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Gopher Robot 776e461a4e go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.
Once this CL is submitted, and post-submit testing succeeds on all
first-class ports across all supported Go versions, this repository
will be tagged with its next minor version.

Change-Id: Ic0f0e8147eae1918612c3d1a1c1de14af0a43294
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/473439
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
2023-03-05 04:00:43 +00:00
Nicola Murino ebe92624d1 ssh: add support for aes256-gcm@openssh.com
Change-Id: I91caf3bda3dfd00c050f5ebf23c2a35a04c5762b
GitHub-Last-Rev: 6e71340e7960b5b6f71f7b96eeeaf8dfb268e306
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#127
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/223518
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
2023-02-15 20:22:00 +00:00
Gopher Robot a9f661cb6e go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.
Once this CL is submitted, and post-submit testing succeeds on all
first-class ports across all supported Go versions, this repository
will be tagged with its next minor version.

Change-Id: If0ff32acaae5f6a717ed4d178a88f3346ecf1600
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/466736
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
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2023-02-08 21:57:58 +00:00
Alexander Yastrebov 310bfa40f1 cryptobyte: reject negative Unwrite argument
Fixes golang/go#57112

Change-Id: I7a533046a6451d7ae3704eb81e6ddeec8442cf06
GitHub-Last-Rev: 3b088d95a2feca197cc4ebd1d9d34cb28008349f
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#249
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/464338
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emmanuel@orijtech.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
2023-02-03 19:59:27 +00:00
cui fliter 59ff47295c all: fix some comments
Change-Id: I11030ee466c8cac6855ce4fe2cf72e0b8d7029f8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/463796
Auto-Submit: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
2023-01-30 18:50:24 +00:00
Gopher Robot 3d872d0428 go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.
Once this CL is submitted, and post-submit testing succeeds on all
first-class ports across all supported Go versions, this repository
will be tagged with its next minor version.

Change-Id: I25128883772569c8f729b091b0efcbc4afcbea67
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/460500
Run-TryBot: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com>
2023-01-04 16:09:43 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker bc7d1d1eb5 bcrypt: reject passwords longer than 72 bytes
By design, bcrypt only uses the first 72 bytes of a password when
generating a hash. Most implementations, including the reference one,
simply silently ignore any trailing input when provided passwords longer
than 72 bytes. This can cause confusion for users who expect the entire
password to be used to generate the hash.

In GenerateFromPassword, reject passwords longer than 72 bytes.
CompareHashAndPassword will still accept these passwords, since we
cannot break hashes that have already been stored.

Fixes golang/go#36546

Change-Id: I039addd2a2961a7fa9d1e4a3e892a9e3c8bf4c9a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/450415
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason McNeil <jmcneil@x2studios.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2022-12-21 17:19:30 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 7e3ac2043e internal/wycheproof: also use Verify in TestECDSA
Check both Verify and VerifyASN1 in the ECDSA tests.

Change-Id: Id767354484a7da18ae4e00cd6f2a01a2909e6732
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/453755
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2022-12-21 16:58:14 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills 23edec0b38 ssh: ensure that handshakeTransport goroutines have finished before Close returns
This fixes a data race in the tests for x/crypto/ssh, which expects to
be able to examine a transport's read and write counters without
locking after closing it.

(Given the number of goroutines, channels, and mutexes used in this
package, I wouldn't be surprised if other concurrency bugs remain.
I would suggest simplifying the concurrency in this package, but I
don't intend to follow up on that myself at the moment.)

Fixes golang/go#56957.

Change-Id: Ib1f1390b66707c66a3608e48f3f52483cff3c1f5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/456758
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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Auto-Submit: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
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2022-12-12 22:32:12 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills f495dc37d5 acme: eliminate arbitrary timeouts in tests
Fixes golang/go#57107.

Change-Id: I20b1f6ca85170c6b4731d7c7ea06f4db742526cc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/456123
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
2022-12-08 18:21:33 +00:00
Gopher Robot eb2c406296 go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.
Once this CL is submitted, and post-submit testing succeeds on all
first-class ports across all supported Go versions, this repository
will be tagged with its next minor version.

Change-Id: If72a913d54ec282d75e270409971b148df4b417c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/455436
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com>
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2022-12-06 15:29:57 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 2c476679df cryptobyte: add support for ReadASN1Integer into []byte
This lets us extract large integers without involving math/big.

While at it, drop some use of reflect where a type switch will do.

Change-Id: Iebe2fb2267610bf95cf9747ba1d49b5ac9e62cda
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/451515
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2022-11-17 19:18:49 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 0ec7e8322c internal/wycheproof: update Go 1.20 crypto/ecdh API
For golang/go#56052

Change-Id: If34d01132e221ff525319e43d127ef14579f9054
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/451095
Reviewed-by: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Joedian Reid <joedian@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Joedian Reid <joedian@golang.org>
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2022-11-16 16:25:40 +00:00
6fad3dfc18 ssh: support rsa-sha2-256/512 on the server side
This lets clients know we support rsa-sha2-256/512 signatures from
ssh-rsa public keys. OpenSSH prefers to break the connection rather than
attempting trial and error, apparently.

We don't enable support for the "ext-info-s" because we're not
interested in any client->server extensions.

This also replaces isAcceptableAlgo which was rejecting the
rsa-sha2-256/512-cert-v01@openssh.com public key algorithms.

Tested with OpenSSH 9.1 on macOS Ventura.

Fixes golang/go#49269
Updates golang/go#49952

Co-authored-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Kristin Davidson <kdavidson@atlassian.com>
Change-Id: I4955c3b12bb45575e9977ac657bb5805b49d00c3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/447757
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
2022-11-12 16:25:23 +00:00
cui fliter 21d60a1521 all: remove redundant type conversion
Change-Id: Ic6b210c1e5b99eef5c6e38d96feaf40e7e6033bb
GitHub-Last-Rev: b8ecf761efe6a2eec78a805a99d778bdcdb938f9
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#229
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/429016
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
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2022-11-09 16:50:04 +00:00
Gopher Robot 183a9b70cc go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.
Once this CL is submitted, and post-submit testing succeeds on all
first-class ports across all supported Go versions, this repository
will be tagged with its next minor version.

Change-Id: Ic7c0afcece0f3d2065c7a7e08f092c4344d90655
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/448755
Run-TryBot: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Jenny Rakoczy <jenny@golang.org>
2022-11-08 20:34:43 +00:00
Park Zhou 334521b960 ssh: fix typo
Change-Id: I560d7f5a62161cd88361a9fe9982d36f8e25e5af
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/447475
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
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2022-11-04 14:06:20 +00:00
Alexander Yastrebov a3485e1740 all: use math/bits.RotateLeft
Updates golang/go#31456

Change-Id: Idf043a25632526baa190bf42ed360cb79f85e493
GitHub-Last-Rev: 59461578926a85a87cc68dac96c0b7559766b7cf
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#195
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/356518
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2022-10-24 17:35:37 +00:00
Gopher Robot 642fcc37f5 go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.
Once this CL is submitted, and post-submit testing succeeds on all
first-class ports across all supported Go versions, this repository
will be tagged with its next minor version.

Change-Id: If840eea1cadc749ce55efd88eb7d9fc38472839e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/443996
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com>
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2022-10-19 16:43:05 +00:00
Axel Wagner 56aed06173 all: use automatic RFC linking
pkgsite automatically links /RFC \d+/ to the mentioned RFC. Insert a
bunch of spaces into doc-comments for that to match.

Change-Id: I01834d7573428563f21c37e43316442e148dd8c4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/442055
Reviewed-by: Joedian Reid <joedian@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
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2022-10-12 13:47:37 +00:00
cui fliter 9be5aaad42 all: fix a few function names on comments
Change-Id: Iac9c8f06b874e62b56f634dede8757b87514f421
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/442135
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Joedian Reid <joedian@golang.org>
2022-10-12 13:45:58 +00:00
Brad Fitzpatrick d6f0a8c073 ssh: add ServerConfig.NoClientAuthCallback
It was possible to accept auth type "none" before, but not dynamically
at runtime as a function of the ConnMetadata like the other auth types'
callback hooks.

Fixes golang/go#51994

Change-Id: I83ea80901d4977d8f78523e3d1e16e0a7df5b172
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/395314
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
2022-10-10 15:29:10 +00:00
cui fliter 4161e89ecf all: replace bytes.Compare with bytes.Equal
Change-Id: I911366b91ff2a1d02d7de202a166d876fb873142
GitHub-Last-Rev: f50e00376856fb9da36bb98ed0cdfd96c2f3b304
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#233
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/438536
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Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
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2022-10-05 02:52:14 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker eccd6366d1 acme/autocert: remove TestRenewFromCache skips
Removes the skips from TestRenewFromCache and
TestRenewFromCacheAlreadyRenewed, which were added due to flakes which
may have been fixed by the renewal timer change.

Updates golang/go#51080

Change-Id: Ib953a24e610e89dfbbea450a4c257c105055ce7e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/433815
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
2022-09-26 16:16:30 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 4ba4fb4dd9 acme/autocert: fix renewal timer issue
Block when creating the renewal timer, rather than doing it in a
goroutine. This fixes an issue where startRenew and stopRenew are called
very closely together, and due to lock ordering, stopRenew may be called
before startRenew, resulting in the appearance that the renewal timer
has been stopped before it has actually been created.

This is only an issue in tests, as that is the only place stopRenew is
actually used. In particular this issue manifests in TestGetCertiifcate
sub-tests, where a httptest server reuses a port across two of the
sub-tests. In this case, the renewal calls end up creating dirty state
for the subsequent test, which can cause confusing behavior (such as
attempting to register an account twice.)

Another solution to this problem would be introducing a bool, protected
by renewalMu, which indicates if renewal has been halted, and to check
it in startRenew to check if stopRenew has already been called, which
would allow us to continue calling startRenew in a goroutine and relying
on renewalMu locking for ordering. That said I don't see a particularly
strong reason to call startRenew concurrently, so this seems like the
simplest solution for now.

Fixes golang/go#52494

Change-Id: I95420d3fd877572a0b9e408d2f8cd353f6a4e80e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/433016
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
2022-09-24 01:33:50 +00:00
cui fliter 35f4265a4b all: replace io/ioutil with io and os package
For golang/go#45557

Change-Id: I447530cc66896aef7a8d528ccb8d095b80e3cf47
GitHub-Last-Rev: 5f385ff46487ac318bd1147cdbbd26bb0ffd0426
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#230
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/430797
Auto-Submit: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Meng Zhuo <mzh@golangcn.org>
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Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
2022-09-19 17:36:07 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker c86fa9a7ed internal/wycheproof: add crypto/ecdh tests
Alongside the existing ECDH tests, add tests that use the new
crypto/ecdh package. The test vectors include a number of private
that use non-standard sizes, which we reject, but aren't flagged,
so we need to skip them.

Change-Id: Iaaef225b0149a86833095f51748d230385d43bfe
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/424274
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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2022-08-29 22:05:03 +00:00
edef bd7e27e617 ssh/agent: match OpenSSH extensionAgentMsg, not IETF draft
The OpenSSH wire format just suffixes the raw extension body,
without a nested string.

Fixes golang/go#51689

Change-Id: Ic224cedb934ba0563abca9a45a6be1c67769ed6d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/412154
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: hopehook <hopehook@qq.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Lublin <daniel@lublin.se>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
2022-08-26 18:10:53 +00:00
hopehook 5757bc0c55 cryptobyte: add ReadUint64 and AddUint64
Fixes golang/go#53481.

Change-Id: Ic00eef498d1d3b5b0ca5c9c526fac7c26de30cf2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/421014
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Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2022-08-24 17:17:10 +00:00
Russ Cox bc19a97f63 acme: gofmt code with Go 1.19 gofmt
Change-Id: Ib0fd6fcfa358df2bdb820a512b73e7cdb34120f8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/424174
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2022-08-17 20:11:39 +00:00
Russ Cox 04dced17f7 internal/subtle: rename to internal/alias
This avoids an import conflict in code that needs to import
crypto/subtle as well.

CL 424194 does the same for the main repo.

Change-Id: Ic54cb62bbfdcf5c2cb6f15ac47075ee1c41981ad
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/424175
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
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Auto-Submit: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
2022-08-17 18:37:53 +00:00
Russ Cox 630584e8d5 A+C: delete AUTHORS and CONTRIBUTORS
In 2009, Google's open-source lawyers asked us to create the AUTHORS
file to define "The Go Authors", and the CONTRIBUTORS file was in
keeping with open source best practices of the time.

Re-reviewing our repos now in 2022, the open-source lawyers are
comfortable with source control history taking the place of the
AUTHORS file, and most open source projects no longer maintain
CONTRIBUTORS files.

To ease maintenance, remove AUTHORS and CONTRIBUTORS from all repos.

For golang/go#53961.

Change-Id: Ieb32933de4f234c77f0131490d4081b6c336820c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/419094
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
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2022-07-22 15:52:17 +00:00
Aaqa Ishtyaq 05595931fe curve25519: remove dependency on fmt
For golang/go#48154

Change-Id: If7e99bd1159edc2e3deeb3a4e3d8fb048bc591ab
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2022-06-22 21:31:12 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 793ad666bf acme/autocert: properly clean DirCache paths
Don't assume the path passed into the DirCache methods is absolute, and
clean it before further operating on it. Put and Delete are not attacker
controlled, but clean them anyway.

Fixes #53082
Fixes CVE-2022-30636

Change-Id: I755f525a737da60ccba07ebce4d41cc8faebfcca
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2022-05-25 23:09:36 +00:00
Jason Baker 6f7dac9698 acme: DeactivateReg fix panic
Currently discover is not called which results in a panic if just a key
is added to an ACME client and then deactivation is attempted.
This patch adds a discover call as well as missing unit tests for the
API.

Change-Id: I0719e5376eb2fccf62182e5f91e5b5eaa7bdd518
GitHub-Last-Rev: 501d7c6c1b75a3069dcad4254b4d4a0d2ccb02c8
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2022-05-18 03:45:28 +00:00
Tobias Klauser 85d78b3ac1 curve25519/internal/field: update generator to avo v0.4.0
This version generates //go:build lines.

For golang/go#46155

Change-Id: I23e4617aa96bc5c15c10f3cd0882028ca08e09e8
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2022-05-17 00:50:47 +00:00
Jason Baker 403b01795a acme: add AccountKeyRollover
Add support for AccountKeyRollover. API only returns an error since acme.Error
will contain appropriate KID lookup information. Due to the requirements
of double JWS encoding jwsEncodeJSON is also modified to support a
missing Nonce header and raw string embedding in the payload.

Fixes golang/go#42516

Change-Id: I959660a1a39b2c469b959accd48fda519daf4eb3
GitHub-Last-Rev: 8e8cc5b094743262939c145f56d3a3b57a057d64
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2022-05-16 16:29:34 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 46612604a0 ssh/agent: fix non-RSA certificates
The type of ssh.PublicKey.Type can be a certificate type, while the
algorithm passed to SignWithAlgorithm is going to be an underlying
algorithm.

Fixes golang/go#52185

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2022-05-13 21:02:58 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker c6db032c6c acme/autocert/internal/acmetest: don't validate in goroutine
In the test server, rather than spawning a goroutine to validate
challenges, block on the validation before responding to the client.
This prevents a test race, where testing.T.Logf is called after the
test is completed.

While this has a slight behavioral difference to some production
ACME server implementations (although is behavior allowed in the spec),
the change has little material impact on what we are testing, since
previously the validation would happen so quickly that it would be
indistinguishable from the new blocking behavior (i.e. we would not be
sending multiple requests during polling previously.)

Fixes golang/go#52170

Change-Id: I75e3b2da69ddc2302be25a99f1b1151ed0f4af9b
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2022-05-11 20:02:25 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 2cf3adece1 internal/wycheproof: skip truncated SHA-512 RSAPSS tests for boring
On the boringcrypto builder, skip the RSAPSS tests that use the
truncated SHA-512 hashes, since boringcrypto does not support them.

Fixes #52670

Change-Id: I8caecd0f34eb6d2740372db2b641563e3965ac7c
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2022-05-07 01:19:49 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda eb4f295cb3 internal/wycheproof: add ECDH tests, including point decompression
Fixes golang/go#38936

Change-Id: I231d30fcc683abd9efb36b6fd9cc05f599078ade
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2022-04-27 17:25:11 +00:00
Russ Cox 7b82a4e95d all: gofmt
Gofmt to update doc comments to the new formatting.

For golang/go#51082.

Change-Id: I076031b6613691eefbb0f21739366e3fd2011ec9
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2022-04-11 22:02:26 +00:00
Ben Burkert 5352b09029 acme/autocert: support External Account Binding (EAB) tokens
Support External Account Binding (EAB) tokens to the Manager as defined
in RFC 8555, Section 7.3.4. If the ExternalAccountBinding field is set
on Manager, pass it into the acme Account during registration.

Fixes golang/go#48809

Change-Id: I64c38b05ab577acbde9f526638cc8104d15ff055
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/354189
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2022-04-08 19:05:44 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker ae2d96664a ocsp: add Response.Raw
Fixes golang/go#38340

Change-Id: I77afc901584ac3361eafa13c9ee9f8cf9ec2ee28
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2022-03-31 22:09:35 +00:00
Peter Verraedt 2c7772ba30 ssh: send ext-info-c only once
In accordance to RFC8308, send ext-info-c only during the first key
exchange. Some server implementations such as OpenSSH 7 will send an
extInfoMsg message each time when ext-info-c is received. This results
in a closed connection, as our client does not expect this message while
handling the mux.

See https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2929 regarding the
behaviour of OpenSSH if it sees ext-info-c in later key exchanges.

Fixes golang/go#51808

Change-Id: Id94f1ef73cec6147136246b0b6048b57db92660d
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2022-03-21 15:39:16 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 3147a52a75 ssh: support rsa-sha2-256/512 for client certificates
The server-sig-algs logic was not working for certificate algorithms.
Follow-up on CL 392394.

Tested with OpenSSH 8.8 configured with

    PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com

Updates golang/go#39885
For golang/go#49952

Change-Id: Ic230dd6f98e96b7938acbd0128ab37d33b70abe5
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2022-03-15 16:07:06 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 5d542ad81a ssh: support rsa-sha2-256/512 for client authentication
CL 220037 had implemented support for host authentication using
rsa-sha2-256/512, but not client public key authentication. OpenSSH
disabled the SHA-1 based ssh-rsa by default in version 8.8 (after
pre-announcing it in versions 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7) although
some distributions re-enable it. GitHub will start rejecting ssh-rsa for
keys uploaded before November 2, 2021 on March 15, 2022.

https://github.blog/2021-09-01-improving-git-protocol-security-github/

The server side already worked, as long as the client selected one of
the SHA-2 algorithms, because the signature flowed freely to Verify.
There was however nothing verifying that the signature algorithm matched
the advertised one. The comment suggested the check was being performed,
but it got lost back in CL 86190043. Not a security issue because the
signature had to pass the callback's Verify method regardless, and both
values were checked to be acceptable.

Tested with OpenSSH 8.8 configured with "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes -ssh-rsa"
and no application-side changes.

The Signers returned by ssh/agent (when backed by an agent client)
didn't actually implement AlgorithmSigner but ParameterizedSigner, an
interface defined in an earlier version of CL 123955.

Updates golang/go#49269
Fixes golang/go#39885
For golang/go#49952

Change-Id: I13b41db8041f1112a70f106c55f077b904b12cb8
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2022-03-14 23:47:24 +00:00
Filippo ValsordaandKevin Wallace a5774263c1 ssh: send (and rename) keyboard-interactive name field to the client
The server side implementation was not actually populating the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST field with the
KeyboardInteractiveChallenge argument, although the client side was
deserializing it and passing it to the KeyboardInteractiveChallenge
callback.

Anyway, the first field of SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST is "name", not
"user". Maybe the confusion was due to the first field of
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST being the user.

RFC 4256, Section 3.3, says this about it

   One possibility is to use the name field (possibly
   prefixed with the application's name) as the title of a dialog window
   in which the prompt(s) are presented.

and examples include "CRYPTOCard Authentication", "Password
Authentication", and "Password Expired".

Co-authored-by: Kevin Wallace <kevin@pentabarf.net>
Change-Id: Ic6ec0dfea2122704603c44f42898a980689a15c9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/372234
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2022-03-14 23:47:16 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 1baeb1ce4c ssh: don't advertise rsa-sha2 algorithms if we can't use them
The server implementation looks at the HostKeys to advertise and
negotiate host key signature algorithms. A fundamental issue of the
Signer and AlgorithmSigner interfaces is that they don't expose the
supported signature algorithms, so really the server has to guess.

Currently, it would guess exclusively based on the PublicKey.Type,
regardless of whether the host key implemented AlgorithmSigner. This
means that a legacy Signer that only supports ssh-rsa still led the
server to negotiate rsa-sha2 algorithms. The server would then fail to
find a suitable host key to make the signature and crash.

This won't happen if only Signers from this package are used, but if a
custom Signer that doesn't support SignWithAlgorithm() but returns
"ssh-rsa" from PublicKey().Type() is used as a HostKey, the server is
vulnerable to DoS.

The only workable rules to determine what to advertise seems to be:

   1. a pure Signer will always Sign with the PublicKey.Type

   2. an AlgorithmSigner supports all algorithms associated with the
      PublicKey.Type

Rule number two means that we can't add new supported algorithms in the
future, which is not great, but it's too late to fix that.

rsaSigner was breaking rule number one, and although it would have been
fine where it's used, I didn't want to break our own interface contract.

It's unclear why we had separate test key entries for rsa-sha2
algorithms, since we can use the ssh-rsa key for those. The only test
that used them, TestCertTypes, seemed broken: the init was actually
failing at making the corresponding signers rsaSigners, and indeed the
test for the SHA-256 signer expected and checked a SHA-512 signature.

Pending CVE
For golang/go#49952

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2022-03-14 23:46:59 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda fcc990c556 ssh: deprecate and replace SigAlgo constants
RFC 8332, Section 2 sets up two overlapping namespaces: public key
formats and public key algorithms.

* The formats are what we currently have KeyAlgo constants for, and they
  appear in PublicKey.Type.

* The algorithms are the set of both KeyAlgo and SigAlgo constants, and
  they appear in Signature.Format (amongst other places).

This is incoherent, because that means Signature.Format can be both a
KeyAlgo (like KeyAlgoECDSA256) or a SigAlgo (like SigAlgoRSASHA2256).

One solution would be to duplicate all the KeyAlgo constants into the
SigAlgo namespace, but that would be confusing because applications are
currently using KeyAlgos where they'd be supposed to use the new
SigAlgos (while we can't deprecate the KeyAlgos because they are still
necessary for the PublicKey.Type namespace).

Instead, drop the separate namespaces, and use KeyAlgos throughout.
There are simply some KeyAlgos that can't be a PublicKey.Type.

Take the opportunity to fix the stuttering SHA22565/SHA2512 names. It's
totally ok to call those hashes SHA-256 and SHA-512 without the family
infix.

For golang/go#49952

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2022-03-14 23:46:46 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 4d399097f0 ssh: fix diffie-hellman-group-exchange g and K bounds checks
The previous code

	if gex.g.Cmp(one) != 1 && gex.g.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 {

deobfuscates to the classic mistake

    if g <= 1 && g >= p - 1 {

which is never true.

What the code actually intended to do is

	if gex.g.Cmp(one) != 1 || gex.g.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 {

or more readably and consistently with the diffieHellman method

	if gex.g.Cmp(one) <= 0 || gex.g.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 {

Now, is this a security issue? The incorrect checks apply to g and k,
but not what we call Y and the spec calls f. RFC 4419 says:

   Either side MUST NOT send or accept e or f values that are not in the
   range [1, p-1].  If this condition is violated, the key exchange
   fails.  To prevent confinement attacks, they MUST accept the shared
   secret K only if 1 < K < p - 1.

Note that RFC 8268, Section 4 updates the equivalent RFC 4253 statement
(although not the RFC 4419 one) about e and f, but we are already doing
the correct full check there.

