outputLen = 64
-	case shake_128:
-		s.rate = 168
-		s.outputLen = 32
-	case shake_256:
-		s.rate = 136
-		s.outputLen = 64
-	default:
-		panic("sha3: unrecognized function code")
-	}
-
-	// limit s.buf size to a multiple of s.rate
-	s.resetBuf()
-	return &s
-}
-
-func (s *asmState) clone() *asmState {
-	c := *s
-	c.buf = c.storage[:len(s.buf):cap(s.buf)]
-	return &c
-}
-
-// copyIntoBuf copies b into buf. It will panic if there is not enough space to
-// store all of b.
-func (s *asmState) copyIntoBuf(b []byte) {
-	bufLen := len(s.buf)
-	s.buf = s.buf[:len(s.buf)+len(b)]
-	copy(s.buf[bufLen:], b)
-}
-
-// resetBuf points buf at storage, sets the length to 0 and sets cap to be a
-// multiple of the rate.
-func (s *asmState) resetBuf() {
-	max := (cap(s.storage) / s.rate) * s.rate
-	s.buf = s.storage[:0:max]
-}
-
-// Write (via the embedded io.Writer interface) adds more data to the running hash.
-// It never returns an error.
-func (s *asmState) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
-	if s.state != spongeAbsorbing {
-		panic("sha3: Write after Read")
-	}
-	length := len(b)
-	for len(b) > 0 {
-		if len(s.buf) == 0 && len(b) >= cap(s.buf) {
-			// Hash the data directly and push any remaining bytes
-			// into the buffer.
-			remainder := len(b) % s.rate
-			kimd(s.function, &s.a, b[:len(b)-remainder])
-			if remainder != 0 {
-				s.copyIntoBuf(b[len(b)-remainder:])
-			}
-			return length, nil
-		}
-
-		if len(s.buf) == cap(s.buf) {
-			// flush the buffer
-			kimd(s.function, &s.a, s.buf)
-			s.buf = s.buf[:0]
-		}
-
-		// copy as much as we can into the buffer
-		n := len(b)
-		if len(b) > cap(s.buf)-len(s.buf) {
-			n = cap(s.buf) - len(s.buf)
-		}
-		s.copyIntoBuf(b[:n])
-		b = b[n:]
-	}
-	return length, nil
-}
-
-// Read squeezes an arbitrary number of bytes from the sponge.
-func (s *asmState) Read(out []byte) (n int, err error) {
-	// The 'compute last message digest' instruction only stores the digest
-	// at the first operand (dst) for SHAKE functions.
-	if s.function != shake_128 && s.function != shake_256 {
-		panic("sha3: can only call Read for SHAKE functions")
-	}
-
-	n = len(out)
-
-	// need to pad if we were absorbing
-	if s.state == spongeAbsorbing {
-		s.state = spongeSqueezing
-
-		// write hash directly into out if possible
-		if len(out)%s.rate == 0 {
-			klmd(s.function, &s.a, out, s.buf) // len(out) may be 0
-			s.buf = s.buf[:0]
-			return
-		}
-
-		// write hash into buffer
-		max := cap(s.buf)
-		if max > len(out) {
-			max = (len(out)/s.rate)*s.rate + s.rate
-		}
-		klmd(s.function, &s.a, s.buf[:max], s.buf)
-		s.buf = s.buf[:max]
-	}
-
-	for len(out) > 0 {
-		// flush the buffer
-		if len(s.buf) != 0 {
-			c := copy(out, s.buf)
-			out = out[c:]
-			s.buf = s.buf[c:]
-			continue
-		}
-
-		// write hash directly into out if possible
-		if len(out)%s.rate == 0 {
-			klmd(s.function|nopad, &s.a, out, nil)
-			return
-		}
-
-		// write hash into buffer
-		s.resetBuf()
-		if cap(s.buf) > len(out) {
-			s.buf = s.buf[:(len(out)/s.rate)*s.rate+s.rate]
-		}
-		klmd(s.function|nopad, &s.a, s.buf, nil)
-	}
-	return
-}
-
-// Sum appends the current hash to b and returns the resulting slice.
-// It does not change the underlying hash state.
-func (s *asmState) Sum(b []byte) []byte {
-	if s.state != spongeAbsorbing {
-		panic("sha3: Sum after Read")
-	}
-
-	// Copy the state to preserve the original.
-	a := s.a
-
-	// Hash the buffer. Note that we don't clear it because we
-	// aren't updating the state.
-	switch s.function {
-	case sha3_224, sha3_256, sha3_384, sha3_512:
-		klmd(s.function, &a, nil, s.buf)
-		return append(b, a[:s.outputLen]...)
-	case shake_128, shake_256:
-		d := make([]byte, s.outputLen, 64)
-		klmd(s.function, &a, d, s.buf)
-		return append(b, d[:s.outputLen]...)
-	default:
-		panic("sha3: unknown function")
-	}
-}
-
-// Reset resets the Hash to its initial state.
-func (s *asmState) Reset() {
-	for i := range s.a {
-		s.a[i] = 0
-	}
-	s.resetBuf()
-	s.state = spongeAbsorbing
-}
-
-// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return.
-func (s *asmState) Size() int {
-	return s.outputLen
-}
-
-// BlockSize returns the hash's underlying block size.
-// The Write method must be able to accept any amount
-// of data, but it may operate more efficiently if all writes
-// are a multiple of the block size.
-func (s *asmState) BlockSize() int {
-	return s.rate
-}
-
-// Clone returns a copy of the ShakeHash in its current state.
-func (s *asmState) Clone() ShakeHash {
-	return s.clone()
-}
-
-// new224 returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-224 if available,
-// otherwise it returns a generic implementation.
-func new224() hash.Hash {
-	if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 {
-		return newAsmState(sha3_224)
-	}
-	return new224Generic()
-}
-
-// new256 returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-256 if available,
-// otherwise it returns a generic implementation.
-func new256() hash.Hash {
-	if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 {
-		return newAsmState(sha3_256)
-	}
-	return new256Generic()
-}
-
-// new384 returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-384 if available,
-// otherwise it returns a generic implementation.
-func new384() hash.Hash {
-	if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 {
-		return newAsmState(sha3_384)
-	}
-	return new384Generic()
-}
-
-// new512 returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-512 if available,
-// otherwise it returns a generic implementation.
-func new512() hash.Hash {
-	if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 {
-		return newAsmState(sha3_512)
-	}
-	return new512Generic()
-}
-
-// newShake128 returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-128 if available,
-// otherwise it returns a generic implementation.
-func newShake128() ShakeHash {
-	if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 {
-		return newAsmState(shake_128)
-	}
-	return newShake128Generic()
-}
-
-// newShake256 returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-256 if available,
-// otherwise it returns a generic implementation.
-func newShake256() ShakeHash {
-	if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 {
-		return newAsmState(shake_256)
-	}
-	return newShake256Generic()
-}

sha3/sha3_s390x.s

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-//go:build gc && !purego
-
-#include "textflag.h"
-
-// func kimd(function code, chain *[200]byte, src []byte)
-TEXT ·kimd(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0-40
-	MOVD function+0(FP), R0
-	MOVD chain+8(FP), R1
-	LMG  src+16(FP), R2, R3 // R2=base, R3=len
-
-continue:
-	WORD $0xB93E0002 // KIMD --, R2
-	BVS  continue    // continue if interrupted
-	MOVD $0, R0      // reset R0 for pre-go1.8 compilers
-	RET
-
-// func klmd(function code, chain *[200]byte, dst, src []byte)
-TEXT ·klmd(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0-64
-	// TODO: SHAKE support
-	MOVD function+0(FP), R0
-	MOVD chain+8(FP), R1
-	LMG  dst+16(FP), R2, R3 // R2=base, R3=len
-	LMG  src+40(FP), R4, R5 // R4=base, R5=len
-
-continue:
-	WORD $0xB93F0024 // KLMD R2, R4
-	BVS  continue    // continue if interrupted
-	MOVD $0, R0      // reset R0 for pre-go1.8 compilers
-	RET

sha3/sha3_test.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 	"encoding"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
 	"hash"
 	"io"
 	"math/rand"
@@ -523,124 +522,3 @@ func testMarshalUnmarshal(t *testing.T, h hash.Hash) {
 		t.Errorf("got %x, want %x", got, want)
 	}
 }
-
-// BenchmarkPermutationFunction measures the speed of the permutation function
-// with no input data.
-func BenchmarkPermutationFunction(b *testing.B) {
-	b.SetBytes(int64(200))
-	var lanes [25]uint64
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		keccakF1600(&lanes)
-	}
-}
-
-// benchmarkHash tests the speed to hash num buffers of buflen each.
-func benchmarkHash(b *testing.B, h hash.Hash, size, num int) {
-	b.StopTimer()
-	h.Reset()
-	data := sequentialBytes(size)
-	b.SetBytes(int64(size * num))
-	b.StartTimer()
-
-	var state []byte
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		for j := 0; j < num; j++ {
-			h.Write(data)
-		}
-		state = h.Sum(state[:0])
-	}
-	b.StopTimer()
-	h.Reset()
-}
-
-// benchmarkShake is specialized to the Shake instances, which don't
-// require a copy on reading output.
-func benchmarkShake(b *testing.B, h ShakeHash, size, num int) {
-	b.StopTimer()
-	h.Reset()
-	data := sequentialBytes(size)
-	d := make([]byte, 32)
-
-	b.SetBytes(int64(size * num))
-	b.StartTimer()
-
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		h.Reset()
-		for j := 0; j < num; j++ {
-			h.Write(data)
-		}
-		h.Read(d)
-	}
-}
-
-func BenchmarkSha3_512_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New512(), 1350, 1) }
-func BenchmarkSha3_384_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New384(), 1350, 1) }
-func BenchmarkSha3_256_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New256(), 1350, 1) }
-func BenchmarkSha3_224_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New224(), 1350, 1) }
-
-func BenchmarkShake128_MTU(b *testing.B)  { benchmarkShake(b, NewShake128(), 1350, 1) }
-func BenchmarkShake256_MTU(b *testing.B)  { benchmarkShake(b, NewShake256(), 1350, 1) }
-func BenchmarkShake256_16x(b *testing.B)  { benchmarkShake(b, NewShake256(), 16, 1024) }
-func BenchmarkShake256_1MiB(b *testing.B) { benchmarkShake(b, NewShake256(), 1024, 1024) }
-
-func BenchmarkSha3_512_1MiB(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New512(), 1024, 1024) }
-
-func Example_sum() {
-	buf := []byte("some data to hash")
-	// A hash needs to be 64 bytes long to have 256-bit collision resistance.
-	h := make([]byte, 64)
-	// Compute a 64-byte hash of buf and put it in h.
-	ShakeSum256(h, buf)
-	fmt.Printf("%x\n", h)
-	// Output: 0f65fe41fc353e52c55667bb9e2b27bfcc8476f2c413e9437d272ee3194a4e3146d05ec04a25d16b8f577c19b82d16b1424c3e022e783d2b4da98de3658d363d
-}
-
-func Example_mac() {
-	k := []byte("this is a secret key; you should generate a strong random key that's at least 32 bytes long")
-	buf := []byte("and this is some data to authenticate")
-	// A MAC with 32 bytes of output has 256-bit security strength -- if you use at least a 32-byte-long key.
-	h := make([]byte, 32)
-	d := NewShake256()
-	// Write the key into the hash.
-	d.Write(k)
-	// Now write the data.
-	d.Write(buf)
-	// Read 32 bytes of output from the hash into h.
-	d.Read(h)
-	fmt.Printf("%x\n", h)
-	// Output: 78de2974bd2711d5549ffd32b753ef0f5fa80a0db2556db60f0987eb8a9218ff
-}
-
-func ExampleNewCShake256() {
-	out := make([]byte, 32)
-	msg := []byte("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog")
-
-	// Example 1: Simple cshake
-	c1 := NewCShake256([]byte("NAME"), []byte("Partition1"))
-	c1.Write(msg)
-	c1.Read(out)
-	fmt.Println(hex.EncodeToString(out))
-
-	// Example 2: Different customization string produces different digest
-	c1 = NewCShake256([]byte("NAME"), []byte("Partition2"))
-	c1.Write(msg)
-	c1.Read(out)
-	fmt.Println(hex.EncodeToString(out))
-
-	// Example 3: Longer output length produces longer digest
-	out = make([]byte, 64)
-	c1 = NewCShake256([]byte("NAME"), []byte("Partition1"))
-	c1.Write(msg)
-	c1.Read(out)
-	fmt.Println(hex.EncodeToString(out))
-
-	// Example 4: Next read produces different result
-	c1.Read(out)
-	fmt.Println(hex.EncodeToString(out))
-
-	// Output:
-	//a90a4c6ca9af2156eba43dc8398279e6b60dcd56fb21837afe6c308fd4ceb05b
-	//a8db03e71f3e4da5c4eee9d28333cdd355f51cef3c567e59be5beb4ecdbb28f0
-	//a90a4c6ca9af2156eba43dc8398279e6b60dcd56fb21837afe6c308fd4ceb05b9dd98c6ee866ca7dc5a39d53e960f400bcd5a19c8a2d6ec6459f63696543a0d8
-	//85e73a72228d08b46515553ca3a29d47df3047e5d84b12d6c2c63e579f4fd1105716b7838e92e981863907f434bfd4443c9e56ea09da998d2f9b47db71988109
-}

sha3/shake.go

@@ -4,24 +4,10 @@
 
 package sha3
 
-// This file defines the ShakeHash interface, and provides
-// functions for creating SHAKE and cSHAKE instances, as well as utility
-// functions for hashing bytes to arbitrary-length output.
-//
-//
-// SHAKE implementation is based on FIPS PUB 202 [1]
-// cSHAKE implementations is based on NIST SP 800-185 [2]
-//
-// [1] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
-// [2] https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185
-
 import (
-	"bytes"
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"errors"
+	"crypto/sha3"
 	"hash"
 	"io"
-	"math/bits"
 )
 
 // ShakeHash defines the interface to hash functions that support
@@ -32,7 +18,7 @@ type ShakeHash interface {
 	hash.Hash
 
 	// Read reads more output from the hash; reading affects the hash's
-	// state. (ShakeHash.Read is thus very different from Hash.Sum)
+	// state. (ShakeHash.Read is thus very different from Hash.Sum.)
 	// It never returns an error, but subsequent calls to Write or Sum
 	// will panic.
 	io.Reader
@@ -41,115 +27,18 @@ type ShakeHash interface {
 	Clone() ShakeHash
 }
 
-// cSHAKE specific context
-type cshakeState struct {
-	*state // SHA-3 state context and Read/Write operations
-
-	// initBlock is the cSHAKE specific initialization set of bytes. It is initialized
-	// by newCShake function and stores concatenation of N followed by S, encoded
-	// by the method specified in 3.3 of [1].
-	// It is stored here in order for Reset() to be able to put context into
-	// initial state.
-	initBlock []byte
-}
-
-func bytepad(data []byte, rate int) []byte {
-	out := make([]byte, 0, 9+len(data)+rate-1)
-	out = append(out, leftEncode(uint64(rate))...)
-	out = append(out, data...)
-	if padlen := rate - len(out)%rate; padlen < rate {
-		out = append(out, make([]byte, padlen)...)
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func leftEncode(x uint64) []byte {
-	// Let n be the smallest positive integer for which 2^(8n) > x.
-	n := (bits.Len64(x) + 7) / 8
-	if n == 0 {
-		n = 1
-	}
-	// Return n || x with n as a byte and x an n bytes in big-endian order.
-	b := make([]byte, 9)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b[1:], x)
-	b = b[9-n-1:]
-	b[0] = byte(n)
-	return b
-}
-
-func newCShake(N, S []byte, rate, outputLen int, dsbyte byte) ShakeHash {
-	c := cshakeState{state: &state{rate: rate, outputLen: outputLen, dsbyte: dsbyte}}
-	c.initBlock = make([]byte, 0, 9+len(N)+9+len(S)) // leftEncode returns max 9 bytes
-	c.initBlock = append(c.initBlock, leftEncode(uint64(len(N))*8)...)
-	c.initBlock = append(c.initBlock, N...)
-	c.initBlock = append(c.initBlock, leftEncode(uint64(len(S))*8)...)
-	c.initBlock = append(c.initBlock, S...)
-	c.Write(bytepad(c.initBlock, c.rate))
-	return &c
-}
-
-// Reset resets the hash to initial state.
-func (c *cshakeState) Reset() {
-	c.state.Reset()
-	c.Write(bytepad(c.initBlock, c.rate))
-}
-
-// Clone returns copy of a cSHAKE context within its current state.
-func (c *cshakeState) Clone() ShakeHash {
-	b := make([]byte, len(c.initBlock))
-	copy(b, c.initBlock)
-	return &cshakeState{state: c.clone(), initBlock: b}
-}
-
-// Clone returns copy of SHAKE context within its current state.
-func (c *state) Clone() ShakeHash {
-	return c.clone()
-}
-
-func (c *cshakeState) MarshalBinary() ([]byte, error) {
-	return c.AppendBinary(make([]byte, 0, marshaledSize+len(c.initBlock)))
-}
-
-func (c *cshakeState) AppendBinary(b []byte) ([]byte, error) {
-	b, err := c.state.AppendBinary(b)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	b = append(b, c.initBlock...)
-	return b, nil
-}
-
-func (c *cshakeState) UnmarshalBinary(b []byte) error {
-	if len(b) <= marshaledSize {
-		return errors.New("sha3: invalid hash state")
-	}
-	if err := c.state.UnmarshalBinary(b[:marshaledSize]); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	c.initBlock = bytes.Clone(b[marshaledSize:])
-	return nil
-}
-
 // NewShake128 creates a new SHAKE128 variable-output-length ShakeHash.
 // Its generic security strength is 128 bits against all attacks if at
 // least 32 bytes of its output are used.
 func NewShake128() ShakeHash {
-	return newShake128()
+	return &shakeWrapper{sha3.NewSHAKE128(), 32, false, sha3.NewSHAKE128}
 }
 
 // NewShake256 creates a new SHAKE256 variable-output-length ShakeHash.
 // Its generic security strength is 256 bits against all attacks if
 // at least 64 bytes of its output are used.
 func NewShake256() ShakeHash {
-	return newShake256()
-}
-
-func newShake128Generic() *state {
-	return &state{rate: rateK256, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: dsbyteShake}
-}
-
-func newShake256Generic() *state {
-	return &state{rate: rateK512, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: dsbyteShake}
+	return &shakeWrapper{sha3.NewSHAKE256(), 64, false, sha3.NewSHAKE256}
 }
 
 // NewCShake128 creates a new instance of cSHAKE128 variable-output-length ShakeHash,
@@ -159,10 +48,9 @@ func newShake256Generic() *state {
 // computations on same input with different S yield unrelated outputs.
 // When N and S are both empty, this is equivalent to NewShake128.
 func NewCShake128(N, S []byte) ShakeHash {
-	if len(N) == 0 && len(S) == 0 {
-		return NewShake128()
-	}
-	return newCShake(N, S, rateK256, 32, dsbyteCShake)
+	return &shakeWrapper{sha3.NewCSHAKE128(N, S), 32, false, func() *sha3.SHAKE {
+		return sha3.NewCSHAKE128(N, S)
+	}}
 }
 
 // NewCShake256 creates a new instance of cSHAKE256 variable-output-length ShakeHash,
@@ -172,10 +60,9 @@ func NewCShake128(N, S []byte) ShakeHash {
 // computations on same input with different S yield unrelated outputs.
 // When N and S are both empty, this is equivalent to NewShake256.
 func NewCShake256(N, S []byte) ShakeHash {
-	if len(N) == 0 && len(S) == 0 {
-		return NewShake256()
-	}
-	return newCShake(N, S, rateK512, 64, dsbyteCShake)
+	return &shakeWrapper{sha3.NewCSHAKE256(N, S), 64, false, func() *sha3.SHAKE {
+		return sha3.NewCSHAKE256(N, S)
+	}}
 }
 
 // ShakeSum128 writes an arbitrary-length digest of data into hash.
@@ -191,3 +78,42 @@ func ShakeSum256(hash, data []byte) {
 	h.Write(data)
 	h.Read(hash)
 }
+
+// shakeWrapper adds the Size, Sum, and Clone methods to a sha3.SHAKE
+// to implement the ShakeHash interface.
+type shakeWrapper struct {
+	*sha3.SHAKE
+	outputLen int
+	squeezing bool
+	newSHAKE  func() *sha3.SHAKE
+}
+
+func (w *shakeWrapper) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	w.squeezing = true
+	return w.SHAKE.Read(p)
+}
+
+func (w *shakeWrapper) Clone() ShakeHash {
+	s := w.newSHAKE()
+	b, err := w.MarshalBinary()
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err) // unreachable
+	}
+	if err := s.UnmarshalBinary(b); err != nil {
+		panic(err) // unreachable
+	}
+	return &shakeWrapper{s, w.outputLen, w.squeezing, w.newSHAKE}
+}
+
+func (w *shakeWrapper) Size() int { return w.outputLen }
+
+func (w *shakeWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte {
+	if w.squeezing {
+		panic("sha3: Sum after Read")
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, w.outputLen)
+	// Clone the state so that we don't affect future Write calls.
+	s := w.Clone()
+	s.Read(out)
+	return append(b, out...)
+}

sha3/shake_noasm.go

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-//go:build !gc || purego || !s390x
-
-package sha3
-
-func newShake128() *state {
-	return newShake128Generic()
-}
-
-func newShake256() *state {
-	return newShake256Generic()
-}

ssh/agent/client.go

@@ -430,8 +430,9 @@ func (c *client) List() ([]*Key, error) {
 		return keys, nil
 	case *failureAgentMsg:
 		return nil, errors.New("agent: failed to list keys")
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: failed to list keys, unexpected message type %T", msg)
 	}
-	panic("unreachable")
 }
 
 // Sign has the agent sign the data using a protocol 2 key as defined
@@ -462,8 +463,9 @@ func (c *client) SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureFl
 		return &sig, nil
 	case *failureAgentMsg:
 		return nil, errors.New("agent: failed to sign challenge")
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: failed to sign challenge, unexpected message type %T", msg)
 	}
-	panic("unreachable")
 }
 
 // unmarshal parses an agent message in packet, returning the parsed
@@ -555,7 +557,7 @@ func (c *client) insertKey(s interface{}, comment string, constraints []byte) er
 		})
 	case *dsa.PrivateKey:
 		req = ssh.Marshal(dsaKeyMsg{
-			Type:        ssh.KeyAlgoDSA,
+			Type:        ssh.InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
 			P:           k.P,
 			Q:           k.Q,
 			G:           k.G,
@@ -803,16 +805,16 @@ var _ ssh.AlgorithmSigner = &agentKeyringSigner{}
 //
 // This map must be kept in sync with the one in certs.go.
 var certKeyAlgoNames = map[string]string{
-	ssh.CertAlgoRSAv01:        ssh.KeyAlgoRSA,
-	ssh.CertAlgoRSASHA256v01:  ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
-	ssh.CertAlgoRSASHA512v01:  ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
-	ssh.CertAlgoDSAv01:        ssh.KeyAlgoDSA,
-	ssh.CertAlgoECDSA256v01:   ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA256,
-	ssh.CertAlgoECDSA384v01:   ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA384,
-	ssh.CertAlgoECDSA521v01:   ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA521,
-	ssh.CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01: ssh.KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
-	ssh.CertAlgoED25519v01:    ssh.KeyAlgoED25519,
-	ssh.CertAlgoSKED25519v01:  ssh.KeyAlgoSKED25519,
+	ssh.CertAlgoRSAv01:         ssh.KeyAlgoRSA,
+	ssh.CertAlgoRSASHA256v01:   ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
+	ssh.CertAlgoRSASHA512v01:   ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
+	ssh.InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01: ssh.InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
+	ssh.CertAlgoECDSA256v01:    ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA256,
+	ssh.CertAlgoECDSA384v01:    ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA384,
+	ssh.CertAlgoECDSA521v01:    ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA521,
+	ssh.CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01:  ssh.KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
+	ssh.CertAlgoED25519v01:     ssh.KeyAlgoED25519,
+	ssh.CertAlgoSKED25519v01:   ssh.KeyAlgoSKED25519,
 }
 
 // underlyingAlgo returns the signature algorithm associated with algo (which is

ssh/agent/client_test.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ package agent
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/binary"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net"
@@ -39,7 +40,11 @@ func startOpenSSHAgent(t *testing.T) (client ExtendedAgent, socket string, clean
 	}
 
 	cmd := exec.Command(bin, "-s")
-	cmd.Env = []string{} // Do not let the user's environment influence ssh-agent behavior.
+	cmd.Env = []string{
+		// ssh-agent creates ~/.ssh and ~/.ssh/agent;
+		// ensure a writeable home directory.
+		"HOME=" + t.TempDir(),
+	} // Do not let the user's environment influence ssh-agent behavior.
 	cmd.Stderr = new(bytes.Buffer)
 	out, err := cmd.Output()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -347,6 +352,53 @@ func TestServerResponseTooLarge(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestInvalidResponses(t *testing.T) {
+	a, b, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	defer func() { <-done }()
+
+	defer a.Close()
+	defer b.Close()
+
+	agent := NewClient(a)
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+
+		resp := []byte{agentSuccess}
+		msg := make([]byte, 4+len(resp))
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[:4], uint32(len(resp)))
+		copy(msg[4:], resp)
+
+		if _, err := b.Write(msg); err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected error sending agent reply: %v", err)
+			b.Close()
+			return
+		}
+
+		if _, err := b.Write(msg); err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected error sending agent reply: %v", err)
+			b.Close()
+		}
+	}()
+	_, err = agent.List()
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("error expected")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "failed to list keys, unexpected message type") {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+	_, err = agent.Sign(testPublicKeys["rsa"], []byte("message"))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("error expected")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "failed to sign challenge, unexpected message type") {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestAuth(t *testing.T) {
 	agent, _, cleanup := startOpenSSHAgent(t)
 	defer cleanup()

ssh/agent/keyring.go

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func (r *keyring) Unlock(passphrase []byte) error {
 }
 
