ssh: curb GSSAPI DoS risk by limiting number of specified OIDs

Previously, an attacker could specify an integer up to 0xFFFFFFFF
that would directly allocate memory despite the observability of
the rest of the payload. This change places a hard cap on the
amount of mechanisms that can be specified and encoded in the
payload. Additionally, it performs a small sanity check to deny
payloads whose stated size is contradictory to the observed payload.

Thank you to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.

Fixes CVE-2025-58181
Fixes golang/go#76363

Change-Id: I0307ab3e906a3f2ae763b5f9f0310f7073f84485
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/721961
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
This commit is contained in:
Neal Patel
2025-11-19 11:28:37 -08:00
committed by Gopher Robot
parent f91f7a7c31
commit e79546e28b
2 changed files with 38 additions and 1 deletions
+7 -1
View File
@@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) {
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("parse uint32 failed")
}
// Each ASN.1 encoded OID must have a minimum
// of 2 bytes; 64 maximum mechanisms is an
// arbitrary, but reasonable ceiling.
const maxMechs = 64
if n > maxMechs || int(n)*2 > len(rest) {
return nil, errors.New("invalid mechanism count")
}
s := &userAuthRequestGSSAPI{
N: n,
OIDS: make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, n),
@@ -122,7 +129,6 @@ func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) {
if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(desiredMech, &s.OIDS[i]); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return s, nil
}
+31
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,37 @@ func TestParseGSSAPIPayload(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestParseDubiousGSSAPIPayload(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
payload []byte
wanterr bool
}{
{
"num mechanisms is unrealistic",
[]byte{0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02},
true,
},
{
"num mechanisms greater than payload",
[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, // 64, |rest| too small
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02},
true,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(tc.payload)
if tc.wanterr && err == nil {
t.Errorf("got nil, want error")
}
if !tc.wanterr && err != nil {
t.Errorf("got %v, want nil", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestBuildMIC(t *testing.T) {
sessionID := []byte{134, 180, 134, 194, 62, 145, 171, 82, 119, 149, 254, 196, 125, 173, 177, 145, 187, 85, 53,
183, 44, 150, 219, 129, 166, 195, 19, 33, 209, 246, 175, 121}