      DH Public Key values MUST be checked and both conditions:

         1 < e < p-1

         1 < f < p-1

      MUST be true.  Values not within these bounds MUST NOT be sent or
      accepted by either side.  If either one of these conditions is
      violated, then the key exchange fails.

   This simple check ensures that:

   o  The remote peer behaves properly.

   o  The local system is not forced into the two-element subgroup.

The check on K seems like a proxy for checking a number of ways to fix
the DH output (for example by manipulating g) to one of 0, 1, or -1.
This should not be meaningful to security for two reasons:

   - all parameters end up in the "transcript" hash that will get signed
     by the server's host key, and if the attacker controls the host
     key's signature, they have the ability to MitM without resorting to
     confinement attacks

   - the client secret is ephemeral, so leaking bits of it by forcing it
     into small sub-groups does not gain the attacker anything, as the
     secret does not get reused

Indeed, this is the same explanation of why it's ok not to check that p
is indeed a (safe) prime, which even OpenSSH omits. Building an
equivalent attack by manipulating p instead of g is left as an exercise
to the reader.

For the future, this is a case study in why we should not add complexity
even when it looks easy enough to do. CL 174257 added the
diffie-hellman-group-exchange kex. That introduced a data race (arguably
a security issue), which was fixed in CL 222078. Then it was too slow,
which led to CL 252337 that removed the primalty check, which required a
full analysis of whether it's safe to skip it, and checking against
other implementations. Now we find there's a bug and we have to do
another security analysis that not even the RFC bothered to do in order
to decide if it's a security issue. My decision in
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/17230#issuecomment-489163656
does not look like the right one in hindsight.

While at it, clean up the code some

   - drop useless bit size bounds logic in the server stub that get
     ignored by the rest of the function

   - make p and g local variables instead of method fields, since they
     are not persistent state (this was originally a data race which was
     fixed in CL 222078 by making Client not a pointer receiver)

Updates golang/go#17230

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2022-03-14 23:46:39 +00:00
Filippo ValsordaandNicola Murino e4b3678e5f ssh: add diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 kex
RFC 9142 made diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 from RFC 8268 a MUST, and
it's strictly better than diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, which we already
have, and trivial to add.

> The method of key exchange used for the name "diffie-hellman-
> group14-sha256" is the same as that for "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
> except that the SHA256 hash algorithm is used.

Ignore the bigger groups which have a meaningful performance cost, and
don't share the same interoperability benefit.

Adapted from CL 387994.

Fixes golang/go#31731

Co-authored-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Change-Id: Id4ce345a2065840f193986739ea890f105a1e929
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2022-03-14 23:46:33 +00:00
Михаил ПатинandFilippo Valsorda 9b076918e3 ssh: support new curve25519-sha256 kex name
RFC 8731 standardized curve25519-sha256@libssh.org as curve25519-sha256,
and some systems only advertise support for the new name.

Fixes golang/go#48756

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2022-03-14 23:46:23 +00:00
Brad Fitzpatrick b769efc7c0 ssh: add IUTF8 constant from RFC 8160
Change-Id: I65ac40d86c4f0ee5552cd2e167ac91a735f6c56e
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2022-03-13 00:37:12 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 6068a2e6cf ssh: ignore MAC if AEAD ciphers negotiated
If the server/client cipher chosen is one of the two AEAD ciphers that
we support (aes128-gcm@openssh.com and chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com),
don't attempt to find a common MAC algorithm in findAgreedAlgorithms.
Similarly in newPacketCipher, don't attempt to generate a MAC key if we
are using a AEAD cipher.

Fixes golang/go#51406

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2022-03-12 13:11:42 +00:00
cuishuang efcb8507fb ssh: fix typo
Change-Id: I5832916eb921d2d18e3082cd04520e22e2b04127
GitHub-Last-Rev: c0999b83439a5f0ff57b740c18f47d81028e552a
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2022-03-07 21:11:46 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills 86341886e2 acme/autocert: skip renewal tests broken on windows/arm64
For golang/go#51080

Change-Id: Icf4414ab58bdea44b793a66770b4c05f9faf5387
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/385675
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2022-02-14 20:07:02 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 1e6e3497d5 crypto/ssh: don't send the last auth failure message if disconnecting
If we are going to send the disconnect message and close the connection,
because we have exhausted the number of authentication attempts, don't
send the final authentication failure message. This behavior matches
that of OpenSSH.

Fixes golang/go#51149

Change-Id: I43b2de2e854f789161cd7fd6c05876661adfb2c1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/385236
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2022-02-13 19:09:39 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills f4118a5b28 acme/autocert: fix races in renewal tests
TestRenewFromCache and TestRenewFromCacheAlreadyRenewed had several
races and API misuses:

1. They called t.Fatalf from a goroutine other than the one invoking
   the Test function, which is explicitly disallowed (see
   https://pkg.go.dev/testing#T).

2. The test did not stop the renewal timers prior to restoring
   test-hook functions, and the process of stopping the renewal timers
   itself did not wait for in-flight calls to complete. That could
   cause data races if one of the renewals failed and triggered a
   retry with a short-enough randomized backoff.
   (One such race was observed in
   https://build.golang.org/log/1a19e22ad826bedeb5a939c6130f368f9979208a.)

3. The testDidRenewLoop hooks accessed the Manager.renewal field
   without locking the Mutex guarding that field.

4. TestGetCertificate_failedAttempt set a testDidRemoveState hook, but
   didn't wait for the timers referring to that hook to complete
   before restoring it, causing races with other timers. I tried
   pulling on that thread a bit, but couldn't untangle the numerous
   untracked goroutines in the package. Instead, I have made a smaller
   and more local change to copy the value of testDidRemoveState into
   a local variable in the timer's closure.

Given the number of untracked goroutines in this package, it is likely
that races and/or deadlocks remain. Notably, so far I have been unable
to spot the actual cause of golang/go#51080.

For golang/go#51080

Change-Id: I7797f6ac34ef3c272f16ca805251dac3aa7f0009
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/384594
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2022-02-10 15:16:21 +00:00
Ian Lance Taylor db638375bc ssh: accept WSAECONNABORTED in TestClientAuthMaxAuthTriesPublicKey
Fixes golang/go#50805

Change-Id: Icdd2835b1626240faf61936288f279570c873158
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/381614
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2022-02-09 19:56:52 +00:00
Jacob Hoffman-Andrews dad33157f4 acme/autocert: include email in example
At Let's Encrypt, we've found that most autocert users do not provide an email address, which makes it hard to get in touch when things go wrong with their client. Demonstrating how to provide an email will probably encourage more people to provide one.

Change-Id: I0aa1ecea7cfbe55ae155804194fb57a8e695c658
GitHub-Last-Rev: 902b5fe2682a6be5af91e886272fd680fd67a94e
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#186
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/323313
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2022-02-09 15:55:44 +00:00
HowJmay 2f5cac09c9 acme, sha3, ssh: fix the typos
Change-Id: I2287ab3492c105791b03f40d45b5dff5a56aa32a
GitHub-Last-Rev: 02cdf82d8b1604fc47b656172b102a48a70e6f05
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#183
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/319269
Trust: Alberto Donizetti <alb.donizetti@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2022-02-09 15:53:12 +00:00
Ben BurkertandBrad Fitzpatrick 65fa2f7aa8 acme: remove support for pre-RFC 8555 ACME spec
LetsEncrypt removed it anyway.

No API changes. Just a lot of deleted code.

Fixes golang/go#46654

Co-authored-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Change-Id: I65cd0d33236033682b767403ad92aa572bee4fdd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/380314
Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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2022-02-09 15:49:31 +00:00
Dan Kortschak bba287dce9 ocsp: fix typo
Change-Id: Icd770cee9ce183f75c49c301f96a4aab73e80303
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/381674
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Trust: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
2022-02-08 23:39:18 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 20e1d8d225 ed25519: drop Go 1.12 compatibility
x/crypto/ed25519 moved to the standard library in Go 1.13. This change
drops the compatibility wrapper we were keeping around to make Go 1.12
and earlier work.

Change-Id: I860ed963a0660753d01c89014c21360b239a38ac
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/317169
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2022-02-08 05:03:32 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 30dcbda588 acme: expose Client KID field
Expose the previously private KID field of the Client type. This allows
callers which have locally cached their key identity to avoid needing
to make a call to the ACME service every time they construct a new
client.

Fixes golang/go#46303

Change-Id: I219167c5b941f56a2028c4bc253ff56386845549
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/354697
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2022-01-31 19:55:33 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 198e4374d7 acme/autocert: replace all ACME server stubs with acmetest
Change-Id: Ie5520f33674471b4a018feb9d0efaf6696ea38a2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/381715
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2022-01-28 20:06:15 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda aa10faf2a1 acme/autocert: renew Let's Encrypt certificates likely to get revoked
Let's Encrypt is revoking all certificates verified with TLS-ALPN-01
beofre January 26th due to a compliance issue. Detect them and force a
renewal.

Also, fix the tests which were not testing if expired certificates were
renewed anymore, as the test certificates were always invalid due to not
having SANs.

Change-Id: If9d0632b2edfe0b7fb70f6cfd7e65e46e2d047dc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/381114
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2022-01-26 23:43:51 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker e04a8579fe ssh/agent: fix TestMalformedRequests
Use a net.Pipe, rather than setting up a local TCP connection,
for testing malformed SSH requests, since we don't need the
complex intricacies of a real connection to test this protocol
behavior.

Fixes golang/go#50161

Change-Id: I5e46c42041ddd03b06725469216b82b801990e64
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/371874
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2022-01-26 17:37:29 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills 5e0467b6c7 acme: in TestFetchCertCancel, do not reply before the cancellation propagates
Fixes golang/go#44611

Change-Id: I81b3c3b7be25fe4e492695fa5935e70aa7b96c07
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/378074
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2022-01-12 18:07:41 +00:00
umlublin e495a2d5b3 cryptobyte: fix parsing of large ASN.1 OIDs
Fixes golang/go#49678

Change-Id: If8a40e25edd810a66165ab78dd68d9b7fc2699f8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/365674
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2021-12-15 15:39:01 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills 4570a0811e internal/wycheproof: skip on builders with flaky network connections
This test downloads JSON test files from GitHub. If the network
connection flakes, the test may hang indefinitely, and builders with
flaky network connections might want to avoid unnecessary downloading
anyway.

Fixes golang/go#50076

Change-Id: I0655a34fce8a003794290c0c82ae75492eda4429
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/370659
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2021-12-09 19:36:57 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 5770296d90 ssh: don't assume packet plaintext size
When reading GCM and ChaChaPoly1305 packets, don't make assumptions
about the size of the enciphered plaintext. This fixes two panics
caused by standards non-compliant malformed packets.

Thanks to Rod Hynes, Psiphon Inc. for reporting this issue.

Fixes golang/go#49932
Fixes CVE-2021-43565

Change-Id: I660cff39d197e0d04ec44d11d792b22d954df2ef
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1262659
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katiehockman@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/368814
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2021-12-02 19:23:23 +00:00
Damien Neil ae814b36b8 all: upgrade x/net to latest
Update acme/autocert test to not depend on whether idna.Lookup uses
transitional processing (Go 1.17 and earlier) or nontransitional
processing (Go 1.18 and later).

Change-Id: I29ca0aaca0ac75a932919a4c7cf8e9fca033b497
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/364014
Trust: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
2021-11-17 18:39:48 +00:00
Hans Nielsen b4de73f9ec ssh: support RSA SHA-2 (RFC8332) signatures
This change adds support for RSA SHA-2 based signatures for host keys and certificates. It also switches the default certificate signature algorithm for RSA to use SHA-512. This is implemented by treating ssh.Signer specially when the key type is `ssh-rsa` by also allowing SHA-256 and SHA-512 signatures.

Fixes golang/go#37278

Change-Id: I2ee1ac4ae4c9c1de441a2d6cf1e806357ef18910
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/220037
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2021-11-15 23:45:14 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker ceb1ce70b4 ocsp: rewrite tests that rely on SHA1-RSA
This test suite should really be completely re-written, but for now
we can just substitute the tests which relied on certificates that
were signed with SHA1-RSA.

Fixes #49443

Change-Id: Ibe4ae3b3062956a56e6e3579144312747df3ef9a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/362334
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2021-11-08 22:10:36 +00:00
James Hartig 089bfa5675 acme: implement Client.ListCertAlternates
Let's Encrypt is defaulting to a longer cross-signed chain on May 4th,
2021 but will offer the ability to download the shorter chain via an
alternate URL via a link header [1]. The shorter chain can be selected
to workaround a validation bug in legacy versions of OpenSSL, GnuTLS,
and LibreSSL. The alternate relation is described in section 7.4.2 of
RFC 8555.

ListCertAlternates should be passed the original certificate chain URL
and will return a list of alternate chain URLs that can be passed to
FetchCert to download.

Fixes golang/go#42437

[1] https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/production-chain-changes/150739

Change-Id: Iaa32e49cb1322ac79ac1a5b4b7980d5401f4b86e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/277294
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2021-09-21 15:51:07 +00:00
Yasuhiro Matsumoto 84f357641f all: fix typos
Change-Id: Ie08e43ae603cf2c691d51be0bfb5d164c8fd45ff
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/337189
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Trust: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
2021-09-20 02:37:35 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda c084706c22 poly1305: deprecate public package
Fixes golang/go#36646

Change-Id: Ic19dd2171c84472fc9d3f44803224b87fc5c0417
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/345649
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2021-09-15 21:47:49 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 32db794688 acme: fix deadlock when Client.Key is nil
When methods that use POSTs are called on a acme.Client which has a
nil Key field it will cause a deadlock due to an infinite loop in
the code that looks up the account KID. This change adds a check for
the key being nil, and errors out if that is the case. Also adds a
test for this behavior.

Fixes golang/go#38790

Change-Id: I65ff6bbbade7ed2d85306895904a976089730bbf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/233164
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2021-08-17 16:40:53 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 0a44fdfbc1 openpgp: fix deprecation message
Fixes the referenced issue and removes an unnecessary word.

Change-Id: Icbf8bd26bccbc603e7dd360d817900ac2ca63a69
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/342049
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2021-08-13 21:11:28 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 0ba0e8f031 openpgp: mark as deprecated
Finally.

Fixes golang/go#44226

Change-Id: I73de5a49357f8891afef9094ab497f389b899943
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/341549
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2021-08-12 20:46:32 +00:00
HowJMay a769d52b0f sha3: fix typo in comment
Change-Id: I2cd8fe55a3918771744ca6b53b8335282b7d2b40
GitHub-Last-Rev: 34bf09adb28954bbaa9db081379b3ff869fe7f28
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#189
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/333429
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
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2021-07-11 02:07:23 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills 5ff15b2933 all: upgrade x/sys to latest
Fixes golang/go#46761

Change-Id: I510532f98c66db1ca1a2288665c571e86d605770
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/328149
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2021-06-16 21:35:33 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda c07d793c2f curve25519/internal/field: fix generator module reference to x/crypto
The generator submodule needs a module dependency on golang.org/x/crypto
to find the type information it needs.

This removes the Comment call from CL 319469 because it does not seem to
generate the intended output. See golang/go#46155.

Fixes golang/go#46133

Change-Id: Iec21c6379d81271047ebf370a76329ed3fdac85c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/319471
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2021-05-13 16:48:29 +00:00
Tobias Klauser cd7d49e622 all: add //go:build lines to assembly files
For golang/go#41184

Change-Id: Ica67fdbf2745ad2eef63dbb9ef70136e9e6fd348
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/319469
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2021-05-13 12:29:33 +00:00
povsister 38f3c27a63 ssh: return missing user field in NewClientConn
Fix golang/go#45249

Change-Id: I27ef2976586ad481d832c6e46695a91f1bb50373
GitHub-Last-Rev: 9f631b80925719a0fb77576f7983cd7c8d0b5056
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#180
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/304990
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emmanuel@orijtech.com>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
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2021-05-06 14:59:44 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 3497b51f5e curve25519: replace field implementation with filippo.io/edwards25519
This imports the crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/field package from
CL 276272, and uses it in x/crypto/curve25519.

The ScalarMult code was ported 1:1 from curve25519_generic.go.

                                old code lines     new code lines

Go                              896                463
Assembly (manually written)     1772 (1772)        362 (34)

43% performance loss on amd64, 33% loss on 386, and 45% gain on arm64.
Feels worth it to remove 1700 lines of manually written assembly.

Apple M1

name               old time/op  new time/op  delta
X25519Basepoint-8  85.0µs ± 1%  46.4µs ± 0%  -45.39%  (p=0.000 n=10+9)
X25519-8           84.4µs ± 0%  46.7µs ± 2%  -44.76%  (p=0.000 n=8+9)

Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7400 CPU @ 3.00GHz

name               old time/op  new time/op  delta
X25519Basepoint-4  42.6µs ± 1%  60.9µs ± 1%  +43.22%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
X25519-4           42.5µs ± 1%  60.9µs ± 0%  +43.17%  (p=0.000 n=9+9)

Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7400 CPU @ 3.00GHz [GOARCH=386]

name               old time/op  new time/op  delta
X25519Basepoint-4   530µs ± 1%   703µs ± 1%  +32.81%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
X25519-4            530µs ± 1%   706µs ± 1%  +33.18%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)

Change-Id: I1dc62a6a3a3e417a1366ff873c475087a0395124
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/315269
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2021-05-05 21:26:54 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills e9a32991a8 go.mod: upgrade to go 1.17
This change was produced using 'go mod tidy -go=1.17'
with a go command built at CL 315210.

This activates lazy loading, and updates the go.mod file to maintain
the lazy-loading invariants (namely, including an explicit requirement
for every package transitively imported by the main module).

Note that this does *not* prevent users with earlier go versions from
successfully building packages from this module.

For golang/go#36460.

Change-Id: I28a6f54b1e41e9e18b726cacba25a52069b8a4e9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/316109
Trust: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Rakoczy <alex@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
2021-05-03 19:58:02 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 83a5a9bb28 acme: add support for subproblems
Add support for RFC 8555 subproblems. The type naming is real bike-shed
territory, but I think I've mostly matched the existing style of the
package. In a similar vein the format of how to print subproblems
when stringing an acme.Error is up for debate (it could just be
completely ignored, and require clients to inspect Error.Subproblems
themselves).

Fixes golang/go#38978

Change-Id: Ice803079bab621ae9410de79e7e75e11c1af21b6
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/233165
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
2021-04-21 17:06:49 +00:00
Paul E. Murphy 5bf0f12bab poly1305: cleanup ppc64le R0/$0 usage
There is some implicit R0 == $0 here which may not be desired.

"CMP $0, Rx" translates to "cmpd r0, rX" which is less preferred
than "cmpdi r0, 0".  Likewise, "ADDE $0, Rx" also turns into
"adde R0, Rx, Rx" which can be simplified to a similar instruction
which adds to zero with carry, "ADDZE Rx, Rx".

Change-Id: I5de17ff5b02c7c9d57daf014c7fe9420bfbeeeab
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/311372
Reviewed-by: Carlos Eduardo Seo <carlos.seo@linaro.org>
Trust: Carlos Eduardo Seo <carlos.seo@linaro.org>
Trust: Lynn Boger <laboger@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2021-04-21 14:28:44 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 4f45737414 cryptobyte: add support for UTCTime
Mostly cribbed from encoding/asn1.parseUTCTime.

Fixes golang/go#45411

Change-Id: I6c6ab2a2ad7c05a7f8bd81ecce4fcbb4e608e8db
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/273286
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Trust: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2021-04-15 15:40:28 +00:00
Trevor Dixon 0c34fe9e7d acme/autocert: include the domain in the SAN of the CSR
More compliant with the spec and allows autocert to work
with Pebble (see letsencrypt/pebble#304).

Fixes golang/go#39746.

Change-Id: I0f41d5b41800d57eb53055cad248e50573c6070f
GitHub-Last-Rev: 777115c545a5266609fad6888d24d586ed4c2916
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#143
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/294389
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Trust: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
2021-03-22 15:32:48 +00:00
Andreas Auernhammer 513c2a44f6 scrypt: use encoding/binary to simplify smix
This CL simplifies the smix implementation.
It:
 - replaces the manual byte-int conversion
   with functionality from encoding/binary.
 - pre-computes the range `r * 32` as `R`.

Change-Id: Ife4920089c011fec82b234fb56df33e94204e0f8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/253357
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Trust: Tobias Klauser <tobias.klauser@gmail.com>
2021-03-17 15:28:58 +00:00
Radek Simko e6e6c4f2bb go.mod: bump golang.org/x/net to e18ecbb05110
This upgrades golang.org/x/net to the latest revision
which itself depends on (upgraded) golang.org/x/text v0.3.3
which in turn addresses CVE-2020-14040.

Change-Id: I67bd552f4a7ce3392bb9dfde28af4b99a2525c54
GitHub-Last-Rev: 34e9c2c16b3fafab8669adccfec6cf05c86cc1dd
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#157
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/259778
Run-TryBot: Tobias Klauser <tobias.klauser@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Tobias Klauser <tobias.klauser@gmail.com>
Trust: Emmanuel Odeke <emmanuel@orijtech.com>
2021-03-14 15:42:23 +00:00
Russ Cox 5ea612d1eb all: go fmt ./...
Make all our package sources use Go 1.17 gofmt format
(adding //go:build lines).

Not strictly necessary but will avoid spurious changes
as files are edited.

Part of //go:build change (#41184).
See https://golang.org/design/draft-gobuild

Change-Id: I70526bf588bf4078887e567795867ece785d666b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/294415
Trust: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
2021-02-20 03:31:48 +00:00
Russ Cox b8e89b74b9 blake2s: fix 386 assembly not to smash SP
For golang/go#44269.

Change-Id: I92e168674612af390bcb80a0579df5c777c26970
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/292052
Trust: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Trust: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2021-02-18 14:52:15 +00:00
Russ Cox 1f2b32a52c blake2b: fix amd64 assembly not to smash SP
For golang/go#44269.

Change-Id: I7e405afd0b55c96ce0a4c6058ba01e8be1173a8c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/292051
Trust: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Trust: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2021-02-18 14:52:09 +00:00
Russ Cox 042588c79f salsa20/salsa: fix amd64 assembly not to smash SP
For golang/go#44269.

Change-Id: Ica352261d696317addbdd422d4cde5bf07fef839
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/292050
Trust: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Trust: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2021-02-18 14:52:05 +00:00
Russ Cox 86c0c3e7f9 blake2s: fix amd64 assembly not to smash SP
For golang/go#44269.

Change-Id: I877a8056dbd8ab1dedadb562aa1b3d9e1e0d55da
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/292049
Trust: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Trust: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2021-02-18 14:51:59 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda eec23a3978 acme: hardcode and remove ExternalAccountBinding.Algorithm
HMAC-SHA256 is a perfectly fine MAC algorithm, and there is no need to
ask the user to choose one.

This does break compatibility with the previous API, but it had been
live only for a weekend, so hopefully still in a window in which we can
make changes with a limited blast radius.

Updates golang/go#41430

Change-Id: I03741a545b25b9fcc147760cd20e9d7029844a6c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/279453
Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: James Kasten <jdkasten@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2020-12-21 18:15:55 +00:00
James KastenandJames Munnelly 9d13527586 acme: add external account binding support
Implements https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3.4

Fixes golang/go#41430

Co-authored-by: James Munnelly <james@munnelly.eu>
Change-Id: Icd0337fddbff49e7e79fb9105c2679609f990285
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/269279
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Trust: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2020-12-17 01:42:55 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 8b5274cf68 ssh: disallow gssapi-with-mic if GSSAPIWithMICConfig is not set
The ability to trigger the 'gssapi-with-mic' authentication method is
not properly gated by the presence of the GSSAPIWithMICConfig field of
the ServerConfig type. If this field is not set and a client sends a
'gssapi-with-mic' request, regardless of if the server advertises it,
the server will panic.

This issue was discovered and reported by Joern Schneewesiz, GitLab
Security Research Team.