 // expireKeysLocked removes expired keys from the keyring. If a key was added
-// with a lifetimesecs contraint and seconds >= lifetimesecs seconds have
+// with a lifetimesecs constraint and seconds >= lifetimesecs seconds have
 // elapsed, it is removed. The caller *must* be holding the keyring mutex.
 func (r *keyring) expireKeysLocked() {
 	for _, k := range r.keys {

ssh/agent/keyring_test.go

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ func validateListedKeys(t *testing.T, a Agent, expectedKeys []string) {
 		return
 	}
 	if len(listedKeys) != len(expectedKeys) {
-		t.Fatalf("expeted %d key, got %d", len(expectedKeys), len(listedKeys))
+		t.Fatalf("expected %d key, got %d", len(expectedKeys), len(listedKeys))
 		return
 	}
 	actualKeys := make(map[string]bool)

ssh/agent/server.go

@@ -203,6 +203,9 @@ func parseConstraints(constraints []byte) (lifetimeSecs uint32, confirmBeforeUse
 	for len(constraints) != 0 {
 		switch constraints[0] {
 		case agentConstrainLifetime:
+			if len(constraints) < 5 {
+				return 0, false, nil, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
+			}
 			lifetimeSecs = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(constraints[1:5])
 			constraints = constraints[5:]
 		case agentConstrainConfirm:
@@ -506,7 +509,7 @@ func (s *server) insertIdentity(req []byte) error {
 	switch record.Type {
 	case ssh.KeyAlgoRSA:
 		addedKey, err = parseRSAKey(req)
-	case ssh.KeyAlgoDSA:
+	case ssh.InsecureKeyAlgoDSA:
 		addedKey, err = parseDSAKey(req)
 	case ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA256, ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA384, ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA521:
 		addedKey, err = parseECDSAKey(req)
@@ -514,7 +517,7 @@ func (s *server) insertIdentity(req []byte) error {
 		addedKey, err = parseEd25519Key(req)
 	case ssh.CertAlgoRSAv01:
 		addedKey, err = parseRSACert(req)
-	case ssh.CertAlgoDSAv01:
+	case ssh.InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01:
 		addedKey, err = parseDSACert(req)
 	case ssh.CertAlgoECDSA256v01, ssh.CertAlgoECDSA384v01, ssh.CertAlgoECDSA521v01:
 		addedKey, err = parseECDSACert(req)

ssh/agent/server_test.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	pseudorand "math/rand"
 	"reflect"
 	"strings"
@@ -258,6 +259,12 @@ func TestParseConstraints(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("got extension %v, want %v", extensions, expect)
 	}
 
+	// Test Malformed Constraint
+	_, _, _, err = parseConstraints([]byte{1})
+	if err != io.ErrUnexpectedEOF {
+		t.Errorf("got %v, want %v", err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF)
+	}
+
 	// Test Unknown Constraint
 	_, _, _, err = parseConstraints([]byte{128})
 	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unknown constraint") {

ssh/certs.go

@@ -20,14 +20,19 @@ import (
 // returned by MultiAlgorithmSigner and don't appear in the Signature.Format
 // field.
 const (
-	CertAlgoRSAv01        = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-	CertAlgoDSAv01        = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-	CertAlgoECDSA256v01   = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-	CertAlgoECDSA384v01   = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-	CertAlgoECDSA521v01   = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-	CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-	CertAlgoED25519v01    = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-	CertAlgoSKED25519v01  = "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	// Deprecated: DSA is only supported at insecure key sizes, and was removed
+	// from major implementations.
+	CertAlgoDSAv01 = InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01
+	// Deprecated: DSA is only supported at insecure key sizes, and was removed
+	// from major implementations.
+	InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	CertAlgoECDSA256v01    = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	CertAlgoECDSA384v01    = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	CertAlgoECDSA521v01    = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01  = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	CertAlgoED25519v01     = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	CertAlgoSKED25519v01   = "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
 
 	// CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 and CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 can't appear as a
 	// Certificate.Type (or PublicKey.Type), but only in
@@ -228,7 +233,11 @@ func parseCert(in []byte, privAlgo string) (*Certificate, error) {
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-
+	// The Type() function is intended to return only certificate key types, but
+	// we use certKeyAlgoNames anyway for safety, to match [Certificate.Type].
+	if _, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[k.Type()]; ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: the signature key type %q is invalid for certificates", k.Type())
+	}
 	c.SignatureKey = k
 	c.Signature, rest, ok = parseSignatureBody(g.Signature)
 	if !ok || len(rest) > 0 {
@@ -296,16 +305,13 @@ type CertChecker struct {
 	SupportedCriticalOptions []string
 
 	// IsUserAuthority should return true if the key is recognized as an
-	// authority for the given user certificate. This allows for
-	// certificates to be signed by other certificates. This must be set
-	// if this CertChecker will be checking user certificates.
+	// authority for user certificate. This must be set if this CertChecker
+	// will be checking user certificates.
 	IsUserAuthority func(auth PublicKey) bool
 
 	// IsHostAuthority should report whether the key is recognized as
-	// an authority for this host. This allows for certificates to be
-	// signed by other keys, and for those other keys to only be valid
-	// signers for particular hostnames. This must be set if this
-	// CertChecker will be checking host certificates.
+	// an authority for this host. This must be set if this CertChecker
+	// will be checking host certificates.
 	IsHostAuthority func(auth PublicKey, address string) bool
 
 	// Clock is used for verifying time stamps. If nil, time.Now
@@ -442,12 +448,19 @@ func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error {
 // SignCert signs the certificate with an authority, setting the Nonce,
 // SignatureKey, and Signature fields. If the authority implements the
 // MultiAlgorithmSigner interface the first algorithm in the list is used. This
-// is useful if you want to sign with a specific algorithm.
+// is useful if you want to sign with a specific algorithm. As specified in
+// [SSH-CERTS], Section 2.1.1, authority can't be a [Certificate].
 func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error {
 	c.Nonce = make([]byte, 32)
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.Nonce); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	// The Type() function is intended to return only certificate key types, but
+	// we use certKeyAlgoNames anyway for safety, to match [Certificate.Type].
+	if _, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[authority.PublicKey().Type()]; ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificates cannot be used as authority (public key type %q)",
+			authority.PublicKey().Type())
+	}
 	c.SignatureKey = authority.PublicKey()
 
 	if v, ok := authority.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok {
@@ -485,16 +498,16 @@ func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error {
 //
 // This map must be kept in sync with the one in agent/client.go.
 var certKeyAlgoNames = map[string]string{
-	CertAlgoRSAv01:        KeyAlgoRSA,
-	CertAlgoRSASHA256v01:  KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
-	CertAlgoRSASHA512v01:  KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
-	CertAlgoDSAv01:        KeyAlgoDSA,
-	CertAlgoECDSA256v01:   KeyAlgoECDSA256,
-	CertAlgoECDSA384v01:   KeyAlgoECDSA384,
-	CertAlgoECDSA521v01:   KeyAlgoECDSA521,
-	CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01: KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
-	CertAlgoED25519v01:    KeyAlgoED25519,
-	CertAlgoSKED25519v01:  KeyAlgoSKED25519,
+	CertAlgoRSAv01:         KeyAlgoRSA,
+	CertAlgoRSASHA256v01:   KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
+	CertAlgoRSASHA512v01:   KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
+	InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01: InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
+	CertAlgoECDSA256v01:    KeyAlgoECDSA256,
+	CertAlgoECDSA384v01:    KeyAlgoECDSA384,
+	CertAlgoECDSA521v01:    KeyAlgoECDSA521,
+	CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01:  KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
+	CertAlgoED25519v01:     KeyAlgoED25519,
+	CertAlgoSKED25519v01:   KeyAlgoSKED25519,
 }
 
 // underlyingAlgo returns the signature algorithm associated with algo (which is

ssh/certs_test.go

@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ func TestCertTypes(t *testing.T) {
 		{"legacyRSASigner", &legacyRSASigner{testSigners["rsa"]}, KeyAlgoRSA},
 		{"multiAlgoRSASignerSHA256", multiAlgoSignerSHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA256},
 		{"multiAlgoRSASignerSHA512", multiAlgoSignerSHA512, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
-		{CertAlgoDSAv01, testSigners["dsa"], ""},
+		{InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01, testSigners["dsa"], ""},
 	}
 
 	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
@@ -338,7 +338,9 @@ func TestCertTypes(t *testing.T) {
 				CertType: UserCert,
 				Key:      priv.PublicKey(),
 			}
-			cert.SignCert(rand.Reader, priv)
+			if err := cert.SignCert(rand.Reader, priv); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("error signing certificate: %v", err)
+			}
 
 			certSigner, err := NewCertSigner(cert, priv)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -404,3 +406,32 @@ func TestCertSignWithMultiAlgorithmSigner(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestCertSignWithCertificate(t *testing.T) {
+	cert := &Certificate{
+		Key:         testPublicKeys["rsa"],
+		ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
+		CertType:    UserCert,
+	}
+	if err := cert.SignCert(rand.Reader, testSigners["ecdsa"]); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SignCert: %v", err)
+	}
+	signer, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(testSigners["rsa"].(AlgorithmSigner), []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	certSigner, err := NewCertSigner(cert, signer)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewCertSigner: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	cert1 := &Certificate{
+		Key:         testPublicKeys["ecdsa"],
+		ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
+		CertType:    UserCert,
+	}
+
+	if err := cert1.SignCert(rand.Reader, certSigner); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("successfully signed a certificate using another certificate, it is expected to fail")
+	}
+}

ssh/cipher.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto/aes"
 	"crypto/cipher"
 	"crypto/des"
+	"crypto/fips140"
 	"crypto/rc4"
 	"crypto/subtle"
 	"encoding/binary"
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"hash"
 	"io"
+	"slices"
 
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305"
@@ -58,11 +60,11 @@ func newRC4(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) {
 type cipherMode struct {
 	keySize int
 	ivSize  int
-	create  func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error)
+	create  func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error)
 }
 
-func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)) func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
-	return func(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)) func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+	return func(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
 		stream, err := createFunc(key, iv)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
@@ -93,41 +95,41 @@ func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream,
 }
 
 // cipherModes documents properties of supported ciphers. Ciphers not included
-// are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly requested in
-// ClientConfig.Crypto.Ciphers.
-var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{
-	// Ciphers from RFC 4344, which introduced many CTR-based ciphers. Algorithms
-	// are defined in the order specified in the RFC.
-	"aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)},
-	"aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)},
-	"aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)},
+// are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly configured.
+// When FIPS mode is enabled, only FIPS-approved algorithms are included.
+var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{}
 
-	// Ciphers from RFC 4345, which introduces security-improved arcfour ciphers.
-	// They are defined in the order specified in the RFC.
-	"arcfour128": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)},
-	"arcfour256": {32, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)},
+func init() {
+	cipherModes[CipherAES128CTR] = &cipherMode{16, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}
+	cipherModes[CipherAES192CTR] = &cipherMode{24, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}
+	cipherModes[CipherAES256CTR] = &cipherMode{32, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}
+	//  Use of GCM with arbitrary IVs is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode,
+	// we'll wire it up to NewGCMForSSH in Go 1.26.
+	//
+	// For now it means we'll work with fips140=on but not fips140=only.
+	cipherModes[CipherAES128GCM] = &cipherMode{16, 12, newGCMCipher}
+	cipherModes[CipherAES256GCM] = &cipherMode{32, 12, newGCMCipher}
 
-	// Cipher defined in RFC 4253, which describes SSH Transport Layer Protocol.
-	// Note that this cipher is not safe, as stated in RFC 4253: "Arcfour (and
-	// RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used with caution."
-	// RFC 4345 introduces improved versions of Arcfour.
-	"arcfour": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)},
-
-	// AEAD ciphers
-	gcm128CipherID:     {16, 12, newGCMCipher},
-	gcm256CipherID:     {32, 12, newGCMCipher},
-	chacha20Poly1305ID: {64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher},
+	if fips140.Enabled() {
+		defaultCiphers = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultCiphers, func(algo string) bool {
+			_, ok := cipherModes[algo]
+			return !ok
+		})
+		return
+	}
 
+	cipherModes[CipherChaCha20Poly1305] = &cipherMode{64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher}
+	// Insecure ciphers not included in the default configuration.
+	cipherModes[InsecureCipherRC4128] = &cipherMode{16, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}
+	cipherModes[InsecureCipherRC4256] = &cipherMode{32, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}
+	cipherModes[InsecureCipherRC4] = &cipherMode{16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)}
 	// CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config.
 	// (See https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a526.pdf). If absolutely
 	// needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it.
 	// You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if
 	// you do.
-	aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher},
-
-	// 3des-cbc is insecure and is not included in the default
-	// config.
-	tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher},
+	cipherModes[InsecureCipherAES128CBC] = &cipherMode{16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher}
+	cipherModes[InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC] = &cipherMode{24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher}
 }
 
 // prefixLen is the length of the packet prefix that contains the packet length
@@ -307,7 +309,7 @@ type gcmCipher struct {
 	buf    []byte
 }
 
-func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
 	c, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -429,7 +431,7 @@ type cbcCipher struct {
 	oracleCamouflage uint32
 }
 
-func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
 	cbc := &cbcCipher{
 		mac:        macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey),
 		decrypter:  cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv),
@@ -443,7 +445,7 @@ func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorith
 	return cbc, nil
 }
 
-func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
 	c, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -457,7 +459,7 @@ func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCi
 	return cbc, nil
 }
 
-func newTripleDESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+func newTripleDESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
 	c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -635,8 +637,6 @@ func (c *cbcCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader
 	return nil
 }
 
-const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
-
 // chacha20Poly1305Cipher implements the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
 // AEAD, which is described here:
 //
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct {
 	buf        []byte
 }
 
-func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs DirectionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
 	if len(key) != 64 {
 		panic(len(key))
 	}

ssh/cipher_test.go

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ func TestDefaultCiphersExist(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Errorf("supported cipher %q is unknown", cipherAlgo)
 		}
 	}
-	for _, cipherAlgo := range preferredCiphers {
+	for _, cipherAlgo := range defaultCiphers {
 		if _, ok := cipherModes[cipherAlgo]; !ok {
 			t.Errorf("preferred cipher %q is unknown", cipherAlgo)
 		}
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ func TestDefaultCiphersExist(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestPacketCiphers(t *testing.T) {
-	defaultMac := "hmac-sha2-256"
-	defaultCipher := "aes128-ctr"
+	defaultMac := HMACSHA256
+	defaultCipher := CipherAES128CTR
 	for cipher := range cipherModes {
 		t.Run("cipher="+cipher,
 			func(t *testing.T) { testPacketCipher(t, cipher, defaultMac) })
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ func TestPacketCiphers(t *testing.T) {
 
 func testPacketCipher(t *testing.T, cipher, mac string) {
 	kr := &kexResult{Hash: crypto.SHA1}
-	algs := directionAlgorithms{
+	algs := DirectionAlgorithms{
 		Cipher:      cipher,
 		MAC:         mac,
-		Compression: "none",
+		compression: compressionNone,
 	}
 	client, err := newPacketCipher(clientKeys, algs, kr)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -77,10 +77,10 @@ func testPacketCipher(t *testing.T, cipher, mac string) {
 
 func TestCBCOracleCounterMeasure(t *testing.T) {
 	kr := &kexResult{Hash: crypto.SHA1}
-	algs := directionAlgorithms{
-		Cipher:      aes128cbcID,
-		MAC:         "hmac-sha1",
-		Compression: "none",
+	algs := DirectionAlgorithms{
+		Cipher:      InsecureCipherAES128CBC,
+		MAC:         HMACSHA1,
+		compression: compressionNone,
 	}
 	client, err := newPacketCipher(clientKeys, algs, kr)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ func TestCVE202143565(t *testing.T) {
 		constructPacket func(packetCipher) io.Reader
 	}{
 		{
-			cipher: gcm128CipherID,
+			cipher: CipherAES128GCM,
 			constructPacket: func(client packetCipher) io.Reader {
 				internalCipher := client.(*gcmCipher)
 				b := &bytes.Buffer{}
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ func TestCVE202143565(t *testing.T) {
 			},
 		},
 		{
-			cipher: chacha20Poly1305ID,
+			cipher: CipherChaCha20Poly1305,
 			constructPacket: func(client packetCipher) io.Reader {
 				internalCipher := client.(*chacha20Poly1305Cipher)
 				b := &bytes.Buffer{}
@@ -201,13 +201,13 @@ func TestCVE202143565(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	for _, tc := range tests {
-		mac := "hmac-sha2-256"
+		mac := HMACSHA256
 
 		kr := &kexResult{Hash: crypto.SHA1}
-		algs := directionAlgorithms{
+		algs := DirectionAlgorithms{
 			Cipher:      tc.cipher,
 			MAC:         mac,
-			Compression: "none",
+			compression: compressionNone,
 		}
 		client, err := newPacketCipher(clientKeys, algs, kr)
 		if err != nil {

ssh/client.go

@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) e
 	}
 
 	c.sessionID = c.transport.getSessionID()
+	c.algorithms = c.transport.getAlgorithms()
 	return c.clientAuthenticate(config)
 }
 

ssh/client_auth.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"
 )
 
@@ -83,7 +84,7 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
 			// success
 			return nil
 		} else if ok == authFailure {
-			if m := auth.method(); !contains(tried, m) {
+			if m := auth.method(); !slices.Contains(tried, m) {
 				tried = append(tried, m)
 			}
 		}
@@ -97,7 +98,7 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
 	findNext:
 		for _, a := range config.Auth {
 			candidateMethod := a.method()
-			if contains(tried, candidateMethod) {
+			if slices.Contains(tried, candidateMethod) {
 				continue
 			}
 			for _, meth := range methods {
@@ -117,15 +118,6 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
 	return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unable to authenticate, attempted methods %v, no supported methods remain", tried)
 }
 
-func contains(list []string, e string) bool {
-	for _, s := range list {
-		if s == e {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
 // An AuthMethod represents an instance of an RFC 4252 authentication method.
 type AuthMethod interface {
 	// auth authenticates user over transport t.
@@ -255,7 +247,7 @@ func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (MultiA
 		// Fallback to use if there is no "server-sig-algs" extension or a
 		// common algorithm cannot be found. We use the public key format if the
 		// MultiAlgorithmSigner supports it, otherwise we return an error.
-		if !contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)) {
+		if !slices.Contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)) {
 			return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common public key signature algorithm, server only supports %q for key type %q, signer only supports %v",
 				underlyingAlgo(keyFormat), keyFormat, as.Algorithms())
 		}
@@ -284,12 +276,12 @@ func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (MultiA
 	// Filter algorithms based on those supported by MultiAlgorithmSigner.
 	var keyAlgos []string
 	for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) {
-		if contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
+		if slices.Contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
 			keyAlgos = append(keyAlgos, algo)
 		}
 	}
 
-	algo, err := findCommon("public key signature algorithm", keyAlgos, serverAlgos)
+	algo, err := findCommon("public key signature algorithm", keyAlgos, serverAlgos, true)
 	if err != nil {
 		// If there is no overlap, return the fallback algorithm to support
 		// servers that fail to list all supported algorithms.
@@ -334,7 +326,7 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
 		// the key try to use the obtained algorithm as if "server-sig-algs" had
 		// not been implemented if supported from the algorithm signer.
 		if !ok && idx < origSignersLen && isRSACert(algo) && algo != CertAlgoRSAv01 {
-			if contains(as.Algorithms(), KeyAlgoRSA) {
+			if slices.Contains(as.Algorithms(), KeyAlgoRSA) {
 				// We retry using the compat algorithm after all signers have
 				// been tried normally.
 				signers = append(signers, &multiAlgorithmSigner{
@@ -385,7 +377,7 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
 		// contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any
 		// other keys.  According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when
 		// additional authentication methods are required.
-		if success == authSuccess || !contains(methods, cb.method()) {
+		if success == authSuccess || !slices.Contains(methods, cb.method()) {
 			return success, methods, err
 		}
 	}
@@ -434,7 +426,7 @@ func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
 			// servers send the key type instead. OpenSSH allows any algorithm
 			// that matches the public key, so we do the same.
 			// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/86bdd385/sshconnect2.c#L709
-			if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(key.Type()), msg.Algo) {
+			if !slices.Contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(key.Type()), msg.Algo) {
 				return false, nil
 			}
 			if !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) {

ssh/client_auth_test.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"os"
 	"runtime"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 )
@@ -324,6 +325,9 @@ func TestMethodInvalidAlgorithm(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestClientHMAC(t *testing.T) {
+	supportedAlgos := SupportedAlgorithms()
+	insecureAlgos := InsecureAlgorithms()
+	supportedMACs := append(supportedAlgos.MACs, insecureAlgos.MACs...)
 	for _, mac := range supportedMACs {
 		config := &ClientConfig{
 			User: "testuser",
@@ -349,7 +353,7 @@ func TestClientUnsupportedCipher(t *testing.T) {
 			PublicKeys(),
 		},
 		Config: Config{
-			Ciphers: []string{"aes128-cbc"}, // not currently supported
+			Ciphers: []string{"unsupported-cipher"}, // not currently supported
 		},
 	}
 	if err := tryAuth(t, config); err == nil {
@@ -1132,7 +1136,7 @@ func TestPickSignatureAlgorithm(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Fatalf("error generating cert signer: %v", err)
 			}
 			// The signer supports the public key algorithm and the
-			// public key format is a certificate type so the cerificate
+			// public key format is a certificate type so the certificate
 			// algorithm matching the key format must be returned
 			_, algo, err = pickSignatureAlgorithm(certSigner, c.extensions)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -1211,7 +1215,7 @@ func (cb configurablePublicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c pack
 	if err != nil {
 		return authFailure, nil, err
 	}
-	if success == authSuccess || !contains(methods, cb.method()) {
+	if success == authSuccess || !slices.Contains(methods, cb.method()) {
 		return success, methods, err
 	}
 

ssh/client_test.go

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ func TestUnsupportedAlgorithm(t *testing.T) {
 		{
 			"unsupported and supported KEXs",
 			Config{
-				KeyExchanges: []string{"unsupported", kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256},
+				KeyExchanges: []string{"unsupported", KeyExchangeCurve25519},
 			},
 			"",
 		},
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func TestUnsupportedAlgorithm(t *testing.T) {
 		{
 			"unsupported and supported ciphers",
 			Config{
-				Ciphers: []string{"unsupported", chacha20Poly1305ID},
+				Ciphers: []string{"unsupported", CipherChaCha20Poly1305},
 			},
 			"",
 		},
@@ -315,16 +315,16 @@ func TestUnsupportedAlgorithm(t *testing.T) {
 			Config{
 				MACs: []string{"unsupported"},
 				// MAC is used for non AAED ciphers.
-				Ciphers: []string{"aes256-ctr"},
+				Ciphers: []string{CipherAES256CTR},
 			},
 			"no common algorithm",
 		},
 		{
 			"unsupported and supported MACs",
 			Config{
-				MACs: []string{"unsupported", "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com"},
+				MACs: []string{"unsupported", HMACSHA256ETM},
 				// MAC is used for non AAED ciphers.
-				Ciphers: []string{"aes256-ctr"},
+				Ciphers: []string{CipherAES256CTR},
 			},
 			"",
 		},

ssh/common.go

@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ package ssh
 
 import (
 	"crypto"
+	"crypto/fips140"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"math"
+	"slices"
 	"sync"
 
 	_ "crypto/sha1"
@@ -24,88 +26,298 @@ const (
 	serviceSSH      = "ssh-connection"
 )
 