Fixes CVE-2020-29652

Change-Id: Ie25de2766e442c8ab46680aae3ac89b0823cdeed
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/278852
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-12-16 22:30:49 +00:00
Julie Qiu 5f87f3452a README.md: add badge to pkg.go.dev
A badge linking to https://pkg.go.dev/golang.org/x/crypto is added.

Change-Id: Ifa07c0c04e3dd30503f196179f6883cc569e7908
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/275873
Trust: Julie Qiu <julie@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Julie Qiu <julie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-12-08 17:14:46 +00:00
Tamir Duberstein be400aefbc all: build tags: appengine,!gccgo => purego,gc
appengine is obsolete and superseded by purego, and gc is a more
precise tag for files that use gc-syntax assembly.

Change-Id: I716f59de772ebeee4adf4d2a432edf300122cef0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/269920
Trust: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-12-03 16:30:18 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker c8d3bf9c53 x/crypto/chacha20: fix typo in benchmark
Change-Id: I003c389585a42089fc9cc595d1f5f1027cd482f2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/272306
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2020-11-24 20:17:22 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda c1f2f97bff ssh/terminal: bump x/term dependency to fix js/nacl
Brings in CL 258002 which should fix builds for unsupported targets.

Change-Id: I06e6b79347f9081834ad85699ec66d1903fbdaca
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/270817
Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
2020-11-17 14:41:27 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 4be66e5b65 ssh/terminal: replace with a golang.org/x/term wrapper
The package moved to x/term in CL 258001.

Fixes golang/go#31044

Change-Id: I9d39bfb6f54f09de60e2669fb0d939968af79b40
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/258003
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-11-16 15:36:03 +00:00
Mahdi Hosseini Moghaddam 0c6587e931 ssh/terminal: add support for zos
Fixes golang/go#42496

Change-Id: Iae2ddb916904d9b3947bec9638c9fbf892df7b7c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/269177
Reviewed-by: Tobias Klauser <tobias.klauser@gmail.com>
Trust: Tobias Klauser <tobias.klauser@gmail.com>
Trust: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
Run-TryBot: Tobias Klauser <tobias.klauser@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-11-12 15:50:50 +00:00
Aidan Coyle 9e8e0b3908 ssh: improve error message for KeyboardInteractiveChallenge
Fixes golang/go#41823

Change-Id: I4653f23239bdf2ab472d3d15c6653b89ebf7ccd4
GitHub-Last-Rev: 179b3ee0efc7b4733da9fbbd8e5ec73a72ef8156
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#158
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/259902
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-10-16 22:06:09 +00:00
Emmanuel T Odeke 84dcc777aa crypto/ssh: add Client.Close in Dial example
Fixes golang/go#41906

Change-Id: I2eee82160a4450f531f11d5ba7bd6ed19c019992
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/261417
Run-TryBot: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Burke <kev@inburke.com>
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2020-10-12 17:37:05 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 7f63de1d35 internal/wycheproof: add RSA OAEP decryption tests
Uses only the test vectors that use the same MGF and label hashes.

Change-Id: I971f78556e7b8fdbc785978dca7a613728676697
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/234917
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Trust: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2020-10-02 17:02:05 +00:00
woat c90954cbb9 nacl/auth: use Size instead of KeySize for Sum output
Fixes golang/go#41692

Change-Id: If6e885ca2e016dfecf534093c989356142ec7823
GitHub-Last-Rev: fe67c18f18ccfc766687b8db4bda92b9f7879a2b
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#154
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/258357
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2020-10-02 09:40:18 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker eb9a90e9f9 ocsp: Improve documentation for ParseResponse and ParseResponseForCert
This change clarifies the behaviors of ParseResponse and ParseResponseForCert,
particularly when parsing responses that contain multiple certificate statuses.

Fixes golang/go#30651

Change-Id: Ia632c8c2a69d1b0c17d71f9f9dcb59ddb0be401b
GitHub-Last-Rev: 481f613438c91521fd90078cc0915cf01cf44b4e
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#122
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/220353
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2020-10-01 19:37:50 +00:00
Daniel Cohen afb6bcd081 ssh: remove slow unnecessary diffie-hellman-group-exchange primality check
The existing implementation validates that the prime returned by the server is, in fact, prime, which is extremely slow, especially for large key sizes.

As other implementations, including OpenSSH, do not verify the primality of the provided parameters, this change removes that check.

Fixes golang/go#41151

Change-Id: I7539714c690f08b5792a0c540cbf46c3e81f13ba
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/252337
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Trust: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2020-09-30 16:06:38 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills 5c72a88397 sha3: remove go:nocheckptr annotation
As of Go 1.14.1, -d=checkptr no longer errors on unaligned reads of
non-pointer data.

This reverts the code change (but not the test) from CL 222855.

Fixes golang/go#37644
Updates golang/go#37298

Change-Id: I935c773a3541ed8dca7eb005d39a082eb5f10eb8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/249378
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
2020-08-20 21:17:05 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 123391ffb6 internal/wycheproof: add generic AEAD test
Add a generic AEAD test that exercises the vectors for AES GCM,
ChaCha20Poly-1305, and XChaCha20-Poly1305. Removes the existing
chacha20_poly1305_test.go test.

Change-Id: Icfaba30f8db2a1e32a9459c98cd3af5d63052027
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/234688
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2020-07-28 19:59:43 +00:00
chronologos 948cd5f358 pkcs12: drop PKCS#12 attributes with unknown OIDs
Looking at our own use case as well as people running into the same issue
[1][2], it seems like users usually don't care about decoding unknown
PKCS12Attributes.

[1]: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/24325
[2]: https://github.com/SSLMate/go-pkcs12/pull/4

Fixes golang/go#24325

Change-Id: I4f3700d2551af6dac215c49dd179ce46c4b2a9db
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/241281
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-07-09 23:00:13 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda ab33eee955 pkcs12: document that we use the wrong PEM type
Fixes golang/go#28018

Change-Id: I2daf99789328ef476de834c3cc703e01b468b3ee
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/241337
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-07-07 23:50:45 +00:00
Julian Kornberger 75b288015a ssh: Make error message deterministic
By using a slice instead of a map for tried authentication methods the order is always the same. Small slices are also faster than maps.

Before the change sometimes I get the error:

    ssh: handshake failed: ssh: unable to authenticate, attempted methods [none publickey], no supported methods remain

and sometimes:

    ssh: handshake failed: ssh: unable to authenticate, attempted methods [publickey none], no supported methods remain

Change-Id: I06507d57e9eef497ff05bce088d52607e69dde3e
GitHub-Last-Rev: 3a46aae4c6e3e5f52ca4b04384b3cc4efc039aa6
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#142
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/239171
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-06-22 21:36:23 +00:00
Roland Shoemaker 70a84ac30b internal/wycheproof: add tests for hmac generation
Required updating wycheproofModVer to pull the most recent test
vectors. Tests against SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512
constructions but not the SHA3 variants.

Change-Id: I5b66632ac0c7106bd9b405f6636922a6383d8b9e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/234718
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2020-06-04 20:27:06 +00:00
Erick Tryzelaar 279210d13f ssh: don't err out on channel request msgs to unknown channels
rfc4254 section 5.4 states that channel request messages sent to an
unrecognized channel should be replied with a `SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE`,
rather than erring out and closing the mux. This can occur with servers
like openssh-portable, which can begin to close a channel and also use
that channel for keepalives before it has received a closed response
from the client.

Fixes golang/go#38908

Change-Id: Id68b77e16b2889d3a21d505ed8018f9f457e067a
GitHub-Last-Rev: 8a92f87dc30697d9e3805af695efdf1b1dc8409b
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#136
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/232659
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-06-02 18:02:16 +00:00
Pasi Tähkäpää 06a226fb4e Use boolean tag (0x01) for boolean type.
Fix for problem with ReadASN1Boolean, which uses invalid tag (Integer / 0x02) when trying to read boolean value. This is a fix for the one case mentioned in "x/crypto/cryptobyte: cannot read boolean values #26565"
This is specified in ITU-T X.690, section 8.2, with DER additions specified in 11.1.

Change-Id: I3c9406bd6febb6112f380224fec1d42a6cd64ed4
GitHub-Last-Rev: fd7d01c897d8aa32d92115be9017f84d75fc4467
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#137
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/233161
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-05-10 22:35:06 +00:00
Michael Munday 4b2356b1ed poly1305: modify s390x assembly to implement MAC interface
The vector (vx) implementation has been updated to read in the
state and update it - as opposed to being a single shot function.
This has allowed the new MAC interface can be implemented.

For performance reasons s390x uses a larger buffer than the generic
implementation. There is a relatively high fixed cost to read the
state, calculate the key coefficients and serialize the state, so
it makes sense to buffer more blocks before calling it.

For now I've had to remove the faster VMSL implementation. It is
too complex for me to update in time for Go 1.15. At some point
I'd like to revisit it but for now it looks like using the MAC
interface is more of a win than using VMSL.

The benchmarks show considerable improvements when using the MAC
interface. The Sum benchmarks show slowdown due to a combination
of the removal of the VMSL implementation and also the added
overhead from splitting the summation function into multiple parts.

poly1305:

name              old speed      new speed      delta
64                1.33GB/s ± 0%  0.80GB/s ± 1%   -39.51%  (p=0.000 n=16+20)
1K                4.04GB/s ± 0%  2.97GB/s ± 0%   -26.46%  (p=0.000 n=19+19)
2M                5.32GB/s ± 1%  3.63GB/s ± 0%   -31.76%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)
64Unaligned       1.33GB/s ± 0%  0.80GB/s ± 0%   -39.80%  (p=0.000 n=19+18)
1KUnaligned       4.09GB/s ± 1%  2.94GB/s ± 0%   -28.23%  (p=0.000 n=19+18)
2MUnaligned       5.33GB/s ± 1%  3.52GB/s ± 0%   -34.04%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)
Write64           1.03GB/s ± 1%  1.49GB/s ± 1%   +44.34%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Write1K           1.21GB/s ± 0%  3.24GB/s ± 0%  +169.02%  (p=0.000 n=20+17)
Write2M           1.24GB/s ± 1%  3.63GB/s ± 0%  +192.36%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)
Write64Unaligned  1.04GB/s ± 1%  1.50GB/s ± 0%   +44.16%  (p=0.000 n=19+14)
Write1KUnaligned  1.21GB/s ± 0%  3.20GB/s ± 0%  +164.55%  (p=0.000 n=20+16)
Write2MUnaligned  1.24GB/s ± 1%  3.51GB/s ± 0%  +183.96%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)

chacha20poly1305 (this vs. using generic MAC interface - post CL 206977):

name         old speed      new speed      delta
Open-64       147MB/s ± 2%   156MB/s ± 1%   +6.15%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)
Seal-64       151MB/s ± 0%   164MB/s ± 1%   +8.86%  (p=0.000 n=19+16)
Open-64-X     104MB/s ± 2%   111MB/s ± 1%   +6.24%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-64-X     109MB/s ± 2%   111MB/s ± 1%   +2.11%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)
Open-1350     555MB/s ± 0%   751MB/s ± 1%  +35.19%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-1350     557MB/s ± 0%   759MB/s ± 0%  +36.23%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Open-1350-X   517MB/s ± 1%   683MB/s ± 1%  +31.97%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-1350-X   511MB/s ± 0%   683MB/s ± 0%  +33.77%  (p=0.000 n=18+19)
Open-8192     672MB/s ± 0%  1013MB/s ± 0%  +50.65%  (p=0.000 n=19+19)
Seal-8192     674MB/s ± 0%  1018MB/s ± 0%  +50.98%  (p=0.000 n=18+20)
Open-8192-X   663MB/s ± 0%   979MB/s ± 0%  +47.57%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-8192-X   658MB/s ± 0%   985MB/s ± 0%  +49.62%  (p=0.000 n=18+20)

name         old allocs/op  new allocs/op  delta
Open-64          0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Seal-64          0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Open-64-X        0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Seal-64-X        0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Open-1350        0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Seal-1350        0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Open-1350-X      0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Seal-1350-X      0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Open-8192        0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Seal-8192        0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Open-8192-X      0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)
Seal-8192-X      0.00           0.00          ~     (all equal)

chacha20poly1305 (this vs. using asm Sum interface - pre CL 206977):

name         old speed      new speed      delta
Open-64       144MB/s ± 0%   156MB/s ± 1%    +8.16%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)
Seal-64       150MB/s ± 0%   164MB/s ± 1%    +9.35%  (p=0.000 n=20+16)
Open-64-X     104MB/s ± 1%   111MB/s ± 1%    +6.15%  (p=0.000 n=19+20)
Seal-64-X     109MB/s ± 1%   111MB/s ± 1%    +1.43%  (p=0.000 n=19+19)
Open-1350     702MB/s ± 1%   751MB/s ± 1%    +6.98%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-1350     715MB/s ± 0%   759MB/s ± 0%    +6.09%  (p=0.000 n=19+20)
Open-1350-X   642MB/s ± 0%   683MB/s ± 1%    +6.37%  (p=0.000 n=19+20)
Seal-1350-X   639MB/s ± 0%   683MB/s ± 0%    +6.98%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)
Open-8192     994MB/s ± 0%  1013MB/s ± 0%    +1.85%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)
Seal-8192    1.00GB/s ± 0%  1.02GB/s ± 0%    +1.90%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Open-8192-X   965MB/s ± 0%   979MB/s ± 0%    +1.43%  (p=0.000 n=19+20)
Seal-8192-X   962MB/s ± 0%   985MB/s ± 0%    +2.39%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)

name         old allocs/op  new allocs/op  delta
Open-64          1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-64          1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Open-64-X        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-64-X        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Open-1350        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-1350        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Open-1350-X      1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-1350-X      1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Open-8192        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-8192        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Open-8192-X      1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
Seal-8192-X      1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)

Updates golang/go#25219.

Change-Id: Ib491e3a47b6b3ec8bbbe1f41f7bf42ad82f5c249
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/219057
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-04-29 18:30:12 +00:00
Lily Chung 729f1e841b ssh: improve docs on Certificate.SignCert
Document the fact that SignCert sets the Nonce field.  This makes it
clear that callers need not set it themselves.

Original change by Jakob Weisblat <jakobw@mit.edu> in CL 57051.

Fixes golang/go#21384

Change-Id: I161e0909ba6c8d07be5f8e68dc6e0f0392bea63f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/230212
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-04-27 16:56:52 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 4bdfaf469e chacha20: don't panic encrypting the final blocks
Certain operations with counter values close to overflowing were causing
an unnecessary panic, which was reachable due to the SetCounter API and
actually observed in QUIC.

Tests by lukechampine <luke.champine@gmail.com> from CL 220591.

Fixes golang/go#37157

Relanding of CL 224279, which was broken on multi-block buffers.
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/224279
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>

Change-Id: Ia382c6f62ae49ffe257b67f7b794e8d7124d981e
(cherry picked from commit 1c2c788b11)
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/229119
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2020-04-23 21:15:02 +00:00
Katie Hockman 18b771bd64 cryptobyte: handle AddASN1BigInt with -1
Fixes golang/go#38510

Change-Id: Ie52db22bf85a5f79046fad95e5bbe2788c3bec92
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/229457
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-04-23 19:51:18 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 44a6062868 poly1305: add (*MAC).Verify API and use it in chacha20poly1305
Also, make sure New inlines so it does not cause an allocation. With
this, we have a zero allocation poly1305 flow and a zero allocation
generic chacha20poly1305 composition! \o/

While at it, remove some redundant code, and prepare to drop some
complexity once the last assembly implementation of sum is dropped.

Benchstat with "-tags purego" on amd64

name              old time/op    new time/op    delta
Open-64-8         461ns ± 2%     415ns ± 1%    -9.93%  (p=0.000 n=10+8)
Seal-64-8         450ns ± 3%     412ns ± 3%    -8.41%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-64-X-8       603ns ± 2%     544ns ± 2%    -9.84%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-64-X-8       580ns ± 3%     553ns ± 1%    -4.56%  (p=0.000 n=9+8)
Open-1350-8      3.98µs ± 2%    3.65µs ± 2%    -8.28%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Seal-1350-8      3.95µs ± 2%    3.64µs ± 1%    -7.93%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Open-1350-X-8    4.06µs ± 1%    3.68µs ± 3%    -9.31%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Seal-1350-X-8    4.08µs ± 4%    3.64µs ± 1%   -10.71%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Open-8192-8      21.7µs ± 3%    18.9µs ± 2%   -13.10%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Seal-8192-8      21.5µs ± 3%    18.8µs ± 1%   -12.51%  (p=0.000 n=9+9)
Open-8192-X-8    21.4µs ± 1%    19.1µs ± 2%   -10.88%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-8192-X-8    21.3µs ± 2%    19.0µs ± 3%   -10.92%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)

name              old speed      new speed      delta
Open-64-8       139MB/s ± 2%   154MB/s ± 2%   +11.05%  (p=0.000 n=10+8)
Seal-64-8       142MB/s ± 3%   155MB/s ± 3%    +9.11%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-64-X-8     106MB/s ± 2%   118MB/s ± 2%   +10.93%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-64-X-8     110MB/s ± 3%   116MB/s ± 1%    +4.75%  (p=0.000 n=9+8)
Open-1350-8     339MB/s ± 2%   370MB/s ± 2%    +9.04%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Seal-1350-8     342MB/s ± 2%   371MB/s ± 1%    +8.60%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Open-1350-X-8   333MB/s ± 1%   367MB/s ± 3%   +10.30%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Seal-1350-X-8   331MB/s ± 4%   371MB/s ± 2%   +11.96%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Open-8192-8     377MB/s ± 3%   434MB/s ± 2%   +15.07%  (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Seal-8192-8     381MB/s ± 3%   436MB/s ± 1%   +14.29%  (p=0.000 n=9+9)
Open-8192-X-8   383MB/s ± 1%   429MB/s ± 2%   +12.21%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-8192-X-8   385MB/s ± 2%   432MB/s ± 3%   +12.26%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)

name              old alloc/op   new alloc/op   delta
Open-64-8         96.0B ± 0%      0.0B       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-64-8         96.0B ± 0%      0.0B       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-64-X-8       96.0B ± 0%      0.0B       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-64-X-8       96.0B ± 0%      0.0B       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-1350-8      1.41kB ± 0%    0.00kB       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-1350-8      1.41kB ± 0%    0.00kB       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-1350-X-8    1.41kB ± 0%    0.00kB       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-1350-X-8    1.41kB ± 0%    0.00kB       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-8192-8      9.47kB ± 0%    0.00kB       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-8192-8      9.47kB ± 0%    0.00kB       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-8192-X-8    9.47kB ± 0%    0.00kB       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-8192-X-8    9.47kB ± 0%    0.00kB       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)

name              old allocs/op  new allocs/op  delta
Open-64-8          1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-64-8          1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-64-X-8        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-64-X-8        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-1350-8        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-1350-8        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-1350-X-8      1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-1350-X-8      1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-8192-8        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-8192-8        1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Open-8192-X-8      1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Seal-8192-X-8      1.00 ± 0%      0.00       -100.00%  (p=0.000 n=10+10)

Change-Id: I2c30ddc960a889b49c8ee8ff8073ffc4e75f43af
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/206977
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2020-04-22 19:42:13 +00:00
Andy Wang 3c4aac8981 chacha20: improve generic implementation performance
Some small changes to improve computation throughput of noasm chacha20 by between 4-11%.

name                 old time/op   new time/op   delta
ChaCha20/64-12         142ns ± 1%    132ns ± 1%   -7.09%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
ChaCha20/256-12        485ns ± 1%    441ns ± 1%   -9.08%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
ChaCha20/10x25-12      822ns ± 1%    785ns ± 1%   -4.42%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
ChaCha20/4096-12       484ns ± 1%    442ns ± 1%   -8.80%  (p=0.000 n=20+19)
ChaCha20/100x40-12    8.65µs ± 1%   8.08µs ± 1%   -6.54%  (p=0.000 n=19+20)
ChaCha20/65536-12      118µs ± 1%    106µs ± 1%  -10.04%  (p=0.000 n=19+20)
ChaCha20/1000x65-12    120µs ± 1%    108µs ± 0%   -9.84%  (p=0.000 n=19+19)

name                 old speed     new speed     delta
ChaCha20/64-12       450MB/s ± 1%  484MB/s ± 1%   +7.61%  (p=0.000 n=19+19)
ChaCha20/256-12      527MB/s ± 1%  580MB/s ± 1%  +10.03%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
ChaCha20/10x25-12    304MB/s ± 1%  318MB/s ± 1%   +4.62%  (p=0.000 n=20+20)
ChaCha20/4096-12     529MB/s ± 1%  580MB/s ± 1%   +9.70%  (p=0.000 n=19+20)
ChaCha20/100x40-12   463MB/s ± 1%  495MB/s ± 1%   +7.00%  (p=0.000 n=19+20)
ChaCha20/65536-12    556MB/s ± 1%  618MB/s ± 1%  +11.16%  (p=0.000 n=19+20)
ChaCha20/1000x65-12  542MB/s ± 1%  602MB/s ± 0%  +10.92%  (p=0.000 n=19+19)

Redundant bound checks on loading key and nonce as uint32s in newUnauthenticatedCipher
are eliminated.

In the main block loop, two changes were made:
1. Specialise the xor function to addXor, so the final block state variables don't need to be
separately incremented by the initial block state before XORing with the input block.
2. Change the loop condition to be bound by len(src) >=64 and len(dst) >= 64.
This eliminates all bound checks later in the load-xor-store stage.
As a result, src and dst are resliced in-place after each block.

Change-Id: Ic3165a556bf7cb2d71349d534cdd21d06d9a7a2c
GitHub-Last-Rev: b3b1a185004c551919a8984547a5bac0283919a1
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#131
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/228618
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-04-20 20:11:42 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda a76a400e30 Revert "chacha20: don't panic encrypting the final blocks"
This reverts CL 224279.

Reason for revert: broken on arm64, ppc64le and s390x 😢

Change-Id: I8632ee78a79696a3117c81729904797233e0071d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/229118
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2020-04-20 19:28:32 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 1c2c788b11 chacha20: don't panic encrypting the final blocks
Certain operations with counter values close to overflowing were causing
an unnecessary panic, which was reachable due to the SetCounter API and
actually observed in QUIC.

Tests by lukechampine <luke.champine@gmail.com> from CL 220591.

Fixes golang/go#37157

Change-Id: Iba52edb1ba36af391b8fe4ee615c5c41d7e64f48
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/224279
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2020-04-20 19:18:34 +00:00
Bob McNaughton 884d27f428 Update reference to CBC vulnerability in cipher.go
The original referenced paper is no longer available. I contacted the author, and this is the reference he supplied.

Change-Id: Ib5ad88932f2bfc12ff62639f7fb7c3ee568610d6
GitHub-Last-Rev: 2cf7d15c63a114952c90a018ea5afe085965202e
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#132
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/228638
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-04-20 10:45:11 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 0848c95719 chacha20poly1305: improve ExampleNewX
The example was failing to direct users on what to do with the nonce,
which should be almost universally prepended to the ciphertext.

Also, leaving key out of the function was pulling the entire file into
the example.

Updates golang/go#38369

Change-Id: I3a13342fff02e1a5d6f9c4ef2a8bddf0b1097707
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/227937
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2020-04-14 17:38:20 +00:00
Hana (Hyang-Ah) Kim 4f8f47aa79 ssh/terminal: handle ctrl+C, ctrl+F, ctrl+B
ctrl+C: terminate readline, which may result in application termination.
ctrl+F: keyRight
ctrl+B: keyLeft

Update golang/go#27147

Change-Id: If319ef79708b98c030cbce102400a785d15137f8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/228223
Reviewed-by: Daniel Martí <mvdan@mvdan.cc>
Run-TryBot: Daniel Martí <mvdan@mvdan.cc>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-04-14 15:58:20 +00:00
Alex Gaynor 056763e48d ssh/agent: handle ed25519.PrivateKey by value in AddedKey
Also document that ed25519 is supported.

Change-Id: Ibc4f44069eae4ff1aad27f22fc651a2f7611679d
GitHub-Last-Rev: ee2ce0ae9900b11e1fa891e3587b111168f708c9
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#119
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/219506
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-04-06 17:35:13 +00:00
Katie Hockman baeed622b8 blake2b,blake2s: clarify difference between blake2b and blake2s
Fixes golang/go#37784

Change-Id: I2fdaf96979390f3744ba8135da78107a15f5e9a8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/226845
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-04-03 20:14:58 +00:00
Ross Kinsey 0ec3e9974c ssh: support aes256-cbc for passphrase-protected OpenSSH keys
The existing code for decrypting OpenSSH-format keys only allows aes256-ctr, the current ssh-keygen default.
However, the default encryption scheme was aes256-cbc until relatively recently, and some of these keys are still in use.
Support for aes256-cbc has been added.

Fixes golang/go#37939

Change-Id: I3730347109c5dd18e4cbe61b48bbca9566ad61d2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/224817
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-03-23 16:52:09 +00:00
Yannic Bonenberger 891825fb96 gitignore: remove obsolete reference to .hgignore in comment
Change-Id: Ie2b79a1132b3d59e5bedc71cb5aa8d9aafeb8c68
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/224297
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
2020-03-20 18:11:02 +00:00
Katie Hockman 97fc981609 internal/wycheproof: update TestEcdsa to use ecdsa.VerifyASN1
Change-Id: Ibd6ce156550615cb85c06e734641c34fca0cfcd0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/220697
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-03-20 14:53:29 +00:00
Lucas Bremgartner 1b76d66859 ssh: fix data race in dh group exchange sha256
Fixes golang/go#37607

Change-Id: Iedf6522ec9b9a676ac51c054407a6aef894885f5
GitHub-Last-Rev: 8cb2460c59d2e32bc3f0480bcd7867a113361c67
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#126
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/222078
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-03-17 14:21:12 +00:00
Bryan C. Mills f7b00557c8 sha3: mark xorInUnaligned with go:nocheckptr
It is unclear whether unaligned reads should be allowed, or if they
are even actually a good idea here. However, while we figure that out,
we should un-break 'go test -race' for users of this package.

Updates golang/go#37644
Updates golang/go#37298
Updates golang/go#37715
Updates golang/go#34972
Updates golang/go#35128

Change-Id: I088f5703023e4f05ee274a6753e925973f12ac1b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/222855
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
2020-03-11 17:13:14 +00:00
Andrew Louis 78000ba7a0 acme: make WaitAuthorization return authorization errors consistently
Fixes golang/go#37340

Change-Id: I19c4f150b8607ad4a1613cf97ad3362f4b779d7c
GitHub-Last-Rev: 4215964b4a680b135301695ccd56cff88a8ffb26
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#121
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/220343
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-03-02 21:09:43 +00:00
Ian Lance Taylor 32487eceac openpgp/packet: ensure that first partial packet is 512 bytes
This requirement is from RFC 4880 4.2.2.4.

Also simplify the partialLengthWriter loop. The old code worked but
was written in a confusing way, with a loop whose terminating condition
didn't make sense and was never true in practice.
Rewrite it to more clearly do a set of partial writes of decreasing size.

Fixes golang/go#32474

Change-Id: Ia53ceb39a34f1d6f2ea7c60190d52948bb0db59b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/181121
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
2020-03-02 21:01:49 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda 2aa609cf4a chacha20,poly1305,chacha20poly1305: set consistent build tags
appengine was only necessary for the legacy system based on Go 1.9, drop
that. Add purego tags instead. Remove redundant architecture tags.

Change-Id: Ib1f65a4837511e63e08c1aa43163a79cfe868e0c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/215498
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
2020-02-21 23:15:18 +00:00
lukechampine eddbd5da47 chacha20: add SetCounter method
Fixes golang/go#35506

Change-Id: I5cfc6b4dc07ab368e370edaee11841c2c1377f82
GitHub-Last-Rev: 16147a1668a903532f2d3777b873ddad8f0f26f5
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#108
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/206638
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-02-21 23:14:36 +00:00
Katie Hockman 0f24fbd83d internal/wycheproof: add test for ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD encryption/decryption
Change-Id: I71d62f95954a39c476bee55e22b6fcf96a196de1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/214939
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-02-21 17:05:53 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda bac4c82f69 ssh: return an error for malformed ed25519 public keys rather than panic
An attacker can craft an ssh-ed25519 or sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
public key, such that the library will panic when trying to verify a
signature with it. Clients can deliver such a public key and signature
to any golang.org/x/crypto/ssh server with a PublicKeyCallback, and
servers can deliver them to any golang.org/x/crypto/ssh client.

This issue was discovered and reported by Alex Gaynor, Fish in a Barrel,
and is tracked as CVE-2020-9283.

Change-Id: Ie25b78a0b0181fbbc8cc7de4f4e27d908777529c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/220357
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-02-20 18:36:23 +00:00
Katie Hockman 1ad67e1f0e internal/wycheproof: add test for CBC decryption with PKCS#5 padding
Change-Id: Ie60bdc10065018e193271b4f90f50298f1272396
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/218323
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-02-19 23:42:26 +00:00
Brad Fitzpatrick 1d94cc7ab1 acme/autocert: remove unused listener struct field
Change-Id: Ie7f4848d7388811bdcf1937eab9d603de64d6e96
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/219220
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-02-14 03:40:16 +00:00
Jason Baker 86ce3cb696 acme/autocert: fix TLS-ALPN identifier in tests
CL 204177 broke autocert tests because they expected the old OID.

Fixes golang/go#37160

Change-Id: Id732d4d249bbe5107fa0a3ba4829012600d8a52d
GitHub-Last-Rev: 77e8d1ff0072866d8466c56885d01d3b91d5baef
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#117
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/218941
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-02-10 22:22:08 +00:00
Jason Baker 6ca56c2f2e acme: update TLS-ALPN identifier to the latest IANA assignment
It looks like the source code has fallen out of date with the draft spec.
The latest version https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-tls-alpn-05 has a different OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.31 assigned.

You can test that you're using the correct OID by performing a TLS-ALPN-01 challenge against a Pebble (https://github.com/letsencrypt/pebble) ACME server running with the -strict argument. This implementation will reject the obsolete OID.

Change-Id: I58c52eaed487949e9071d3b9772f7acfdcc91201
GitHub-Last-Rev: 4cacc0723c431a29aec77d4fb3320d91c66c1ff5
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#91
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/204177
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Vaghin <alex@cloudware.io>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-02-10 19:18:31 +00:00
Alex Brainman ecb85df213 ssh/terminal: adjust ReadConsole rules on windows
CL 212377 changed end of input character on windows - from \n to \r.
But CL 212377 did not adjust ReadConsole accordingly. For example,
after CL 212377 \n was still used to end of password processing,
and \r was ignored.

This CL swaps these rules - \r is now used to end password processing,
and \n are ignored. The change only affects windows, all non windows
code should work as before.

This CL also adjusts TestReadPasswordLineEnd to fit new rules.

Fixes golang/go#36609

Change-Id: I027bf80d10e7d4d4b17ff0264935d14b8bea9097
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/215417
Run-TryBot: Alex Brainman <alex.brainman@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-02-08 06:05:01 +00:00
Mariano Cano a95e85b341 ssh: support ECDSA private keys in OpenSSH format
This adds support for parsing OpenSSH ECDSA private keys. It
implements parsing for P-256, P-384, and P-521 keys.

Fixes golang/go#36722

Change-Id: I77c8e0a23ed6353f6667686cc79ec14661cb10db
GitHub-Last-Rev: 2324b920d080fc7ac35fbcf0a79e25161b6a7f82
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#114
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/215540
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
2020-02-07 20:58:29 +00:00
Katie Hockman a0c6ece9d3 internal/wycheproof: add test for hkdf key extraction
Change-Id: I501bcc2f4bd8107937756087d20e849e3a4bc182
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/214584
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2020-02-06 16:14:12 +00:00
Filippo Valsorda c9f3fb736b ssh: support encrypted OpenSSH private keys
Includes the bcrypt_pbkdf package by Dmitry Chestnykh,
submitted with permission on his behalf under the CLA:
https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/207600/2#message-6a035dd62ff76f6c9367299b911076a1be237fb8