-// supportedCiphers lists ciphers we support but might not recommend.
-var supportedCiphers = []string{
-	"aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr",
-	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com", gcm256CipherID,
-	chacha20Poly1305ID,
-	"arcfour256", "arcfour128", "arcfour",
-	aes128cbcID,
-	tripledescbcID,
+// The ciphers currently or previously implemented by this library, to use in
+// [Config.Ciphers]. For a list, see the [Algorithms.Ciphers] returned by
+// [SupportedAlgorithms] or [InsecureAlgorithms].
+const (
+	CipherAES128GCM            = "aes128-gcm@openssh.com"
+	CipherAES256GCM            = "aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
+	CipherChaCha20Poly1305     = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
+	CipherAES128CTR            = "aes128-ctr"
+	CipherAES192CTR            = "aes192-ctr"
+	CipherAES256CTR            = "aes256-ctr"
+	InsecureCipherAES128CBC    = "aes128-cbc"
+	InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC = "3des-cbc"
+	InsecureCipherRC4          = "arcfour"
+	InsecureCipherRC4128       = "arcfour128"
+	InsecureCipherRC4256       = "arcfour256"
+)
+
+// The key exchanges currently or previously implemented by this library, to use
+// in [Config.KeyExchanges]. For a list, see the
+// [Algorithms.KeyExchanges] returned by [SupportedAlgorithms] or
+// [InsecureAlgorithms].
+const (
+	InsecureKeyExchangeDH1SHA1   = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+	InsecureKeyExchangeDH14SHA1  = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
+	KeyExchangeDH14SHA256        = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
+	KeyExchangeDH16SHA512        = "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512"
+	KeyExchangeECDHP256          = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
+	KeyExchangeECDHP384          = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
+	KeyExchangeECDHP521          = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
+	KeyExchangeCurve25519        = "curve25519-sha256"
+	InsecureKeyExchangeDHGEXSHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
+	KeyExchangeDHGEXSHA256       = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
+	// KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519 is supported from Go 1.24.
+	KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519 = "mlkem768x25519-sha256"
+
+	// An alias for KeyExchangeCurve25519SHA256. This kex ID will be added if
+	// KeyExchangeCurve25519SHA256 is requested for backward compatibility with
+	// OpenSSH versions up to 7.2.
+	keyExchangeCurve25519LibSSH = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
+)
+
+// The message authentication code (MAC) currently or previously implemented by
+// this library, to use in [Config.MACs]. For a list, see the
+// [Algorithms.MACs] returned by [SupportedAlgorithms] or
+// [InsecureAlgorithms].
+const (
+	HMACSHA256ETM      = "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com"
+	HMACSHA512ETM      = "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
+	HMACSHA256         = "hmac-sha2-256"
+	HMACSHA512         = "hmac-sha2-512"
+	HMACSHA1           = "hmac-sha1"
+	InsecureHMACSHA196 = "hmac-sha1-96"
+)
+
+var (
+	// supportedKexAlgos specifies key-exchange algorithms implemented by this
+	// package in preference order, excluding those with security issues.
+	supportedKexAlgos = []string{
+		KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519,
+		KeyExchangeCurve25519,
+		KeyExchangeECDHP256,
+		KeyExchangeECDHP384,
+		KeyExchangeECDHP521,
+		KeyExchangeDH14SHA256,
+		KeyExchangeDH16SHA512,
+		KeyExchangeDHGEXSHA256,
+	}
+	// defaultKexAlgos specifies the default preference for key-exchange
+	// algorithms in preference order.
+	defaultKexAlgos = []string{
+		KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519,
+		KeyExchangeCurve25519,
+		KeyExchangeECDHP256,
+		KeyExchangeECDHP384,
+		KeyExchangeECDHP521,
+		KeyExchangeDH14SHA256,
+		InsecureKeyExchangeDH14SHA1,
+	}
+	// insecureKexAlgos specifies key-exchange algorithms implemented by this
+	// package and which have security issues.
+	insecureKexAlgos = []string{
+		InsecureKeyExchangeDH14SHA1,
+		InsecureKeyExchangeDH1SHA1,
+		InsecureKeyExchangeDHGEXSHA1,
+	}
+	// supportedCiphers specifies cipher algorithms implemented by this package
+	// in preference order, excluding those with security issues.
+	supportedCiphers = []string{
+		CipherAES128GCM,
+		CipherAES256GCM,
+		CipherChaCha20Poly1305,
+		CipherAES128CTR,
+		CipherAES192CTR,
+		CipherAES256CTR,
+	}
+	// defaultCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers algorithms
+	// in preference order.
+	defaultCiphers = supportedCiphers
+	// insecureCiphers specifies cipher algorithms implemented by this
+	// package and which have security issues.
+	insecureCiphers = []string{
+		InsecureCipherAES128CBC,
+		InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC,
+		InsecureCipherRC4256,
+		InsecureCipherRC4128,
+		InsecureCipherRC4,
+	}
+	// supportedMACs specifies MAC algorithms implemented by this package in
+	// preference order, excluding those with security issues.
+	supportedMACs = []string{
+		HMACSHA256ETM,
+		HMACSHA512ETM,
+		HMACSHA256,
+		HMACSHA512,
+		HMACSHA1,
+	}
+	// defaultMACs specifies the default preference for MAC algorithms in
+	// preference order.
+	defaultMACs = []string{
+		HMACSHA256ETM,
+		HMACSHA512ETM,
+		HMACSHA256,
+		HMACSHA512,
+		HMACSHA1,
+		InsecureHMACSHA196,
+	}
+	// insecureMACs specifies MAC algorithms implemented by this
+	// package and which have security issues.
+	insecureMACs = []string{
+		InsecureHMACSHA196,
+	}
+	// supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e.
+	// methods of authenticating servers) implemented by this package in
+	// preference order, excluding those with security issues.
+	supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{
+		CertAlgoRSASHA256v01,
+		CertAlgoRSASHA512v01,
+		CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
+		CertAlgoECDSA384v01,
+		CertAlgoECDSA521v01,
+		CertAlgoED25519v01,
+		KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
+		KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA256,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA384,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA521,
+		KeyAlgoED25519,
+	}
+	// defaultHostKeyAlgos specifies the default preference for host-key
+	// algorithms in preference order.
+	defaultHostKeyAlgos = []string{
+		CertAlgoRSASHA256v01,
+		CertAlgoRSASHA512v01,
+		CertAlgoRSAv01,
+		InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01,
+		CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
+		CertAlgoECDSA384v01,
+		CertAlgoECDSA521v01,
+		CertAlgoED25519v01,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA256,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA384,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA521,
+		KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
+		KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
+		KeyAlgoRSA,
+		InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
+		KeyAlgoED25519,
+	}
+	// insecureHostKeyAlgos specifies host-key algorithms implemented by this
+	// package and which have security issues.
+	insecureHostKeyAlgos = []string{
+		KeyAlgoRSA,
+		InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
+		CertAlgoRSAv01,
+		InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01,
+	}
+	// supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos specifies the supported client public key
+	// authentication algorithms. Note that this doesn't include certificate
+	// types since those use the underlying algorithm. Order is irrelevant.
+	supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{
+		KeyAlgoED25519,
+		KeyAlgoSKED25519,
+		KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA256,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA384,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA521,
+		KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
+		KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
+	}
+
+	// defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos specifies the preferred client public key
+	// authentication algorithms. This list is sent to the client if it supports
+	// the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant.
+	defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{
+		KeyAlgoED25519,
+		KeyAlgoSKED25519,
+		KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA256,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA384,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA521,
+		KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
+		KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
+		KeyAlgoRSA,
+		InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
+	}
+	// insecurePubKeyAuthAlgos specifies client public key authentication
+	// algorithms implemented by this package and which have security issues.
+	insecurePubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{
+		KeyAlgoRSA,
+		InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
+	}
+)
+
+// NegotiatedAlgorithms defines algorithms negotiated between client and server.
+type NegotiatedAlgorithms struct {
+	KeyExchange string
+	HostKey     string
+	Read        DirectionAlgorithms
+	Write       DirectionAlgorithms
 }
 
-// preferredCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers.
-var preferredCiphers = []string{
-	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com", gcm256CipherID,
-	chacha20Poly1305ID,
-	"aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr",
+// Algorithms defines a set of algorithms that can be configured in the client
+// or server config for negotiation during a handshake.
+type Algorithms struct {
+	KeyExchanges   []string
+	Ciphers        []string
+	MACs           []string
+	HostKeys       []string
+	PublicKeyAuths []string
 }
 
-// supportedKexAlgos specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in
-// preference order.
-var supportedKexAlgos = []string{
-	kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH,
-	// P384 and P521 are not constant-time yet, but since we don't
-	// reuse ephemeral keys, using them for ECDH should be OK.
-	kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521,
-	kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH16SHA512, kexAlgoDH14SHA1,
-	kexAlgoDH1SHA1,
+func init() {
+	if fips140.Enabled() {
+		defaultHostKeyAlgos = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultHostKeyAlgos, func(algo string) bool {
+			_, err := hashFunc(underlyingAlgo(algo))
+			return err != nil
+		})
+		defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos, func(algo string) bool {
+			_, err := hashFunc(underlyingAlgo(algo))
+			return err != nil
+		})
+	}
 }
 
-// serverForbiddenKexAlgos contains key exchange algorithms, that are forbidden
-// for the server half.
-var serverForbiddenKexAlgos = map[string]struct{}{
-	kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1:   {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests
-	kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests
+func hashFunc(format string) (crypto.Hash, error) {
+	switch format {
+	case KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoSKED25519, KeyAlgoSKECDSA256:
+		return crypto.SHA256, nil
+	case KeyAlgoECDSA384:
+		return crypto.SHA384, nil
+	case KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoECDSA521:
+		return crypto.SHA512, nil
+	case KeyAlgoED25519:
+		// KeyAlgoED25519 doesn't pre-hash.
+		return 0, nil
+	case KeyAlgoRSA, InsecureKeyAlgoDSA:
+		if fips140.Enabled() {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("ssh: hash algorithm for format %q not allowed in FIPS 140 mode", format)
+		}
+		return crypto.SHA1, nil
+	default:
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("ssh: hash algorithm for format %q not mapped", format)
+	}
 }
 
-// preferredKexAlgos specifies the default preference for key-exchange
-// algorithms in preference order. The diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 algorithm
-// is disabled by default because it is a bit slower than the others.
-var preferredKexAlgos = []string{
-	kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH,
-	kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521,
-	kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH14SHA1,
+// SupportedAlgorithms returns algorithms currently implemented by this package,
+// excluding those with security issues, which are returned by
+// InsecureAlgorithms. The algorithms listed here are in preference order.
+func SupportedAlgorithms() Algorithms {
+	return Algorithms{
+		Ciphers:        slices.Clone(supportedCiphers),
+		MACs:           slices.Clone(supportedMACs),
+		KeyExchanges:   slices.Clone(supportedKexAlgos),
+		HostKeys:       slices.Clone(supportedHostKeyAlgos),
+		PublicKeyAuths: slices.Clone(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos),
+	}
 }
 
-// supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e. methods
-// of authenticating servers) in preference order.
-var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{
-	CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01,
-	CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
-	CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01,
-
-	KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521,
-	KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
-	KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA,
-
-	KeyAlgoED25519,
-}
-
-// supportedMACs specifies a default set of MAC algorithms in preference order.
-// This is based on RFC 4253, section 6.4, but with hmac-md5 variants removed
-// because they have reached the end of their useful life.
-var supportedMACs = []string{
-	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-256", "hmac-sha2-512", "hmac-sha1", "hmac-sha1-96",
+// InsecureAlgorithms returns algorithms currently implemented by this package
+// and which have security issues.
+func InsecureAlgorithms() Algorithms {
+	return Algorithms{
+		KeyExchanges:   slices.Clone(insecureKexAlgos),
+		Ciphers:        slices.Clone(insecureCiphers),
+		MACs:           slices.Clone(insecureMACs),
+		HostKeys:       slices.Clone(insecureHostKeyAlgos),
+		PublicKeyAuths: slices.Clone(insecurePubKeyAuthAlgos),
+	}
 }
 
 var supportedCompressions = []string{compressionNone}
 
-// hashFuncs keeps the mapping of supported signature algorithms to their
-// respective hashes needed for signing and verification.
-var hashFuncs = map[string]crypto.Hash{
-	KeyAlgoRSA:       crypto.SHA1,
-	KeyAlgoRSASHA256: crypto.SHA256,
-	KeyAlgoRSASHA512: crypto.SHA512,
-	KeyAlgoDSA:       crypto.SHA1,
-	KeyAlgoECDSA256:  crypto.SHA256,
-	KeyAlgoECDSA384:  crypto.SHA384,
-	KeyAlgoECDSA521:  crypto.SHA512,
-	// KeyAlgoED25519 doesn't pre-hash.
-	KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: crypto.SHA256,
-	KeyAlgoSKED25519:  crypto.SHA256,
-}
-
 // algorithmsForKeyFormat returns the supported signature algorithms for a given
 // public key format (PublicKey.Type), in order of preference. See RFC 8332,
 // Section 2. See also the note in sendKexInit on backwards compatibility.
@@ -120,11 +332,40 @@ func algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat string) []string {
 	}
 }
 
+// keyFormatForAlgorithm returns the key format corresponding to the given
+// signature algorithm. It returns an empty string if the signature algorithm is
+// invalid or unsupported.
+func keyFormatForAlgorithm(sigAlgo string) string {
+	switch sigAlgo {
+	case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512:
+		return KeyAlgoRSA
+	case CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01:
+		return CertAlgoRSAv01
+	case KeyAlgoED25519,
+		KeyAlgoSKED25519,
+		KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA256,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA384,
+		KeyAlgoECDSA521,
+		InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
+		InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01,
+		CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
+		CertAlgoECDSA384v01,
+		CertAlgoECDSA521v01,
+		CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01,
+		CertAlgoED25519v01,
+		CertAlgoSKED25519v01:
+		return sigAlgo
+	default:
+		return ""
+	}
+}
+
 // isRSA returns whether algo is a supported RSA algorithm, including certificate
 // algorithms.
 func isRSA(algo string) bool {
 	algos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(KeyAlgoRSA)
-	return contains(algos, underlyingAlgo(algo))
+	return slices.Contains(algos, underlyingAlgo(algo))
 }
 
 func isRSACert(algo string) bool {
@@ -135,18 +376,6 @@ func isRSACert(algo string) bool {
 	return isRSA(algo)
 }
 
-// supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos specifies the supported client public key
-// authentication algorithms. Note that this doesn't include certificate types
-// since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the client if
-// it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant.
-var supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{
-	KeyAlgoED25519,
-	KeyAlgoSKED25519, KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
-	KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521,
-	KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSA,
-	KeyAlgoDSA,
-}
-
 // unexpectedMessageError results when the SSH message that we received didn't
 // match what we wanted.
 func unexpectedMessageError(expected, got uint8) error {
@@ -158,7 +387,7 @@ func parseError(tag uint8) error {
 	return fmt.Errorf("ssh: parse error in message type %d", tag)
 }
 
-func findCommon(what string, client []string, server []string) (common string, err error) {
+func findCommon(what string, client []string, server []string, isClient bool) (string, error) {
 	for _, c := range client {
 		for _, s := range server {
 			if c == s {
@@ -166,23 +395,49 @@ func findCommon(what string, client []string, server []string) (common string, e
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common algorithm for %s; client offered: %v, server offered: %v", what, client, server)
+	err := &AlgorithmNegotiationError{
+		What: what,
+	}
+	if isClient {
+		err.SupportedAlgorithms = client
+		err.RequestedAlgorithms = server
+	} else {
+		err.SupportedAlgorithms = server
+		err.RequestedAlgorithms = client
+	}
+	return "", err
 }
 
-// directionAlgorithms records algorithm choices in one direction (either read or write)
-type directionAlgorithms struct {
+// AlgorithmNegotiationError defines the error returned if the client and the
+// server cannot agree on an algorithm for key exchange, host key, cipher, MAC.
+type AlgorithmNegotiationError struct {
+	What string
+	// RequestedAlgorithms lists the algorithms supported by the peer.
+	RequestedAlgorithms []string
+	// SupportedAlgorithms lists the algorithms supported on our side.
+	SupportedAlgorithms []string
+}
+
+func (a *AlgorithmNegotiationError) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: no common algorithm for %s; we offered: %v, peer offered: %v",
+		a.What, a.SupportedAlgorithms, a.RequestedAlgorithms)
+}
+
+// DirectionAlgorithms defines the algorithms negotiated in one direction
+// (either read or write).
+type DirectionAlgorithms struct {
 	Cipher      string
 	MAC         string
-	Compression string
+	compression string
 }
 
 // rekeyBytes returns a rekeying intervals in bytes.
-func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 {
+func (a *DirectionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 {
 	// According to RFC 4344 block ciphers should rekey after
 	// 2^(BLOCKSIZE/4) blocks. For all AES flavors BLOCKSIZE is
 	// 128.
 	switch a.Cipher {
-	case "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", gcm128CipherID, gcm256CipherID, aes128cbcID:
+	case CipherAES128CTR, CipherAES192CTR, CipherAES256CTR, CipherAES128GCM, CipherAES256GCM, InsecureCipherAES128CBC:
 		return 16 * (1 << 32)
 
 	}
@@ -192,66 +447,59 @@ func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 {
 }
 
 var aeadCiphers = map[string]bool{
-	gcm128CipherID:     true,
-	gcm256CipherID:     true,
-	chacha20Poly1305ID: true,
+	CipherAES128GCM:        true,
+	CipherAES256GCM:        true,
+	CipherChaCha20Poly1305: true,
 }
 
-type algorithms struct {
-	kex     string
-	hostKey string
-	w       directionAlgorithms
-	r       directionAlgorithms
-}
+func findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient bool, clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *NegotiatedAlgorithms, err error) {
+	result := &NegotiatedAlgorithms{}
 
-func findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient bool, clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *algorithms, err error) {
-	result := &algorithms{}
-
-	result.kex, err = findCommon("key exchange", clientKexInit.KexAlgos, serverKexInit.KexAlgos)
+	result.KeyExchange, err = findCommon("key exchange", clientKexInit.KexAlgos, serverKexInit.KexAlgos, isClient)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
-	result.hostKey, err = findCommon("host key", clientKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos, serverKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos)
+	result.HostKey, err = findCommon("host key", clientKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos, serverKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos, isClient)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
-	stoc, ctos := &result.w, &result.r
+	stoc, ctos := &result.Write, &result.Read
 	if isClient {
 		ctos, stoc = stoc, ctos
 	}
 
-	ctos.Cipher, err = findCommon("client to server cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersClientServer, serverKexInit.CiphersClientServer)
+	ctos.Cipher, err = findCommon("client to server cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersClientServer, serverKexInit.CiphersClientServer, isClient)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
-	stoc.Cipher, err = findCommon("server to client cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersServerClient, serverKexInit.CiphersServerClient)
+	stoc.Cipher, err = findCommon("server to client cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersServerClient, serverKexInit.CiphersServerClient, isClient)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
 	if !aeadCiphers[ctos.Cipher] {
-		ctos.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer)
+		ctos.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer, isClient)
 		if err != nil {
 			return
 		}
 	}
 
 	if !aeadCiphers[stoc.Cipher] {
-		stoc.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient)
+		stoc.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient, isClient)
 		if err != nil {
 			return
 		}
 	}
 
-	ctos.Compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer)
+	ctos.compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer, isClient)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
-	stoc.Compression, err = findCommon("server to client compression", clientKexInit.CompressionServerClient, serverKexInit.CompressionServerClient)
+	stoc.compression, err = findCommon("server to client compression", clientKexInit.CompressionServerClient, serverKexInit.CompressionServerClient, isClient)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
@@ -297,7 +545,7 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
 		c.Rand = rand.Reader
 	}
 	if c.Ciphers == nil {
-		c.Ciphers = preferredCiphers
+		c.Ciphers = defaultCiphers
 	}
 	var ciphers []string
 	for _, c := range c.Ciphers {
@@ -309,19 +557,22 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
 	c.Ciphers = ciphers
 
 	if c.KeyExchanges == nil {
-		c.KeyExchanges = preferredKexAlgos
+		c.KeyExchanges = defaultKexAlgos
 	}
 	var kexs []string
 	for _, k := range c.KeyExchanges {
 		if kexAlgoMap[k] != nil {
 			// Ignore the KEX if we have no kexAlgoMap definition.
 			kexs = append(kexs, k)
+			if k == KeyExchangeCurve25519 && !slices.Contains(c.KeyExchanges, keyExchangeCurve25519LibSSH) {
+				kexs = append(kexs, keyExchangeCurve25519LibSSH)
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	c.KeyExchanges = kexs
 
 	if c.MACs == nil {
-		c.MACs = supportedMACs
+		c.MACs = defaultMACs
 	}
 	var macs []string
 	for _, m := range c.MACs {

ssh/common_test.go

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@
 package ssh
 
 import (
+	"maps"
 	"reflect"
+	"slices"
 	"testing"
 )
 
@@ -51,33 +53,33 @@ func TestFindAgreedAlgorithms(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	initDirAlgs := func(a *directionAlgorithms) {
+	initDirAlgs := func(a *DirectionAlgorithms) {
 		if a.Cipher == "" {
 			a.Cipher = "cipher1"
 		}
 		if a.MAC == "" {
 			a.MAC = "mac1"
 		}
-		if a.Compression == "" {
-			a.Compression = "compression1"
+		if a.compression == "" {
+			a.compression = "compression1"
 		}
 	}
 
-	initAlgs := func(a *algorithms) {
-		if a.kex == "" {
-			a.kex = "kex1"
+	initAlgs := func(a *NegotiatedAlgorithms) {
+		if a.KeyExchange == "" {
+			a.KeyExchange = "kex1"
 		}
-		if a.hostKey == "" {
-			a.hostKey = "hostkey1"
+		if a.HostKey == "" {
+			a.HostKey = "hostkey1"
 		}
-		initDirAlgs(&a.r)
-		initDirAlgs(&a.w)
+		initDirAlgs(&a.Read)
+		initDirAlgs(&a.Write)
 	}
 
 	type testcase struct {
 		name                   string
 		clientIn, serverIn     kexInitMsg
-		wantClient, wantServer algorithms
+		wantClient, wantServer NegotiatedAlgorithms
 		wantErr                bool
 	}
 
@@ -120,19 +122,19 @@ func TestFindAgreedAlgorithms(t *testing.T) {
 				CiphersClientServer: []string{"cipher2", "cipher1"},
 				CiphersServerClient: []string{"cipher3", "cipher2"},
 			},
-			wantClient: algorithms{
-				r: directionAlgorithms{
+			wantClient: NegotiatedAlgorithms{
+				Read: DirectionAlgorithms{
 					Cipher: "cipher3",
 				},
-				w: directionAlgorithms{
+				Write: DirectionAlgorithms{
 					Cipher: "cipher2",
 				},
 			},
-			wantServer: algorithms{
-				w: directionAlgorithms{
+			wantServer: NegotiatedAlgorithms{
+				Write: DirectionAlgorithms{
 					Cipher: "cipher3",
 				},
-				r: directionAlgorithms{
+				Read: DirectionAlgorithms{
 					Cipher: "cipher2",
 				},
 			},
@@ -174,3 +176,21 @@ func TestFindAgreedAlgorithms(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestKeyFormatAlgorithms(t *testing.T) {
+	supportedAlgos := SupportedAlgorithms()
+	insecureAlgos := InsecureAlgorithms()
+	algoritms := append(supportedAlgos.PublicKeyAuths, insecureAlgos.PublicKeyAuths...)
+	algoritms = append(algoritms, slices.Collect(maps.Keys(certKeyAlgoNames))...)
+
+	for _, algo := range algoritms {
+		keyFormat := keyFormatForAlgorithm(algo)
+		if keyFormat == "" {
+			t.Errorf("got empty key format for algorithm %q", algo)
+		}
+		if !slices.Contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat), algo) {
+			t.Errorf("algorithms for key format %q, does not contain %q", keyFormat, algo)
+		}
+
+	}
+}

ssh/connection.go

@@ -74,6 +74,13 @@ type Conn interface {
 	//   Disconnect
 }
 
+// AlgorithmsConnMetadata is a ConnMetadata that can return the algorithms
+// negotiated between client and server.
+type AlgorithmsConnMetadata interface {
+	ConnMetadata
+	Algorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms
+}
+
 // DiscardRequests consumes and rejects all requests from the
 // passed-in channel.
 func DiscardRequests(in <-chan *Request) {
@@ -106,6 +113,7 @@ type sshConn struct {
 	sessionID     []byte
 	clientVersion []byte
 	serverVersion []byte
+	algorithms    NegotiatedAlgorithms
 }
 
 func dup(src []byte) []byte {
@@ -141,3 +149,7 @@ func (c *sshConn) ClientVersion() []byte {
 func (c *sshConn) ServerVersion() []byte {
 	return dup(c.serverVersion)
 }
+
+func (c *sshConn) Algorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms {
+	return c.algorithms
+}

ssh/doc.go

@@ -16,8 +16,19 @@ References:
 	[PROTOCOL]: https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?rev=HEAD
 	[PROTOCOL.certkeys]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=HEAD
 	[SSH-PARAMETERS]:    http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xml#ssh-parameters-1
+	[SSH-CERTS]:	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-miller-ssh-cert-01
+	[FIPS 140-3 mode]: https://go.dev/doc/security/fips140
 
 This package does not fall under the stability promise of the Go language itself,
 so its API may be changed when pressing needs arise.
+
+# FIPS 140-3 mode
+
+When the program is in [FIPS 140-3 mode], this package behaves as if only SP
+800-140C and SP 800-140D approved cipher suites, signature algorithms,
+certificate public key types and sizes, and key exchange and derivation
+algorithms were implemented. Others are silently ignored and not negotiated, or
+rejected. This set may depend on the algorithms supported by the FIPS 140-3 Go
+Cryptographic Module selected with GOFIPS140, and may change across Go versions.
 */
 package ssh

ssh/example_test.go

@@ -154,6 +154,75 @@ func ExampleNewServerConn() {
 	}
 }
 
+func ExampleServerConfig() {
+	// Minimal ServerConfig with SHA-1 algorithms disabled and supporting only
+	// public key authentication.
+
+	// The algorithms returned by ssh.SupportedAlgorithms() are different from
+	// the default ones and do not include algorithms that are considered
+	// insecure, such as those using SHA-1, returned by
+	// ssh.InsecureAlgorithms().
+	algorithms := ssh.SupportedAlgorithms()
+
+	// Public key authentication is done by comparing
+	// the public key of a received connection
+	// with the entries in the authorized_keys file.
+	authorizedKeysBytes, err := os.ReadFile("authorized_keys")
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("Failed to load authorized_keys, err: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	authorizedKeysMap := map[string]bool{}
+	for len(authorizedKeysBytes) > 0 {
+		pubKey, _, _, rest, err := ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(authorizedKeysBytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		authorizedKeysMap[string(pubKey.Marshal())] = true
+		authorizedKeysBytes = rest
+	}
+
+	config := &ssh.ServerConfig{
+		Config: ssh.Config{
+			KeyExchanges: algorithms.KeyExchanges,
+			Ciphers:      algorithms.Ciphers,
+			MACs:         algorithms.MACs,
+		},
+		// The configured PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms do not contain SHA-1 based
+		// signature formats, so if the client attempts to use them the
+		// authentication will fail before calling the defined callback.
+		PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms: algorithms.PublicKeyAuths,
+		PublicKeyCallback: func(c ssh.ConnMetadata, pubKey ssh.PublicKey) (*ssh.Permissions, error) {
+			if authorizedKeysMap[string(pubKey.Marshal())] {
+				return &ssh.Permissions{
+					// Record the public key used for authentication.
+					Extensions: map[string]string{
+						"pubkey-fp": ssh.FingerprintSHA256(pubKey),
+					},
+				}, nil
+			}
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown public key for %q", c.User())
+		},
+	}
+
+	privateBytes, err := os.ReadFile("id_rsa")
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatal("Failed to load private key: ", err)
+	}
+
+	private, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(privateBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatal("Failed to parse private key: ", err)
+	}
+	// Restrict host key algorithms to disable ssh-rsa.
+	signer, err := ssh.NewSignerWithAlgorithms(private.(ssh.AlgorithmSigner), []string{ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256, ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512})
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatal("Failed to create private key with restricted algorithms: ", err)
+	}
+	config.AddHostKey(signer)
+}
+
 func ExampleServerConfig_AddHostKey() {
 	// Minimal ServerConfig supporting only password authentication.
 	config := &ssh.ServerConfig{
@@ -262,6 +331,47 @@ func ExampleDial() {
 	fmt.Println(b.String())
 }
 
+func ExampleClientConfig() {
+	var hostKey ssh.PublicKey
+	key, err := os.ReadFile("/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa")
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("unable to read private key: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Create the Signer for this private key.
+	signer, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("unable to parse private key: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Minimal ClientConfig with SHA-1 algorithms disabled.
+	// The algorithms returned by ssh.SupportedAlgorithms() are different from
+	// the default ones and do not include algorithms that are considered
+	// insecure, such as those using SHA-1, returned by
+	// ssh.InsecureAlgorithms().
+	algorithms := ssh.SupportedAlgorithms()
+	config := &ssh.ClientConfig{
+		Config: ssh.Config{
+			KeyExchanges: algorithms.KeyExchanges,
+			Ciphers:      algorithms.Ciphers,
+			MACs:         algorithms.MACs,
+		},
+		User: "username",
+		Auth: []ssh.AuthMethod{
+			ssh.PublicKeys(signer),
+		},
+		HostKeyCallback: ssh.FixedHostKey(hostKey),
+		// We should check that hostKey algorithm is included in
+		// algorithms.HostKeys.
+		HostKeyAlgorithms: algorithms.HostKeys,
+	}
+	client, err := ssh.Dial("tcp", "yourserver.com:22", config)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatal("Failed to dial: ", err)
+	}
+	defer client.Close()
+}
+
 func ExamplePublicKeys() {
 	var hostKey ssh.PublicKey
 	// A public key may be used to authenticate against the remote

ssh/handshake.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"log"
 	"net"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 )
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ type keyingTransport interface {
 	// prepareKeyChange sets up a key change. The key change for a
 	// direction will be effected if a msgNewKeys message is sent
 	// or received.
-	prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error
+	prepareKeyChange(*NegotiatedAlgorithms, *kexResult) error
 