Fixes golang/go#18692

Change-Id: I74e3ab355a8d720948d64d87adc009783a9d9732
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/207600
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
2020-02-04 10:40:54 +00:00
244 changed files with 9824 additions and 13902 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
# Add no patterns to .hgignore except for files generated by the build.
# Add no patterns to .gitignore except for files generated by the build.
last-change
-3
View File
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
# This source code refers to The Go Authors for copyright purposes.
# The master list of authors is in the main Go distribution,
# visible at https://tip.golang.org/AUTHORS.
-3
View File
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
# This source code was written by the Go contributors.
# The master list of contributors is in the main Go distribution,
# visible at https://tip.golang.org/CONTRIBUTORS.
+2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
# Go Cryptography
[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/golang.org/x/crypto.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/golang.org/x/crypto)
This repository holds supplementary Go cryptography libraries.
## Download/Install
+98 -377
View File
@@ -3,17 +3,20 @@
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package acme provides an implementation of the
// Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) spec.
// The intial implementation was based on ACME draft-02 and
// is now being extended to comply with RFC 8555.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02
// and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555 for details.
// Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) spec,
// most famously used by Let's Encrypt.
//
// The initial implementation of this package was based on an early version
// of the spec. The current implementation supports only the modern
// RFC 8555 but some of the old API surface remains for compatibility.
// While code using the old API will still compile, it will return an error.
// Note the deprecation comments to update your code.
//
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555 for the spec.
//
// Most common scenarios will want to use autocert subdirectory instead,
// which provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt
// and any other ACME-based CA.
//
// This package is a work in progress and makes no API stability promises.
package acme
import (
@@ -33,8 +36,6 @@ import (
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"strings"
@@ -55,8 +56,9 @@ const (
ALPNProto = "acme-tls/1"
)
// idPeACMEIdentifierV1 is the OID for the ACME extension for the TLS-ALPN challenge.
var idPeACMEIdentifierV1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 30, 1}
// idPeACMEIdentifier is the OID for the ACME extension for the TLS-ALPN challenge.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-tls-alpn-05#section-5.1
var idPeACMEIdentifier = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 31}
const (
maxChainLen = 5 // max depth and breadth of a certificate chain
@@ -71,22 +73,22 @@ const (
)
// Client is an ACME client.
//
// The only required field is Key. An example of creating a client with a new key
// is as follows:
//
// key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
// if err != nil {
// log.Fatal(err)
// }
// client := &Client{Key: key}
//
// key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
// if err != nil {
// log.Fatal(err)
// }
// client := &Client{Key: key}
type Client struct {
// Key is the account key used to register with a CA and sign requests.
// Key.Public() must return a *rsa.PublicKey or *ecdsa.PublicKey.
//
// The following algorithms are supported:
// RS256, ES256, ES384 and ES512.
// See RFC7518 for more details about the algorithms.
// See RFC 7518 for more details about the algorithms.
Key crypto.Signer
// HTTPClient optionally specifies an HTTP client to use
@@ -124,7 +126,9 @@ type Client struct {
cacheMu sync.Mutex
dir *Directory // cached result of Client's Discover method
kid keyID // cached Account.URI obtained from registerRFC or getAccountRFC
// KID is the key identifier provided by the CA. If not provided it will be
// retrieved from the CA by making a call to the registration endpoint.
KID KeyID
noncesMu sync.Mutex
nonces map[string]struct{} // nonces collected from previous responses
@@ -139,23 +143,22 @@ type Client struct {
//
// When in pre-RFC mode or when c.getRegRFC responds with an error, accountKID
// returns noKeyID.
func (c *Client) accountKID(ctx context.Context) keyID {
func (c *Client) accountKID(ctx context.Context) KeyID {
c.cacheMu.Lock()
defer c.cacheMu.Unlock()
if !c.dir.rfcCompliant() {
return noKeyID
}
if c.kid != noKeyID {
return c.kid
if c.KID != noKeyID {
return c.KID
}
a, err := c.getRegRFC(ctx)
if err != nil {
return noKeyID
}
c.kid = keyID(a.URI)
return c.kid
c.KID = KeyID(a.URI)
return c.KID
}
var errPreRFC = errors.New("acme: server does not support the RFC 8555 version of ACME")
// Discover performs ACME server discovery using c.DirectoryURL.
//
// It caches successful result. So, subsequent calls will not result in
@@ -176,53 +179,36 @@ func (c *Client) Discover(ctx context.Context) (Directory, error) {
c.addNonce(res.Header)
var v struct {
Reg string `json:"new-reg"`
RegRFC string `json:"newAccount"`
Authz string `json:"new-authz"`
AuthzRFC string `json:"newAuthz"`
OrderRFC string `json:"newOrder"`
Cert string `json:"new-cert"`
Revoke string `json:"revoke-cert"`
RevokeRFC string `json:"revokeCert"`
NonceRFC string `json:"newNonce"`
KeyChangeRFC string `json:"keyChange"`
Meta struct {
Terms string `json:"terms-of-service"`
TermsRFC string `json:"termsOfService"`
WebsiteRFC string `json:"website"`
CAA []string `json:"caa-identities"`
CAARFC []string `json:"caaIdentities"`
ExternalAcctRFC bool `json:"externalAccountRequired"`
Reg string `json:"newAccount"`
Authz string `json:"newAuthz"`
Order string `json:"newOrder"`
Revoke string `json:"revokeCert"`
Nonce string `json:"newNonce"`
KeyChange string `json:"keyChange"`
Meta struct {
Terms string `json:"termsOfService"`
Website string `json:"website"`
CAA []string `json:"caaIdentities"`
ExternalAcct bool `json:"externalAccountRequired"`
}
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
return Directory{}, err
}
if v.OrderRFC == "" {
// Non-RFC compliant ACME CA.
c.dir = &Directory{
RegURL: v.Reg,
AuthzURL: v.Authz,
CertURL: v.Cert,
RevokeURL: v.Revoke,
Terms: v.Meta.Terms,
Website: v.Meta.WebsiteRFC,
CAA: v.Meta.CAA,
}
return *c.dir, nil
if v.Order == "" {
return Directory{}, errPreRFC
}
// RFC compliant ACME CA.
c.dir = &Directory{
RegURL: v.RegRFC,
AuthzURL: v.AuthzRFC,
OrderURL: v.OrderRFC,
RevokeURL: v.RevokeRFC,
NonceURL: v.NonceRFC,
KeyChangeURL: v.KeyChangeRFC,
Terms: v.Meta.TermsRFC,
Website: v.Meta.WebsiteRFC,
CAA: v.Meta.CAARFC,
ExternalAccountRequired: v.Meta.ExternalAcctRFC,
RegURL: v.Reg,
AuthzURL: v.Authz,
OrderURL: v.Order,
RevokeURL: v.Revoke,
NonceURL: v.Nonce,
KeyChangeURL: v.KeyChange,
Terms: v.Meta.Terms,
Website: v.Meta.Website,
CAA: v.Meta.CAA,
ExternalAccountRequired: v.Meta.ExternalAcct,
}
return *c.dir, nil
}
@@ -234,55 +220,11 @@ func (c *Client) directoryURL() string {
return LetsEncryptURL
}
// CreateCert requests a new certificate using the Certificate Signing Request csr encoded in DER format.
// It is incompatible with RFC 8555. Callers should use CreateOrderCert when interfacing
// with an RFC-compliant CA.
// CreateCert was part of the old version of ACME. It is incompatible with RFC 8555.
//
// The exp argument indicates the desired certificate validity duration. CA may issue a certificate
// with a different duration.
// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate chain.
//
// In the case where CA server does not provide the issued certificate in the response,
// CreateCert will poll certURL using c.FetchCert, which will result in additional round-trips.
// In such a scenario, the caller can cancel the polling with ctx.
//
// CreateCert returns an error if the CA's response or chain was unreasonably large.
// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid and has the expected features.
// Deprecated: this was for the pre-RFC 8555 version of ACME. Callers should use CreateOrderCert.
func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
req := struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
CSR string `json:"csr"`
NotBefore string `json:"notBefore,omitempty"`
NotAfter string `json:"notAfter,omitempty"`
}{
Resource: "new-cert",
CSR: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(csr),
}
now := timeNow()
req.NotBefore = now.Format(time.RFC3339)
if exp > 0 {
req.NotAfter = now.Add(exp).Format(time.RFC3339)
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, c.dir.CertURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated))
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
curl := res.Header.Get("Location") // cert permanent URL
if res.ContentLength == 0 {
// no cert in the body; poll until we get it
cert, err := c.FetchCert(ctx, curl, bundle)
return cert, curl, err
}
// slurp issued cert and CA chain, if requested
cert, err := c.responseCert(ctx, res, bundle)
return cert, curl, err
return nil, "", errPreRFC
}
// FetchCert retrieves already issued certificate from the given url, in DER format.
@@ -296,20 +238,10 @@ func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration,
// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid
// and has expected features.
func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if dir.rfcCompliant() {
return c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, url, bundle)
}
// Legacy non-authenticated GET request.
res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c.responseCert(ctx, res, bundle)
return c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, url, bundle)
}
// RevokeCert revokes a previously issued certificate cert, provided in DER format.
@@ -319,30 +251,10 @@ func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]by
// For instance, the key pair of the certificate may be authorized.
// If the key is nil, c.Key is used instead.
func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return err
}
if dir.rfcCompliant() {
return c.revokeCertRFC(ctx, key, cert, reason)
}
// Legacy CA.
body := &struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
Cert string `json:"certificate"`
Reason int `json:"reason"`
}{
Resource: "revoke-cert",
Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert),
Reason: int(reason),
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, key, dir.RevokeURL, body, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
return nil
return c.revokeCertRFC(ctx, key, cert, reason)
}
// AcceptTOS always returns true to indicate the acceptance of a CA's Terms of Service
@@ -362,74 +274,50 @@ func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true }
// Also see Error's Instance field for when a CA requires already registered accounts to agree
// to an updated Terms of Service.
func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
if c.Key == nil {
return nil, errors.New("acme: client.Key must be set to Register")
}
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if dir.rfcCompliant() {
return c.registerRFC(ctx, acct, prompt)
}
// Legacy ACME draft registration flow.
a, err := c.doReg(ctx, dir.RegURL, "new-reg", acct)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var accept bool
if a.CurrentTerms != "" && a.CurrentTerms != a.AgreedTerms {
accept = prompt(a.CurrentTerms)
}
if accept {
a.AgreedTerms = a.CurrentTerms
a, err = c.UpdateReg(ctx, a)
}
return a, err
return c.registerRFC(ctx, acct, prompt)
}
// GetReg retrieves an existing account associated with c.Key.
//
// The url argument is an Account URI used with pre-RFC 8555 CAs.
// It is ignored when interfacing with an RFC-compliant CA.
// The url argument is a legacy artifact of the pre-RFC 8555 API
// and is ignored.
func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if dir.rfcCompliant() {
return c.getRegRFC(ctx)
}
// Legacy CA.
a, err := c.doReg(ctx, url, "reg", nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
a.URI = url
return a, nil
return c.getRegRFC(ctx)
}
// UpdateReg updates an existing registration.
// It returns an updated account copy. The provided account is not modified.
//
// When interfacing with RFC-compliant CAs, a.URI is ignored and the account URL
// associated with c.Key is used instead.
// The account's URI is ignored and the account URL associated with
// c.Key is used instead.
func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, acct *Account) (*Account, error) {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if dir.rfcCompliant() {
return c.updateRegRFC(ctx, acct)
}
return c.updateRegRFC(ctx, acct)
}
// Legacy CA.
uri := acct.URI
a, err := c.doReg(ctx, uri, "reg", acct)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
a.URI = uri
return a, nil
// AccountKeyRollover attempts to transition a client's account key to a new key.
// On success client's Key is updated which is not concurrency safe.
// On failure an error will be returned.
// The new key is already registered with the ACME provider if the following is true:
// - error is of type acme.Error
// - StatusCode should be 409 (Conflict)
// - Location header will have the KID of the associated account
//
// More about account key rollover can be found at
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3.5.
func (c *Client) AccountKeyRollover(ctx context.Context, newKey crypto.Signer) error {
return c.accountKeyRollover(ctx, newKey)
}
// Authorize performs the initial step in the pre-authorization flow,
@@ -498,17 +386,11 @@ func (c *Client) authorize(ctx context.Context, typ, val string) (*Authorization
// If a caller needs to poll an authorization until its status is final,
// see the WaitAuthorization method.
func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var res *http.Response
if dir.rfcCompliant() {
res, err = c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
} else {
res, err = c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
}
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -530,7 +412,6 @@ func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizati
//
// It does not revoke existing certificates.
func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error {
// Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode.
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -560,18 +441,11 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error {
// In all other cases WaitAuthorization returns an error.
// If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *AuthorizationError.
func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) {
// Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode.
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
getfn := c.postAsGet
if !dir.rfcCompliant() {
getfn = c.get
}
for {
res, err := getfn(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -614,17 +488,11 @@ func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizat
//
// A client typically polls a challenge status using this method.
func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, error) {
// Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode.
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
getfn := c.postAsGet
if !dir.rfcCompliant() {
getfn = c.get
}
res, err := getfn(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -642,29 +510,11 @@ func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, erro
//
// The server will then perform the validation asynchronously.
func (c *Client) Accept(ctx context.Context, chal *Challenge) (*Challenge, error) {
// Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode.
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var req interface{} = json.RawMessage("{}") // RFC-compliant CA
if !dir.rfcCompliant() {
auth, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), chal.Token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req = struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"`
}{
Resource: "challenge",
Type: chal.Type,
Auth: auth,
}
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, chal.URI, req, wantStatus(
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, chal.URI, json.RawMessage("{}"), wantStatus(
http.StatusOK, // according to the spec
http.StatusAccepted, // Let's Encrypt: see https://goo.gl/WsJ7VT (acme-divergences.md)
))
@@ -715,7 +565,7 @@ func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengePath(token string) string {
// TLSSNI01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-01 challenge response.
//
// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of ACME spec.
// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of the ACME spec.
func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
if err != nil {
@@ -733,7 +583,7 @@ func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tl
// TLSSNI02ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-02 challenge response.
//
// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of ACME spec.
// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of the ACME spec.
func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
@@ -778,7 +628,7 @@ func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain string, opt ...CertOption)
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
acmeExtension := pkix.Extension{
Id: idPeACMEIdentifierV1,
Id: idPeACMEIdentifier,
Critical: true,
Value: extValue,
}
@@ -800,63 +650,6 @@ func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain string, opt ...CertOption)
return tlsChallengeCert([]string{domain}, newOpt)
}
// doReg sends all types of registration requests the old way (pre-RFC world).
// The type of request is identified by typ argument, which is a "resource"
// in the ACME spec terms.
//
// A non-nil acct argument indicates whether the intention is to mutate data
// of the Account. Only Contact and Agreement of its fields are used
// in such cases.
func (c *Client) doReg(ctx context.Context, url string, typ string, acct *Account) (*Account, error) {
req := struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"`
Agreement string `json:"agreement,omitempty"`
}{
Resource: typ,
}
if acct != nil {
req.Contact = acct.Contact
req.Agreement = acct.AgreedTerms
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(
http.StatusOK, // updates and deletes
http.StatusCreated, // new account creation
http.StatusAccepted, // Let's Encrypt divergent implementation
))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
var v struct {
Contact []string
Agreement string
Authorizations string
Certificates string
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
}
var tos string
if v := linkHeader(res.Header, "terms-of-service"); len(v) > 0 {
tos = v[0]
}
var authz string
if v := linkHeader(res.Header, "next"); len(v) > 0 {
authz = v[0]
}
return &Account{
URI: res.Header.Get("Location"),
Contact: v.Contact,
AgreedTerms: v.Agreement,
CurrentTerms: tos,
Authz: authz,
Authorizations: v.Authorizations,
Certificates: v.Certificates,
}, nil
}
// popNonce returns a nonce value previously stored with c.addNonce
// or fetches a fresh one from c.dir.NonceURL.
// If NonceURL is empty, it first tries c.directoryURL() and, failing that,
@@ -931,78 +724,6 @@ func nonceFromHeader(h http.Header) string {
return h.Get("Replay-Nonce")
}
func (c *Client) responseCert(ctx context.Context, res *http.Response, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) {
b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxCertSize+1))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: response stream: %v", err)
}
if len(b) > maxCertSize {
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate is too big")
}
cert := [][]byte{b}
if !bundle {
return cert, nil
}
// Append CA chain cert(s).
// At least one is required according to the spec:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-03#section-6.3.1
up := linkHeader(res.Header, "up")
if len(up) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme: rel=up link not found")
}
if len(up) > maxChainLen {
return nil, errors.New("acme: rel=up link is too large")
}
for _, url := range up {
cc, err := c.chainCert(ctx, url, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cert = append(cert, cc...)
}
return cert, nil
}
// chainCert fetches CA certificate chain recursively by following "up" links.
// Each recursive call increments the depth by 1, resulting in an error
// if the recursion level reaches maxChainLen.
//
// First chainCert call starts with depth of 0.
func (c *Client) chainCert(ctx context.Context, url string, depth int) ([][]byte, error) {
if depth >= maxChainLen {
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too deep")
}
res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxCertSize+1))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(b) > maxCertSize {
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate is too big")
}
chain := [][]byte{b}
uplink := linkHeader(res.Header, "up")
if len(uplink) > maxChainLen {
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too large")
}
for _, up := range uplink {
cc, err := c.chainCert(ctx, up, depth+1)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
chain = append(chain, cc...)
}
return chain, nil
}
// linkHeader returns URI-Reference values of all Link headers
// with relation-type rel.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5988#section-5 for details.
@@ -1093,5 +814,5 @@ func encodePEM(typ string, b []byte) []byte {
return pem.EncodeToMemory(pb)
}
// timeNow is useful for testing for fixed current time.
// timeNow is time.Now, except in tests which can mess with it.
var timeNow = time.Now
+63 -640
View File
@@ -79,240 +79,28 @@ func decodeJWSHead(r io.Reader) (*jwsHead, error) {
return &head, nil
}
func TestDiscover(t *testing.T) {
const (
reg = "https://example.com/acme/new-reg"
authz = "https://example.com/acme/new-authz"
cert = "https://example.com/acme/new-cert"
revoke = "https://example.com/acme/revoke-cert"
)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "testnonce")
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
"new-reg": %q,
"new-authz": %q,
"new-cert": %q,
"revoke-cert": %q
}`, reg, authz, cert, revoke)
}))
defer ts.Close()
c := Client{DirectoryURL: ts.URL}
dir, err := c.Discover(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if dir.RegURL != reg {
t.Errorf("dir.RegURL = %q; want %q", dir.RegURL, reg)
}
if dir.AuthzURL != authz {
t.Errorf("dir.AuthzURL = %q; want %q", dir.AuthzURL, authz)
}
if dir.CertURL != cert {
t.Errorf("dir.CertURL = %q; want %q", dir.CertURL, cert)
}
if dir.RevokeURL != revoke {
t.Errorf("dir.RevokeURL = %q; want %q", dir.RevokeURL, revoke)
}
if _, exist := c.nonces["testnonce"]; !exist {
t.Errorf("c.nonces = %q; want 'testnonce' in the map", c.nonces)
}
}
func TestRegister(t *testing.T) {
contacts := []string{"mailto:admin@example.com"}
func TestRegisterWithoutKey(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "test-nonce")
return
}
if r.Method != "POST" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want POST", r.Method)
}
var j struct {
Resource string
Contact []string
Agreement string
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &j, r.Body)
// Test request
if j.Resource != "new-reg" {
t.Errorf("j.Resource = %q; want new-reg", j.Resource)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(j.Contact, contacts) {
t.Errorf("j.Contact = %v; want %v", j.Contact, contacts)
}
w.Header().Set("Location", "https://ca.tld/acme/reg/1")
w.Header().Set("Link", `<https://ca.tld/acme/new-authz>;rel="next"`)
w.Header().Add("Link", `<https://ca.tld/acme/recover-reg>;rel="recover"`)
w.Header().Add("Link", `<https://ca.tld/acme/terms>;rel="terms-of-service"`)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
b, _ := json.Marshal(contacts)
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"contact": %s}`, b)
fmt.Fprint(w, `{}`)
}))
defer ts.Close()
prompt := func(url string) bool {
const terms = "https://ca.tld/acme/terms"
if url != terms {
t.Errorf("prompt url = %q; want %q", url, terms)
}
return false
}
// First verify that using a complete client results in success.
c := Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL,
dir: &Directory{RegURL: ts.URL},
}
a := &Account{Contact: contacts}
var err error
if a, err = c.Register(context.Background(), a, prompt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
if _, err := c.Register(context.Background(), &Account{}, AcceptTOS); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("c.Register() = %v; want success with a complete test client", err)
}
if a.URI != "https://ca.tld/acme/reg/1" {
t.Errorf("a.URI = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/reg/1", a.URI)
}
if a.Authz != "https://ca.tld/acme/new-authz" {
t.Errorf("a.Authz = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/new-authz", a.Authz)
}
if a.CurrentTerms != "https://ca.tld/acme/terms" {
t.Errorf("a.CurrentTerms = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/terms", a.CurrentTerms)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(a.Contact, contacts) {
t.Errorf("a.Contact = %v; want %v", a.Contact, contacts)
}
}
func TestUpdateReg(t *testing.T) {
const terms = "https://ca.tld/acme/terms"
contacts := []string{"mailto:admin@example.com"}
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "test-nonce")
return
}
if r.Method != "POST" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want POST", r.Method)
}
var j struct {
Resource string
Contact []string
Agreement string
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &j, r.Body)
// Test request
if j.Resource != "reg" {
t.Errorf("j.Resource = %q; want reg", j.Resource)
}
if j.Agreement != terms {
t.Errorf("j.Agreement = %q; want %q", j.Agreement, terms)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(j.Contact, contacts) {
t.Errorf("j.Contact = %v; want %v", j.Contact, contacts)
}
w.Header().Set("Link", `<https://ca.tld/acme/new-authz>;rel="next"`)
w.Header().Add("Link", `<https://ca.tld/acme/recover-reg>;rel="recover"`)
w.Header().Add("Link", fmt.Sprintf(`<%s>;rel="terms-of-service"`, terms))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
b, _ := json.Marshal(contacts)
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"contact":%s, "agreement":%q}`, b, terms)
}))
defer ts.Close()
c := Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL, // don't dial outside of localhost
dir: &Directory{}, // don't do discovery
}
a := &Account{URI: ts.URL, Contact: contacts, AgreedTerms: terms}
var err error
if a, err = c.UpdateReg(context.Background(), a); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if a.Authz != "https://ca.tld/acme/new-authz" {
t.Errorf("a.Authz = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/new-authz", a.Authz)
}
if a.AgreedTerms != terms {
t.Errorf("a.AgreedTerms = %q; want %q", a.AgreedTerms, terms)
}
if a.CurrentTerms != terms {
t.Errorf("a.CurrentTerms = %q; want %q", a.CurrentTerms, terms)
}
if a.URI != ts.URL {
t.Errorf("a.URI = %q; want %q", a.URI, ts.URL)
}
}
func TestGetReg(t *testing.T) {
const terms = "https://ca.tld/acme/terms"
const newTerms = "https://ca.tld/acme/new-terms"
contacts := []string{"mailto:admin@example.com"}
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "test-nonce")
return
}
if r.Method != "POST" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want POST", r.Method)
}
var j struct {
Resource string
Contact []string
Agreement string
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &j, r.Body)
// Test request
if j.Resource != "reg" {
t.Errorf("j.Resource = %q; want reg", j.Resource)
}
if len(j.Contact) != 0 {
t.Errorf("j.Contact = %v", j.Contact)
}
if j.Agreement != "" {
t.Errorf("j.Agreement = %q", j.Agreement)
}
w.Header().Set("Link", `<https://ca.tld/acme/new-authz>;rel="next"`)
w.Header().Add("Link", `<https://ca.tld/acme/recover-reg>;rel="recover"`)
w.Header().Add("Link", fmt.Sprintf(`<%s>;rel="terms-of-service"`, newTerms))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
b, _ := json.Marshal(contacts)
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"contact":%s, "agreement":%q}`, b, terms)
}))
defer ts.Close()
c := Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL, // don't dial outside of localhost
dir: &Directory{}, // don't do discovery
}
a, err := c.GetReg(context.Background(), ts.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if a.Authz != "https://ca.tld/acme/new-authz" {
t.Errorf("a.AuthzURL = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/new-authz", a.Authz)
}
if a.AgreedTerms != terms {
t.Errorf("a.AgreedTerms = %q; want %q", a.AgreedTerms, terms)
}
if a.CurrentTerms != newTerms {
t.Errorf("a.CurrentTerms = %q; want %q", a.CurrentTerms, newTerms)
}
if a.URI != ts.URL {
t.Errorf("a.URI = %q; want %q", a.URI, ts.URL)
c.Key = nil
if _, err := c.Register(context.Background(), &Account{}, AcceptTOS); err == nil {
t.Error("c.Register() from client without key succeeded, wanted error")
}
}
@@ -466,82 +254,6 @@ func TestAuthorizeValid(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestGetAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != "GET" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want GET", r.Method)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
"identifier": {"type":"dns","value":"example.com"},
"status":"pending",
"challenges":[
{
"type":"http-01",
"status":"pending",
"uri":"https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1",
"token":"token1"
},
{
"type":"tls-sni-01",
"status":"pending",
"uri":"https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id2",
"token":"token2"
}
],
"combinations":[[0],[1]]}`)
}))
defer ts.Close()
cl := Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: ts.URL}
auth, err := cl.GetAuthorization(context.Background(), ts.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if auth.Status != "pending" {
t.Errorf("Status = %q; want pending", auth.Status)
}
if auth.Identifier.Type != "dns" {
t.Errorf("Identifier.Type = %q; want dns", auth.Identifier.Type)
}
if auth.Identifier.Value != "example.com" {
t.Errorf("Identifier.Value = %q; want example.com", auth.Identifier.Value)
}
if n := len(auth.Challenges); n != 2 {
t.Fatalf("len(set.Challenges) = %d; want 2", n)
}
c := auth.Challenges[0]
if c.Type != "http-01" {
t.Errorf("c.Type = %q; want http-01", c.Type)
}
if c.URI != "https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1" {
t.Errorf("c.URI = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1", c.URI)
}
if c.Token != "token1" {
t.Errorf("c.Token = %q; want token1", c.Token)
}
c = auth.Challenges[1]
if c.Type != "tls-sni-01" {
t.Errorf("c.Type = %q; want tls-sni-01", c.Type)
}
if c.URI != "https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id2" {
t.Errorf("c.URI = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id2", c.URI)
}
if c.Token != "token2" {
t.Errorf("c.Token = %q; want token2", c.Token)
}
combs := [][]int{{0}, {1}}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(auth.Combinations, combs) {
t.Errorf("auth.Combinations: %+v\nwant: %+v\n", auth.Combinations, combs)
}
}
func TestWaitAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("wait loop", func(t *testing.T) {
var count int
@@ -569,6 +281,45 @@ func TestWaitAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("err is %v (%T); want non-nil *AuthorizationError", err, err)
}
})
t.Run("invalid status with error returns the authorization error", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := runWaitAuthorization(context.Background(), t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
"type": "dns-01",
"status": "invalid",
"error": {
"type": "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa",
"detail": "CAA record for <domain> prevents issuance",
"status": 403
},
"url": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/chall-v3/xxx/xxx",
"token": "xxx",
"validationRecord": [
{
"hostname": "<domain>"
}
]
}`)
})
want := &AuthorizationError{
Errors: []error{
(&wireError{
Status: 403,
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa",
Detail: "CAA record for <domain> prevents issuance",
}).error(nil),
},
}
_, ok := err.(*AuthorizationError)
if !ok {
t.Errorf("err is %T; want non-nil *AuthorizationError", err)
}
if err.Error() != want.Error() {
t.Errorf("err is %v; want %v", err, want)
}
})
t.Run("non-retriable error", func(t *testing.T) {
const code = http.StatusBadRequest
_, err := runWaitAuthorization(context.Background(), t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -603,38 +354,34 @@ func TestWaitAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
})
}
t.Run("context cancel", func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 200*time.Millisecond)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
_, err := runWaitAuthorization(ctx, t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "60")
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"pending"}`)
time.AfterFunc(1*time.Millisecond, cancel)
})
if err == nil {
t.Error("err is nil")
}
})
}
func runWaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, h http.HandlerFunc) (*Authorization, error) {
t.Helper()
ts := httptest.NewServer(h)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", fmt.Sprintf("bad-test-nonce-%v", time.Now().UnixNano()))
h(w, r)
}))
defer ts.Close()
type res struct {
authz *Authorization
err error
client := &Client{
Key: testKey,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL,
dir: &Directory{},
KID: "some-key-id", // set to avoid lookup attempt
}
ch := make(chan res, 1)
go func() {
var client = Client{DirectoryURL: ts.URL}
a, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, ts.URL)
ch <- res{a, err}
}()
select {
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("WaitAuthorization took too long to return")
case v := <-ch:
return v.authz, v.err
}
panic("runWaitAuthorization: out of select")
return client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, ts.URL)
}
func TestRevokeAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
@@ -679,238 +426,9 @@ func TestRevokeAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestPollChallenge(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != "GET" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want GET", r.Method)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
"type":"http-01",
"status":"pending",
"uri":"https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1",
"token":"token1"}`)
}))
defer ts.Close()
cl := Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: ts.URL}
chall, err := cl.GetChallenge(context.Background(), ts.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if chall.Status != "pending" {
t.Errorf("Status = %q; want pending", chall.Status)
}
if chall.Type != "http-01" {
t.Errorf("c.Type = %q; want http-01", chall.Type)
}
if chall.URI != "https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1" {
t.Errorf("c.URI = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1", chall.URI)
}
if chall.Token != "token1" {
t.Errorf("c.Token = %q; want token1", chall.Token)
}
}
func TestAcceptChallenge(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "test-nonce")
return
}
if r.Method != "POST" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want POST", r.Method)
}
var j struct {
Resource string
Type string
Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"`
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &j, r.Body)
// Test request
if j.Resource != "challenge" {
t.Errorf(`resource = %q; want "challenge"`, j.Resource)
}
if j.Type != "http-01" {
t.Errorf(`type = %q; want "http-01"`, j.Type)
}
keyAuth := "token1." + testKeyECThumbprint
if j.Auth != keyAuth {
t.Errorf(`keyAuthorization = %q; want %q`, j.Auth, keyAuth)
}
// Respond to request
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
"type":"http-01",
"status":"pending",
"uri":"https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1",
"token":"token1",
"keyAuthorization":%q
}`, keyAuth)
}))
defer ts.Close()
cl := Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL, // don't dial outside of localhost
dir: &Directory{}, // don't do discovery
}
c, err := cl.Accept(context.Background(), &Challenge{
URI: ts.URL,
Token: "token1",
Type: "http-01",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if c.Type != "http-01" {
t.Errorf("c.Type = %q; want http-01", c.Type)
}
if c.URI != "https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1" {
t.Errorf("c.URI = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/challenge/publickey/id1", c.URI)
}
if c.Token != "token1" {
t.Errorf("c.Token = %q; want token1", c.Token)
}
}
func TestNewCert(t *testing.T) {
notBefore := time.Now()
notAfter := notBefore.AddDate(0, 2, 0)
timeNow = func() time.Time { return notBefore }
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "test-nonce")
return
}
if r.Method != "POST" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want POST", r.Method)
}
var j struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
CSR string `json:"csr"`
NotBefore string `json:"notBefore,omitempty"`
NotAfter string `json:"notAfter,omitempty"`
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &j, r.Body)
// Test request
if j.Resource != "new-cert" {
t.Errorf(`resource = %q; want "new-cert"`, j.Resource)
}
if j.NotBefore != notBefore.Format(time.RFC3339) {
t.Errorf(`notBefore = %q; wanted %q`, j.NotBefore, notBefore.Format(time.RFC3339))
}
if j.NotAfter != notAfter.Format(time.RFC3339) {
t.Errorf(`notAfter = %q; wanted %q`, j.NotAfter, notAfter.Format(time.RFC3339))
}
// Respond to request
template := x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(int64(1)),
Subject: pkix.Name{
Organization: []string{"goacme"},
},
NotBefore: notBefore,
NotAfter: notAfter,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
}
sampleCert, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &template, &template, &testKeyEC.PublicKey, testKeyEC)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error creating certificate: %v", err)
}
w.Header().Set("Location", "https://ca.tld/acme/cert/1")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
w.Write(sampleCert)
}))
defer ts.Close()
csr := x509.CertificateRequest{
Version: 0,
Subject: pkix.Name{
CommonName: "example.com",
Organization: []string{"goacme"},
},
}
csrb, err := x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, &csr, testKeyEC)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
c := Client{Key: testKeyEC, dir: &Directory{CertURL: ts.URL}}
cert, certURL, err := c.CreateCert(context.Background(), csrb, notAfter.Sub(notBefore), false)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if cert == nil {
t.Errorf("cert is nil")
}
if certURL != "https://ca.tld/acme/cert/1" {
t.Errorf("certURL = %q; want https://ca.tld/acme/cert/1", certURL)
}
}
func TestFetchCert(t *testing.T) {
var count byte
var ts *httptest.Server
ts = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
count++
if count < 3 {
up := fmt.Sprintf("<%s>;rel=up", ts.URL)
w.Header().Set("Link", up)
}
w.Write([]byte{count})
}))
defer ts.Close()
cl := newTestClient()
res, err := cl.FetchCert(context.Background(), ts.URL, true)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("FetchCert: %v", err)
}
cert := [][]byte{{1}, {2}, {3}}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(res, cert) {
t.Errorf("res = %v; want %v", res, cert)
}
}
func TestFetchCertRetry(t *testing.T) {
var count int
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if count < 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
count++
return
}
w.Write([]byte{1})
}))
defer ts.Close()
cl := newTestClient()
res, err := cl.FetchCert(context.Background(), ts.URL, false)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("FetchCert: %v", err)
}
cert := [][]byte{{1}}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(res, cert) {
t.Errorf("res = %v; want %v", res, cert)
}
}
func TestFetchCertCancel(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
<-r.Context().Done()
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
}))
@@ -979,42 +497,6 @@ func TestFetchCertSize(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRevokeCert(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "nonce")
return
}
var req struct {
Resource string
Certificate string
Reason int
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &req, r.Body)
if req.Resource != "revoke-cert" {
t.Errorf("req.Resource = %q; want revoke-cert", req.Resource)
}
if req.Reason != 1 {
t.Errorf("req.Reason = %d; want 1", req.Reason)
}
// echo -n cert | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-'
cert := "Y2VydA"
if req.Certificate != cert {
t.Errorf("req.Certificate = %q; want %q", req.Certificate, cert)
}
}))
defer ts.Close()
client := &Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
dir: &Directory{RevokeURL: ts.URL},
}
ctx := context.Background()
if err := client.RevokeCert(ctx, nil, []byte("cert"), CRLReasonKeyCompromise); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestNonce_add(t *testing.T) {
var c Client
c.addNonce(http.Header{"Replay-Nonce": {"nonce"}})
@@ -1135,65 +617,6 @@ func TestNonce_popWhenEmpty(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestNonce_postJWS(t *testing.T) {
var count int
seen := make(map[string]bool)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
count++
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", fmt.Sprintf("nonce%d", count))
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
// We expect the client do a HEAD request
// but only to fetch the first nonce.
return
}
// Make client.Authorize happy; we're not testing its result.
defer func() {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"valid"}`))
}()
head, err := decodeJWSHead(r.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("decodeJWSHead: %v", err)
return
}
if head.Nonce == "" {
t.Error("head.Nonce is empty")
return
}
if seen[head.Nonce] {
t.Errorf("nonce is already used: %q", head.Nonce)
}
seen[head.Nonce] = true
}))
defer ts.Close()
client := Client{
Key: testKey,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL, // nonces are fetched from here first
dir: &Directory{AuthzURL: ts.URL},
}
if _, err := client.Authorize(context.Background(), "example.com"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("client.Authorize 1: %v", err)
}
// The second call should not generate another extra HEAD request.
if _, err := client.Authorize(context.Background(), "example.com"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("client.Authorize 2: %v", err)
}
if count != 3 {
t.Errorf("total requests count: %d; want 3", count)
}
if n := len(client.nonces); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("len(client.nonces) = %d; want 1", n)
}
for k := range seen {
if _, exist := client.nonces[k]; exist {
t.Errorf("used nonce %q in client.nonces", k)
}
}
}
func TestLinkHeader(t *testing.T) {
h := http.Header{"Link": {
`<https://example.com/acme/new-authz>;rel="next"`,
@@ -1317,7 +740,7 @@ func TestTLSALPN01ChallengeCert(t *testing.T) {
}
acmeExts := []pkix.Extension{}
for _, ext := range cert.Extensions {
if idPeACMEIdentifierV1.Equal(ext.Id) {
if idPeACMEIdentifier.Equal(ext.Id) {
acmeExts = append(acmeExts, ext)
}
}
+46 -97
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ var createCertRetryAfter = time.Minute
// pseudoRand is safe for concurrent use.
var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand
var errPreRFC = errors.New("autocert: ACME server doesn't support RFC 8555")
func init() {
src := mathrand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano())
pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)}
@@ -168,6 +170,11 @@ type Manager struct {
// in the template's ExtraExtensions field as is.
ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
// ExternalAccountBinding optionally represents an arbitrary binding to an
// account of the CA to which the ACME server is tied.
// See RFC 8555, Section 7.3.4 for more details.
ExternalAccountBinding *acme.ExternalAccountBinding
clientMu sync.Mutex
client *acme.Client // initialized by acmeClient method
@@ -456,7 +463,7 @@ func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error
leaf: cert.Leaf,
}
m.state[ck] = s
go m.renew(ck, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
m.startRenew(ck, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
return cert, nil
}
@@ -582,8 +589,9 @@ func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate,
if err != nil {
// Remove the failed state after some time,
// making the manager call createCert again on the following TLS hello.
didRemove := testDidRemoveState // The lifetime of this timer is untracked, so copy mutable local state to avoid races.
time.AfterFunc(createCertRetryAfter, func() {
defer testDidRemoveState(ck)
defer didRemove(ck)
m.stateMu.Lock()
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
// Verify the state hasn't changed and it's still invalid
@@ -601,7 +609,7 @@ func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate,
}
state.cert = der
state.leaf = leaf
go m.renew(ck, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
m.startRenew(ck, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
return state.tlscert()
}
@@ -658,31 +666,19 @@ func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck cert
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
var chain [][]byte
switch {
// Pre-RFC legacy CA.
case dir.OrderURL == "":
if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
der, _, err := client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
chain = der
// RFC 8555 compliant CA.
default:
o, err := m.verifyRFC(ctx, client, ck.domain)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
der, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
chain = der
if dir.OrderURL == "" {
return nil, nil, errPreRFC
}
o, err := m.verifyRFC(ctx, client, ck.domain)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
chain, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
leaf, err = validCert(ck, chain, key, m.now())
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
@@ -690,69 +686,6 @@ func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck cert
return chain, leaf, nil
}
// verify runs the identifier (domain) pre-authorization flow for legacy CAs
// using each applicable ACME challenge type.
func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) error {
// Remove all hanging authorizations to reduce rate limit quotas
// after we're done.
var authzURLs []string
defer func() {
go m.deactivatePendingAuthz(authzURLs)
}()
// errs accumulates challenge failure errors, printed if all fail
errs := make(map[*acme.Challenge]error)
challengeTypes := m.supportedChallengeTypes()
var nextTyp int // challengeType index of the next challenge type to try
for {
// Start domain authorization and get the challenge.
authz, err := client.Authorize(ctx, domain)
if err != nil {
return err
}
authzURLs = append(authzURLs, authz.URI)
// No point in accepting challenges if the authorization status
// is in a final state.
switch authz.Status {
case acme.StatusValid:
return nil // already authorized
case acme.StatusInvalid:
return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid authorization %q", authz.URI)
}
// Pick the next preferred challenge.
var chal *acme.Challenge
for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) {
chal = pickChallenge(challengeTypes[nextTyp], authz.Challenges)
nextTyp++
}
if chal == nil {
errorMsg := fmt.Sprintf("acme/autocert: unable to authorize %q", domain)
for chal, err := range errs {
errorMsg += fmt.Sprintf("; challenge %q failed with error: %v", chal.Type, err)
}
return errors.New(errorMsg)
}
cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal, domain)
if err != nil {
errs[chal] = err
continue
}
defer cleanup()
if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil {
errs[chal] = err
continue
}
// A challenge is fulfilled and accepted: wait for the CA to validate.
if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI); err != nil {
errs[chal] = err
continue
}
return nil
}
}
// verifyRFC runs the identifier (domain) order-based authorization flow for RFC compliant CAs
// using each applicable ACME challenge type.
func (m *Manager) verifyRFC(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) (*acme.Order, error) {
@@ -966,7 +899,7 @@ func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string {
return path.Base(tokenPath) + "+http-01"
}
// renew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain.
// startRenew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain.
//
// The loop is scheduled in two cases:
// - a cert was fetched from cache for the first time (wasn't in m.state)
@@ -974,7 +907,7 @@ func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string {
//
// The key argument is a certificate private key.
// The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter).
func (m *Manager) renew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
func (m *Manager) startRenew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
m.renewalMu.Lock()
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
if m.renewal[ck] != nil {
@@ -1068,7 +1001,7 @@ func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) {
if m.Email != "" {
contact = []string{"mailto:" + m.Email}
}
a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact}
a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact, ExternalAccountBinding: m.ExternalAccountBinding}
_, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt)
if err == nil || isAccountAlreadyExist(err) {
m.client = client
@@ -1133,11 +1066,11 @@ func (s *certState) tlscert() (*tls.Certificate, error) {
}, nil
}
// certRequest generates a CSR for the given common name cn and optional SANs.
func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, ext []pkix.Extension, san ...string) ([]byte, error) {
// certRequest generates a CSR for the given common name.
func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, name string, ext []pkix.Extension) ([]byte, error) {
req := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
DNSNames: san,
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: name},
DNSNames: []string{name},
ExtraExtensions: ext,
}
return x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, req, key)
@@ -1200,6 +1133,10 @@ func validCert(ck certKey, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer, now time.Time) (leaf
if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(ck.domain); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// renew certificates revoked by Let's Encrypt in January 2022
if isRevokedLetsEncrypt(leaf) {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate was probably revoked by Let's Encrypt")
}
// ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key and matches the certKey type
switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
@@ -1230,6 +1167,18 @@ func validCert(ck certKey, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer, now time.Time) (leaf
return leaf, nil
}
// https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/2022-01-25-issue-with-tls-alpn-01-validation-method/170450
var letsEncryptFixDeployTime = time.Date(2022, time.January, 26, 00, 48, 0, 0, time.UTC)
// isRevokedLetsEncrypt returns whether the certificate is likely to be part of
// a batch of certificates revoked by Let's Encrypt in January 2022. This check
// can be safely removed from May 2022.
func isRevokedLetsEncrypt(cert *x509.Certificate) bool {
O := cert.Issuer.Organization
return len(O) == 1 && O[0] == "Let's Encrypt" &&
cert.NotBefore.Before(letsEncryptFixDeployTime)
}
type lockedMathRand struct {
sync.Mutex
rnd *mathrand.Rand
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+5 -6
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ package autocert
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path/filepath"
)
@@ -41,14 +40,14 @@ type DirCache string
// Get reads a certificate data from the specified file name.
func (d DirCache) Get(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
name = filepath.Join(string(d), name)
name = filepath.Join(string(d), filepath.Clean("/"+name))
var (
data []byte
err error
done = make(chan struct{})
)
go func() {
data, err = ioutil.ReadFile(name)
data, err = os.ReadFile(name)
close(done)
}()
select {
@@ -82,7 +81,7 @@ func (d DirCache) Put(ctx context.Context, name string, data []byte) error {
case <-ctx.Done():
// Don't overwrite the file if the context was canceled.
default:
newName := filepath.Join(string(d), name)
newName := filepath.Join(string(d), filepath.Clean("/"+name))
err = os.Rename(tmp, newName)
}
}()
@@ -96,7 +95,7 @@ func (d DirCache) Put(ctx context.Context, name string, data []byte) error {
// Delete removes the specified file name.
func (d DirCache) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error {
name = filepath.Join(string(d), name)
name = filepath.Join(string(d), filepath.Clean("/"+name))
var (
err error
done = make(chan struct{})
@@ -119,7 +118,7 @@ func (d DirCache) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error {
// writeTempFile writes b to a temporary file, closes the file and returns its path.
func (d DirCache) writeTempFile(prefix string, b []byte) (name string, reterr error) {
// TempFile uses 0600 permissions
f, err := ioutil.TempFile(string(d), prefix)
f, err := os.CreateTemp(string(d), prefix)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ package autocert
import (
"context"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
@@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ import (
var _ Cache = DirCache("/")
func TestDirCache(t *testing.T) {
dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "autocert")
dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "autocert")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
+1
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ func ExampleManager() {
m := &autocert.Manager{
Cache: autocert.DirCache("secret-dir"),
Prompt: autocert.AcceptTOS,
Email: "example@example.org",
HostPolicy: autocert.HostWhitelist("example.org", "www.example.org"),
}
s := &http.Server{
+424 -180
View File
@@ -8,27 +8,30 @@
package acmetest
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"path"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
@@ -36,56 +39,65 @@ import (
// CAServer is a simple test server which implements ACME spec bits needed for testing.
type CAServer struct {
URL string // server URL after it has been started
Roots *x509.CertPool // CA root certificates; initialized in NewCAServer
rootKey crypto.Signer
rootCert []byte // DER encoding
rootTemplate *x509.Certificate
server *httptest.Server
challengeTypes []string // supported challenge types
domainsWhitelist []string // only these domains are valid for issuing, unless empty
t *testing.T
server *httptest.Server
issuer pkix.Name
challengeTypes []string
url string
roots *x509.CertPool
eabRequired bool
mu sync.Mutex
certCount int // number of issued certs
domainAddr map[string]string // domain name to addr:port resolution
authorizations map[string]*authorization // keyed by domain name
orders []*order // index is used as order ID
errors []error // encountered client errors
certCount int // number of issued certs
acctRegistered bool // set once an account has been registered
domainAddr map[string]string // domain name to addr:port resolution
domainGetCert map[string]getCertificateFunc // domain name to GetCertificate function
domainHandler map[string]http.Handler // domain name to Handle function
validAuthz map[string]*authorization // valid authz, keyed by domain name
authorizations []*authorization // all authz, index is used as ID
orders []*order // index is used as order ID
errors []error // encountered client errors
}
// NewCAServer creates a new ACME test server and starts serving requests.
// The returned CAServer issues certs signed with the CA roots
// available in the Roots field.
//
// The challengeTypes argument defines the supported ACME challenge types
// sent to a client in a response for a domain authorization.
// If domainsWhitelist is non-empty, the certs will be issued only for the specified
// list of domains. Otherwise, any domain name is allowed.
func NewCAServer(challengeTypes []string, domainsWhitelist []string) *CAServer {
var whitelist []string
for _, name := range domainsWhitelist {
whitelist = append(whitelist, name)
}
sort.Strings(whitelist)
ca := &CAServer{
challengeTypes: challengeTypes,
domainsWhitelist: whitelist,
domainAddr: make(map[string]string),
authorizations: make(map[string]*authorization),
type getCertificateFunc func(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error)
// NewCAServer creates a new ACME test server. The returned CAServer issues
// certs signed with the CA roots available in the Roots field.
func NewCAServer(t *testing.T) *CAServer {
ca := &CAServer{t: t,
challengeTypes: []string{"fake-01", "tls-alpn-01", "http-01"},
domainAddr: make(map[string]string),
domainGetCert: make(map[string]getCertificateFunc),
domainHandler: make(map[string]http.Handler),
validAuthz: make(map[string]*authorization),
}
ca.server = httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(ca.handle))
r, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1000000))
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("rand.Int: %v", err))
}
ca.issuer = pkix.Name{
Organization: []string{"Test Acme Co"},
CommonName: "Root CA " + r.String(),
}
return ca
}
func (ca *CAServer) generateRoot() {
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("ecdsa.GenerateKey: %v", err))
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
Subject: pkix.Name{
Organization: []string{"Test Acme Co"},
CommonName: "Root CA",
},
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
Subject: ca.issuer,
NotBefore: time.Now(),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(365 * 24 * time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
@@ -100,40 +112,96 @@ func NewCAServer(challengeTypes []string, domainsWhitelist []string) *CAServer {
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("x509.ParseCertificate: %v", err))
}
ca.Roots = x509.NewCertPool()
ca.Roots.AddCert(cert)
ca.roots = x509.NewCertPool()
ca.roots.AddCert(cert)
ca.rootKey = key
ca.rootCert = der
ca.rootTemplate = tmpl
}
ca.server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(ca.handle))
ca.URL = ca.server.URL
// IssuerName sets the name of the issuing CA.
func (ca *CAServer) IssuerName(name pkix.Name) *CAServer {
if ca.url != "" {
panic("IssuerName must be called before Start")
}
ca.issuer = name
return ca
}
// Close shuts down the server and blocks until all outstanding
// requests on this server have completed.
func (ca *CAServer) Close() {
ca.server.Close()
// ChallengeTypes sets the supported challenge types.
func (ca *CAServer) ChallengeTypes(types ...string) *CAServer {
if ca.url != "" {
panic("ChallengeTypes must be called before Start")
}
ca.challengeTypes = types
return ca
}
// URL returns the server address, after Start has been called.
func (ca *CAServer) URL() string {
if ca.url == "" {
panic("URL called before Start")
}
return ca.url
}
// Roots returns a pool cointaining the CA root.
func (ca *CAServer) Roots() *x509.CertPool {
if ca.url == "" {
panic("Roots called before Start")
}
return ca.roots
}
// ExternalAccountRequired makes an EAB JWS required for account registration.
func (ca *CAServer) ExternalAccountRequired() *CAServer {
if ca.url != "" {
panic("ExternalAccountRequired must be called before Start")
}
ca.eabRequired = true
return ca
}
// Start starts serving requests. The server address becomes available in the
// URL field.
func (ca *CAServer) Start() *CAServer {
if ca.url == "" {
ca.generateRoot()
ca.server.Start()
ca.t.Cleanup(ca.server.Close)
ca.url = ca.server.URL
}
return ca
}
func (ca *CAServer) serverURL(format string, arg ...interface{}) string {
return ca.server.URL + fmt.Sprintf(format, arg...)
}
func (ca *CAServer) addr(domain string) (string, error) {
func (ca *CAServer) addr(domain string) (string, bool) {
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
addr, ok := ca.domainAddr[domain]
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("CAServer: no addr resolution for %q", domain)
}
return addr, nil
return addr, ok
}
func (ca *CAServer) getCert(domain string) (getCertificateFunc, bool) {
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
f, ok := ca.domainGetCert[domain]
return f, ok
}
func (ca *CAServer) getHandler(domain string) (http.Handler, bool) {
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
h, ok := ca.domainHandler[domain]
return h, ok
}
func (ca *CAServer) httpErrorf(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, format string, a ...interface{}) {
s := fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)
log.Println(s)
ca.t.Errorf(format, a...)
http.Error(w, s, code)
}
@@ -145,11 +213,33 @@ func (ca *CAServer) Resolve(domain, addr string) {
ca.domainAddr[domain] = addr
}
// ResolveGetCertificate redirects TLS connections for domain to f when
// validating challenges for the domain authorization.
func (ca *CAServer) ResolveGetCertificate(domain string, f getCertificateFunc) {
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
ca.domainGetCert[domain] = f
}
// ResolveHandler redirects HTTP requests for domain to f when
// validating challenges for the domain authorization.
func (ca *CAServer) ResolveHandler(domain string, h http.Handler) {
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
ca.domainHandler[domain] = h
}
type discovery struct {
NewNonce string `json:"newNonce"`
NewReg string `json:"newAccount"`
NewOrder string `json:"newOrder"`
NewAuthz string `json:"newAuthz"`
NewNonce string `json:"newNonce"`
NewAccount string `json:"newAccount"`
NewOrder string `json:"newOrder"`
NewAuthz string `json:"newAuthz"`
Meta discoveryMeta `json:"meta,omitempty"`
}
type discoveryMeta struct {
ExternalAccountRequired bool `json:"externalAccountRequired,omitempty"`
}
type challenge struct {
@@ -163,6 +253,7 @@ type authorization struct {
Challenges []challenge `json:"challenges"`
domain string
id int
}
type order struct {
@@ -175,7 +266,7 @@ type order struct {
}
func (ca *CAServer) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
log.Printf("%s %s", r.Method, r.URL)
ca.t.Logf("%s %s", r.Method, r.URL)
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "nonce")
// TODO: Verify nonce header for all POST requests.
@@ -186,10 +277,12 @@ func (ca *CAServer) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Discovery request.
case r.URL.Path == "/":
resp := &discovery{
NewNonce: ca.serverURL("/new-nonce"),
NewReg: ca.serverURL("/new-reg"),
NewOrder: ca.serverURL("/new-order"),
NewAuthz: ca.serverURL("/new-authz"),
NewNonce: ca.serverURL("/new-nonce"),
NewAccount: ca.serverURL("/new-account"),
NewOrder: ca.serverURL("/new-order"),
Meta: discoveryMeta{
ExternalAccountRequired: ca.eabRequired,
},
}
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("discovery response: %v", err))
@@ -201,7 +294,29 @@ func (ca *CAServer) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
// Client key registration request.
case r.URL.Path == "/new-reg":
case r.URL.Path == "/new-account":
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
if ca.acctRegistered {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "multiple accounts are not implemented")
return
}
ca.acctRegistered = true
var req struct {
ExternalAccountBinding json.RawMessage
}
if err := decodePayload(&req, r.Body); err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
if ca.eabRequired && len(req.ExternalAccountBinding) == 0 {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "registration failed: no JWS for EAB")
return
}
// TODO: Check the user account key against a ca.accountKeys?
w.Header().Set("Location", ca.serverURL("/accounts/1"))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
@@ -221,7 +336,7 @@ func (ca *CAServer) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
o := &order{Status: acme.StatusPending}
for _, id := range req.Identifiers {
z := ca.authz(id.Value)
o.AuthzURLs = append(o.AuthzURLs, ca.serverURL("/authz/%s", z.domain))
o.AuthzURLs = append(o.AuthzURLs, ca.serverURL("/authz/%d", z.id))
}
orderID := len(ca.orders)
ca.orders = append(ca.orders, o)
@@ -244,49 +359,50 @@ func (ca *CAServer) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
panic(err)
}
// Identifier authorization request.
case r.URL.Path == "/new-authz":
var req struct {
Identifier struct{ Value string }
}
if err := decodePayload(&req, r.Body); err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
// Accept challenge requests.
case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/challenge/"):