 	// setStrictMode sets the strict KEX mode, notably triggering
 	// sequence number resets on sending or receiving msgNewKeys.
@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ type handshakeTransport struct {
 	bannerCallback BannerCallback
 
 	// Algorithms agreed in the last key exchange.
-	algorithms *algorithms
+	algorithms *NegotiatedAlgorithms
 
 	// Counters exclusively owned by readLoop.
 	readPacketsLeft uint32
@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byt
 	if config.HostKeyAlgorithms != nil {
 		t.hostKeyAlgorithms = config.HostKeyAlgorithms
 	} else {
-		t.hostKeyAlgorithms = supportedHostKeyAlgos
+		t.hostKeyAlgorithms = defaultHostKeyAlgos
 	}
 	go t.readLoop()
 	go t.kexLoop()
@@ -184,6 +185,10 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) getSessionID() []byte {
 	return t.sessionID
 }
 
+func (t *handshakeTransport) getAlgorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms {
+	return *t.algorithms
+}
+
 // waitSession waits for the session to be established. This should be
 // the first thing to call after instantiating handshakeTransport.
 func (t *handshakeTransport) waitSession() error {
@@ -290,7 +295,7 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) resetWriteThresholds() {
 	if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 {
 		t.writeBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold)
 	} else if t.algorithms != nil {
-		t.writeBytesLeft = t.algorithms.w.rekeyBytes()
+		t.writeBytesLeft = t.algorithms.Write.rekeyBytes()
 	} else {
 		t.writeBytesLeft = 1 << 30
 	}
@@ -407,7 +412,7 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) resetReadThresholds() {
 	if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 {
 		t.readBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold)
 	} else if t.algorithms != nil {
-		t.readBytesLeft = t.algorithms.r.rekeyBytes()
+		t.readBytesLeft = t.algorithms.Read.rekeyBytes()
 	} else {
 		t.readBytesLeft = 1 << 30
 	}
@@ -523,7 +528,7 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
 			switch s := k.(type) {
 			case MultiAlgorithmSigner:
 				for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) {
-					if contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
+					if slices.Contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
 						msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algo)
 					}
 				}
@@ -675,7 +680,7 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	if t.sessionID == nil && ((isClient && contains(serverInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer)) || (!isClient && contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient))) {
+	if t.sessionID == nil && ((isClient && slices.Contains(serverInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer)) || (!isClient && slices.Contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient))) {
 		t.strictMode = true
 		if err := t.conn.setStrictMode(); err != nil {
 			return err
@@ -700,9 +705,9 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	kex, ok := kexAlgoMap[t.algorithms.kex]
+	kex, ok := kexAlgoMap[t.algorithms.KeyExchange]
 	if !ok {
-		return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected key exchange algorithm %v", t.algorithms.kex)
+		return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected key exchange algorithm %v", t.algorithms.KeyExchange)
 	}
 
 	var result *kexResult
@@ -732,7 +737,7 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
 	// On the server side, after the first SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, send a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO
 	// message with the server-sig-algs extension if the client supports it. See
 	// RFC 8308, Sections 2.4 and 3.1, and [PROTOCOL], Section 1.9.
-	if !isClient && firstKeyExchange && contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") {
+	if !isClient && firstKeyExchange && slices.Contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") {
 		supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList := strings.Join(t.publicKeyAuthAlgorithms, ",")
 		extInfo := &extInfoMsg{
 			NumExtensions: 2,
@@ -786,7 +791,7 @@ func (a algorithmSignerWrapper) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, a
 func pickHostKey(hostKeys []Signer, algo string) AlgorithmSigner {
 	for _, k := range hostKeys {
 		if s, ok := k.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok {
-			if !contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
+			if !slices.Contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
 				continue
 			}
 		}
@@ -809,12 +814,12 @@ func pickHostKey(hostKeys []Signer, algo string) AlgorithmSigner {
 }
 
 func (t *handshakeTransport) server(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
-	hostKey := pickHostKey(t.hostKeys, t.algorithms.hostKey)
+	hostKey := pickHostKey(t.hostKeys, t.algorithms.HostKey)
 	if hostKey == nil {
 		return nil, errors.New("ssh: internal error: negotiated unsupported signature type")
 	}
 
-	r, err := kex.Server(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics, hostKey, t.algorithms.hostKey)
+	r, err := kex.Server(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics, hostKey, t.algorithms.HostKey)
 	return r, err
 }
 
@@ -829,7 +834,7 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) client(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	if err := verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey, t.algorithms.hostKey, result); err != nil {
+	if err := verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey, t.algorithms.HostKey, result); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 

ssh/handshake_test.go

@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ type errorKeyingTransport struct {
 	readLeft, writeLeft int
 }
 
-func (n *errorKeyingTransport) prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error {
+func (n *errorKeyingTransport) prepareKeyChange(*NegotiatedAlgorithms, *kexResult) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ type mockKeyingTransport struct {
 	kexInitSent    chan struct{}
 }
 
-func (n *mockKeyingTransport) prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error {
+func (n *mockKeyingTransport) prepareKeyChange(*NegotiatedAlgorithms, *kexResult) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ func TestHandshakePendingPacketsError(t *testing.T) {
 func TestHandshakeRekeyDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	clientConf := &ClientConfig{
 		Config: Config{
-			Ciphers: []string{"aes128-ctr"},
+			Ciphers: []string{CipherAES128CTR},
 		},
 		HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
 	}
@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRekeyDefault(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestHandshakeAEADCipherNoMAC(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, cipher := range []string{chacha20Poly1305ID, gcm128CipherID} {
+	for _, cipher := range []string{CipherChaCha20Poly1305, CipherAES128GCM} {
 		checker := &syncChecker{
 			called: make(chan int, 1),
 		}
@@ -1239,3 +1239,128 @@ func TestStrictKEXMixed(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("client.waitSession: %v", err)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestNegotiatedAlgorithms(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	var serverAlgorithms NegotiatedAlgorithms
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
+			if algorithmConn, ok := conn.(AlgorithmsConnMetadata); ok {
+				serverAlgorithms = algorithmConn.Algorithms()
+				return &Permissions{}, nil
+			}
+			return nil, errors.New("server conn does not implement AlgorithmsConnMetadata")
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+	go NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+
+	clientConf := &ClientConfig{
+		User:            "test",
+		Auth:            []AuthMethod{Password("testpw")},
+		HostKeyCallback: FixedHostKey(testSigners["rsa"].PublicKey()),
+	}
+
+	if conn, _, _, err := NewClientConn(c2, "", clientConf); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	} else {
+		if algorithmConn, ok := conn.(AlgorithmsConnMetadata); ok {
+			clientAlgorithms := algorithmConn.Algorithms()
+			if clientAlgorithms.HostKey == "" {
+				t.Fatal("negotiated client host key is empty")
+			}
+			if clientAlgorithms.KeyExchange == "" {
+				t.Fatal("negotiated client KEX is empty")
+			}
+			if clientAlgorithms.Read.Cipher == "" {
+				t.Fatal("negotiated client read cipher is empty")
+			}
+			if clientAlgorithms.Write.Cipher == "" {
+				t.Fatal("negotiated client write cipher is empty")
+			}
+			if !reflect.DeepEqual(clientAlgorithms, serverAlgorithms) {
+				t.Fatalf("negotiated client algorithms: %+v differs from negotiated server algorithms: %+v",
+					clientAlgorithms, serverAlgorithms)
+			}
+		} else {
+			t.Fatal("client conn does not implement AlgorithmsConnMetadata")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAlgorithmNegotiationError(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		Config: Config{
+			Ciphers: []string{CipherAES128CTR, CipherAES256CTR},
+		},
+		PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
+			return &Permissions{}, nil
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+
+	srvErrCh := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, _, _, err := NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+		srvErrCh <- err
+	}()
+
+	clientConf := &ClientConfig{
+		Config: Config{
+			Ciphers: []string{CipherAES128GCM, CipherAES256GCM},
+		},
+		User:            "test",
+		Auth:            []AuthMethod{Password("testpw")},
+		HostKeyCallback: FixedHostKey(testSigners["rsa"].PublicKey()),
+	}
+
+	_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", clientConf)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("client connection succeeded expected algorithm negotiation error")
+	}
+	var negotiationError *AlgorithmNegotiationError
+	if !errors.As(err, &negotiationError) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected algorithm negotiation error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	expectedErrorString := fmt.Sprintf("ssh: handshake failed: ssh: no common algorithm for client to server cipher; we offered: %v, peer offered: %v",
+		clientConf.Ciphers, serverConf.Ciphers)
+	if err.Error() != expectedErrorString {
+		t.Fatalf("expected error string %q, got %q", expectedErrorString, err.Error())
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(negotiationError.RequestedAlgorithms, serverConf.Ciphers) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected requested algorithms %v, got %v", serverConf.Ciphers, negotiationError.RequestedAlgorithms)
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(negotiationError.SupportedAlgorithms, clientConf.Ciphers) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected supported algorithms %v, got %v", clientConf.Ciphers, negotiationError.SupportedAlgorithms)
+	}
+	err = <-srvErrCh
+	negotiationError = nil
+	if !errors.As(err, &negotiationError) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected algorithm negotiation error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	expectedErrorString = fmt.Sprintf("ssh: no common algorithm for client to server cipher; we offered: %v, peer offered: %v",
+		serverConf.Ciphers, clientConf.Ciphers)
+	if err.Error() != expectedErrorString {
+		t.Fatalf("expected error string %q, got %q", expectedErrorString, err.Error())
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(negotiationError.RequestedAlgorithms, clientConf.Ciphers) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected requested algorithms %v, got %v", clientConf.Ciphers, negotiationError.RequestedAlgorithms)
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(negotiationError.SupportedAlgorithms, serverConf.Ciphers) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected supported algorithms %v, got %v", serverConf.Ciphers, negotiationError.SupportedAlgorithms)
+	}
+}

ssh/kex.go

@@ -8,33 +8,31 @@ import (
 	"crypto"
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
 	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/fips140"
 	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/subtle"
 	"encoding/binary"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"math/big"
+	"slices"
 
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
 )
 
 const (
-	kexAlgoDH1SHA1                = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
-	kexAlgoDH14SHA1               = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
-	kexAlgoDH14SHA256             = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
-	kexAlgoDH16SHA512             = "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512"
-	kexAlgoECDH256                = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
-	kexAlgoECDH384                = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
-	kexAlgoECDH521                = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
-	kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
-	kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256       = "curve25519-sha256"
-
-	// For the following kex only the client half contains a production
-	// ready implementation. The server half only consists of a minimal
-	// implementation to satisfy the automated tests.
-	kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1   = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
-	kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
+	// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in RFC 4253 and
+	// Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409.
+	oakleyGroup2 = "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+	// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC 4253 and
+	// Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526.
+	oakleyGroup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
+	// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 in RFC 8268 and
+	// Oakley Group 15 in RFC 3526.
+	oakleyGroup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
+	// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 in RFC 8268 and
+	// Oakley Group 16 in RFC 3526.
+	oakleyGroup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
 )
 
 // kexResult captures the outcome of a key exchange.
@@ -399,56 +397,64 @@ func ecHash(curve elliptic.Curve) crypto.Hash {
 	return crypto.SHA512
 }
 
+// kexAlgoMap defines the supported KEXs. KEXs not included are not supported
+// and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly configured. When FIPS mode is
+// enabled, only FIPS-approved algorithms are included.
 var kexAlgoMap = map[string]kexAlgorithm{}
 
 func init() {
-	// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in
-	// RFC 4253 and Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409.
-	p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16)
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH1SHA1] = &dhGroup{
+	// mlkem768x25519-sha256 we'll work with fips140=on but not fips140=only
+	// until Go 1.26.
+	kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519] = &mlkem768WithCurve25519sha256{}
+	kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeECDHP521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()}
+	kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeECDHP384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()}
+	kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeECDHP256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()}
+
+	if fips140.Enabled() {
+		defaultKexAlgos = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultKexAlgos, func(algo string) bool {
+			_, ok := kexAlgoMap[algo]
+			return !ok
+		})
+		return
+	}
+
+	p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup2, 16)
+	kexAlgoMap[InsecureKeyExchangeDH1SHA1] = &dhGroup{
 		g:        new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
 		p:        p,
 		pMinus1:  new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
 		hashFunc: crypto.SHA1,
 	}
 
-	// This are the groups called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and
-	// diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 in RFC 4253 and RFC 8268,
-	// and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526.
-	p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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
+	p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup14, 16)
 	group14 := &dhGroup{
 		g:       new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
 		p:       p,
 		pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
 	}
 
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA1] = &dhGroup{
+	kexAlgoMap[InsecureKeyExchangeDH14SHA1] = &dhGroup{
 		g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1,
 		hashFunc: crypto.SHA1,
 	}
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA256] = &dhGroup{
+	kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeDH14SHA256] = &dhGroup{
 		g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1,
 		hashFunc: crypto.SHA256,
 	}
 
-	// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 in RFC
-	// 8268 and Oakley Group 16 in RFC 3526.
-	p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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
+	p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup16, 16)
 
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH16SHA512] = &dhGroup{
+	kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeDH16SHA512] = &dhGroup{
 		g:        new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
 		p:        p,
 		pMinus1:  new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
 		hashFunc: crypto.SHA512,
 	}
 
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()}
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()}
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()}
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256] = &curve25519sha256{}
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH] = &curve25519sha256{}
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA1}
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA256}
+	kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeCurve25519] = &curve25519sha256{}
+	kexAlgoMap[keyExchangeCurve25519LibSSH] = &curve25519sha256{}
+	kexAlgoMap[InsecureKeyExchangeDHGEXSHA1] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA1}
+	kexAlgoMap[KeyExchangeDHGEXSHA256] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA256}
 }
 
 // curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256 (formerly known as
@@ -464,15 +470,17 @@ func (kp *curve25519KeyPair) generate(rand io.Reader) error {
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, kp.priv[:]); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&kp.pub, &kp.priv)
+	p, err := curve25519.X25519(kp.priv[:], curve25519.Basepoint)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("curve25519: %w", err)
+	}
+	if len(p) != 32 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("curve25519: internal error: X25519 returned %d bytes, expected 32", len(p))
+	}
+	copy(kp.pub[:], p)
 	return nil
 }
 
-// curve25519Zeros is just an array of 32 zero bytes so that we have something
-// convenient to compare against in order to reject curve25519 points with the
-// wrong order.
-var curve25519Zeros [32]byte
-
 func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
 	var kp curve25519KeyPair
 	if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil {
@@ -495,11 +503,9 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
 		return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length")
 	}
 
-	var servPub, secret [32]byte
-	copy(servPub[:], reply.EphemeralPubKey)
-	curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &servPub)
-	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 {
-		return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order")
+	secret, err := curve25519.X25519(kp.priv[:], reply.EphemeralPubKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value is not valid: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	h := crypto.SHA256.New()
@@ -541,11 +547,9 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	var clientPub, secret [32]byte
-	copy(clientPub[:], kexInit.ClientPubKey)
-	curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &clientPub)
-	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 {
-		return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order")
+	secret, err := curve25519.X25519(kp.priv[:], kexInit.ClientPubKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value is not valid: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
@@ -601,9 +605,9 @@ const (
 func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
 	// Send GexRequest
 	kexDHGexRequest := kexDHGexRequestMsg{
-		MinBits:      dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits,
-		PreferedBits: dhGroupExchangePreferredBits,
-		MaxBits:      dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits,
+		MinBits:       dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits,
+		PreferredBits: dhGroupExchangePreferredBits,
+		MaxBits:       dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits,
 	}
 	if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexRequest)); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -690,9 +694,7 @@ func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshak
 }
 
 // Server half implementation of the Diffie Hellman Key Exchange with SHA1 and SHA256.
-//
-// This is a minimal implementation to satisfy the automated tests.
-func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) {
+func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) {
 	// Receive GexRequest
 	packet, err := c.readPacket()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -702,13 +704,32 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
 	if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexRequest); err != nil {
 		return
 	}
+	// We check that the request received is valid and that the MaxBits
+	// requested are at least equal to our supported minimum. This is the same
+	// check done in OpenSSH:
+	// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/80a2f64b/kexgexs.c#L94
+	//
+	// Furthermore, we also check that the required MinBits are less than or
+	// equal to 4096 because we can use up to Oakley Group 16.
+	if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < kexDHGexRequest.MinBits || kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits < kexDHGexRequest.MinBits ||
+		kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits || kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits ||
+		kexDHGexRequest.MinBits > 4096 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: DH GEX request out of range, min: %d, max: %d, preferred: %d", kexDHGexRequest.MinBits,
+			kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits, kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits)
+	}
+
+	var p *big.Int
+	// We hardcode sending Oakley Group 14 (2048 bits), Oakley Group 15 (3072
+	// bits) or Oakley Group 16 (4096 bits), based on the requested max size.
+	if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < 3072 {
+		p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup14, 16)
+	} else if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < 4096 {
+		p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup15, 16)
+	} else {
+		p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup16, 16)
+	}
 
-	// Send GexGroup
-	// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC
-	// 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526.
-	p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString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
 	g := big.NewInt(2)
-
 	msg := &kexDHGexGroupMsg{
 		P: p,
 		G: g,
@@ -746,9 +767,9 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
 	h := gex.hashFunc.New()
 	magics.write(h)
 	writeString(h, hostKeyBytes)
-	binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits))
-	binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits))
-	binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits))
+	binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, kexDHGexRequest.MinBits)
+	binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits)
+	binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits)
 	writeInt(h, p)
 	writeInt(h, g)
 	writeInt(h, kexDHGexInit.X)

ssh/keys.go

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"math/big"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"
 
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf"
@@ -36,14 +37,19 @@ import (
 // ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms, Signature.Format, or as AlgorithmSigner
 // arguments.
 const (
-	KeyAlgoRSA        = "ssh-rsa"
-	KeyAlgoDSA        = "ssh-dss"
-	KeyAlgoECDSA256   = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256"
-	KeyAlgoSKECDSA256 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
-	KeyAlgoECDSA384   = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384"
-	KeyAlgoECDSA521   = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
-	KeyAlgoED25519    = "ssh-ed25519"
-	KeyAlgoSKED25519  = "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+	KeyAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa"
+	// Deprecated: DSA is only supported at insecure key sizes, and was removed
+	// from major implementations.
+	KeyAlgoDSA = InsecureKeyAlgoDSA
+	// Deprecated: DSA is only supported at insecure key sizes, and was removed
+	// from major implementations.
+	InsecureKeyAlgoDSA = "ssh-dss"
+	KeyAlgoECDSA256    = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256"
+	KeyAlgoSKECDSA256  = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+	KeyAlgoECDSA384    = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384"
+	KeyAlgoECDSA521    = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
+	KeyAlgoED25519     = "ssh-ed25519"
+	KeyAlgoSKED25519   = "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
 
 	// KeyAlgoRSASHA256 and KeyAlgoRSASHA512 are only public key algorithms, not
 	// public key formats, so they can't appear as a PublicKey.Type. The
@@ -67,7 +73,7 @@ func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err err
 	switch algo {
 	case KeyAlgoRSA:
 		return parseRSA(in)
-	case KeyAlgoDSA:
+	case InsecureKeyAlgoDSA:
 		return parseDSA(in)
 	case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521:
 		return parseECDSA(in)
@@ -77,13 +83,18 @@ func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err err
 		return parseED25519(in)
 	case KeyAlgoSKED25519:
 		return parseSKEd25519(in)
-	case CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, CertAlgoSKED25519v01:
+	case CertAlgoRSAv01, InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, CertAlgoSKED25519v01:
 		cert, err := parseCert(in, certKeyAlgoNames[algo])
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, nil, err
 		}
 		return cert, nil, nil
 	}
+	if keyFormat := keyFormatForAlgorithm(algo); keyFormat != "" {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature algorithm %q isn't a key format; key is malformed and should be re-encoded with type %q",
+			algo, keyFormat)
+	}
+
 	return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown key algorithm: %v", algo)
 }
 
@@ -186,9 +197,10 @@ func ParseKnownHosts(in []byte) (marker string, hosts []string, pubKey PublicKey
 	return "", nil, nil, "", nil, io.EOF
 }
 
-// ParseAuthorizedKey parses a public key from an authorized_keys
-// file used in OpenSSH according to the sshd(8) manual page.
+// ParseAuthorizedKey parses a public key from an authorized_keys file used in
+// OpenSSH according to the sshd(8) manual page. Invalid lines are ignored.
 func ParseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, options []string, rest []byte, err error) {
+	var lastErr error
 	for len(in) > 0 {
 		end := bytes.IndexByte(in, '\n')
 		if end != -1 {
@@ -217,6 +229,8 @@ func ParseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, options []str
 
 		if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil {
 			return out, comment, options, rest, nil
+		} else {
+			lastErr = err
 		}
 
 		// No key type recognised. Maybe there's an options field at
@@ -259,16 +273,22 @@ func ParseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, options []str
 		if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil {
 			options = candidateOptions
 			return out, comment, options, rest, nil
+		} else {
+			lastErr = err
 		}
 
 		in = rest
 		continue
 	}
 
+	if lastErr != nil {
+		return nil, "", nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: no key found; last parsing error for ignored line: %w", lastErr)
+	}
+
 	return nil, "", nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found")
 }
 
-// ParsePublicKey parses an SSH public key formatted for use in
+// ParsePublicKey parses an SSH public key or certificate formatted for use in
 // the SSH wire protocol according to RFC 4253, section 6.6.
 func ParsePublicKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, err error) {
 	algo, in, ok := parseString(in)
@@ -390,11 +410,11 @@ func NewSignerWithAlgorithms(signer AlgorithmSigner, algorithms []string) (Multi
 	}
 
 	for _, algo := range algorithms {
-		if !contains(supportedAlgos, algo) {
+		if !slices.Contains(supportedAlgos, algo) {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is not supported for key type %q",
 				algo, signer.PublicKey().Type())
 		}
-		if !contains(signerAlgos, algo) {
+		if !slices.Contains(signerAlgos, algo) {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is restricted for the provided signer", algo)
 		}
 	}
@@ -481,10 +501,13 @@ func (r *rsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
 
 func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
 	supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(r.Type())
-	if !contains(supportedAlgos, sig.Format) {
+	if !slices.Contains(supportedAlgos, sig.Format) {
 		return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, r.Type())
 	}
-	hash := hashFuncs[sig.Format]
+	hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	h := hash.New()
 	h.Write(data)
 	digest := h.Sum(nil)
@@ -601,7 +624,11 @@ func (k *dsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
 	if sig.Format != k.Type() {
 		return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
 	}
-	h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New()
+	hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	h := hash.New()
 	h.Write(data)
 	digest := h.Sum(nil)
 
@@ -646,7 +673,11 @@ func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
 	}
 
-	h := hashFuncs[k.PublicKey().Type()].New()
+	hash, err := hashFunc(k.PublicKey().Type())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	h := hash.New()
 	h.Write(data)
 	digest := h.Sum(nil)
 	r, s, err := dsa.Sign(rand, k.PrivateKey, digest)
@@ -796,8 +827,11 @@ func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
 	if sig.Format != k.Type() {
 		return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
 	}
-
-	h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New()
+	hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	h := hash.New()
 	h.Write(data)
 	digest := h.Sum(nil)
 
@@ -900,8 +934,11 @@ func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
 	if sig.Format != k.Type() {
 		return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
 	}
-
-	h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New()
+	hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	h := hash.New()
 	h.Write([]byte(k.application))
 	appDigest := h.Sum(nil)
 
@@ -1004,7 +1041,11 @@ func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l)
 	}
 
-	h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New()
+	hash, err := hashFunc(sig.Format)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	h := hash.New()
 	h.Write([]byte(k.application))
 	appDigest := h.Sum(nil)
 
@@ -1107,11 +1148,14 @@ func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm
 		algorithm = s.pubKey.Type()
 	}
 
-	if !contains(s.Algorithms(), algorithm) {
+	if !slices.Contains(s.Algorithms(), algorithm) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %q for key format %q", algorithm, s.pubKey.Type())
 	}
 
-	hashFunc := hashFuncs[algorithm]
+	hashFunc, err := hashFunc(algorithm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	var digest []byte
 	if hashFunc != 0 {
 		h := hashFunc.New()
@@ -1446,6 +1490,7 @@ type openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey struct {
 	NumKeys      uint32
 	PubKey       []byte
 	PrivKeyBlock []byte
+	Rest         []byte `ssh:"rest"`
 }
 
 type openSSHPrivateKey struct {

ssh/keys_test.go

@@ -59,6 +59,17 @@ func TestKeyMarshalParse(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestParsePublicKeyWithSigningAlgoAsKeyFormat(t *testing.T) {
+	key := []byte(`rsa-sha2-256 AAAADHJzYS1zaGEyLTI1NgAAAAMBAAEAAAEBAJ7qMyjLXEJCCJmRknuCLo0uPi5GrPY5pQYr84lhlN8Gor5KVL2LKYCW4e70r5xzj7SrHHSCft1FMlYg1KDO9xrprJh733kQqAPWETmSuH0EfRtGtcH6EarKyVxk6As076/yNiiMKVBtG0RPa1L7FviTfcYK4vnCCVrbv3RmA5CCzuG5BSMbRLxzVb4Ri3p8jhxYT8N4QGe/2yqvJLys5vQ9szpZR3tcFp3DJIVZhBRfR6LnoY23XZniAAMQaUVBX86dXQ++dNwAwZSXSt9Og+AniOCiBYqhNVa5n3DID/H7YtEtG+CbZr3r2KD3fv8AfSLRar4XOp8rsRdD31h/kr8=`)
+	_, _, _, _, err := ParseAuthorizedKey(key)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("parsing a public key using a signature algorithm as the key format succeeded unexpectedly")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `signature algorithm "rsa-sha2-256" isn't a key format`) {
+		t.Errorf(`got %v, expected 'signature algorithm "rsa-sha2-256" isn't a key format'`, err)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestUnsupportedCurves(t *testing.T) {
 	raw, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P224(), rand.Reader)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -260,6 +271,21 @@ func TestParseEncryptedPrivateKeysWithPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestParseEncryptedPrivateKeysWithUnsupportedCiphers(t *testing.T) {
+    for _, tt := range testdata.UnsupportedCipherData {
+        t.Run(tt.Name, func(t *testing.T){
+            _, err := ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(tt.PEMBytes, []byte(tt.EncryptionKey))
+            if err == nil {
+                t.Fatalf("expected 'unknown cipher' error for %q, got nil", tt.Name)
+                // If this cipher is now supported, remove it from testdata.UnsupportedCipherData
+            }
+            if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unknown cipher") {
+                t.Errorf("wanted 'unknown cipher' error, got %v", err.Error())
+            }
+        })
+    }
+}
+
 func TestParseEncryptedPrivateKeysWithIncorrectPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
 	pem := testdata.PEMEncryptedKeys[0].PEMBytes
 	for i := 0; i < 4096; i++ {
@@ -810,3 +836,30 @@ func TestCryptoPublicKey(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+func TestParseCertWithCertSignatureKey(t *testing.T) {
+	certBytes := []byte(`-----BEGIN SSH CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END SSH CERTIFICATE-----
+	`)
+	block, _ := pem.Decode(certBytes)
+	if block == nil {
+		t.Fatal("invalid test certificate")
+	}
+
+	if _, err := ParsePublicKey(block.Bytes); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("parsing an SSH certificate using another certificate as signature key succeeded; expected failure")
+	}
+}

ssh/knownhosts/knownhosts.go

@@ -421,20 +421,26 @@ func New(files ...string) (ssh.HostKeyCallback, error) {
 	return certChecker.CheckHostKey, nil
 }
 
-// Normalize normalizes an address into the form used in known_hosts
+// Normalize normalizes an address into the form used in known_hosts. Supports
+// IPv4, hostnames, bracketed IPv6. Any other non-standard formats are returned
+// with minimal transformation.
 func Normalize(address string) string {
+	const defaultSSHPort = "22"
+
 	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
 	if err != nil {
 		host = address
-		port = "22"
+		port = defaultSSHPort
 	}
-	entry := host
-	if port != "22" {
-		entry = "[" + entry + "]:" + port
-	} else if strings.Contains(host, ":") && !strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") {
-		entry = "[" + entry + "]"
+
+	if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
+		host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
 	}
-	return entry
+
+	if port == defaultSSHPort {
+		return host
+	}
+	return "[" + host + "]:" + port
 }
 
 // Line returns a line to add append to the known_hosts files.

ssh/knownhosts/knownhosts_test.go

@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ func TestLine(t *testing.T) {
 		"server.org":                             "server.org " + edKeyStr,
 		"server.org:22":                          "server.org " + edKeyStr,
 		"server.org:23":                          "[server.org]:23 " + edKeyStr,
-		"[c629:1ec4:102:304:102:304:102:304]:22": "[c629:1ec4:102:304:102:304:102:304] " + edKeyStr,
+		"[c629:1ec4:102:304:102:304:102:304]:22": "c629:1ec4:102:304:102:304:102:304 " + edKeyStr,
 		"[c629:1ec4:102:304:102:304:102:304]:23": "[c629:1ec4:102:304:102:304:102:304]:23 " + edKeyStr,
 	} {
 		if got := Line([]string{in}, edKey); got != want {
@@ -310,14 +310,25 @@ func testHostHash(t *testing.T, hostname, encoded string) {
 
 func TestNormalize(t *testing.T) {
 	for in, want := range map[string]string{
-		"127.0.0.1:22":             "127.0.0.1",
-		"[127.0.0.1]:22":           "127.0.0.1",
-		"[127.0.0.1]:23":           "[127.0.0.1]:23",
-		"127.0.0.1:23":             "[127.0.0.1]:23",
-		"[a.b.c]:22":               "a.b.c",
-		"[abcd:abcd:abcd:abcd]":    "[abcd:abcd:abcd:abcd]",
-		"[abcd:abcd:abcd:abcd]:22": "[abcd:abcd:abcd:abcd]",
-		"[abcd:abcd:abcd:abcd]:23": "[abcd:abcd:abcd:abcd]:23",
+		"127.0.0.1":                 "127.0.0.1",
+		"127.0.0.1:22":              "127.0.0.1",
+		"[127.0.0.1]:22":            "127.0.0.1",
+		"[127.0.0.1]:23":            "[127.0.0.1]:23",
+		"127.0.0.1:23":              "[127.0.0.1]:23",
+		"[a.b.c]:22":                "a.b.c",
+		"[a.b.c]:23":                "[a.b.c]:23",
+		"abcd::abcd:abcd:abcd":      "abcd::abcd:abcd:abcd",
+		"[abcd::abcd:abcd:abcd]":    "abcd::abcd:abcd:abcd",
+		"[abcd::abcd:abcd:abcd]:22": "abcd::abcd:abcd:abcd",
+		"[abcd::abcd:abcd:abcd]:23": "[abcd::abcd:abcd:abcd]:23",
+		"2001:db8::1":               "2001:db8::1",
+		"2001:db8::1:22":            "2001:db8::1:22",
+		"[2001:db8::1]:22":          "2001:db8::1",
+		"2001:db8::1:2200":          "2001:db8::1:2200",
+		"a.b.c.d.com:2200":          "[a.b.c.d.com]:2200",
+		"2001::db8:1":               "2001::db8:1",
+		"2001::db8:1:22":            "2001::db8:1:22",
+		"2001::db8:1:2200":          "2001::db8:1:2200",
 	} {
 		got := Normalize(in)
 		if got != want {

ssh/mac.go

@@ -7,11 +7,13 @@ package ssh
 // Message authentication support
 
 import (
+	"crypto/fips140"
 	"crypto/hmac"
 	"crypto/sha1"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"crypto/sha512"
 	"hash"
+	"slices"
 )
 
 type macMode struct {
@@ -46,23 +48,37 @@ func (t truncatingMAC) Size() int {
 
 func (t truncatingMAC) BlockSize() int { return t.hmac.BlockSize() }
 
-var macModes = map[string]*macMode{
-	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com": {64, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+// macModes defines the supported MACs. MACs not included are not supported
+// and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly configured. When FIPS mode is
+// enabled, only FIPS-approved algorithms are included.
+var macModes = map[string]*macMode{}
+
+func init() {
+	macModes[HMACSHA512ETM] = &macMode{64, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
 		return hmac.New(sha512.New, key)
-	}},
-	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com": {32, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+	}}
+	macModes[HMACSHA256ETM] = &macMode{32, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
 		return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
-	}},
-	"hmac-sha2-512": {64, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+	}}
+	macModes[HMACSHA512] = &macMode{64, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
 		return hmac.New(sha512.New, key)
-	}},
-	"hmac-sha2-256": {32, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+	}}
+	macModes[HMACSHA256] = &macMode{32, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
 		return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
-	}},
-	"hmac-sha1": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+	}}
+
+	if fips140.Enabled() {
+		defaultMACs = slices.DeleteFunc(defaultMACs, func(algo string) bool {
+			_, ok := macModes[algo]
+			return !ok
+		})
+		return
+	}
+
+	macModes[HMACSHA1] = &macMode{20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
 		return hmac.New(sha1.New, key)
-	}},
-	"hmac-sha1-96": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+	}}
+	macModes[InsecureHMACSHA196] = &macMode{20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
 		return truncatingMAC{12, hmac.New(sha1.New, key)}
-	}},
+	}}
 }

ssh/messages.go

@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ type kexDHGexReplyMsg struct {
 const msgKexDHGexRequest = 34
 
 type kexDHGexRequestMsg struct {
-	MinBits      uint32 `sshtype:"34"`
-	PreferedBits uint32
-	MaxBits      uint32
+	MinBits       uint32 `sshtype:"34"`
+	PreferredBits uint32
+	MaxBits       uint32
 }
 
 // See RFC 4253, section 10.
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ func marshalString(to []byte, s []byte) []byte {
 	return to[len(s):]
 }
 
-var bigIntType = reflect.TypeOf((*big.Int)(nil))
+var bigIntType = reflect.TypeFor[*big.Int]()
 
 // Decode a packet into its corresponding message.
 func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) {

ssh/messages_test.go

@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ func TestDecode(t *testing.T) {
 	userAuthSuccess, err := decode([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("error decoding userAuthSuccessMsg")
-	} else if reflect.TypeOf(userAuthSuccess) != reflect.TypeOf((*userAuthSuccessMsg)(nil)) {
+	} else if _, ok := userAuthSuccess.(*userAuthSuccessMsg); !ok {
 		t.Errorf("error decoding userAuthSuccessMsg, unexpected %T", userAuthSuccess)
 	}
 }

ssh/mlkem.go

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
-//go:build go1.24
-
 package ssh
 
 import (
@@ -13,27 +11,10 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"runtime"
-	"slices"
 
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
 )
 
-const (
-	kexAlgoMLKEM768xCurve25519SHA256 = "mlkem768x25519-sha256"
-)
-
-func init() {
-	// After Go 1.24rc1 mlkem swapped the order of return values of Encapsulate.
-	// See #70950.
-	if runtime.Version() == "go1.24rc1" {
-		return
-	}
-	supportedKexAlgos = slices.Insert(supportedKexAlgos, 0, kexAlgoMLKEM768xCurve25519SHA256)
-	preferredKexAlgos = slices.Insert(preferredKexAlgos, 0, kexAlgoMLKEM768xCurve25519SHA256)
-	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoMLKEM768xCurve25519SHA256] = &mlkem768WithCurve25519sha256{}
-}
-
 // mlkem768WithCurve25519sha256 implements the hybrid ML-KEM768 with
 // curve25519-sha256 key exchange method, as described by
 // draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-ke-05 section 2.3.3.

ssh/server.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"
 )
 
@@ -43,6 +44,9 @@ type Permissions struct {
 	// pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server
 	// application layer.
 	Extensions map[string]string
+
+	// ExtraData allows to store user defined data.
+	ExtraData map[any]any
 }
 
 type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct {
@@ -126,6 +130,21 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
 	// Permissions.Extensions entry.
 	PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error)
 
+	// VerifiedPublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called after a client
+	// successfully confirms having control over a key that was previously
+	// approved by PublicKeyCallback. The permissions object passed to the
+	// callback is the one returned by PublicKeyCallback for the given public
+	// key and its ownership is transferred to the callback. The returned
+	// Permissions object can be the same object, optionally modified, or a
+	// completely new object. If VerifiedPublicKeyCallback is non-nil,
+	// PublicKeyCallback is not allowed to return a PartialSuccessError, which
+	// can instead be returned by VerifiedPublicKeyCallback.
+	//
+	// VerifiedPublicKeyCallback does not affect which authentication methods
+	// are included in the list of methods that can be attempted by the client.
+	VerifiedPublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions,
+		signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error)
+
 	// KeyboardInteractiveCallback, if non-nil, is called when
 	// keyboard-interactive authentication is selected (RFC
 	// 4256). The client object's Challenge function should be
@@ -243,22 +262,15 @@ func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewCha
 		fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6
 	}
 	if len(fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms) == 0 {
-		fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms = supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos
+		fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms = defaultPubKeyAuthAlgos
 	} else {
 		for _, algo := range fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms {
-			if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, algo) {
+			if !slices.Contains(SupportedAlgorithms().PublicKeyAuths, algo) && !slices.Contains(InsecureAlgorithms().PublicKeyAuths, algo) {
 				c.Close()
 				return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported public key authentication algorithm %s", algo)
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	// Check if the config contains any unsupported key exchanges
-	for _, kex := range fullConf.KeyExchanges {
-		if _, ok := serverForbiddenKexAlgos[kex]; ok {
-			c.Close()
-			return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key exchange %s for server", kex)
-		}
-	}
 
 	s := &connection{
 		sshConn: sshConn{conn: c},
@@ -315,6 +327,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error)
 
 	// We just did the key change, so the session ID is established.
 	s.sessionID = s.transport.getSessionID()
+	s.algorithms = s.transport.getAlgorithms()
 
 	var packet []byte
 	if packet, err = s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil {
@@ -637,7 +650,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
 				return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
 			}
 			algo := string(algoBytes)
-			if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
+			if !slices.Contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
 				authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo)
 				break
 			}
@@ -658,6 +671,9 @@ userAuthLoop:
 				candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData
 				candidate.perms, candidate.result = authConfig.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey)
 				_, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError)
+				if isPartialSuccessError && config.VerifiedPublicKeyCallback != nil {
+					return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid library usage: PublicKeyCallback must not return partial success when VerifiedPublicKeyCallback is defined")
+				}
 
 				if (candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError) &&
 					candidate.perms != nil &&
@@ -701,7 +717,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
 				// ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com algorithm with ssh-rsa public
 				// key type. The algorithm and public key type must be
 				// consistent: both must be certificate algorithms, or neither.
-				if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(pubKey.Type()), algo) {
+				if !slices.Contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(pubKey.Type()), algo) {
 					authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: public key type %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q",
 						pubKey.Type(), algo)
 					break
@@ -711,7 +727,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
 				// algorithm name that corresponds to algo with
 				// sig.Format.  This is usually the same, but
 				// for certs, the names differ.
-				if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, sig.Format) {
+				if !slices.Contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, sig.Format) {
 					authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format)
 					break
 				}
@@ -728,6 +744,12 @@ userAuthLoop:
 
 				authErr = candidate.result
 				perms = candidate.perms
+				if authErr == nil && config.VerifiedPublicKeyCallback != nil {
+					// Only call VerifiedPublicKeyCallback after the key has been accepted
+					// and successfully verified. If authErr is non-nil, the key is not
+					// considered verified and the callback must not run.
+					perms, authErr = config.VerifiedPublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey, perms, algo)
+				}
 			}
 		case "gssapi-with-mic":
 			if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil {

ssh/server_test.go

@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ func TestNewServerConnValidationErrors(t *testing.T) {
 
 	serverConf = &ServerConfig{
 		Config: Config{
-			KeyExchanges: []string{kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256},
+			KeyExchanges: []string{KeyExchangeDHGEXSHA256},
 		},
 	}
 	c = &markerConn{}
@@ -434,6 +434,380 @@ func TestPreAuthConnAndBanners(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestVerifiedPublicKeyCallback(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	extraKey := "extra"
+	extraDataString := "just a string"
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		VerifiedPublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions, signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error) {
+			if permissions != nil && permissions.ExtraData != nil {
+				if !reflect.DeepEqual(map[any]any{extraKey: extraDataString}, permissions.ExtraData) {
+					t.Errorf("expected extra data: %v; got: %v", extraDataString, permissions.ExtraData)
+				}
+			} else {
+				t.Error("expected extra data is missing")
+			}
+			if signatureAlgorithm != KeyAlgoRSASHA256 {
+				t.Errorf("expected signature algorithm: %q; got: %q", KeyAlgoRSASHA256, signatureAlgorithm)
+			}
+			return permissions, nil
+		},
+		PublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
+			return &Permissions{ExtraData: map[any]any{extraKey: extraDataString}}, nil
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+		conn, _, _, err := NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected server error: %v", err)
+		}
+		if !reflect.DeepEqual(map[any]any{extraKey: extraDataString}, conn.Permissions.ExtraData) {
+			t.Errorf("expected extra data: %v; got: %v", extraDataString, conn.Permissions.ExtraData)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	clientConf := ClientConfig{
+		User: "user",
+		Auth: []AuthMethod{
+			PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
+		},
+		HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
+	}
+
+	_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", &clientConf)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	<-done
+}
+
+func TestVerifiedPublicCallbackPartialSuccess(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		PublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
+			if bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
+				return nil, nil
+			}
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
+		},
+		VerifiedPublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions, signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error) {
+			if bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
+				return nil, &PartialSuccessError{
+					Next: ServerAuthCallbacks{
+						PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
+							if string(password) == clientPassword {
+								return nil, nil
+							}
+							return nil, nil
+						},
+					},
+				}
+			}
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+
+	clientConf := ClientConfig{
+		User: "user",
+		Auth: []AuthMethod{
+			PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
+			Password(clientPassword),
+		},
+		HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
+	}
+
+	go NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+
+	_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", &clientConf)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("client login error: %s", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiedPublicKeyCallbackPwdAndKey(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
+			if string(password) == clientPassword {
+				return nil, &PartialSuccessError{
+					Next: ServerAuthCallbacks{
+						PublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
+							if bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
+								return nil, nil
+							}
+							return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
+						},
+					},
+				}
+			}
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
+
+		},
+		VerifiedPublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions, signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error) {
+			if bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
+				return nil, nil
+			}
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+
+	clientConf := ClientConfig{
+		User: "user",
+		Auth: []AuthMethod{
+			Password(clientPassword),
+			PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
+		},
+		HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
+	}
+
+	go NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+
+	_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", &clientConf)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("client login error: %s", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiedPubKeyCallbackAuthMethods(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
+			return nil, nil
+		},
+		VerifiedPublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions, signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error) {
+			if bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
+				return nil, nil
+			}
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+
+	clientConf := ClientConfig{
+		User: "user",
+		Auth: []AuthMethod{
+			PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
+		},
+		HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
+	}
+
+	go NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+
+	_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", &clientConf)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("client login succeed with only VerifiedPublicKeyCallback defined")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiedPubKeyCallbackError(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		PublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
+			return nil, nil
+		},
+		VerifiedPublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions, signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error) {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+
+	clientConf := ClientConfig{
+		User: "user",
+		Auth: []AuthMethod{
+			PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
+		},
+		HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
+	}
+
+	go NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+
+	_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", &clientConf)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("client login succeed with VerifiedPublicKeyCallback returning an error")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiedPublicCallbackPartialSuccessBadUsage(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		PublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
+			if bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
+				// Returning PartialSuccessError is not permitted when
+				// VerifiedPublicKeyCallback is defined. This callback is
+				// invoked for both query requests and real authentications,
+				// while VerifiedPublicKeyCallback is only triggered if the
+				// client has proven control of the key.
+				return nil, &PartialSuccessError{
+					Next: ServerAuthCallbacks{
+						PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
+							if string(password) == clientPassword {
+								return nil, nil
+							}
+							return nil, nil
+						},
+					},
+				}
+			}
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
+		},
+		VerifiedPublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions, signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error) {
+			if bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
+				return nil, &PartialSuccessError{
+					Next: ServerAuthCallbacks{
+						PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
+							if string(password) == clientPassword {
+								return nil, nil
+							}
+							return nil, nil
+						},
+					},
+				}
+			}
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+
+	clientConf := ClientConfig{
+		User: "user",
+		Auth: []AuthMethod{
+			PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
+			Password(clientPassword),
+		},
+		HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
+	}
+
+	go NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+
+	_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", &clientConf)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("authentication succeeded with PartialSuccess returned from PublicKeyCallback and  VerifiedPublicKeyCallback defined")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiedPublicKeyCallbackOnError(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	var verifiedCallbackCalled bool
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		VerifiedPublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions, signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error) {
+			verifiedCallbackCalled = true
+			return nil, nil
+		},
+		PublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid key")
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+		NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+	}()
+
+	clientConf := ClientConfig{
+		User: "user",
+		Auth: []AuthMethod{
+			PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
+		},
+		HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
+	}
+
+	_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", &clientConf)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("authentication should fail")
+	}
+	<-done
+	if verifiedCallbackCalled {
+		t.Error("VerifiedPublicKeyCallback called after PublicKeyCallback returned an error")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifiedPublicKeyCallbackOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	c1, c2, err := netPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer c1.Close()
+	defer c2.Close()
+
+	serverConf := &ServerConfig{
+		VerifiedPublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey, permissions *Permissions, signatureAlgorithm string) (*Permissions, error) {
+			return nil, nil
+		},
+	}
+	serverConf.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+		NewServerConn(c1, serverConf)
+	}()
+
+	clientConf := ClientConfig{
+		User: "user",
+		Auth: []AuthMethod{
+			PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
+		},
+		HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
+	}
+
+	_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", &clientConf)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("authentication succeeded with only VerifiedPublicKeyCallback defined")
+	}
+	<-done
+}
+
 type markerConn struct {
 	closed uint32
 	used   uint32

ssh/ssh_gss.go

@@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) {
 	if !ok {
 		return nil, errors.New("parse uint32 failed")
 	}
+	// Each ASN.1 encoded OID must have a minimum
+	// of 2 bytes; 64 maximum mechanisms is an
+	// arbitrary, but reasonable ceiling.
+	const maxMechs = 64
+	if n > maxMechs || int(n)*2 > len(rest) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid mechanism count")
+	}
 	s := &userAuthRequestGSSAPI{
 		N:    n,
 		OIDS: make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, n),
@@ -122,7 +129,6 @@ func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) {
 		if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(desiredMech, &s.OIDS[i]); err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
-
 	}
 	return s, nil
 }

ssh/ssh_gss_test.go

@@ -17,6 +17,37 @@ func TestParseGSSAPIPayload(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestParseDubiousGSSAPIPayload(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name    string
+		payload []byte
+		wanterr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			"num mechanisms is unrealistic",
+			[]byte{0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF,
+				0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02},
+			true,
+		},
+		{
+			"num mechanisms greater than payload",
+			[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, // 64, |rest| too small
+				0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02},
+			true,
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			_, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(tc.payload)
+			if tc.wanterr && err == nil {
+				t.Errorf("got nil, want error")
+			}
+			if !tc.wanterr && err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("got %v, want nil", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestBuildMIC(t *testing.T) {
 	sessionID := []byte{134, 180, 134, 194, 62, 145, 171, 82, 119, 149, 254, 196, 125, 173, 177, 145, 187, 85, 53,
 		183, 44, 150, 219, 129, 166, 195, 19, 33, 209, 246, 175, 121}

ssh/streamlocal.go

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) {
 	if !ok {
 		return nil, errors.New("ssh: streamlocal-forward@openssh.com request denied by peer")
 	}
-	ch := c.forwards.add(&net.UnixAddr{Name: socketPath, Net: "unix"})
+	ch := c.forwards.add("unix", socketPath)
 
 	return &unixListener{socketPath, c, ch}, nil
 }
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ func (l *unixListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
 // Close closes the listener.
 func (l *unixListener) Close() error {
 	// this also closes the listener.
-	l.conn.forwards.remove(&net.UnixAddr{Name: l.socketPath, Net: "unix"})
+	l.conn.forwards.remove("unix", l.socketPath)
 	m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{
 		l.socketPath,
 	}

ssh/tcpip.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"math/rand"
 	"net"
+	"net/netip"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -22,14 +23,21 @@ import (
 // the returned net.Listener. The listener must be serviced, or the
 // SSH connection may hang.
 // N must be "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6", or "unix".
+//
+// If the address is a hostname, it is sent to the remote peer as-is, without
+// being resolved locally, and the Listener Addr method will return a zero IP.
 func (c *Client) Listen(n, addr string) (net.Listener, error) {
 	switch n {
 	case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6":
-		laddr, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr(n, addr)
+		host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
-		return c.ListenTCP(laddr)
+		port, err := strconv.ParseInt(portStr, 10, 32)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return c.listenTCPInternal(host, int(port))
 	case "unix":
 		return c.ListenUnix(addr)
 	default:
@@ -102,15 +110,24 @@ func (c *Client) handleForwards() {
 // ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket
 // on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling
 // Accept on the returned net.Listener.
+//
+// ListenTCP accepts an IP address, to provide a hostname use [Client.Listen]
+// with "tcp", "tcp4", or "tcp6" network instead.
 func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) {
 	c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards)
 	if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) {
 		return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr)
 	}
 
+	return c.listenTCPInternal(laddr.IP.String(), laddr.Port)
+}
+
+func (c *Client) listenTCPInternal(host string, port int) (net.Listener, error) {
+	c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards)
+
 	m := channelForwardMsg{
-		laddr.IP.String(),
-		uint32(laddr.Port),
+		host,
+		uint32(port),
 	}
 	// send message
 	ok, resp, err := c.SendRequest("tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m))
@@ -123,20 +140,33 @@ func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) {
 
 	// If the original port was 0, then the remote side will
 	// supply a real port number in the response.
-	if laddr.Port == 0 {
+	if port == 0 {
 		var p struct {
 			Port uint32
 		}
 		if err := Unmarshal(resp, &p); err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
-		laddr.Port = int(p.Port)
+		port = int(p.Port)
 	}
+	// Construct a local address placeholder for the remote listener. If the
+	// original host is an IP address, preserve it so that Listener.Addr()
+	// reports the same IP. If the host is a hostname or cannot be parsed as an
+	// IP, fall back to IPv4zero. The port field is always set, even if the
+	// original port was 0, because in that case the remote server will assign
+	// one, allowing callers to determine which port was selected.
+	ip := net.IPv4zero
+	if parsed, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil {
+		ip = net.IP(parsed.AsSlice())
+	}
+	laddr := &net.TCPAddr{
+		IP:   ip,
+		Port: port,
+	}
+	addr := net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.FormatInt(int64(port), 10))
+	ch := c.forwards.add("tcp", addr)
 
-	// Register this forward, using the port number we obtained.
-	ch := c.forwards.add(laddr)
-
-	return &tcpListener{laddr, c, ch}, nil
+	return &tcpListener{laddr, addr, c, ch}, nil
 }
 
 // forwardList stores a mapping between remote
@@ -149,8 +179,9 @@ type forwardList struct {
 // forwardEntry represents an established mapping of a laddr on a
 // remote ssh server to a channel connected to a tcpListener.
 type forwardEntry struct {
-	laddr net.Addr
-	c     chan forward
+	addr    string // host:port or socket path
+	network string // tcp or unix
+	c       chan forward
 }
 
 // forward represents an incoming forwarded tcpip connection. The
@@ -161,12 +192,13 @@ type forward struct {
 	raddr net.Addr   // the raddr of the incoming connection
 }
 