parts := strings.Split(r.URL.Path, "/")
typ, id := parts[len(parts)-2], parts[len(parts)-1]
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
z := ca.authz(req.Identifier.Value)
w.Header().Set("Location", ca.serverURL("/authz/%s", z.domain))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(z); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("new authz response: %v", err))
supported := false
for _, suppTyp := range ca.challengeTypes {
if suppTyp == typ {
supported = true
}
}
// Accept tls-alpn-01 challenge type requests.
case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/challenge/tls-alpn-01/"):
domain := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/challenge/tls-alpn-01/")
ca.mu.Lock()
_, exist := ca.authorizations[domain]
a, err := ca.storedAuthz(id)
ca.mu.Unlock()
if !exist {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "challenge accept: no authz for %q", domain)
if !supported {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unsupported challenge: %v", typ)
return
}
go ca.validateChallenge("tls-alpn-01", domain)
if err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "challenge accept: %v", err)
return
}
ca.validateChallenge(a, typ)
w.Write([]byte("{}"))
// Get authorization status requests.
case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/authz/"):
domain := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/authz/")
var req struct{ Status string }
decodePayload(&req, r.Body)
deactivate := req.Status == "deactivated"
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
authz, ok := ca.authorizations[domain]
if !ok {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusNotFound, "no authz for %q", domain)
authz, err := ca.storedAuthz(strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/authz/"))
if err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusNotFound, "%v", err)
return
}
if deactivate {
// Note we don't invalidate authorized orders as we should.
authz.Status = "deactivated"
ca.t.Logf("authz %d is now %s", authz.id, authz.Status)
ca.updatePendingOrders()
}
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authz); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("get authz for %q response: %v", domain, err))
panic(fmt.Sprintf("encoding authz %d: %v", authz.id, err))
}
// Certificate issuance request.
@@ -314,15 +430,6 @@ func (ca *CAServer) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
names := unique(append(csr.DNSNames, csr.Subject.CommonName))
if err := ca.matchWhitelist(names); err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, err.Error())
return
}
if err := ca.authorized(names); err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, err.Error())
return
}
// Issue the certificate.
der, err := ca.leafCert(csr)
if err != nil {
@@ -355,25 +462,6 @@ func (ca *CAServer) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
}
// matchWhitelist reports whether all dnsNames are whitelisted.
// The whitelist is provided in NewCAServer.
func (ca *CAServer) matchWhitelist(dnsNames []string) error {
if len(ca.domainsWhitelist) == 0 {
return nil
}
var nomatch []string
for _, name := range dnsNames {
i := sort.SearchStrings(ca.domainsWhitelist, name)
if i == len(ca.domainsWhitelist) || ca.domainsWhitelist[i] != name {
nomatch = append(nomatch, name)
}
}
if len(nomatch) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("matchWhitelist: some domains don't match: %q", nomatch)
}
return nil
}
// storedOrder retrieves a previously created order at index i.
// It requires ca.mu to be locked.
func (ca *CAServer) storedOrder(i string) (*order, error) {
@@ -387,46 +475,50 @@ func (ca *CAServer) storedOrder(i string) (*order, error) {
if idx > len(ca.orders)-1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storedOrder: no such order %d", idx)
}
ca.updatePendingOrders()
return ca.orders[idx], nil
}
// authz returns an existing authorization for the identifier or creates a new one.
// storedAuthz retrieves a previously created authz at index i.
// It requires ca.mu to be locked.
func (ca *CAServer) storedAuthz(i string) (*authorization, error) {
idx, err := strconv.Atoi(i)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storedAuthz: %v", err)
}
if idx < 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storedAuthz: invalid authz index %d", idx)
}
if idx > len(ca.authorizations)-1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storedAuthz: no such authz %d", idx)
}
return ca.authorizations[idx], nil
}
// authz returns an existing valid authorization for the identifier or creates a
// new one. It requires ca.mu to be locked.
func (ca *CAServer) authz(identifier string) *authorization {
authz, ok := ca.authorizations[identifier]
authz, ok := ca.validAuthz[identifier]
if !ok {
authzId := len(ca.authorizations)
authz = &authorization{
id: authzId,
domain: identifier,
Status: acme.StatusPending,
}
for _, typ := range ca.challengeTypes {
authz.Challenges = append(authz.Challenges, challenge{
Type: typ,
URI: ca.serverURL("/challenge/%s/%s", typ, authz.domain),
Token: challengeToken(authz.domain, typ),
URI: ca.serverURL("/challenge/%s/%d", typ, authzId),
Token: challengeToken(authz.domain, typ, authzId),
})
}
ca.authorizations[authz.domain] = authz
ca.authorizations = append(ca.authorizations, authz)
}
return authz
}
// authorized reports whether all authorizations for dnsNames have been satisfied.
// It requires ca.mu to be locked.
func (ca *CAServer) authorized(dnsNames []string) error {
var noauthz []string
for _, name := range dnsNames {
authz, ok := ca.authorizations[name]
if !ok || authz.Status != acme.StatusValid {
noauthz = append(noauthz, name)
}
}
if len(noauthz) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("CAServer: no authz for %q", noauthz)
}
return nil
}
// leafCert issues a new certificate.
// It requires ca.mu to be locked.
func (ca *CAServer) leafCert(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (der []byte, err error) {
@@ -447,79 +539,231 @@ func (ca *CAServer) leafCert(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (der []byte, err erro
return x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leaf, ca.rootTemplate, csr.PublicKey, ca.rootKey)
}
// TODO: Only tls-alpn-01 is currently supported: implement http-01 and dns-01.
func (ca *CAServer) validateChallenge(typ, identifier string) {
// LeafCert issues a leaf certificate.
func (ca *CAServer) LeafCert(name, keyType string, notBefore, notAfter time.Time) *tls.Certificate {
if ca.url == "" {
panic("LeafCert called before Start")
}
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
var pk crypto.Signer
switch keyType {
case "RSA":
var err error
pk, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 1024)
if err != nil {
ca.t.Fatal(err)
}
case "ECDSA":
var err error
pk, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
ca.t.Fatal(err)
}
default:
panic("LeafCert: unknown key type")
}
ca.certCount++ // next leaf cert serial number
leaf := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(int64(ca.certCount)),
Subject: pkix.Name{Organization: []string{"Test Acme Co"}},
NotBefore: notBefore,
NotAfter: notAfter,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
DNSNames: []string{name},
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leaf, ca.rootTemplate, pk.Public(), ca.rootKey)
if err != nil {
ca.t.Fatal(err)
}
return &tls.Certificate{
Certificate: [][]byte{der},
PrivateKey: pk,
}
}
func (ca *CAServer) validateChallenge(authz *authorization, typ string) {
var err error
switch typ {
case "tls-alpn-01":
err = ca.verifyALPNChallenge(identifier)
err = ca.verifyALPNChallenge(authz)
case "http-01":
err = ca.verifyHTTPChallenge(authz)
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("validation of %q is not implemented", typ))
}
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
authz := ca.authorizations[identifier]
if err != nil {
authz.Status = "invalid"
} else {
authz.Status = "valid"
ca.validAuthz[authz.domain] = authz
}
log.Printf("validated %q for %q; authz status is now: %s", typ, identifier, authz.Status)
ca.t.Logf("validated %q for %q, err: %v", typ, authz.domain, err)
ca.t.Logf("authz %d is now %s", authz.id, authz.Status)
ca.updatePendingOrders()
}
func (ca *CAServer) updatePendingOrders() {
// Update all pending orders.
// An order becomes "ready" if all authorizations are "valid".
// An order becomes "invalid" if any authorization is "invalid".
// Status changes: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.1.6
OrdersLoop:
for i, o := range ca.orders {
if o.Status != acme.StatusPending {
continue
}
var countValid int
for _, zurl := range o.AuthzURLs {
z, ok := ca.authorizations[path.Base(zurl)]
if !ok {
log.Printf("no authz %q for order %d", zurl, i)
continue OrdersLoop
}
if z.Status == acme.StatusInvalid {
o.Status = acme.StatusInvalid
log.Printf("order %d is now invalid", i)
continue OrdersLoop
}
if z.Status == acme.StatusValid {
countValid++
}
countValid, countInvalid := ca.validateAuthzURLs(o.AuthzURLs, i)
if countInvalid > 0 {
o.Status = acme.StatusInvalid
ca.t.Logf("order %d is now invalid", i)
continue
}
if countValid == len(o.AuthzURLs) {
o.Status = acme.StatusReady
o.FinalizeURL = ca.serverURL("/new-cert/%d", i)
log.Printf("order %d is now ready", i)
ca.t.Logf("order %d is now ready", i)
}
}
}
func (ca *CAServer) verifyALPNChallenge(domain string) error {
func (ca *CAServer) validateAuthzURLs(urls []string, orderNum int) (countValid, countInvalid int) {
for _, zurl := range urls {
z, err := ca.storedAuthz(path.Base(zurl))
if err != nil {
ca.t.Logf("no authz %q for order %d", zurl, orderNum)
continue
}
if z.Status == acme.StatusInvalid {
countInvalid++
}
if z.Status == acme.StatusValid {
countValid++
}
}
return countValid, countInvalid
}
func (ca *CAServer) verifyALPNChallenge(a *authorization) error {
const acmeALPNProto = "acme-tls/1"
addr, err := ca.addr(domain)
if err != nil {
return err
addr, haveAddr := ca.addr(a.domain)
getCert, haveGetCert := ca.getCert(a.domain)
if !haveAddr && !haveGetCert {
return fmt.Errorf("no resolution information for %q", a.domain)
}
conn, err := tls.Dial("tcp", addr, &tls.Config{
ServerName: domain,
InsecureSkipVerify: true,
NextProtos: []string{acmeALPNProto},
})
if err != nil {
return err
if haveAddr && haveGetCert {
return fmt.Errorf("overlapping resolution information for %q", a.domain)
}
if v := conn.ConnectionState().NegotiatedProtocol; v != acmeALPNProto {
return fmt.Errorf("CAServer: verifyALPNChallenge: negotiated proto is %q; want %q", v, acmeALPNProto)
var crt *x509.Certificate
switch {
case haveAddr:
conn, err := tls.Dial("tcp", addr, &tls.Config{
ServerName: a.domain,
InsecureSkipVerify: true,
NextProtos: []string{acmeALPNProto},
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if v := conn.ConnectionState().NegotiatedProtocol; v != acmeALPNProto {
return fmt.Errorf("CAServer: verifyALPNChallenge: negotiated proto is %q; want %q", v, acmeALPNProto)
}
if n := len(conn.ConnectionState().PeerCertificates); n != 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("len(PeerCertificates) = %d; want 1", n)
}
crt = conn.ConnectionState().PeerCertificates[0]
case haveGetCert:
hello := &tls.ClientHelloInfo{
ServerName: a.domain,
// TODO: support selecting ECDSA.
CipherSuites: []uint16{tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305},
SupportedProtos: []string{acme.ALPNProto},
SupportedVersions: []uint16{tls.VersionTLS12},
}
c, err := getCert(hello)
if err != nil {
return err
}
crt, err = x509.ParseCertificate(c.Certificate[0])
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
if n := len(conn.ConnectionState().PeerCertificates); n != 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("len(PeerCertificates) = %d; want 1", n)
if err := crt.VerifyHostname(a.domain); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("verifyALPNChallenge: VerifyHostname: %v", err)
}
// See RFC 8737, Section 6.1.
oid := asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 31}
for _, x := range crt.Extensions {
if x.Id.Equal(oid) {
// TODO: check the token.
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("verifyTokenCert: no id-pe-acmeIdentifier extension found")
}
func (ca *CAServer) verifyHTTPChallenge(a *authorization) error {
addr, haveAddr := ca.addr(a.domain)
handler, haveHandler := ca.getHandler(a.domain)
if !haveAddr && !haveHandler {
return fmt.Errorf("no resolution information for %q", a.domain)
}
if haveAddr && haveHandler {
return fmt.Errorf("overlapping resolution information for %q", a.domain)
}
token := challengeToken(a.domain, "http-01", a.id)
path := "/.well-known/acme-challenge/" + token
var body string
switch {
case haveAddr:
t := &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
},
}
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://"+a.domain+path, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
res, err := t.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("http token: w.Code = %d; want %d", res.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)
}
b, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
if err != nil {
return err
}
body = string(b)
case haveHandler:
r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", path, nil)
r.Host = a.domain
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("http token: w.Code = %d; want %d", w.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
body = w.Body.String()
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(body, token) {
return fmt.Errorf("http token value = %q; want 'token-http-01.' prefix", body)
}
// TODO: verify conn.ConnectionState().PeerCertificates[0]
return nil
}
@@ -535,8 +779,8 @@ func decodePayload(v interface{}, r io.Reader) error {
return json.Unmarshal(payload, v)
}
func challengeToken(domain, challType string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("token-%s-%s", domain, challType)
func challengeToken(domain, challType string, authzID int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("token-%s-%s-%d", domain, challType, authzID)
}
func unique(a []string) []string {
+1 -3
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import (
//
// It enables one-line HTTPS servers:
//
// log.Fatal(http.Serve(autocert.NewListener("example.com"), handler))
// log.Fatal(http.Serve(autocert.NewListener("example.com"), handler))
//
// NewListener is a convenience function for a common configuration.
// More complex or custom configurations can use the autocert.Manager
@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@ func NewListener(domains ...string) net.Listener {
// the Manager m's Prompt, Cache, HostPolicy, and other desired options.
func (m *Manager) Listener() net.Listener {
ln := &listener{
m: m,
conf: m.TLSConfig(),
}
ln.tcpListener, ln.tcpListenErr = net.Listen("tcp", ":443")
@@ -80,7 +79,6 @@ func (m *Manager) Listener() net.Listener {
}
type listener struct {
m *Manager
conf *tls.Config
tcpListener net.Listener
+25 -10
View File
@@ -21,8 +21,9 @@ type domainRenewal struct {
ck certKey
key crypto.Signer
timerMu sync.Mutex
timer *time.Timer
timerMu sync.Mutex
timer *time.Timer
timerClose chan struct{} // if non-nil, renew closes this channel (and nils out the timer fields) instead of running
}
// start starts a cert renewal timer at the time
@@ -38,16 +39,28 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) start(exp time.Time) {
dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(dr.next(exp), dr.renew)
}
// stop stops the cert renewal timer.
// If the timer is already stopped, calling stop is a noop.
// stop stops the cert renewal timer and waits for any in-flight calls to renew
// to complete. If the timer is already stopped, calling stop is a noop.
func (dr *domainRenewal) stop() {
dr.timerMu.Lock()
defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
if dr.timer == nil {
return
for {
if dr.timer == nil {
return
}
if dr.timer.Stop() {
dr.timer = nil
return
} else {
// dr.timer fired, and we acquired dr.timerMu before the renew callback did.
// (We know this because otherwise the renew callback would have reset dr.timer!)
timerClose := make(chan struct{})
dr.timerClose = timerClose
dr.timerMu.Unlock()
<-timerClose
dr.timerMu.Lock()
}
}
dr.timer.Stop()
dr.timer = nil
}
// renew is called periodically by a timer.
@@ -55,7 +68,9 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) stop() {
func (dr *domainRenewal) renew() {
dr.timerMu.Lock()
defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
if dr.timer == nil {
if dr.timerClose != nil {
close(dr.timerClose)
dr.timer, dr.timerClose = nil, nil
return
}
@@ -67,8 +82,8 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) renew() {
next = renewJitter / 2
next += time.Duration(pseudoRand.int63n(int64(next)))
}
dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(next, dr.renew)
testDidRenewLoop(next, err)
dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(next, dr.renew)
}
// updateState locks and replaces the relevant Manager.state item with the given
+92 -155
View File
@@ -6,19 +6,13 @@ package autocert
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
"golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/internal/acmetest"
)
func TestRenewalNext(t *testing.T) {
@@ -48,101 +42,47 @@ func TestRenewalNext(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRenewFromCache(t *testing.T) {
// ACME CA server stub
var ca *httptest.Server
ca = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "nonce")
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
// a nonce request
return
}
man := testManager(t)
man.RenewBefore = 24 * time.Hour
switch r.URL.Path {
// discovery
case "/":
if err := discoTmpl.Execute(w, ca.URL); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("discoTmpl: %v", err)
}
// client key registration
case "/new-reg":
w.Write([]byte("{}"))
// domain authorization
case "/new-authz":
w.Header().Set("Location", ca.URL+"/authz/1")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status": "valid"}`))
// authorization status request done by Manager's revokePendingAuthz.
case "/authz/1":
w.Write([]byte(`{"status": "valid"}`))
// cert request
case "/new-cert":
var req struct {
CSR string `json:"csr"`
}
decodePayload(&req, r.Body)
b, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(req.CSR)
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(b)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new-cert: CSR: %v", err)
}
der, err := dummyCert(csr.PublicKey, exampleDomain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new-cert: dummyCert: %v", err)
}
chainUp := fmt.Sprintf("<%s/ca-cert>; rel=up", ca.URL)
w.Header().Set("Link", chainUp)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
w.Write(der)
// CA chain cert
case "/ca-cert":
der, err := dummyCert(nil, "ca")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ca-cert: dummyCert: %v", err)
}
w.Write(der)
default:
t.Errorf("unrecognized r.URL.Path: %s", r.URL.Path)
}
}))
defer ca.Close()
ca := acmetest.NewCAServer(t).Start()
ca.ResolveGetCertificate(exampleDomain, man.GetCertificate)
man := &Manager{
Prompt: AcceptTOS,
Cache: newMemCache(t),
RenewBefore: 24 * time.Hour,
Client: &acme.Client{
DirectoryURL: ca.URL,
},
man.Client = &acme.Client{
DirectoryURL: ca.URL(),
}
defer man.stopRenew()
// cache an almost expired cert
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
now := time.Now()
cert, err := dateDummyCert(key.Public(), now.Add(-2*time.Hour), now.Add(time.Minute), exampleDomain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tlscert := &tls.Certificate{PrivateKey: key, Certificate: [][]byte{cert}}
if err := man.cachePut(context.Background(), exampleCertKey, tlscert); err != nil {
c := ca.LeafCert(exampleDomain, "ECDSA", now.Add(-2*time.Hour), now.Add(time.Minute))
if err := man.cachePut(context.Background(), exampleCertKey, c); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// veriy the renewal happened
// verify the renewal happened
defer func() {
// Stop the timers that read and execute testDidRenewLoop before restoring it.
// Otherwise the timer callback may race with the deferred write.
man.stopRenew()
testDidRenewLoop = func(next time.Duration, err error) {}
}()
done := make(chan struct{})
renewed := make(chan bool, 1)
testDidRenewLoop = func(next time.Duration, err error) {
defer close(done)
defer func() {
select {
case renewed <- true:
default:
// The renewal timer uses a random backoff. If the first renewal fails for
// some reason, we could end up with multiple calls here before the test
// stops the timer.
}
}()
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("testDidRenewLoop: %v", err)
}
// Next should be about 90 days:
// dummyCert creates 90days expiry + account for man.RenewBefore.
// CaServer creates 90days expiry + account for man.RenewBefore.
// Previous expiration was within 1 min.
future := 88 * 24 * time.Hour
if next < future {
@@ -153,7 +93,8 @@ func TestRenewFromCache(t *testing.T) {
after := time.Now().Add(future)
tlscert, err := man.cacheGet(context.Background(), exampleCertKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("man.cacheGet: %v", err)
t.Errorf("man.cacheGet: %v", err)
return
}
if !tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter.After(after) {
t.Errorf("cache leaf.NotAfter = %v; want > %v", tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter, after)
@@ -164,11 +105,13 @@ func TestRenewFromCache(t *testing.T) {
defer man.stateMu.Unlock()
s := man.state[exampleCertKey]
if s == nil {
t.Fatalf("m.state[%q] is nil", exampleCertKey)
t.Errorf("m.state[%q] is nil", exampleCertKey)
return
}
tlscert, err = s.tlscert()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("s.tlscert: %v", err)
t.Errorf("s.tlscert: %v", err)
return
}
if !tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter.After(after) {
t.Errorf("state leaf.NotAfter = %v; want > %v", tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter, after)
@@ -180,55 +123,34 @@ func TestRenewFromCache(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := man.GetCertificate(hello); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// wait for renew loop
select {
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("renew took too long to occur")
case <-done:
}
<-renewed
}
func TestRenewFromCacheAlreadyRenewed(t *testing.T) {
man := &Manager{
Prompt: AcceptTOS,
Cache: newMemCache(t),
RenewBefore: 24 * time.Hour,
Client: &acme.Client{
DirectoryURL: "invalid",
},
ca := acmetest.NewCAServer(t).Start()
man := testManager(t)
man.RenewBefore = 24 * time.Hour
man.Client = &acme.Client{
DirectoryURL: "invalid",
}
defer man.stopRenew()
// cache a recently renewed cert with a different private key
newKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
now := time.Now()
newCert, err := dateDummyCert(newKey.Public(), now.Add(-2*time.Hour), now.Add(time.Hour*24*90), exampleDomain)
if err != nil {
newCert := ca.LeafCert(exampleDomain, "ECDSA", now.Add(-2*time.Hour), now.Add(time.Hour*24*90))
if err := man.cachePut(context.Background(), exampleCertKey, newCert); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
newLeaf, err := validCert(exampleCertKey, [][]byte{newCert}, newKey, now)
newLeaf, err := validCert(exampleCertKey, newCert.Certificate, newCert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer), now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
newTLSCert := &tls.Certificate{PrivateKey: newKey, Certificate: [][]byte{newCert}, Leaf: newLeaf}
if err := man.cachePut(context.Background(), exampleCertKey, newTLSCert); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// set internal state to an almost expired cert
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
oldCert := ca.LeafCert(exampleDomain, "ECDSA", now.Add(-2*time.Hour), now.Add(time.Minute))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
oldCert, err := dateDummyCert(key.Public(), now.Add(-2*time.Hour), now.Add(time.Minute), exampleDomain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
oldLeaf, err := validCert(exampleCertKey, [][]byte{oldCert}, key, now)
oldLeaf, err := validCert(exampleCertKey, oldCert.Certificate, oldCert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer), now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -237,20 +159,32 @@ func TestRenewFromCacheAlreadyRenewed(t *testing.T) {
man.state = make(map[certKey]*certState)
}
s := &certState{
key: key,
cert: [][]byte{oldCert},
key: oldCert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer),
cert: oldCert.Certificate,
leaf: oldLeaf,
}
man.state[exampleCertKey] = s
man.stateMu.Unlock()
// veriy the renewal accepted the newer cached cert
// verify the renewal accepted the newer cached cert
defer func() {
// Stop the timers that read and execute testDidRenewLoop before restoring it.
// Otherwise the timer callback may race with the deferred write.
man.stopRenew()
testDidRenewLoop = func(next time.Duration, err error) {}
}()
done := make(chan struct{})
renewed := make(chan bool, 1)
testDidRenewLoop = func(next time.Duration, err error) {
defer close(done)
defer func() {
select {
case renewed <- true:
default:
// The renewal timer uses a random backoff. If the first renewal fails for
// some reason, we could end up with multiple calls here before the test
// stops the timer.
}
}()
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("testDidRenewLoop: %v", err)
}
@@ -264,7 +198,8 @@ func TestRenewFromCacheAlreadyRenewed(t *testing.T) {
// ensure the cached cert was not modified
tlscert, err := man.cacheGet(context.Background(), exampleCertKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("man.cacheGet: %v", err)
t.Errorf("man.cacheGet: %v", err)
return
}
if !tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter.Equal(newLeaf.NotAfter) {
t.Errorf("cache leaf.NotAfter = %v; want == %v", tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter, newLeaf.NotAfter)
@@ -275,30 +210,22 @@ func TestRenewFromCacheAlreadyRenewed(t *testing.T) {
defer man.stateMu.Unlock()
s := man.state[exampleCertKey]
if s == nil {
t.Fatalf("m.state[%q] is nil", exampleCertKey)
t.Errorf("m.state[%q] is nil", exampleCertKey)
return
}
stateKey := s.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if stateKey.X.Cmp(newKey.X) != 0 || stateKey.Y.Cmp(newKey.Y) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("state key was not updated from cache x: %v y: %v; want x: %v y: %v", stateKey.X, stateKey.Y, newKey.X, newKey.Y)
if !stateKey.Equal(newLeaf.PublicKey) {
t.Error("state key was not updated from cache")
return
}
tlscert, err = s.tlscert()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("s.tlscert: %v", err)
t.Errorf("s.tlscert: %v", err)
return
}
if !tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter.Equal(newLeaf.NotAfter) {
t.Errorf("state leaf.NotAfter = %v; want == %v", tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter, newLeaf.NotAfter)
}
// verify the private key is replaced in the renewal state
r := man.renewal[exampleCertKey]
if r == nil {
t.Fatalf("m.renewal[%q] is nil", exampleCertKey)
}
renewalKey := r.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if renewalKey.X.Cmp(newKey.X) != 0 || renewalKey.Y.Cmp(newKey.Y) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("renewal private key was not updated from cache x: %v y: %v; want x: %v y: %v", renewalKey.X, renewalKey.Y, newKey.X, newKey.Y)
}
}
// assert the expiring cert is returned from state
@@ -312,21 +239,31 @@ func TestRenewFromCacheAlreadyRenewed(t *testing.T) {
}
// trigger renew
go man.renew(exampleCertKey, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
man.startRenew(exampleCertKey, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
<-renewed
func() {
man.renewalMu.Lock()
defer man.renewalMu.Unlock()
// wait for renew loop
select {
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("renew took too long to occur")
case <-done:
// assert the new cert is returned from state after renew
hello := clientHelloInfo(exampleDomain, algECDSA)
tlscert, err := man.GetCertificate(hello)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
// verify the private key is replaced in the renewal state
r := man.renewal[exampleCertKey]
if r == nil {
t.Errorf("m.renewal[%q] is nil", exampleCertKey)
return
}
if !newTLSCert.Leaf.NotAfter.Equal(tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter) {
t.Errorf("state leaf.NotAfter = %v; want == %v", tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter, newTLSCert.Leaf.NotAfter)
renewalKey := r.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if !renewalKey.Equal(newLeaf.PublicKey) {
t.Error("renewal private key was not updated from cache")
}
}()
// assert the new cert is returned from state after renew
hello = clientHelloInfo(exampleDomain, algECDSA)
tlscert, err = man.GetCertificate(hello)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !newLeaf.NotAfter.Equal(tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter) {
t.Errorf("state leaf.NotAfter = %v; want == %v", tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter, newLeaf.NotAfter)
}
}
+7 -3
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ import (
"crypto"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"io"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"strconv"
@@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Respons
}
}
// postAsGet is POST-as-GET, a replacement for GET in RFC8555
// postAsGet is POST-as-GET, a replacement for GET in RFC 8555
// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3.
// It makes a POST request in KID form with zero JWS payload.
// See nopayload doc comments in jws.go.
@@ -215,6 +216,9 @@ func (c *Client) post(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body i
func (c *Client) postNoRetry(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}) (*http.Response, *http.Request, error) {
kid := noKeyID
if key == nil {
if c.Key == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.New("acme: Client.Key must be populated to make POST requests")
}
key = c.Key
kid = c.accountKID(ctx)
}
@@ -306,7 +310,7 @@ func isRetriable(code int) bool {
func responseError(resp *http.Response) error {
// don't care if ReadAll returns an error:
// json.Unmarshal will fail in that case anyway
b, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)
b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
e := &wireError{Status: resp.StatusCode}
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, e); err != nil {
// this is not a regular error response:
+20 -5
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ package acme
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"reflect"
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func TestErrorResponse(t *testing.T) {
res := &http.Response{
StatusCode: 400,
Status: "400 Bad Request",
Body: ioutil.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(s)),
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(s)),
Header: http.Header{"X-Foo": {"bar"}},
}
err := responseError(res)
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ func TestPostWithRetries(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := client.Authorize(context.Background(), "example.com"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("client.Authorize 1: %v", err)
}
if count != 4 {
t.Errorf("total requests count: %d; want 4", count)
if count != 3 {
t.Errorf("total requests count: %d; want 3", count)
}
}
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ func TestUserAgent(t *testing.T) {
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{}`))
w.Write([]byte(`{"newOrder": "sure"}`))
}))
defer ts.Close()
@@ -238,3 +238,18 @@ func TestUserAgent(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
func TestAccountKidLoop(t *testing.T) {
// if Client.postNoRetry is called with a nil key argument
// then Client.Key must be set, otherwise we fall into an
// infinite loop (which also causes a deadlock).
client := &Client{dir: &Directory{OrderURL: ":)"}}
_, _, err := client.postNoRetry(context.Background(), nil, "", nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Client.postNoRetry didn't fail with a nil key")
}
expected := "acme: Client.Key must be populated to make POST requests"
if err.Error() != expected {
t.Fatalf("Unexpected error returned: wanted %q, got %q", expected, err.Error())
}
}
+7 -54
View File
@@ -11,12 +11,12 @@
//
// A usage example:
//
// go run prober.go \
// -d https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory \
// -f order \
// -t http-01 \
// -a :8080 \