-func (l *forwardList) add(addr net.Addr) chan forward {
+func (l *forwardList) add(n, addr string) chan forward {
 	l.Lock()
 	defer l.Unlock()
 	f := forwardEntry{
-		laddr: addr,
-		c:     make(chan forward, 1),
+		addr:    addr,
+		network: n,
+		c:       make(chan forward, 1),
 	}
 	l.entries = append(l.entries, f)
 	return f.c
@@ -185,19 +217,20 @@ func parseTCPAddr(addr string, port uint32) (*net.TCPAddr, error) {
 	if port == 0 || port > 65535 {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: port number out of range: %d", port)
 	}
-	ip := net.ParseIP(string(addr))
-	if ip == nil {
+	ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(addr)
+	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot parse IP address %q", addr)
 	}
-	return &net.TCPAddr{IP: ip, Port: int(port)}, nil
+	return &net.TCPAddr{IP: net.IP(ip.AsSlice()), Port: int(port)}, nil
 }
 
 func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) {
 	for ch := range in {
 		var (
-			laddr net.Addr
-			raddr net.Addr
-			err   error
+			addr    string
+			network string
+			raddr   net.Addr
+			err     error
 		)
 		switch channelType := ch.ChannelType(); channelType {
 		case "forwarded-tcpip":
@@ -207,40 +240,34 @@ func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) {
 				continue
 			}
 
-			// RFC 4254 section 7.2 specifies that incoming
-			// addresses should list the address, in string
-			// format. It is implied that this should be an IP
-			// address, as it would be impossible to connect to it
-			// otherwise.
-			laddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.Addr, payload.Port)
-			if err != nil {
-				ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error())
-				continue
-			}
+			// RFC 4254 section 7.2 specifies that incoming addresses should
+			// list the address that was connected, in string format. It is the
+			// same address used in the tcpip-forward request. The originator
+			// address is an IP address instead.
+			addr = net.JoinHostPort(payload.Addr, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(payload.Port), 10))
+
 			raddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.OriginAddr, payload.OriginPort)
 			if err != nil {
 				ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error())
 				continue
 			}
-
+			network = "tcp"
 		case "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com":
 			var payload forwardedStreamLocalPayload
 			if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil {
 				ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com payload: "+err.Error())
 				continue
 			}
-			laddr = &net.UnixAddr{
-				Name: payload.SocketPath,
-				Net:  "unix",
-			}
+			addr = payload.SocketPath
 			raddr = &net.UnixAddr{
 				Name: "@",
 				Net:  "unix",
 			}
+			network = "unix"
 		default:
 			panic(fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown channel type %s", channelType))
 		}
-		if ok := l.forward(laddr, raddr, ch); !ok {
+		if ok := l.forward(network, addr, raddr, ch); !ok {
 			// Section 7.2, implementations MUST reject spurious incoming
 			// connections.
 			ch.Reject(Prohibited, "no forward for address")
@@ -252,11 +279,11 @@ func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) {
 
 // remove removes the forward entry, and the channel feeding its
 // listener.
-func (l *forwardList) remove(addr net.Addr) {
+func (l *forwardList) remove(n, addr string) {
 	l.Lock()
 	defer l.Unlock()
 	for i, f := range l.entries {
-		if addr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && addr.String() == f.laddr.String() {
+		if n == f.network && addr == f.addr {
 			l.entries = append(l.entries[:i], l.entries[i+1:]...)
 			close(f.c)
 			return
@@ -274,11 +301,11 @@ func (l *forwardList) closeAll() {
 	l.entries = nil
 }
 
-func (l *forwardList) forward(laddr, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool {
+func (l *forwardList) forward(n, addr string, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool {
 	l.Lock()
 	defer l.Unlock()
 	for _, f := range l.entries {
-		if laddr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && laddr.String() == f.laddr.String() {
+		if n == f.network && addr == f.addr {
 			f.c <- forward{newCh: ch, raddr: raddr}
 			return true
 		}
@@ -288,6 +315,7 @@ func (l *forwardList) forward(laddr, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool {
 
 type tcpListener struct {
 	laddr *net.TCPAddr
+	addr  string
 
 	conn *Client
 	in   <-chan forward
@@ -314,13 +342,21 @@ func (l *tcpListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
 
 // Close closes the listener.
 func (l *tcpListener) Close() error {
+	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(l.addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	rport, err := strconv.ParseUint(port, 10, 32)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	m := channelForwardMsg{
-		l.laddr.IP.String(),
-		uint32(l.laddr.Port),
+		host,
+		uint32(rport),
 	}
 
 	// this also closes the listener.
-	l.conn.forwards.remove(l.laddr)
+	l.conn.forwards.remove("tcp", l.addr)
 	ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m))
 	if err == nil && !ok {
 		err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-tcpip-forward failed")

ssh/test/doc.go

@@ -4,4 +4,6 @@
 
 // Package test contains integration tests for the
 // golang.org/x/crypto/ssh package.
+//
+// Deprecated: this package is for internal use only.
 package test

ssh/test/forward_unix_test.go

@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ func testPortForward(t *testing.T, n, listenAddr string) {
 		}
 	}()
 
+	// The forwarded address match the listen address because we run the tests
+	// on the same host.
 	forwardedAddr := sshListener.Addr().String()
 	netConn, err := net.Dial(n, forwardedAddr)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -111,6 +113,8 @@ func testPortForward(t *testing.T, n, listenAddr string) {
 }
 
 func TestPortForwardTCP(t *testing.T) {
+	testPortForward(t, "tcp", ":0")
+	testPortForward(t, "tcp", "[::]:0")
 	testPortForward(t, "tcp", "localhost:0")
 }
 

ssh/test/recording_client_test.go

@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ func recordingsClientConfig() *ssh.ClientConfig {
 	config := clientConfig()
 	config.SetDefaults()
 	// Remove ML-KEM since it only works with Go 1.24.
-	if config.KeyExchanges[0] == "mlkem768x25519-sha256" {
+	if config.KeyExchanges[0] == ssh.KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519 {
 		config.KeyExchanges = config.KeyExchanges[1:]
 	}
 	config.Auth = []ssh.AuthMethod{
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ func TestClientKeyExchanges(t *testing.T) {
 
 	var keyExchanges []string
 	for _, kex := range config.KeyExchanges {
-		// Exclude ecdh for now, to make them determistic we should use see a
+		// Exclude ecdh for now, to make them deterministic we should use see a
 		// stream of fixed bytes as the random source.
 		if !strings.HasPrefix(kex, "ecdh-") {
 			keyExchanges = append(keyExchanges, kex)
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ func TestHostKeyCheck(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// change the keys.
 	hostDB.keys[ssh.KeyAlgoRSA][25]++
-	hostDB.keys[ssh.KeyAlgoDSA][25]++
+	hostDB.keys[ssh.InsecureKeyAlgoDSA][25]++
 	hostDB.keys[ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA256][25]++
 
 	test := clientTest{

ssh/test/recording_server_test.go

@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ func recordingsServerConfig() *ssh.ServerConfig {
 	config.SetDefaults()
 	// Remove ML-KEM since it only works with Go 1.24.
 	config.SetDefaults()
-	if config.KeyExchanges[0] == "mlkem768x25519-sha256" {
+	if config.KeyExchanges[0] == ssh.KeyExchangeMLKEM768X25519 {
 		config.KeyExchanges = config.KeyExchanges[1:]
 	}
 	config.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ func TestServerKeyExchanges(t *testing.T) {
 
 	var keyExchanges []string
 	for _, kex := range config.KeyExchanges {
-		// Exclude ecdh for now, to make them determistic we should use see a
+		// Exclude ecdh for now, to make them deterministic we should use see a
 		// stream of fixed bytes as the random source.
 		// Exclude ML-KEM because server side is not deterministic.
 		if !strings.HasPrefix(kex, "ecdh-") && !strings.HasPrefix(kex, "mlkem") {

ssh/test/recording_test.go

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ func clientConfig() *ssh.ClientConfig {
 		HostKeyCallback: hostKeyDB().Check,
 		HostKeyAlgorithms: []string{ // by default, don't allow certs as this affects the hostKeyDB checker
 			ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA256, ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA384, ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA521,
-			ssh.KeyAlgoRSA, ssh.KeyAlgoDSA,
+			ssh.KeyAlgoRSA, ssh.InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
 			ssh.KeyAlgoED25519,
 		},
 	}

ssh/test/session_test.go

@@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ func testOneCipher(t *testing.T, cipher string, cipherOrder []string) {
 }
 
 var deprecatedCiphers = []string{
-	"aes128-cbc", "3des-cbc",
-	"arcfour128", "arcfour256",
+	ssh.InsecureCipherAES128CBC, ssh.InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC,
+	ssh.InsecureCipherRC4128, ssh.InsecureCipherRC4256,
 }
 
 func TestCiphers(t *testing.T) {

ssh/test/sshcli_test.go

@@ -34,23 +34,29 @@ func sshClient(t *testing.T) string {
 	return sshCLI
 }
 
+// setupSSHCLIKeys writes the provided key files to a temporary directory and
+// returns the path to the private key.
+func setupSSHCLIKeys(t *testing.T, keyFiles map[string][]byte, privKeyName string) string {
+	tmpDir := t.TempDir()
+	for fn, content := range keyFiles {
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, fn), content, 0600); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("WriteFile(%q): %v", fn, err)
+		}
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(tmpDir, privKeyName)
+}
+
 func TestSSHCLIAuth(t *testing.T) {
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
 		t.Skipf("always fails on Windows, see #64403")
 	}
 	sshCLI := sshClient(t)
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	keyPrivPath := filepath.Join(dir, "rsa")
-
-	for fn, content := range map[string][]byte{
-		keyPrivPath:                        testdata.PEMBytes["rsa"],
-		keyPrivPath + ".pub":               ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(testPublicKeys["rsa"]),
-		filepath.Join(dir, "rsa-cert.pub"): testdata.SSHCertificates["rsa-user-testcertificate"],
-	} {
-		if err := os.WriteFile(fn, content, 0600); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("WriteFile(%q): %v", fn, err)
-		}
+	keyFiles := map[string][]byte{
+		"rsa":          testdata.PEMBytes["rsa"],
+		"rsa.pub":      ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(testPublicKeys["rsa"]),
+		"rsa-cert.pub": testdata.SSHCertificates["rsa-user-testcertificate"],
 	}
+	keyPrivPath := setupSSHCLIKeys(t, keyFiles, "rsa")
 
 	certChecker := ssh.CertChecker{
 		IsUserAuthority: func(k ssh.PublicKey) bool {
@@ -98,3 +104,60 @@ func TestSSHCLIAuth(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("user certificate authentication failed, error: %v, command output %q", err, string(out))
 	}
 }
+
+func TestSSHCLIKeyExchanges(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skipf("always fails on Windows, see #64403")
+	}
+	sshCLI := sshClient(t)
+	keyFiles := map[string][]byte{
+		"rsa":     testdata.PEMBytes["rsa"],
+		"rsa.pub": ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(testPublicKeys["rsa"]),
+	}
+	keyPrivPath := setupSSHCLIKeys(t, keyFiles, "rsa")
+
+	keyExchanges := append(ssh.SupportedAlgorithms().KeyExchanges, ssh.InsecureAlgorithms().KeyExchanges...)
+	for _, kex := range keyExchanges {
+		t.Run(kex, func(t *testing.T) {
+			cmd := testenv.Command(t, sshCLI, "-Q", "kex")
+			out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("%s failed to check if the KEX is supported, error: %v, command output %q", kex, err, string(out))
+			}
+			if !bytes.Contains(out, []byte(kex)) {
+				t.Skipf("KEX %q is not supported in the installed ssh CLI", kex)
+			}
+			config := &ssh.ServerConfig{
+				Config: ssh.Config{
+					KeyExchanges: []string{kex},
+				},
+				PublicKeyCallback: func(conn ssh.ConnMetadata, key ssh.PublicKey) (*ssh.Permissions, error) {
+					if conn.User() == "testpubkey" && bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
+						return nil, nil
+					}
+
+					return nil, fmt.Errorf("pubkey for %q not acceptable", conn.User())
+				},
+			}
+			config.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
+
+			server, err := newTestServer(config)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("unable to start test server: %v", err)
+			}
+			defer server.Close()
+
+			port, err := server.port()
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("unable to get server port: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			cmd = testenv.Command(t, sshCLI, "-vvv", "-i", keyPrivPath, "-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=no",
+				"-o", fmt.Sprintf("KexAlgorithms=%s", kex), "-p", port, "testpubkey@127.0.0.1", "true")
+			out, err = cmd.CombinedOutput()
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("%s failed, error: %v, command output %q", kex, err, string(out))
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

ssh/testdata/Client-KEX-curve25519-sha256

@@ -2,58 +2,59 @@
 00000000  53 53 48 2d 32 2e 30 2d  47 6f 0d 0a              |SSH-2.0-Go..|
 >>> Flow 2 (server to client)
 00000000  53 53 48 2d 32 2e 30 2d  4f 70 65 6e 53 53 48 5f  |SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_|
-00000010  39 2e 39 0d 0a                                    |9.9..|
+00000010  31 30 2e 30 0d 0a                                 |10.0..|
 >>> Flow 3 (client to server)
-00000000  00 00 02 9c 11 14 7f 9c  2b a4 e8 8f 82 7d 61 60  |........+....}a`|
-00000010  45 50 76 05 85 3e 00 00  00 39 63 75 72 76 65 32  |EPv..>...9curve2|
-00000020  35 35 31 39 2d 73 68 61  32 35 36 2c 65 78 74 2d  |5519-sha256,ext-|
-00000030  69 6e 66 6f 2d 63 2c 6b  65 78 2d 73 74 72 69 63  |info-c,kex-stric|
-00000040  74 2d 63 2d 76 30 30 40  6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e  |t-c-v00@openssh.|
-00000050  63 6f 6d 00 00 00 57 65  63 64 73 61 2d 73 68 61  |com...Wecdsa-sha|
-00000060  32 2d 6e 69 73 74 70 32  35 36 2c 65 63 64 73 61  |2-nistp256,ecdsa|
-00000070  2d 73 68 61 32 2d 6e 69  73 74 70 33 38 34 2c 65  |-sha2-nistp384,e|
-00000080  63 64 73 61 2d 73 68 61  32 2d 6e 69 73 74 70 35  |cdsa-sha2-nistp5|
-00000090  32 31 2c 73 73 68 2d 72  73 61 2c 73 73 68 2d 64  |21,ssh-rsa,ssh-d|
-000000a0  73 73 2c 73 73 68 2d 65  64 32 35 35 31 39 00 00  |ss,ssh-ed25519..|
-000000b0  00 6c 61 65 73 31 32 38  2d 67 63 6d 40 6f 70 65  |.laes128-gcm@ope|
-000000c0  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  2c 61 65 73 32 35 36 2d  |nssh.com,aes256-|
-000000d0  67 63 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e  73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c  |gcm@openssh.com,|
-000000e0  63 68 61 63 68 61 32 30  2d 70 6f 6c 79 31 33 30  |chacha20-poly130|
-000000f0  35 40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73  68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61 65  |5@openssh.com,ae|
-00000100  73 31 32 38 2d 63 74 72  2c 61 65 73 31 39 32 2d  |s128-ctr,aes192-|
-00000110  63 74 72 2c 61 65 73 32  35 36 2d 63 74 72 00 00  |ctr,aes256-ctr..|
-00000120  00 6c 61 65 73 31 32 38  2d 67 63 6d 40 6f 70 65  |.laes128-gcm@ope|
-00000130  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  2c 61 65 73 32 35 36 2d  |nssh.com,aes256-|
-00000140  67 63 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e  73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c  |gcm@openssh.com,|
-00000150  63 68 61 63 68 61 32 30  2d 70 6f 6c 79 31 33 30  |chacha20-poly130|
-00000160  35 40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73  68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61 65  |5@openssh.com,ae|
-00000170  73 31 32 38 2d 63 74 72  2c 61 65 73 31 39 32 2d  |s128-ctr,aes192-|
-00000180  63 74 72 2c 61 65 73 32  35 36 2d 63 74 72 00 00  |ctr,aes256-ctr..|
-00000190  00 6e 68 6d 61 63 2d 73  68 61 32 2d 32 35 36 2d  |.nhmac-sha2-256-|
-000001a0  65 74 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e  73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c  |etm@openssh.com,|
-000001b0  68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61  32 2d 35 31 32 2d 65 74  |hmac-sha2-512-et|
-000001c0  6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73  68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 68 6d  |m@openssh.com,hm|
-000001d0  61 63 2d 73 68 61 32 2d  32 35 36 2c 68 6d 61 63  |ac-sha2-256,hmac|
-000001e0  2d 73 68 61 32 2d 35 31  32 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73  |-sha2-512,hmac-s|
-000001f0  68 61 31 2c 68 6d 61 63  2d 73 68 61 31 2d 39 36  |ha1,hmac-sha1-96|
-00000200  00 00 00 6e 68 6d 61 63  2d 73 68 61 32 2d 32 35  |...nhmac-sha2-25|
-00000210  36 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f 70  65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f  |6-etm@openssh.co|
-00000220  6d 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73  68 61 32 2d 35 31 32 2d  |m,hmac-sha2-512-|
-00000230  65 74 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e  73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c  |etm@openssh.com,|
-00000240  68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61  32 2d 32 35 36 2c 68 6d  |hmac-sha2-256,hm|
-00000250  61 63 2d 73 68 61 32 2d  35 31 32 2c 68 6d 61 63  |ac-sha2-512,hmac|
-00000260  2d 73 68 61 31 2c 68 6d  61 63 2d 73 68 61 31 2d  |-sha1,hmac-sha1-|
-00000270  39 36 00 00 00 04 6e 6f  6e 65 00 00 00 04 6e 6f  |96....none....no|
-00000280  6e 65 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d7  |ne..............|
-00000290  3b 80 93 f6 ef bc 88 eb  1a 6e ac fa 66 ef 26 3c  |;........n..f.&<|
+00000000  00 00 02 ac 04 14 7f 9c  2b a4 e8 8f 82 7d 61 60  |........+....}a`|
+00000010  45 50 76 05 85 3e 00 00  00 56 63 75 72 76 65 32  |EPv..>...Vcurve2|
+00000020  35 35 31 39 2d 73 68 61  32 35 36 2c 63 75 72 76  |5519-sha256,curv|
+00000030  65 32 35 35 31 39 2d 73  68 61 32 35 36 40 6c 69  |e25519-sha256@li|
+00000040  62 73 73 68 2e 6f 72 67  2c 65 78 74 2d 69 6e 66  |bssh.org,ext-inf|
+00000050  6f 2d 63 2c 6b 65 78 2d  73 74 72 69 63 74 2d 63  |o-c,kex-strict-c|
+00000060  2d 76 30 30 40 6f 70 65  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  |-v00@openssh.com|
+00000070  00 00 00 57 65 63 64 73  61 2d 73 68 61 32 2d 6e  |...Wecdsa-sha2-n|
+00000080  69 73 74 70 32 35 36 2c  65 63 64 73 61 2d 73 68  |istp256,ecdsa-sh|
+00000090  61 32 2d 6e 69 73 74 70  33 38 34 2c 65 63 64 73  |a2-nistp384,ecds|
+000000a0  61 2d 73 68 61 32 2d 6e  69 73 74 70 35 32 31 2c  |a-sha2-nistp521,|
+000000b0  73 73 68 2d 72 73 61 2c  73 73 68 2d 64 73 73 2c  |ssh-rsa,ssh-dss,|
+000000c0  73 73 68 2d 65 64 32 35  35 31 39 00 00 00 6c 61  |ssh-ed25519...la|
+000000d0  65 73 31 32 38 2d 67 63  6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73  |es128-gcm@openss|
+000000e0  68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61 65  73 32 35 36 2d 67 63 6d  |h.com,aes256-gcm|
+000000f0  40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68  2e 63 6f 6d 2c 63 68 61  |@openssh.com,cha|
+00000100  63 68 61 32 30 2d 70 6f  6c 79 31 33 30 35 40 6f  |cha20-poly1305@o|
+00000110  70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63  6f 6d 2c 61 65 73 31 32  |penssh.com,aes12|
+00000120  38 2d 63 74 72 2c 61 65  73 31 39 32 2d 63 74 72  |8-ctr,aes192-ctr|
+00000130  2c 61 65 73 32 35 36 2d  63 74 72 00 00 00 6c 61  |,aes256-ctr...la|
+00000140  65 73 31 32 38 2d 67 63  6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73  |es128-gcm@openss|
+00000150  68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61 65  73 32 35 36 2d 67 63 6d  |h.com,aes256-gcm|
+00000160  40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68  2e 63 6f 6d 2c 63 68 61  |@openssh.com,cha|
+00000170  63 68 61 32 30 2d 70 6f  6c 79 31 33 30 35 40 6f  |cha20-poly1305@o|
+00000180  70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63  6f 6d 2c 61 65 73 31 32  |penssh.com,aes12|
+00000190  38 2d 63 74 72 2c 61 65  73 31 39 32 2d 63 74 72  |8-ctr,aes192-ctr|
+000001a0  2c 61 65 73 32 35 36 2d  63 74 72 00 00 00 6e 68  |,aes256-ctr...nh|
+000001b0  6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61 32  2d 32 35 36 2d 65 74 6d  |mac-sha2-256-etm|
+000001c0  40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68  2e 63 6f 6d 2c 68 6d 61  |@openssh.com,hma|
+000001d0  63 2d 73 68 61 32 2d 35  31 32 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f  |c-sha2-512-etm@o|
+000001e0  70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63  6f 6d 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d  |penssh.com,hmac-|
+000001f0  73 68 61 32 2d 32 35 36  2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68  |sha2-256,hmac-sh|
+00000200  61 32 2d 35 31 32 2c 68  6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61 31  |a2-512,hmac-sha1|
+00000210  2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68  61 31 2d 39 36 00 00 00  |,hmac-sha1-96...|
+00000220  6e 68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68  61 32 2d 32 35 36 2d 65  |nhmac-sha2-256-e|
+00000230  74 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 68  |tm@openssh.com,h|
+00000240  6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61 32  2d 35 31 32 2d 65 74 6d  |mac-sha2-512-etm|
+00000250  40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68  2e 63 6f 6d 2c 68 6d 61  |@openssh.com,hma|
+00000260  63 2d 73 68 61 32 2d 32  35 36 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d  |c-sha2-256,hmac-|
+00000270  73 68 61 32 2d 35 31 32  2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68  |sha2-512,hmac-sh|
+00000280  61 31 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d  73 68 61 31 2d 39 36 00  |a1,hmac-sha1-96.|
+00000290  00 00 04 6e 6f 6e 65 00  00 00 04 6e 6f 6e 65 00  |...none....none.|
+000002a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 d7 3b 80 93  |.............;..|
 >>> Flow 4 (server to client)
-00000000  00 00 04 9c 0a 14 86 1d  13 33 bb 65 c5 7e 3d 8b  |.........3.e.~=.|
-00000010  4f 63 27 f5 d1 59 00 00  01 7a 73 6e 74 72 75 70  |Oc'..Y...zsntrup|
-00000020  37 36 31 78 32 35 35 31  39 2d 73 68 61 35 31 32  |761x25519-sha512|
-00000030  2c 73 6e 74 72 75 70 37  36 31 78 32 35 35 31 39  |,sntrup761x25519|
-00000040  2d 73 68 61 35 31 32 40  6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e  |-sha512@openssh.|
-00000050  63 6f 6d 2c 6d 6c 6b 65  6d 37 36 38 78 32 35 35  |com,mlkem768x255|
-00000060  31 39 2d 73 68 61 32 35  36 2c 63 75 72 76 65 32  |19-sha256,curve2|
+00000000  00 00 04 7c 08 14 d7 da  a8 cd 40 76 e6 8a 12 b5  |...|......@v....|
+00000010  5f ff a4 a5 57 4b 00 00  01 5c 6d 6c 6b 65 6d 37  |_...WK...\mlkem7|
+00000020  36 38 78 32 35 35 31 39  2d 73 68 61 32 35 36 2c  |68x25519-sha256,|
+00000030  73 6e 74 72 75 70 37 36  31 78 32 35 35 31 39 2d  |sntrup761x25519-|
+00000040  73 68 61 35 31 32 2c 73  6e 74 72 75 70 37 36 31  |sha512,sntrup761|
+00000050  78 32 35 35 31 39 2d 73  68 61 35 31 32 40 6f 70  |x25519-sha512@op|
+00000060  65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f  6d 2c 63 75 72 76 65 32  |enssh.com,curve2|
 00000070  35 35 31 39 2d 73 68 61  32 35 36 2c 63 75 72 76  |5519-sha256,curv|
 00000080  65 32 35 35 31 39 2d 73  68 61 32 35 36 40 6c 69  |e25519-sha256@li|
 00000090  62 73 73 68 2e 6f 72 67  2c 65 63 64 68 2d 73 68  |bssh.org,ecdh-sh|
@@ -61,229 +62,227 @@
 000000b0  2d 73 68 61 32 2d 6e 69  73 74 70 33 38 34 2c 65  |-sha2-nistp384,e|
 000000c0  63 64 68 2d 73 68 61 32  2d 6e 69 73 74 70 35 32  |cdh-sha2-nistp52|
 000000d0  31 2c 64 69 66 66 69 65  2d 68 65 6c 6c 6d 61 6e  |1,diffie-hellman|
-000000e0  2d 67 72 6f 75 70 2d 65  78 63 68 61 6e 67 65 2d  |-group-exchange-|
-000000f0  73 68 61 32 35 36 2c 64  69 66 66 69 65 2d 68 65  |sha256,diffie-he|
-00000100  6c 6c 6d 61 6e 2d 67 72  6f 75 70 31 36 2d 73 68  |llman-group16-sh|
-00000110  61 35 31 32 2c 64 69 66  66 69 65 2d 68 65 6c 6c  |a512,diffie-hell|
-00000120  6d 61 6e 2d 67 72 6f 75  70 31 38 2d 73 68 61 35  |man-group18-sha5|
-00000130  31 32 2c 64 69 66 66 69  65 2d 68 65 6c 6c 6d 61  |12,diffie-hellma|
-00000140  6e 2d 67 72 6f 75 70 31  34 2d 73 68 61 32 35 36  |n-group14-sha256|
-00000150  2c 64 69 66 66 69 65 2d  68 65 6c 6c 6d 61 6e 2d  |,diffie-hellman-|
-00000160  67 72 6f 75 70 31 34 2d  73 68 61 31 2c 65 78 74  |group14-sha1,ext|
-00000170  2d 69 6e 66 6f 2d 73 2c  6b 65 78 2d 73 74 72 69  |-info-s,kex-stri|
-00000180  63 74 2d 73 2d 76 30 30  40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68  |ct-s-v00@openssh|
-00000190  2e 63 6f 6d 00 00 00 2d  72 73 61 2d 73 68 61 32  |.com...-rsa-sha2|
-000001a0  2d 35 31 32 2c 72 73 61  2d 73 68 61 32 2d 32 35  |-512,rsa-sha2-25|
-000001b0  36 2c 65 63 64 73 61 2d  73 68 61 32 2d 6e 69 73  |6,ecdsa-sha2-nis|
-000001c0  74 70 32 35 36 00 00 00  6c 63 68 61 63 68 61 32  |tp256...lchacha2|
-000001d0  30 2d 70 6f 6c 79 31 33  30 35 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  |0-poly1305@opens|
-000001e0  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61  65 73 31 32 38 2d 63 74  |sh.com,aes128-ct|
-000001f0  72 2c 61 65 73 31 39 32  2d 63 74 72 2c 61 65 73  |r,aes192-ctr,aes|
-00000200  32 35 36 2d 63 74 72 2c  61 65 73 31 32 38 2d 67  |256-ctr,aes128-g|
-00000210  63 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61  |cm@openssh.com,a|
-00000220  65 73 32 35 36 2d 67 63  6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73  |es256-gcm@openss|
-00000230  68 2e 63 6f 6d 00 00 00  6c 63 68 61 63 68 61 32  |h.com...lchacha2|
-00000240  30 2d 70 6f 6c 79 31 33  30 35 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  |0-poly1305@opens|
-00000250  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61  65 73 31 32 38 2d 63 74  |sh.com,aes128-ct|
-00000260  72 2c 61 65 73 31 39 32  2d 63 74 72 2c 61 65 73  |r,aes192-ctr,aes|
-00000270  32 35 36 2d 63 74 72 2c  61 65 73 31 32 38 2d 67  |256-ctr,aes128-g|
-00000280  63 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61  |cm@openssh.com,a|
-00000290  65 73 32 35 36 2d 67 63  6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73  |es256-gcm@openss|
-000002a0  68 2e 63 6f 6d 00 00 00  d5 75 6d 61 63 2d 36 34  |h.com....umac-64|
-000002b0  2d 65 74 6d 40 6f 70 65  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  |-etm@openssh.com|
-000002c0  2c 75 6d 61 63 2d 31 32  38 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f 70  |,umac-128-etm@op|
+000000e0  2d 67 72 6f 75 70 31 34  2d 73 68 61 31 2c 64 69  |-group14-sha1,di|
+000000f0  66 66 69 65 2d 68 65 6c  6c 6d 61 6e 2d 67 72 6f  |ffie-hellman-gro|
+00000100  75 70 31 34 2d 73 68 61  32 35 36 2c 64 69 66 66  |up14-sha256,diff|
+00000110  69 65 2d 68 65 6c 6c 6d  61 6e 2d 67 72 6f 75 70  |ie-hellman-group|
+00000120  31 36 2d 73 68 61 35 31  32 2c 64 69 66 66 69 65  |16-sha512,diffie|
+00000130  2d 68 65 6c 6c 6d 61 6e  2d 67 72 6f 75 70 2d 65  |-hellman-group-e|
+00000140  78 63 68 61 6e 67 65 2d  73 68 61 32 35 36 2c 65  |xchange-sha256,e|
+00000150  78 74 2d 69 6e 66 6f 2d  73 2c 6b 65 78 2d 73 74  |xt-info-s,kex-st|
+00000160  72 69 63 74 2d 73 2d 76  30 30 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  |rict-s-v00@opens|
+00000170  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 00 00  00 2d 72 73 61 2d 73 68  |sh.com...-rsa-sh|
+00000180  61 32 2d 35 31 32 2c 72  73 61 2d 73 68 61 32 2d  |a2-512,rsa-sha2-|
+00000190  32 35 36 2c 65 63 64 73  61 2d 73 68 61 32 2d 6e  |256,ecdsa-sha2-n|
+000001a0  69 73 74 70 32 35 36 00  00 00 6c 63 68 61 63 68  |istp256...lchach|
+000001b0  61 32 30 2d 70 6f 6c 79  31 33 30 35 40 6f 70 65  |a20-poly1305@ope|
+000001c0  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  2c 61 65 73 31 32 38 2d  |nssh.com,aes128-|
+000001d0  67 63 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e  73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c  |gcm@openssh.com,|
+000001e0  61 65 73 32 35 36 2d 67  63 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  |aes256-gcm@opens|
+000001f0  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61  65 73 31 32 38 2d 63 74  |sh.com,aes128-ct|
+00000200  72 2c 61 65 73 31 39 32  2d 63 74 72 2c 61 65 73  |r,aes192-ctr,aes|
+00000210  32 35 36 2d 63 74 72 00  00 00 6c 63 68 61 63 68  |256-ctr...lchach|
+00000220  61 32 30 2d 70 6f 6c 79  31 33 30 35 40 6f 70 65  |a20-poly1305@ope|
+00000230  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  2c 61 65 73 31 32 38 2d  |nssh.com,aes128-|
+00000240  67 63 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e  73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c  |gcm@openssh.com,|
+00000250  61 65 73 32 35 36 2d 67  63 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  |aes256-gcm@opens|
+00000260  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 61  65 73 31 32 38 2d 63 74  |sh.com,aes128-ct|
+00000270  72 2c 61 65 73 31 39 32  2d 63 74 72 2c 61 65 73  |r,aes192-ctr,aes|
+00000280  32 35 36 2d 63 74 72 00  00 00 d5 75 6d 61 63 2d  |256-ctr....umac-|
+00000290  36 34 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f  70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63  |64-etm@openssh.c|
+000002a0  6f 6d 2c 75 6d 61 63 2d  31 32 38 2d 65 74 6d 40  |om,umac-128-etm@|
+000002b0  6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e  63 6f 6d 2c 68 6d 61 63  |openssh.com,hmac|
+000002c0  2d 73 68 61 32 2d 32 35  36 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f 70  |-sha2-256-etm@op|
 000002d0  65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f  6d 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73  |enssh.com,hmac-s|
-000002e0  68 61 32 2d 32 35 36 2d  65 74 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e  |ha2-256-etm@open|
+000002e0  68 61 32 2d 35 31 32 2d  65 74 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e  |ha2-512-etm@open|
 000002f0  73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c  68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61  |ssh.com,hmac-sha|
-00000300  32 2d 35 31 32 2d 65 74  6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73  |2-512-etm@openss|
-00000310  68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 68 6d  61 63 2d 73 68 61 31 2d  |h.com,hmac-sha1-|
-00000320  65 74 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e  73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c  |etm@openssh.com,|
-00000330  75 6d 61 63 2d 36 34 40  6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e  |umac-64@openssh.|
-00000340  63 6f 6d 2c 75 6d 61 63  2d 31 32 38 40 6f 70 65  |com,umac-128@ope|
-00000350  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68  |nssh.com,hmac-sh|
-00000360  61 32 2d 32 35 36 2c 68  6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61 32  |a2-256,hmac-sha2|
-00000370  2d 35 31 32 2c 68 6d 61  63 2d 73 68 61 31 00 00  |-512,hmac-sha1..|
-00000380  00 d5 75 6d 61 63 2d 36  34 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f 70  |..umac-64-etm@op|
-00000390  65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f  6d 2c 75 6d 61 63 2d 31  |enssh.com,umac-1|
-000003a0  32 38 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f  70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63  |28-etm@openssh.c|
-000003b0  6f 6d 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d  73 68 61 32 2d 32 35 36  |om,hmac-sha2-256|
+00000300  31 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f 70  65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f  |1-etm@openssh.co|
+00000310  6d 2c 75 6d 61 63 2d 36  34 40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73  |m,umac-64@openss|
+00000320  68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 75 6d  61 63 2d 31 32 38 40 6f  |h.com,umac-128@o|
+00000330  70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63  6f 6d 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d  |penssh.com,hmac-|
+00000340  73 68 61 32 2d 32 35 36  2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68  |sha2-256,hmac-sh|
+00000350  61 32 2d 35 31 32 2c 68  6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61 31  |a2-512,hmac-sha1|
+00000360  00 00 00 d5 75 6d 61 63  2d 36 34 2d 65 74 6d 40  |....umac-64-etm@|
+00000370  6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e  63 6f 6d 2c 75 6d 61 63  |openssh.com,umac|
+00000380  2d 31 32 38 2d 65 74 6d  40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68  |-128-etm@openssh|
+00000390  2e 63 6f 6d 2c 68 6d 61  63 2d 73 68 61 32 2d 32  |.com,hmac-sha2-2|
+000003a0  35 36 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f  70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63  |56-etm@openssh.c|
+000003b0  6f 6d 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d  73 68 61 32 2d 35 31 32  |om,hmac-sha2-512|
 000003c0  2d 65 74 6d 40 6f 70 65  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  |-etm@openssh.com|
-000003d0  2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68  61 32 2d 35 31 32 2d 65  |,hmac-sha2-512-e|
-000003e0  74 6d 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 68  |tm@openssh.com,h|
-000003f0  6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61 31  2d 65 74 6d 40 6f 70 65  |mac-sha1-etm@ope|
-00000400  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  2c 75 6d 61 63 2d 36 34  |nssh.com,umac-64|
-00000410  40 6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68  2e 63 6f 6d 2c 75 6d 61  |@openssh.com,uma|
-00000420  63 2d 31 32 38 40 6f 70  65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f  |c-128@openssh.co|
-00000430  6d 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73  68 61 32 2d 32 35 36 2c  |m,hmac-sha2-256,|
-00000440  68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61  32 2d 35 31 32 2c 68 6d  |hmac-sha2-512,hm|
-00000450  61 63 2d 73 68 61 31 00  00 00 15 6e 6f 6e 65 2c  |ac-sha1....none,|
-00000460  7a 6c 69 62 40 6f 70 65  6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f 6d  |zlib@openssh.com|
-00000470  00 00 00 15 6e 6f 6e 65  2c 7a 6c 69 62 40 6f 70  |....none,zlib@op|
-00000480  65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63 6f  6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |enssh.com.......|
-00000490  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
+000003d0  2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68  61 31 2d 65 74 6d 40 6f  |,hmac-sha1-etm@o|
+000003e0  70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63  6f 6d 2c 75 6d 61 63 2d  |penssh.com,umac-|
+000003f0  36 34 40 6f 70 65 6e 73  73 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2c 75  |64@openssh.com,u|
+00000400  6d 61 63 2d 31 32 38 40  6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e  |mac-128@openssh.|
+00000410  63 6f 6d 2c 68 6d 61 63  2d 73 68 61 32 2d 32 35  |com,hmac-sha2-25|
+00000420  36 2c 68 6d 61 63 2d 73  68 61 32 2d 35 31 32 2c  |6,hmac-sha2-512,|
+00000430  68 6d 61 63 2d 73 68 61  31 00 00 00 15 6e 6f 6e  |hmac-sha1....non|
+00000440  65 2c 7a 6c 69 62 40 6f  70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e 63  |e,zlib@openssh.c|
+00000450  6f 6d 00 00 00 15 6e 6f  6e 65 2c 7a 6c 69 62 40  |om....none,zlib@|
+00000460  6f 70 65 6e 73 73 68 2e  63 6f 6d 00 00 00 00 00  |openssh.com.....|
+00000470  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
 >>> Flow 5 (client to server)
-00000000  00 00 00 2c 06 1e 00 00  00 20 aa 80 4b 53 a8 4b  |...,..... ..KS.K|
-00000010  4c 0f fa ac a3 b8 5f 64  7d 36 42 e7 1d 56 45 7e  |L....._d}6B..VE~|
-00000020  2b ac e0 f9 e7 60 f5 d7  55 37 b8 cc 87 3c 23 dc  |+....`..U7...<#.|
+00000000  00 00 00 2c 06 1e 00 00  00 20 13 87 32 34 3e 68  |...,..... ..24>h|
+00000010  e6 9b 9a cb 23 22 06 11  e8 24 71 e5 d7 96 79 83  |....#"...$q...y.|
+00000020  48 59 1a 95 f2 b0 86 1c  76 54 58 e8 a3 63 9c a8  |HY......vTX..c..|
 >>> Flow 6 (server to client)
-00000000  00 00 01 04 0b 1f 00 00  00 68 00 00 00 13 65 63  |.........h....ec|
+00000000  00 00 01 04 0a 1f 00 00  00 68 00 00 00 13 65 63  |.........h....ec|
 00000010  64 73 61 2d 73 68 61 32  2d 6e 69 73 74 70 32 35  |dsa-sha2-nistp25|
 00000020  36 00 00 00 08 6e 69 73  74 70 32 35 36 00 00 00  |6....nistp256...|
 00000030  41 04 8b d1 dd c3 a2 af  65 c5 b1 7e 0d 88 0e 10  |A.......e..~....|
 00000040  3b 52 4a 43 b7 3c ed e9  9a 89 5d 2b 05 74 b7 7e  |;RJC.<....]+.t.~|
 00000050  2b 1e 12 dd 2c 78 71 53  be eb f6 4e 5d 19 cf 98  |+...,xqS...N]...|
 00000060  d0 25 2d 4a a3 4a 15 2c  50 10 67 80 6d 2e d9 fa  |.%-J.J.,P.g.m...|
-00000070  84 a8 00 00 00 20 e8 01  e7 b0 7b 47 62 2e ac 12  |..... ....{Gb...|
-00000080  80 ba 70 5b a4 65 6a 25  50 1c 59 6c f3 12 ed 64  |..p[.ej%P.Yl...d|
-00000090  2c f3 7a 3b 0e 53 00 00  00 63 00 00 00 13 65 63  |,.z;.S...c....ec|
+00000070  84 a8 00 00 00 20 85 12  a8 ca dd 22 7d 74 89 87  |..... ....."}t..|
+00000080  df 36 23 6e fb 59 c0 75  4b 38 1e 49 d6 fa 5e 8c  |.6#n.Y.uK8.I..^.|
+00000090  cd 6c eb fd 26 34 00 00  00 64 00 00 00 13 65 63  |.l..&4...d....ec|
 000000a0  64 73 61 2d 73 68 61 32  2d 6e 69 73 74 70 32 35  |dsa-sha2-nistp25|
-000000b0  36 00 00 00 48 00 00 00  1f 1f dd 4b cc 7e f3 af  |6...H......K.~..|
-000000c0  63 93 77 64 79 a8 77 02  96 98 cb 96 59 a6 a6 a2  |c.wdy.w.....Y...|
-000000d0  9b 23 08 d0 f5 2e 13 04  00 00 00 21 00 e9 d8 dc  |.#.........!....|
-000000e0  27 de b1 e8 bc ee 5e ca  9e 62 20 09 d3 08 43 f6  |'.....^..b ...C.|
-000000f0  d0 7d a1 6a f7 6d 64 64  81 ea 63 82 f8 00 00 00  |.}.j.mdd..c.....|
+000000b0  36 00 00 00 49 00 00 00  21 00 f4 8e 10 b5 77 04  |6...I...!.....w.|
+000000c0  3e 1b 59 06 4f ef 48 08  2b 15 07 4a 69 0f 30 a2  |>.Y.O.H.+..Ji.0.|
+000000d0  a4 37 7b 5e f9 de 15 0a  ca 1a 00 00 00 20 6a 97  |.7{^......... j.|
+000000e0  a3 23 e3 7c 92 67 28 0d  02 9e 36 e0 ae b1 f3 37  |.#.|.g(...6....7|
+000000f0  19 34 12 cd bf db 84 31  8e 97 72 a5 e1 3f 00 00  |.4.....1..r..?..|
 00000100  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 0c 0a 15 00 00  |................|
-00000110  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 01 40 62 ac b9 7c  |...........@b..||
-00000120  06 dc 0b 16 24 e2 56 cd  b2 3a f9 51 ab e8 62 3e  |....$.V..:.Q..b>|
-00000130  72 a8 fa 95 2d af 2d d0  54 e1 de 08 a3 97 11 08  |r...-.-.T.......|
-00000140  52 6b d5 dd 7e 81 be a5  f9 71 83 9e 68 f8 7e d1  |Rk..~....q..h.~.|
-00000150  e8 22 8b b3 ff b2 2e 67  16 af d8 df 74 3f bf d6  |.".....g....t?..|
-00000160  aa 46 3d 49 90 3d fa 12  6a 6f 75 98 1b b8 67 22  |.F=I.=..jou...g"|
-00000170  d0 06 31 61 eb 29 aa 21  fb 7d e4 7e c7 ff b4 e5  |..1a.).!.}.~....|
-00000180  a1 0f da 75 74 6f c0 45  31 3f e1 7a 29 d0 ff 25  |...uto.E1?.z)..%|
-00000190  64 8c 49 5c c5 bf 9c 44  36 67 e1 86 5c e9 13 23  |d.I\...D6g..\..#|
-000001a0  b8 d5 85 5d 33 4b 19 a5  fa bc 50 86 08 32 08 48  |...]3K....P..2.H|
-000001b0  5e 0e 2e 68 9a ff 96 6a  00 51 d9 16 87 a6 88 c1  |^..h...j.Q......|
-000001c0  dd b5 9c 18 3b fc 66 6a  ff a7 60 f6 4a 29 f8 5d  |....;.fj..`.J).]|
-000001d0  fd 8d 5e 6a f0 1a 70 21  d6 4e c0 92 e3 95 96 b8  |..^j..p!.N......|
-000001e0  fa 50 90 58 c5 59 6a 20  12 3d ce d4 49 0e da 2e  |.P.X.Yj .=..I...|
-000001f0  1d 2c b9 28 d1 71 52 49  43 25 90 24 b2 16 a9 58  |.,.(.qRIC%.$...X|
-00000200  0f f3 07 94 92 83 8e 1a  3f 2a 92 a3 42 80 0e 3c  |........?*..B..<|
-00000210  42 7a 7c 65 3a f0 86 cf  40 49 9b f7 e6 a5 3d 36  |Bz|e:...@I....=6|
-00000220  f6 ae db 6e 6c 39 cc 5e  47 f4 eb d2 c6 61 5e 61  |...nl9.^G....a^a|
-00000230  e0 58 6c 16 13 c4 74 db  e1 be 29 fc 84 be 42 22  |.Xl...t...)...B"|
-00000240  14 72 ab 29 f1 ea 10 2c  34 1c 5e d2 a4 19 0d cb  |.r.)...,4.^.....|
-00000250  23 e0 d3 db 4d 5d 50 c7  a0 82 11 ed 1d 49 d3 4e  |#...M]P......I.N|
-00000260  32 be db 14 c1 fc 4b dc  97 3a 38 9b              |2.....K..:8.|
+00000110  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 01 40 03 fb e9 4c  |...........@...L|
+00000120  15 76 5c bf 4b d7 6a 8b  2a 83 6f df bd 5e f6 45  |.v\.K.j.*.o..^.E|
+00000130  b2 2b bc bf 38 9f f0 30  13 e1 03 67 d3 4f e6 6f  |.+..8..0...g.O.o|
+00000140  88 97 39 8e a6 2d df 6f  a7 d2 90 df c2 9a 87 93  |..9..-.o........|
+00000150  ad 91 12 2e 92 c1 c4 bb  93 b7 7d 6e fd 7c c2 10  |..........}n.|..|
+00000160  fe fa b6 22 7e a5 a7 64  c4 25 ce cc bb 5d a5 f0  |..."~..d.%...]..|
+00000170  ad 41 c7 8c a1 59 c3 a9  23 f0 69 38 4a 64 2a a1  |.A...Y..#.i8Jd*.|
+00000180  62 8d bc 69 1c c1 01 ce  ac a9 30 58 a1 d0 68 92  |b..i......0X..h.|
+00000190  35 e8 7b 3a bf 1b 68 82  f6 90 8e dd 01 e6 92 4b  |5.{:..h........K|
+000001a0  bc ce 50 a8 96 2a 7d a5  4d 61 13 98 67 83 11 70  |..P..*}.Ma..g..p|
+000001b0  ef f2 af 94 a6 0c 34 78  05 a8 39 d3 44 f6 c4 13  |......4x..9.D...|
+000001c0  76 59 77 38 72 83 c4 92  a7 4c 7f 5e 25 08 9b a0  |vYw8r....L.^%...|
+000001d0  6f eb 02 4d 4d c6 0a 07  09 2d c6 80 d3 05 8b c2  |o..MM....-......|
+000001e0  e7 de 37 16 5a db 1c 02  2e 35 fb 3a 93 ce 79 4e  |..7.Z....5.:..yN|
+000001f0  0c 25 05 c9 b7 be b7 47  31 8c 18 d8 37 ba 66 34  |.%.....G1...7.f4|
+00000200  bb 03 15 0d 0d cc da ad  2d 2c 36 0f 88 3f 5a 70  |........-,6..?Zp|
+00000210  21 5f f1 cc 8a 21 e7 5a  af c7 7c a0 e3 51 04 4a  |!_...!.Z..|..Q.J|
+00000220  d3 cb bb a4 60 2f d1 28  7b 6f 52 10 e8 76 fa c2  |....`/.({oR..v..|
+00000230  86 9b 08 3f b2 72 e5 f0  0a 7c e0 19 ce 6f d2 74  |...?.r...|...o.t|
+00000240  3e 12 8f 7d 1e 21 73 25  57 b8 c9 96 ad 35 f3 b6  |>..}.!s%W....5..|
+00000250  5f b0 ae 82 90 4b 05 10  de 11 46 ea ad d7 3b 08  |_....K....F...;.|
+00000260  a6 0d b5 24 f6 e3 ae 3b  67 3c a0 44              |...$...;g<.D|
 >>> Flow 7 (client to server)
-00000000  00 00 00 0c 0a 15 62 b8  d2 60 16 9a fa 2f 75 ab  |......b..`.../u.|
-00000010  00 00 00 20 d9 dc 27 14  2c 6d 93 10 bd 87 c5 06  |... ..'.,m......|
-00000020  90 80 21 40 13 e5 86 f4  39 f1 5b b5 75 ed 31 19  |..!@....9.[.u.1.|
-00000030  87 05 83 a7 5f 28 81 02  d0 6e b4 f0 bd 89 0a e5  |...._(...n......|
-00000040  fa 1e ac 07                                       |....|
+00000000  00 00 00 0c 0a 15 a1 e3  f9 ae 57 e2 35 b8 cc 87  |..........W.5...|
+00000010  00 00 00 20 ba d9 4a 00  05 48 df ec d8 c5 bf f8  |... ..J..H......|
+00000020  7d ed c8 ac a8 5f 1c 46  a0 21 c3 26 7e c6 51 2d  |}...._.F.!.&~.Q-|
+00000030  b8 e8 12 50 38 3a 08 8c  a8 0e 98 e7 8c 27 4f 4d  |...P8:.......'OM|
+00000040  76 42 94 1f                                       |vB..|
 >>> Flow 8 (server to client)
-00000000  00 00 00 20 03 52 b6 aa  7d 30 65 ad 08 b8 dd d1  |... .R..}0e.....|
-00000010  7f f0 3e b5 69 43 fa 0f  06 2a 18 5d 9d 4e b0 13  |..>.iC...*.].N..|
-00000020  d8 4a 06 ca e1 d7 99 f9  59 14 d0 ef 0b a1 1a 47  |.J......Y......G|
-00000030  8f c5 4b e5                                       |..K.|
+00000000  00 00 00 20 53 c2 11 dc  60 cb f1 e0 55 eb f8 50  |... S...`...U..P|
+00000010  38 11 aa 98 fc 4c 2a d1  36 0f 57 c2 c9 55 cb 04  |8....L*.6.W..U..|
+00000020  dc 2f 79 36 28 5d fa 67  08 01 0a 1b fc a5 57 cd  |./y6(].g......W.|
+00000030  7f 67 ea 81                                       |.g..|
 >>> Flow 9 (client to server)
-00000000  00 00 00 30 34 a3 2c 36  49 de 9d 6c 4b 74 c4 0d  |...04.,6I..lKt..|
-00000010  2d 25 98 e4 6b 48 58 c5  e0 e6 04 90 31 11 59 4f  |-%..kHX.....1.YO|
-00000020  f0 33 8d e8 1a 9b e9 b5  02 fb 26 32 0e 5a 09 7b  |.3........&2.Z.{|
-00000030  5f 2a 80 dd 72 17 cd ed  cb 54 ca 3b 50 44 ed 1f  |_*..r....T.;PD..|
-00000040  d4 4b b4 9b                                       |.K..|
+00000000  00 00 00 30 c5 dd dd 05  d4 df 9e 48 d6 58 76 a1  |...0.......H.Xv.|
+00000010  8a 7e 04 c6 51 26 44 1a  cb 85 8b 9a 51 44 bd 57  |.~..Q&D.....QD.W|
+00000020  bc 4f 2e a0 0a b9 e0 ee  00 b6 57 d3 2f 52 71 8e  |.O........W./Rq.|
+00000030  b6 4e f6 f7 34 7c 9f fe  c7 c7 ec ca 08 6f d9 b0  |.N..4|.......o..|
+00000040  e3 85 81 49                                       |...I|
 >>> Flow 10 (server to client)
-00000000  00 00 00 20 7e c0 e9 9e  89 d7 16 2d 48 c0 e0 bf  |... ~......-H...|
-00000010  dd c3 89 1e 08 3e ee ab  73 77 77 2e 5a 62 14 02  |.....>..sww.Zb..|
-00000020  6a 7f c2 e9 19 c0 df 69  43 60 82 d6 ea ff da f0  |j......iC`......|
-00000030  fa 40 2b b6 00 00 00 40  3a 06 de c5 ac 63 46 77  |.@+....@:....cFw|
-00000040  a8 8e a1 d0 be 35 cb 27  34 d1 63 a1 0c b2 c3 30  |.....5.'4.c....0|
-00000050  c6 d8 bd 92 7a f7 48 4b  95 a5 5f 6e 4e ca 6f 60  |....z.HK.._nN.o`|
-00000060  32 11 4d d0 15 2e 31 22  03 1a 89 fa 91 e0 ea 10  |2.M...1"........|
-00000070  7b e4 4e d8 a8 a7 a4 35  3c b0 76 39 6e e9 ef c9  |{.N....5<.v9n...|
-00000080  69 02 c8 01 51 bc fb ad                           |i...Q...|
+00000000  00 00 00 20 4e d8 10 08  39 ab 47 f6 49 42 4e bd  |... N...9.G.IBN.|
+00000010  2f 69 f7 bc 48 26 1b 5f  ee ee 08 25 2e b8 8d 1f  |/i..H&._...%....|
+00000020  a0 e0 fa 11 28 26 9c af  f0 6b 7e e0 f0 00 8f 92  |....(&...k~.....|
+00000030  08 96 73 64 00 00 00 40  60 bb 40 d2 c4 8f 5e 09  |..sd...@`.@...^.|
+00000040  e6 d9 13 04 fc 4e 21 81  51 dc ad 06 48 51 fc 35  |.....N!.Q...HQ.5|
+00000050  b2 cd bb ba df 66 c4 20  b1 c0 b0 7e 7b c0 a7 41  |.....f. ...~{..A|
+00000060  6f 16 7a fe 01 fe 3a be  45 4a b9 94 d1 46 a1 82  |o.z...:.EJ...F..|
+00000070  09 24 97 57 17 83 9e e6  1b 4e 04 83 a0 73 55 08  |.$.W.....N...sU.|
+00000080  2f e6 de 6b 43 77 84 31                           |/..kCw.1|
 >>> Flow 11 (client to server)
-00000000  00 00 01 60 3a fe b0 e3  19 9e ef b8 4b 47 ac 18  |...`:.......KG..|
-00000010  52 0f 93 e5 04 69 58 d5  51 b9 82 ab 56 41 5c 73  |R....iX.Q...VA\s|
-00000020  e2 e7 d1 98 41 f2 73 30  13 b5 7d ca 0e 0d 78 7b  |....A.s0..}...x{|
-00000030  01 83 ab e7 ce 1d 3b 8c  14 ed c5 0d 39 cf 82 f3  |......;.....9...|
-00000040  f6 eb 9e 17 c4 36 61 78  5b 50 66 2d 8c 37 cf fb  |.....6ax[Pf-.7..|
-00000050  42 44 45 fc 94 a8 e2 d2  9e 5e 5f 12 85 f2 4a 46  |BDE......^_...JF|
-00000060  50 fc 5c 04 80 2e 17 ce  7e f2 a6 ee 94 7c e7 99  |P.\.....~....|..|
-00000070  6c a3 b3 5d 08 23 f6 10  6f 79 8b a0 56 20 d3 ed  |l..].#..oy..V ..|
-00000080  e0 44 07 fb dc d3 b6 64  5b c2 d4 66 77 3e 39 a2  |.D.....d[..fw>9.|
-00000090  57 4b 44 95 96 33 4b 51  51 40 3f f0 9a db 95 96  |WKD..3KQQ@?.....|
-000000a0  41 3c f2 d6 7c d3 bb 6b  a5 b1 b3 67 0b 94 38 e1  |A<..|..k...g..8.|
-000000b0  4d e5 68 68 f4 e0 93 57  d7 01 7b 4d 9c 8c 18 32  |M.hh...W..{M...2|
-000000c0  44 3a 93 7b 38 3b 19 0f  63 98 04 15 22 1e ce 09  |D:.{8;..c..."...|
-000000d0  db f5 80 2e 42 bb 22 59  9d 04 05 7e 67 32 c8 52  |....B."Y...~g2.R|
-000000e0  9f 2d d0 02 e9 ad d0 7f  1d b3 f8 64 f2 4b ff 03  |.-.........d.K..|
-000000f0  56 6b 28 b5 bb 2e 3c eb  47 5b 95 96 26 64 8a 8e  |Vk(...<.G[..&d..|
-00000100  96 e6 fe bd ee 71 e7 53  6b 27 a6 b7 38 ba 8c 5b  |.....q.Sk'..8..[|
-00000110  14 14 08 ec 59 e7 a5 42  b4 0e 0e 39 09 c1 25 bc  |....Y..B...9..%.|
-00000120  6f 9b 94 85 14 ae 76 6c  94 f2 58 d5 ad 73 01 fc  |o.....vl..X..s..|
-00000130  f1 6c 0d e7 13 f1 9b 86  54 33 b3 d2 c0 78 3e 9b  |.l......T3...x>.|
-00000140  fb aa e2 ce c8 1f 3e f5  19 2e 22 78 fb 02 4d ab  |......>..."x..M.|
-00000150  49 52 3e 17 6c 22 a7 4a  19 aa 68 a1 12 d6 24 4e  |IR>.l".J..h...$N|
-00000160  e7 0d 39 cc a5 1a 90 f6  26 15 75 9f 80 88 74 11  |..9.....&.u...t.|
-00000170  9f d8 2b 2e                                       |..+.|
+00000000  00 00 01 60 f2 7d b2 4f  d9 db ec 78 6b a2 c2 77  |...`.}.O...xk..w|
+00000010  6a a1 f8 d0 3c 5c e0 3b  d3 99 33 ac 54 4b f7 e2  |j...<\.;..3.TK..|
+00000020  3d 1f 6e 51 6f 4c c2 7e  d5 3a 79 1e 9f 51 70 75  |=.nQoL.~.:y..Qpu|
+00000030  67 35 8c f8 5d 62 35 9a  ff fe b2 46 6f 72 47 0b  |g5..]b5....ForG.|
+00000040  5b 78 30 5b ce 54 5c ab  46 a4 a5 12 8b ef 32 2e  |[x0[.T\.F.....2.|
+00000050  1e a9 4a 25 07 9e a3 87  42 f9 69 ae c6 9d 83 68  |..J%....B.i....h|
+00000060  e8 dd 19 a3 ef 4e 97 c9  ef 19 be a7 08 77 28 7d  |.....N.......w(}|
+00000070  ee aa b4 a4 3a e5 c1 4e  78 ee b2 b7 50 6d f2 eb  |....:..Nx...Pm..|
+00000080  2b df 38 22 a3 c9 be f7  ea 36 2f 7d f7 25 fd f4  |+.8".....6/}.%..|
+00000090  9f 54 ec cf d5 82 5c 4b  e5 e0 3f 74 da 9d d0 32  |.T....\K..?t...2|
+000000a0  06 f6 a1 13 15 f4 11 24  e9 74 4c 9b 5e e2 c8 5b  |.......$.tL.^..[|
+000000b0  32 6b 89 87 d4 d4 ee e3  0c 81 16 d4 54 b7 97 ef  |2k..........T...|
+000000c0  c6 a4 d7 16 2d 87 be 2c  19 b8 48 9d d6 82 3c 82  |....-..,..H...<.|
+000000d0  88 de bc 18 5b 64 ab aa  d7 ac 8b 64 6a ad a8 4d  |....[d.....dj..M|
+000000e0  5a 20 a3 6e ee 7b 7f bf  dc 6d 69 6a b0 8b ee 26  |Z .n.{...mij...&|
+000000f0  0b 34 f0 22 a6 81 0f d3  b5 15 e8 86 1b 71 1a 60  |.4.".........q.`|
+00000100  16 dc 2f 6b ca 63 6c 52  b3 33 42 46 c0 ea 63 50  |../k.clR.3BF..cP|
+00000110  bb 23 29 69 79 0c 23 3f  fb da 29 dd 94 44 f1 7e  |.#)iy.#?..)..D.~|
+00000120  58 1c 12 0f df a7 80 3c  69 8a 44 f7 4d 2e 7b db  |X......<i.D.M.{.|
+00000130  c2 5a 01 c0 0c 57 8e ff  4f 98 74 71 c3 3b 61 fc  |.Z...W..O.tq.;a.|
+00000140  1b e6 fb 4c 75 33 ff 6b  0e 83 52 40 4a 7f 35 2f  |...Lu3.k..R@J.5/|
+00000150  82 38 40 22 22 bc 51 6e  21 ce f9 bb 02 bf 26 a5  |.8@"".Qn!.....&.|
+00000160  63 9b 91 c3 37 46 6d f6  fe 19 27 5f 91 68 a7 29  |c...7Fm...'_.h.)|
+00000170  b7 00 27 37                                       |..'7|
 >>> Flow 12 (server to client)
-00000000  00 00 01 40 07 30 22 23  53 70 62 fd 53 15 21 49  |...@.0"#Spb.S.!I|
-00000010  b7 ff 50 fc c0 4e 4d 8f  ef 4b 09 8a 9f e0 0e de  |..P..NM..K......|
-00000020  de 3d 06 cf e2 8c f1 cc  92 c4 84 78 6f 1e 4a cd  |.=.........xo.J.|
-00000030  8b 8a 61 a9 ff 6e 3c c2  3c d0 0e 70 5d 6e 4e 40  |..a..n<.<..p]nN@|
-00000040  c0 8a 4f 3b e4 25 05 15  21 63 09 fd f7 fd ee d9  |..O;.%..!c......|
-00000050  92 10 e1 e6 6a 27 ae ff  fe 1e 66 7a 00 e7 27 95  |....j'....fz..'.|
-00000060  d2 fe 32 5f f8 79 89 ea  25 19 62 44 04 aa 84 8c  |..2_.y..%.bD....|
-00000070  2b 46 b4 73 e3 4f 9b d9  bd 39 7d 13 91 5c 55 44  |+F.s.O...9}..\UD|
-00000080  70 67 8e 50 5b 12 23 b4  39 82 cd 15 ac 77 91 bf  |pg.P[.#.9....w..|
-00000090  4d ea d7 4c e2 ef 7b 0a  f6 4e 77 aa 47 49 fd a2  |M..L..{..Nw.GI..|
-000000a0  bd ae 0e 06 d8 23 df f2  c7 62 8a c0 13 24 3e 30  |.....#...b...$>0|
-000000b0  5d ba 3e e1 3f 5d 80 34  54 ab e0 00 7c 61 5b 17  |].>.?].4T...|a[.|
-000000c0  23 c6 7e c6 d2 d1 01 0a  32 a5 d5 85 3e ec dd a8  |#.~.....2...>...|
-000000d0  13 dc 52 e8 c4 85 56 04  3d 98 2d 72 6a f2 bb 52  |..R...V.=.-rj..R|
-000000e0  ae f0 86 ff 99 9e a9 b9  23 4c 27 65 41 5b 27 37  |........#L'eA['7|
-000000f0  93 ee ac 33 f8 c9 23 e9  3e 5a 4d d3 58 51 e8 e4  |...3..#.>ZM.XQ..|
-00000100  7e 3f 45 d3 d0 02 ab 5b  9d 12 5d 16 34 7b 01 dd  |~?E....[..].4{..|
-00000110  fb 77 cf 24 55 f5 0d 00  56 9c 94 4c 96 af eb 68  |.w.$U...V..L...h|
-00000120  af 80 d8 20 8a 7f 26 6b  ec 47 64 0c 9d 05 9c 8f  |... ..&k.Gd.....|
-00000130  93 3a 2c 89 81 ae 37 6f  f5 53 43 19 cf 7d c7 95  |.:,...7o.SC..}..|
-00000140  6d f1 25 ff c1 8f 26 5b  4f b1 a0 99 cf 29 b7 cc  |m.%...&[O....)..|
-00000150  72 b2 49 83                                       |r.I.|
+00000000  00 00 01 40 ed 8c ad 60  63 f2 de d8 77 4e ea e5  |...@...`c...wN..|
+00000010  7f 0e e7 65 d5 07 51 66  b5 f6 60 1f ba f0 00 59  |...e..Qf..`....Y|
+00000020  ed b3 87 97 9f 52 71 a1  60 9b 3b ef 16 5c 69 2b  |.....Rq.`.;..\i+|
+00000030  73 1b 35 01 61 52 d6 36  50 5b 61 04 da e3 eb 2f  |s.5.aR.6P[a..../|
+00000040  b1 5f e4 b2 20 fa f9 52  76 ff 90 66 fe 69 98 26  |._.. ..Rv..f.i.&|
+00000050  c2 72 9f 93 aa e3 bb 9a  b4 28 62 e3 ea 7f 94 c6  |.r.......(b.....|
+00000060  92 e3 2a 81 99 6c 08 f1  df 99 dc d1 a0 cd d0 e6  |..*..l..........|
+00000070  31 21 7b d4 c0 e7 85 66  2c 3f 0e 9e 8f 8b 49 11  |1!{....f,?....I.|
+00000080  64 6b 61 c4 39 15 d2 c0  83 76 f5 cf f5 5d 0c dc  |dka.9....v...]..|
+00000090  03 37 22 a7 fa f5 3c 8b  b2 a4 2f 1b c3 57 7f 9a  |.7"...<.../..W..|
+000000a0  4b eb 80 dc e2 17 fd 8f  55 90 b9 03 2d 7f 1e e8  |K.......U...-...|
+000000b0  5a 2b 08 57 76 a1 c7 7b  46 97 68 6e af b4 42 8a  |Z+.Wv..{F.hn..B.|
+000000c0  ea 13 b1 d7 7a 88 c1 f1  9d 45 ec 41 aa ed ef a0  |....z....E.A....|
+000000d0  40 3b b8 74 e4 80 88 a9  6a bf d4 a8 9c 27 3d 21  |@;.t....j....'=!|
+000000e0  65 8f 28 8a e5 4e 33 a7  fd 9b 78 08 07 ee d0 cf  |e.(..N3...x.....|
+000000f0  51 f9 b7 5c e3 6c cb 07  5a 74 55 f6 0f ef 42 2b  |Q..\.l..ZtU...B+|
+00000100  da 28 ac 34 e7 70 64 9b  4d 35 dd a0 d6 94 4f 48  |.(.4.pd.M5....OH|
+00000110  d0 91 d5 6b 36 64 9e ce  88 c7 07 9b b7 c4 2e e3  |...k6d..........|
+00000120  3b a9 0e 2e b2 63 f6 f6  0c 38 48 71 a0 a4 de 1b  |;....c...8Hq....|
+00000130  42 61 82 1e d8 1f d0 6b  83 71 ff e8 d5 c6 bc 7b  |Ba.....k.q.....{|
+00000140  ee 53 5b 87 b5 38 cf 07  5d 73 6e 59 cb d5 d7 d6  |.S[..8..]snY....|
+00000150  bc 76 4e e8                                       |.vN.|
 >>> Flow 13 (client to server)
-00000000  00 00 02 80 28 72 8e 75  6f ff ec ad 60 fe ff b9  |....(r.uo...`...|
-00000010  e9 92 32 54 9f 41 16 05  7d ea 7d 65 36 d9 90 d1  |..2T.A..}.}e6...|
-00000020  e1 0b 5d 7c c9 86 08 de  9b fb 7d 45 6f 08 3f b0  |..]|......}Eo.?.|
-00000030  74 54 75 53 0f d2 03 fa  d8 d4 d7 98 db e3 ed 2c  |tTuS...........,|
-00000040  76 21 10 53 84 ed 08 53  98 50 5b 93 38 cd 82 35  |v!.S...S.P[.8..5|
-00000050  f3 f6 06 cb fd 67 06 4f  4c a9 86 1a bd 27 40 77  |.....g.OL....'@w|
-00000060  87 04 da b8 d5 3a bc c6  18 4b 41 54 d4 bc fc 49  |.....:...KAT...I|
-00000070  26 e0 4b e1 e9 3b 1a 05  c9 22 94 8e 52 40 30 1d  |&.K..;..."..R@0.|
-00000080  bb 53 c6 96 2a 38 24 3b  e1 23 4d 9f 53 27 b1 3b  |.S..*8$;.#M.S'.;|
-00000090  39 49 89 a8 d3 02 59 90  fa ee 6f e1 63 d1 6a 86  |9I....Y...o.c.j.|
-000000a0  c0 c0 f0 78 2f 5c d7 19  42 59 9d 72 03 96 f8 cd  |...x/\..BY.r....|
-000000b0  d1 4f 0a 7f c2 e7 cb 87  6e 9a 68 45 05 03 b5 66  |.O......n.hE...f|
-000000c0  4f d1 de 9b 97 b4 79 d3  ad b9 b9 ab 49 9a fb 38  |O.....y.....I..8|
-000000d0  1e cc bb ce 8a 14 f5 0c  4b b5 6e ce 87 18 d0 bd  |........K.n.....|
-000000e0  4f 57 28 bf a5 06 1a d2  85 92 61 45 d8 38 c4 5b  |OW(.......aE.8.[|
-000000f0  6e 0e 65 64 4e e9 dc f6  a4 2c 1c 31 c5 d9 28 fd  |n.edN....,.1..(.|
-00000100  71 19 c3 2b f0 23 6f f7  c8 2a 6e 4d 1d 5c 93 94  |q..+.#o..*nM.\..|
-00000110  ff 9b 5f 33 7f 6c 18 e2  de f4 08 ea 99 ac 83 39  |.._3.l.........9|
-00000120  25 6c 16 eb 7f da 70 f8  9e 89 76 5f 4c b1 86 6f  |%l....p...v_L..o|
-00000130  0e 0e cb 62 af dc 35 e4  20 83 7e e3 37 ca 67 2e  |...b..5. .~.7.g.|
-00000140  9c e3 97 e3 d0 09 fd 6a  1c 70 e0 ca c8 a4 1e 9d  |.......j.p......|
-00000150  67 10 07 ef ec 98 c9 7e  c2 b2 7f f6 ba 30 34 e0  |g......~.....04.|
-00000160  a7 1c da 9b cf f5 5b 11  5a 43 97 47 ad e6 d7 da  |......[.ZC.G....|
-00000170  28 4a 17 92 58 1a ae a7  c2 29 2c 29 5c c4 fd 41  |(J..X....),)\..A|
-00000180  43 99 27 dc a9 5a 06 fd  d8 50 36 95 73 42 8a e6  |C.'..Z...P6.sB..|
-00000190  a9 9b 66 a6 d4 b6 56 4b  3e b7 a5 cb f4 82 e6 93  |..f...VK>.......|
-000001a0  40 e6 f2 0c ed d5 d0 bf  be 30 5a 3c c2 18 9f 8d  |@........0Z<....|
-000001b0  35 f8 d8 26 60 a4 84 d8  3b 22 96 ad 58 6e 62 15  |5..&`...;"..Xnb.|
-000001c0  aa 23 66 4b d7 78 63 7a  95 02 41 45 9d 70 47 ef  |.#fK.xcz..AE.pG.|
-000001d0  54 0e 60 61 9a 18 f9 6e  1e e4 35 55 ef cf d2 33  |T.`a...n..5U...3|
-000001e0  92 0f 28 a2 74 81 c1 62  4e 14 a3 6a 4b b1 d7 32  |..(.t..bN..jK..2|
-000001f0  95 3a e8 4b 00 61 19 3a  57 a0 a0 a6 a2 85 3d d9  |.:.K.a.:W.....=.|
-00000200  47 5f 79 26 c6 21 c3 94  27 c2 9e 57 57 2f 43 1a  |G_y&.!..'..WW/C.|
-00000210  5e ea da 9b c3 69 29 90  d4 17 63 41 4b 24 cc ed  |^....i)...cAK$..|
-00000220  37 3c d2 d3 4a 87 29 25  4a 83 03 0f 48 9e 86 80  |7<..J.)%J...H...|
-00000230  54 e1 01 df 83 8c 83 49  c1 18 ff a8 22 12 73 da  |T......I....".s.|
-00000240  e9 d7 d1 76 04 74 f3 eb  6e f8 15 07 92 21 67 28  |...v.t..n....!g(|
-00000250  b9 9f 07 71 e5 83 78 1f  27 6e 92 82 48 7b 70 ce  |...q..x.'n..H{p.|
-00000260  46 d9 e3 6a e2 9c 77 cf  45 e3 5f e5 ab 44 ca 51  |F..j..w.E._..D.Q|
-00000270  ea 40 81 4a 85 89 0d 7c  ab 4d 09 81 2e d7 7d 3e  |.@.J...|.M....}>|
-00000280  fc 43 ca ad 9f 4f fc f4  52 cb 4e 40 97 9f e4 3d  |.C...O..R.N@...=|
-00000290  ef 02 58 d5                                       |..X.|
+00000000  00 00 02 80 62 66 4c ce  e6 ed b9 56 ed 11 4a 46  |....bfL....V..JF|
+00000010  93 45 c7 16 71 c0 e2 c4  fc bf 06 58 fb 20 3d ca  |.E..q......X. =.|
+00000020  2f 85 8f 6f da 51 9a 0d  90 3e 0b e0 af d5 00 5d  |/..o.Q...>.....]|
+00000030  f2 17 db fb 3c e9 4a 93  df a7 f2 a9 e1 d0 65 33  |....<.J.......e3|
+00000040  18 f2 45 09 28 4e eb d2  58 22 b7 9e a9 df b4 48  |..E.(N..X".....H|
+00000050  8e 60 e0 b3 b6 78 e9 e5  1c 37 26 1a a1 82 4b e8  |.`...x...7&...K.|
+00000060  c3 9d 06 69 f5 13 59 18  2a 78 f6 2c 36 f0 96 0a  |...i..Y.*x.,6...|
+00000070  99 c5 f0 90 de 38 c4 58  b7 0d 42 0f e1 5d 11 2f  |.....8.X..B..]./|
+00000080  1f 56 da d6 d9 94 86 68  df bb 4b df ce ea 31 86  |.V.....h..K...1.|
+00000090  32 cc 7f 50 75 ac 03 f3  48 c1 7b 58 7f db f8 3b  |2..Pu...H.{X...;|
+000000a0  5e 02 79 9d 59 38 9d 7f  7c ee 24 8b a1 22 92 a0  |^.y.Y8..|.$.."..|
+000000b0  a1 52 2a 09 3a a1 b8 fb  3e be 40 63 7d af cf 21  |.R*.:...>.@c}..!|
+000000c0  c8 a0 b6 86 94 af d8 bc  21 3b 83 77 55 c4 0a d0  |........!;.wU...|
+000000d0  8e ea 4b 19 04 e7 88 2d  6f ff 9f 79 32 8a 7a 7d  |..K....-o..y2.z}|
+000000e0  20 09 9b 52 05 d7 a2 95  53 0d 7b 57 b0 92 be 0e  | ..R....S.{W....|
+000000f0  52 c2 0e c2 71 a4 d2 67  f5 80 e9 89 7b 6c d1 ea  |R...q..g....{l..|
+00000100  7c 83 f1 af 13 3e b6 69  62 e7 10 ed 75 c8 f8 cf  ||....>.ib...u...|
+00000110  60 07 d8 9a 46 e6 4f b4  22 f2 f7 ca ba ed 36 f9  |`...F.O.".....6.|
+00000120  f3 ac a9 e0 f3 e5 37 b0  b0 7d 23 ed b9 7f 1f b3  |......7..}#.....|
+00000130  57 38 7c c3 34 b0 78 a5  e8 29 a9 cb 35 17 68 4d  |W8|.4.x..)..5.hM|
+00000140  dd 8f 35 9c f1 b5 e6 e6  29 00 3b 1c ac 5d d0 cd  |..5.....).;..]..|
+00000150  1f a0 a8 a1 25 b0 97 53  ed 9a 72 a8 f0 61 0b 66  |....%..S..r..a.f|
+00000160  2c 67 c9 e1 dd 86 6a 14  54 00 7b 90 7e 3c d2 5c  |,g....j.T.{.~<.\|
+00000170  d8 d3 a2 a0 cd c9 b2 82  8f 48 a0 22 49 63 54 6d  |.........H."IcTm|
+00000180  9f 04 f9 47 27 db 4f 3d  41 82 4a 1a be 4a b7 2f  |...G'.O=A.J..J./|
+00000190  81 c5 ad 12 cc 1e 45 f8  bb 42 93 ea 4b 24 97 44  |......E..B..K$.D|
+000001a0  6b c4 4c 4d f4 61 08 0c  a3 37 20 48 d3 be 47 71  |k.LM.a...7 H..Gq|
+000001b0  1b b2 8a a1 eb 9f b9 17  61 07 64 15 29 6e fc 93  |........a.d.)n..|
+000001c0  7d 21 fd 7d f2 09 6b 9c  5f 05 79 2b dc e0 c6 d4  |}!.}..k._.y+....|
+000001d0  03 d4 9e 23 f2 3e 4b 23  11 5e 58 ec a8 5e 96 63  |...#.>K#.^X..^.c|
+000001e0  6d 51 22 d5 3e e3 de ee  1a c5 d5 85 c3 c5 c4 05  |mQ".>...........|
+000001f0  38 4c bd 54 b4 1e 6a 64  5a 9a 3e 48 82 ec e7 fe  |8L.T..jdZ.>H....|
+00000200  6a 67 a5 30 c0 fc fd c6  7e d4 d0 68 a7 30 40 e0  |jg.0....~..h.0@.|
+00000210  87 c1 5d 75 0b a0 4f 90  f7 46 51 18 8b 02 36 c5  |..]u..O..FQ...6.|
+00000220  fb b5 54 bd 32 75 dc 63  84 6f 61 a5 36 fe a6 23  |..T.2u.c.oa.6..#|
+00000230  f8 a5 b9 cc af 00 e4 83  c0 11 50 ad 81 2b e2 bd  |..........P..+..|
+00000240  20 08 85 11 40 5e 66 25  d8 ac 06 a3 a2 10 dc 52  | ...@^f%.......R|
+00000250  7a d5 13 61 82 b5 48 83  02 32 7b 20 96 78 40 14  |z..a..H..2{ .x@.|
+00000260  38 10 9f 88 25 d3 60 3c  7e e4 11 da a9 6e 1e 58  |8...%.`<~....n.X|
+00000270  13 de d8 d4 74 78 b2 5f  8c ce 9c ce 33 5c 1a 6e  |....tx._....3\.n|
+00000280  76 56 49 a4 54 0c ab 20  b9 c6 20 d4 fa b8 6f 41  |vVI.T.. .. ...oA|
+00000290  81 1a 7e f4                                       |..~.|
 >>> Flow 14 (server to client)
-00000000  00 00 00 10 bc 56 ff 49  8f 1b c2 79 5b 65 67 84  |.....V.I...y[eg.|
-00000010  fb 19 0c 51 ef 4f 2c e8  58 01 84 90 5c 31 78 d4  |...Q.O,.X...\1x.|
-00000020  ab 3e cb 21                                       |.>.!|
+00000000  00 00 00 10 6e 70 e8 37  1b 64 e5 98 df 83 52 b2  |....np.7.d....R.|
+00000010  40 ca 82 24 96 8c 21 c4  df d2 ec a8 d8 c7 b1 48  |@..$..!........H|
+00000020  c2 48 90 90                                       |.H..|