// -domain some.example.org
// go run prober.go \
// -d https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory \
// -f order \
// -t http-01 \
// -a :8080 \
// -domain some.example.org
//
// The above assumes a TCP tunnel from some.example.org:80 to 0.0.0.0:8080
// in order for the test to be able to fulfill http-01 challenge.
@@ -50,14 +50,13 @@ import (
var (
// ACME CA directory URL.
// Let's Encrypt v1 prod: https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
// Let's Encrypt v2 prod: https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
// Let's Encrypt v2 staging: https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
// See the following for more CAs implementing ACME protocol:
// https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_Certificate_Management_Environment#CAs_&_PKIs_that_offer_ACME_certificates
directory = flag.String("d", "", "ACME directory URL.")
reginfo = flag.String("r", "", "ACME account registration info.")
flow = flag.String("f", "", "Flow to run: order, preauthz (RFC8555) or preauthz02 (draft-02).")
flow = flag.String("f", "", `Flow to run: "order" or "preauthz" (RFC8555).`)
chaltyp = flag.String("t", "", "Challenge type: tls-alpn-01, http-01 or dns-01.")
addr = flag.String("a", "", "Local server address for tls-alpn-01 and http-01.")
dnsscript = flag.String("s", "", "Script to run for provisioning dns-01 challenges.")
@@ -127,8 +126,6 @@ When running with dns-01 challenge type, use -s argument instead of -a.
p.runOrder(ctx, identifiers)
case "preauthz":
p.runPreauthz(ctx, identifiers)
case "preauthz02":
p.runPreauthzLegacy(ctx, identifiers)
default:
log.Fatalf("unknown flow: %q", *flow)
}
@@ -276,50 +273,6 @@ func (p *prober) runPreauthz(ctx context.Context, identifiers []acme.AuthzID) {
}
}
func (p *prober) runPreauthzLegacy(ctx context.Context, identifiers []acme.AuthzID) {
var zurls []string
for _, id := range identifiers {
z, err := authorize(ctx, p.client, id)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("AuthorizeID(%+v): %v", id, err)
}
if z.Status == acme.StatusValid {
log.Printf("authz %s is valid; skipping", z.URI)
continue
}
if err := p.fulfill(ctx, z); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("fulfill(%s): %v", z.URI, err)
}
zurls = append(zurls, z.URI)
log.Printf("authorized for %+v", id)
}
// We should be all set now.
log.Print("all authorizations are done")
csr, certkey := newCSR(identifiers)
der, curl, err := p.client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 48*time.Hour, true)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("CreateCert: %v", err)
}
log.Printf("cert URL: %s", curl)
if err := checkCert(der, identifiers); err != nil {
p.errorf("invalid cert: %v", err)
}
// Deactivate all authorizations we satisfied earlier.
for _, v := range zurls {
if err := p.client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, v); err != nil {
p.errorf("RevokAuthorization(%q): %v", v, err)
continue
}
}
// Try revoking the issued cert using its private key.
if err := p.client.RevokeCert(ctx, certkey, der[0], acme.CRLReasonCessationOfOperation); err != nil {
p.errorf("RevokeCert: %v", err)
}
}
func (p *prober) fulfill(ctx context.Context, z *acme.Authorization) error {
var chal *acme.Challenge
for i, c := range z.Challenges {
+87 -17
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ package acme
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
@@ -14,16 +15,17 @@ import (
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
)
// keyID is the account identity provided by a CA during registration.
type keyID string
// KeyID is the account key identity provided by a CA during registration.
type KeyID string
// noKeyID indicates that jwsEncodeJSON should compute and use JWK instead of a KID.
// See jwsEncodeJSON for details.
const noKeyID = keyID("")
const noKeyID = KeyID("")
// noPayload indicates jwsEncodeJSON will encode zero-length octet string
// in a JWS request. This is called POST-as-GET in RFC 8555 and is used to make
@@ -31,34 +33,70 @@ const noKeyID = keyID("")
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3 for more details.
const noPayload = ""
// noNonce indicates that the nonce should be omitted from the protected header.
// See jwsEncodeJSON for details.
const noNonce = ""
// jsonWebSignature can be easily serialized into a JWS following
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-3.2.
type jsonWebSignature struct {
Protected string `json:"protected"`
Payload string `json:"payload"`
Sig string `json:"signature"`
}
// jwsEncodeJSON signs claimset using provided key and a nonce.
// The result is serialized in JSON format containing either kid or jwk
// fields based on the provided keyID value.
// fields based on the provided KeyID value.
//
// If kid is non-empty, its quoted value is inserted in the protected head
// The claimset is marshalled using json.Marshal unless it is a string.
// In which case it is inserted directly into the message.
//
// If kid is non-empty, its quoted value is inserted in the protected header
// as "kid" field value. Otherwise, JWK is computed using jwkEncode and inserted
// as "jwk" field value. The "jwk" and "kid" fields are mutually exclusive.
//
// If nonce is non-empty, its quoted value is inserted in the protected header.
//
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-7.
func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, kid keyID, nonce, url string) ([]byte, error) {
func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, kid KeyID, nonce, url string) ([]byte, error) {
if key == nil {
return nil, errors.New("nil key")
}
alg, sha := jwsHasher(key.Public())
if alg == "" || !sha.Available() {
return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
}
var phead string
headers := struct {
Alg string `json:"alg"`
KID string `json:"kid,omitempty"`
JWK json.RawMessage `json:"jwk,omitempty"`
Nonce string `json:"nonce,omitempty"`
URL string `json:"url"`
}{
Alg: alg,
Nonce: nonce,
URL: url,
}
switch kid {
case noKeyID:
jwk, err := jwkEncode(key.Public())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
phead = fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"jwk":%s,"nonce":%q,"url":%q}`, alg, jwk, nonce, url)
headers.JWK = json.RawMessage(jwk)
default:
phead = fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"kid":%q,"nonce":%q,"url":%q}`, alg, kid, nonce, url)
headers.KID = string(kid)
}
phead = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phead))
phJSON, err := json.Marshal(headers)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
phead := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phJSON))
var payload string
if claimset != noPayload {
if val, ok := claimset.(string); ok {
payload = val
} else {
cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -71,12 +109,7 @@ func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, kid keyID, nonce, ur
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
enc := struct {
Protected string `json:"protected"`
Payload string `json:"payload"`
Sig string `json:"signature"`
}{
enc := jsonWebSignature{
Protected: phead,
Payload: payload,
Sig: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig),
@@ -84,6 +117,43 @@ func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, kid keyID, nonce, ur
return json.Marshal(&enc)
}
// jwsWithMAC creates and signs a JWS using the given key and the HS256
// algorithm. kid and url are included in the protected header. rawPayload
// should not be base64-URL-encoded.
func jwsWithMAC(key []byte, kid, url string, rawPayload []byte) (*jsonWebSignature, error) {
if len(key) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme: cannot sign JWS with an empty MAC key")
}
header := struct {
Algorithm string `json:"alg"`
KID string `json:"kid"`
URL string `json:"url,omitempty"`
}{
// Only HMAC-SHA256 is supported.
Algorithm: "HS256",
KID: kid,
URL: url,
}
rawProtected, err := json.Marshal(header)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
protected := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(rawProtected)
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(rawPayload)
h := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
if _, err := h.Write([]byte(protected + "." + payload)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
mac := h.Sum(nil)
return &jsonWebSignature{
Protected: protected,
Payload: payload,
Sig: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac),
}, nil
}
// jwkEncode encodes public part of an RSA or ECDSA key into a JWK.
// The result is also suitable for creating a JWK thumbprint.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517
+85 -4
View File
@@ -195,8 +195,46 @@ func TestJWSEncodeJSON(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestJWSEncodeNoNonce(t *testing.T) {
kid := KeyID("https://example.org/account/1")
claims := "RawString"
const (
// {"alg":"ES256","kid":"https://example.org/account/1","nonce":"nonce","url":"url"}
protected = "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcvYWNjb3VudC8xIiwidXJsIjoidXJsIn0"
// "Raw String"
payload = "RawString"
)
b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(claims, testKeyEC, kid, "", "url")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var jws struct{ Protected, Payload, Signature string }
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &jws); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if jws.Protected != protected {
t.Errorf("protected:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", jws.Protected, protected)
}
if jws.Payload != payload {
t.Errorf("payload:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", jws.Payload, payload)
}
sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jws.Signature)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("jws.Signature: %v", err)
}
r, s := big.NewInt(0), big.NewInt(0)
r.SetBytes(sig[:len(sig)/2])
s.SetBytes(sig[len(sig)/2:])
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(protected + "." + payload))
if !ecdsa.Verify(testKeyEC.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
t.Error("invalid signature")
}
}
func TestJWSEncodeKID(t *testing.T) {
kid := keyID("https://example.org/account/1")
kid := KeyID("https://example.org/account/1")
claims := struct{ Msg string }{"Hello JWS"}
// JWS signed with testKeyEC
const (
@@ -376,7 +414,7 @@ func TestJWSEncodeJSONCustom(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var j struct{ Protected, Payload, Signature string }
var j jsonWebSignature
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &j); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -386,13 +424,56 @@ func TestJWSEncodeJSONCustom(t *testing.T) {
if j.Payload != payload {
t.Errorf("j.Payload = %q\nwant %q", j.Payload, payload)
}
if j.Signature != tc.jwsig {
t.Errorf("j.Signature = %q\nwant %q", j.Signature, tc.jwsig)
if j.Sig != tc.jwsig {
t.Errorf("j.Sig = %q\nwant %q", j.Sig, tc.jwsig)
}
})
}
}
func TestJWSWithMAC(t *testing.T) {
// Example from RFC 7520 Section 4.4.3.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7520#section-4.4.3
b64Key := "hJtXIZ2uSN5kbQfbtTNWbpdmhkV8FJG-Onbc6mxCcYg"
rawPayload := []byte("It\xe2\x80\x99s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out your " +
"door. You step onto the road, and if you don't keep your feet, " +
"there\xe2\x80\x99s no knowing where you might be swept off " +
"to.")
protected := "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW" +
"VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9"
payload := "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg" +
"Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h" +
"ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi" +
"gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m" +
"ZiB0by4"
sig := "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0"
key, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(b64Key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to decode key: %q", b64Key)
}
got, err := jwsWithMAC(key, "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037", "", rawPayload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("jwsWithMAC() = %q", err)
}
if got.Protected != protected {
t.Errorf("got.Protected = %q\nwant %q", got.Protected, protected)
}
if got.Payload != payload {
t.Errorf("got.Payload = %q\nwant %q", got.Payload, payload)
}
if got.Sig != sig {
t.Errorf("got.Signature = %q\nwant %q", got.Sig, sig)
}
}
func TestJWSWithMACError(t *testing.T) {
p := "{}"
if _, err := jwsWithMAC(nil, "", "", []byte(p)); err == nil {
t.Errorf("jwsWithMAC(nil, ...) = success; want err")
}
}
func TestJWKThumbprintRSA(t *testing.T) {
// Key example from RFC 7638
const base64N = "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx4cbbfAAt" +
+93 -9
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"net/http"
"time"
)
@@ -24,6 +23,9 @@ import (
//
// It only works with CAs implementing RFC 8555.
func (c *Client) DeactivateReg(ctx context.Context) error {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { // required by c.accountKID
return err
}
url := string(c.accountKID(ctx))
if url == "" {
return ErrNoAccount
@@ -37,22 +39,32 @@ func (c *Client) DeactivateReg(ctx context.Context) error {
return nil
}
// registerRFC is quivalent to c.Register but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// registerRFC is equivalent to c.Register but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// It expects c.Discover to have already been called.
// TODO: Implement externalAccountBinding.
func (c *Client) registerRFC(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) {
c.cacheMu.Lock() // guard c.kid access
defer c.cacheMu.Unlock()
req := struct {
TermsAgreed bool `json:"termsOfServiceAgreed,omitempty"`
Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"`
TermsAgreed bool `json:"termsOfServiceAgreed,omitempty"`
Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"`
ExternalAccountBinding *jsonWebSignature `json:"externalAccountBinding,omitempty"`
}{
Contact: acct.Contact,
}
if c.dir.Terms != "" {
req.TermsAgreed = prompt(c.dir.Terms)
}
// set 'externalAccountBinding' field if requested
if acct.ExternalAccountBinding != nil {
eabJWS, err := c.encodeExternalAccountBinding(acct.ExternalAccountBinding)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: failed to encode external account binding: %v", err)
}
req.ExternalAccountBinding = eabJWS
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.RegURL, req, wantStatus(
http.StatusOK, // account with this key already registered
http.StatusCreated, // new account created
@@ -68,14 +80,24 @@ func (c *Client) registerRFC(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tos
}
// Cache Account URL even if we return an error to the caller.
// It is by all means a valid and usable "kid" value for future requests.
c.kid = keyID(a.URI)
c.KID = KeyID(a.URI)
if res.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
return nil, ErrAccountAlreadyExists
}
return a, nil
}
// updateGegRFC is equivalent to c.UpdateReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// encodeExternalAccountBinding will encode an external account binding stanza
// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3.4.
func (c *Client) encodeExternalAccountBinding(eab *ExternalAccountBinding) (*jsonWebSignature, error) {
jwk, err := jwkEncode(c.Key.Public())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return jwsWithMAC(eab.Key, eab.KID, c.dir.RegURL, []byte(jwk))
}
// updateRegRFC is equivalent to c.UpdateReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// It expects c.Discover to have already been called.
func (c *Client) updateRegRFC(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) {
url := string(c.accountKID(ctx))
@@ -95,7 +117,7 @@ func (c *Client) updateRegRFC(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error)
return responseAccount(res)
}
// getGegRFC is equivalent to c.GetReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// getRegRFC is equivalent to c.GetReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// It expects c.Discover to have already been called.
func (c *Client) getRegRFC(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
req := json.RawMessage(`{"onlyReturnExisting": true}`)
@@ -128,6 +150,42 @@ func responseAccount(res *http.Response) (*Account, error) {
}, nil
}
// accountKeyRollover attempts to perform account key rollover.
// On success it will change client.Key to the new key.
func (c *Client) accountKeyRollover(ctx context.Context, newKey crypto.Signer) error {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) // Also required by c.accountKID
if err != nil {
return err
}
kid := c.accountKID(ctx)
if kid == noKeyID {
return ErrNoAccount
}
oldKey, err := jwkEncode(c.Key.Public())
if err != nil {
return err
}
payload := struct {
Account string `json:"account"`
OldKey json.RawMessage `json:"oldKey"`
}{
Account: string(kid),
OldKey: json.RawMessage(oldKey),
}
inner, err := jwsEncodeJSON(payload, newKey, noKeyID, noNonce, dir.KeyChangeURL)
if err != nil {
return err
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, dir.KeyChangeURL, base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(inner), wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
c.Key = newKey
return nil
}
// AuthorizeOrder initiates the order-based application for certificate issuance,
// as opposed to pre-authorization in Authorize.
// It is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555.
@@ -331,7 +389,7 @@ func (c *Client) fetchCertRFC(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][
// Get all the bytes up to a sane maximum.
// Account very roughly for base64 overhead.
const max = maxCertChainSize + maxCertChainSize/33
b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, max+1))
b, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, max+1))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: fetch cert response stream: %v", err)
}
@@ -390,3 +448,29 @@ func isAlreadyRevoked(err error) bool {
e, ok := err.(*Error)
return ok && e.ProblemType == "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:alreadyRevoked"
}
// ListCertAlternates retrieves any alternate certificate chain URLs for the
// given certificate chain URL. These alternate URLs can be passed to FetchCert
// in order to retrieve the alternate certificate chains.
//
// If there are no alternate issuer certificate chains, a nil slice will be
// returned.
func (c *Client) ListCertAlternates(ctx context.Context, url string) ([]string, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { // required by c.accountKID
return nil, err
}
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
// We don't need the body but we need to discard it so we don't end up
// preventing keep-alive
if _, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, res.Body); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: cert alternates response stream: %v", err)
}
alts := linkHeader(res.Header, "alternate")
return alts, nil
}
+331 -57
View File
@@ -7,17 +7,22 @@ package acme
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"io"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"reflect"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -59,7 +64,7 @@ func TestRFC_Discover(t *testing.T) {
}`, nonce, reg, order, authz, revoke, keychange, metaTerms, metaWebsite, metaCAA)
}))
defer ts.Close()
c := Client{DirectoryURL: ts.URL}
c := &Client{DirectoryURL: ts.URL}
dir, err := c.Discover(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -143,7 +148,7 @@ func TestRFC_postKID(t *testing.T) {
w.Header().Set("Location", "/account-1")
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"valid"}`))
case "/post":
b, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body) // check err later in decodeJWSxxx
b, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) // check err later in decodeJWSxxx
head, err := decodeJWSHead(bytes.NewReader(b))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("decodeJWSHead: %v", err)
@@ -172,8 +177,7 @@ func TestRFC_postKID(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer ts.Close()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
ctx := context.Background()
cl := &Client{
Key: testKey,
DirectoryURL: ts.URL,
@@ -189,13 +193,13 @@ func TestRFC_postKID(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer res.Body.Close()
b, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(res.Body) // don't care about err - just checking b
b, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body) // don't care about err - just checking b
if string(b) != "pong" {
t.Errorf("res.Body = %q; want pong", b)
}
}
// acmeServer simulates a subset of RFC8555 compliant CA.
// acmeServer simulates a subset of RFC 8555 compliant CA.
//
// TODO: We also have x/crypto/acme/autocert/acmetest and startACMEServerStub in autocert_test.go.
// It feels like this acmeServer is a sweet spot between usefulness and added complexity.
@@ -229,6 +233,7 @@ func (s *acmeServer) start() {
"newOrder": %q,
"newAuthz": %q,
"revokeCert": %q,
"keyChange": %q,
"meta": {"termsOfService": %q}
}`,
s.url("/acme/new-nonce"),
@@ -236,6 +241,7 @@ func (s *acmeServer) start() {
s.url("/acme/new-order"),
s.url("/acme/new-authz"),
s.url("/acme/revoke-cert"),
s.url("/acme/key-change"),
s.url("/terms"),
)
return
@@ -290,7 +296,7 @@ func TestRFC_Register(t *testing.T) {
"orders": %q
}`, email, s.url("/accounts/1/orders"))
b, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body) // check err later in decodeJWSxxx
b, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) // check err later in decodeJWSxxx
head, err := decodeJWSHead(bytes.NewReader(b))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("decodeJWSHead: %v", err)
@@ -309,8 +315,7 @@ func TestRFC_Register(t *testing.T) {
s.start()
defer s.close()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
ctx := context.Background()
cl := &Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
DirectoryURL: s.url("/"),
@@ -341,7 +346,144 @@ func TestRFC_Register(t *testing.T) {
if !didPrompt {
t.Error("tos prompt wasn't called")
}
if v := cl.accountKID(ctx); v != keyID(okAccount.URI) {
if v := cl.accountKID(ctx); v != KeyID(okAccount.URI) {
t.Errorf("account kid = %q; want %q", v, okAccount.URI)
}
}
func TestRFC_RegisterExternalAccountBinding(t *testing.T) {
eab := &ExternalAccountBinding{
KID: "kid-1",
Key: []byte("secret"),
}
type protected struct {
Algorithm string `json:"alg"`
KID string `json:"kid"`
URL string `json:"url"`
}
const email = "mailto:user@example.org"
s := newACMEServer()
s.handle("/acme/new-account", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Location", s.url("/accounts/1"))
if r.Method != "POST" {
t.Errorf("r.Method = %q; want POST", r.Method)
}
var j struct {
Protected string
Contact []string
TermsOfServiceAgreed bool
ExternalaccountBinding struct {
Protected string
Payload string
Signature string
}
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &j, r.Body)
protData, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(j.ExternalaccountBinding.Protected)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var prot protected
err = json.Unmarshal(protData, &prot)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(j.Contact, []string{email}) {
t.Errorf("j.Contact = %v; want %v", j.Contact, []string{email})
}
if !j.TermsOfServiceAgreed {
t.Error("j.TermsOfServiceAgreed = false; want true")
}
// Ensure same KID.
if prot.KID != eab.KID {
t.Errorf("j.ExternalAccountBinding.KID = %s; want %s", prot.KID, eab.KID)
}
// Ensure expected Algorithm.
if prot.Algorithm != "HS256" {
t.Errorf("j.ExternalAccountBinding.Alg = %s; want %s",
prot.Algorithm, "HS256")
}
// Ensure same URL as outer JWS.
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/acme/new-account", r.Host)
if prot.URL != url {
t.Errorf("j.ExternalAccountBinding.URL = %s; want %s",
prot.URL, url)
}
// Ensure payload is base64URL encoded string of JWK in outer JWS
jwk, err := jwkEncode(testKeyEC.Public())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
decodedPayload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(j.ExternalaccountBinding.Payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if jwk != string(decodedPayload) {
t.Errorf("j.ExternalAccountBinding.Payload = %s; want %s", decodedPayload, jwk)
}
// Check signature on inner external account binding JWS
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte("secret"))
_, err = hmac.Write([]byte(j.ExternalaccountBinding.Protected + "." + j.ExternalaccountBinding.Payload))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
mac := hmac.Sum(nil)
encodedMAC := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac)
if !bytes.Equal([]byte(encodedMAC), []byte(j.ExternalaccountBinding.Signature)) {
t.Errorf("j.ExternalAccountBinding.Signature = %v; want %v",
[]byte(j.ExternalaccountBinding.Signature), encodedMAC)
}
w.Header().Set("Location", s.url("/accounts/1"))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
b, _ := json.Marshal([]string{email})
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"valid","orders":"%s","contact":%s}`, s.url("/accounts/1/orders"), b)
})
s.start()
defer s.close()
ctx := context.Background()
cl := &Client{
Key: testKeyEC,
DirectoryURL: s.url("/"),
}
var didPrompt bool
a := &Account{Contact: []string{email}, ExternalAccountBinding: eab}
acct, err := cl.Register(ctx, a, func(tos string) bool {
didPrompt = true
terms := s.url("/terms")
if tos != terms {
t.Errorf("tos = %q; want %q", tos, terms)
}
return true
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
okAccount := &Account{
URI: s.url("/accounts/1"),
Status: StatusValid,
Contact: []string{email},
OrdersURL: s.url("/accounts/1/orders"),
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(acct, okAccount) {
t.Errorf("acct = %+v; want %+v", acct, okAccount)
}
if !didPrompt {
t.Error("tos prompt wasn't called")
}
if v := cl.accountKID(ctx); v != KeyID(okAccount.URI) {
t.Errorf("account kid = %q; want %q", v, okAccount.URI)
}
}
@@ -361,7 +503,7 @@ func TestRFC_RegisterExisting(t *testing.T) {
if err != ErrAccountAlreadyExists {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want %v", err, ErrAccountAlreadyExists)
}
kid := keyID(s.url("/accounts/1"))
kid := KeyID(s.url("/accounts/1"))
if v := cl.accountKID(context.Background()); v != kid {
t.Errorf("account kid = %q; want %q", v, kid)
}
@@ -383,7 +525,7 @@ func TestRFC_UpdateReg(t *testing.T) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status": "valid"}`))
b, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body) // check err later in decodeJWSxxx
b, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) // check err later in decodeJWSxxx
head, err := decodeJWSHead(bytes.NewReader(b))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("decodeJWSHead: %v", err)
@@ -480,6 +622,128 @@ func TestRFC_GetRegOtherError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRFC_AccountKeyRollover(t *testing.T) {
s := newACMEServer()
s.handle("/acme/new-account", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Location", s.url("/accounts/1"))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status": "valid"}`))
})
s.handle("/acme/key-change", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
s.start()
defer s.close()
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
if err := cl.AccountKeyRollover(context.Background(), testKeyEC384); err != nil {
t.Errorf("AccountKeyRollover: %v, wanted no error", err)
} else if cl.Key != testKeyEC384 {
t.Error("AccountKeyRollover did not rotate the client key")
}
}
func TestRFC_DeactivateReg(t *testing.T) {
const email = "mailto:user@example.org"
curStatus := StatusValid
type account struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
Contact []string `json:"contact"`
AcceptTOS bool `json:"termsOfServiceAgreed"`
Orders string `json:"orders"`
}
s := newACMEServer()
s.handle("/acme/new-account", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Location", s.url("/accounts/1"))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) // 200 means existing account
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(account{
Status: curStatus,
Contact: []string{email},
AcceptTOS: true,
Orders: s.url("/accounts/1/orders"),
})
b, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) // check err later in decodeJWSxxx
head, err := decodeJWSHead(bytes.NewReader(b))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("decodeJWSHead: %v", err)
return
}
if len(head.JWK) == 0 {
t.Error("head.JWK is empty")
}
var req struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
Contact []string `json:"contact"`
AcceptTOS bool `json:"termsOfServiceAgreed"`
OnlyExisting bool `json:"onlyReturnExisting"`
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &req, bytes.NewReader(b))
if !req.OnlyExisting {
t.Errorf("req.OnlyReturnExisting = %t; want = %t", req.OnlyExisting, true)
}
})
s.handle("/accounts/1", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if curStatus == StatusValid {
curStatus = StatusDeactivated
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
} else {
s.error(w, &wireError{
Status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:unauthorized",
})
}
var req account
b, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) // check err later in decodeJWSxxx
head, err := decodeJWSHead(bytes.NewReader(b))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("decodeJWSHead: %v", err)
return
}
if len(head.JWK) != 0 {
t.Error("head.JWK is not empty")
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(head.KID, "/accounts/1") {
t.Errorf("head.KID = %q; want suffix /accounts/1", head.KID)
}
decodeJWSRequest(t, &req, bytes.NewReader(b))
if req.Status != StatusDeactivated {
t.Errorf("req.Status = %q; want = %q", req.Status, StatusDeactivated)
}
})
s.start()
defer s.close()
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
if err := cl.DeactivateReg(context.Background()); err != nil {
t.Errorf("DeactivateReg: %v, wanted no error", err)
}
if err := cl.DeactivateReg(context.Background()); err == nil {
t.Errorf("DeactivateReg: %v, wanted error for unauthorized", err)
}
}
func TestRF_DeactivateRegNoAccount(t *testing.T) {
s := newACMEServer()
s.handle("/acme/new-account", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.error(w, &wireError{
Status: http.StatusBadRequest,
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:accountDoesNotExist",
})
})
s.start()
defer s.close()
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
if err := cl.DeactivateReg(context.Background()); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoAccount) {
t.Errorf("DeactivateReg: %v, wanted ErrNoAccount", err)
}
}
func TestRFC_AuthorizeOrder(t *testing.T) {
s := newACMEServer()
s.handle("/acme/new-account", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -600,24 +864,13 @@ func testWaitOrderStatus(t *testing.T, okStatus string) {
s.start()
defer s.close()
var order *Order
var err error
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
order, err = cl.WaitOrder(context.Background(), s.url("/orders/1"))
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("WaitOrder took too long to return")
case <-done:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("WaitOrder: %v", err)
}
if order.Status != okStatus {
t.Errorf("order.Status = %q; want %q", order.Status, okStatus)
}
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
order, err := cl.WaitOrder(context.Background(), s.url("/orders/1"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("WaitOrder: %v", err)
}
if order.Status != okStatus {
t.Errorf("order.Status = %q; want %q", order.Status, okStatus)
}
}
@@ -642,30 +895,20 @@ func TestRFC_WaitOrderError(t *testing.T) {
s.start()
defer s.close()
var err error
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
_, err = cl.WaitOrder(context.Background(), s.url("/orders/1"))
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("WaitOrder took too long to return")
case <-done:
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("WaitOrder returned nil error")
}
e, ok := err.(*OrderError)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("err = %v (%T); want OrderError", err, err)
}
if e.OrderURL != s.url("/orders/1") {
t.Errorf("e.OrderURL = %q; want %q", e.OrderURL, s.url("/orders/1"))
}
if e.Status != StatusInvalid {
t.Errorf("e.Status = %q; want %q", e.Status, StatusInvalid)
}
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
_, err := cl.WaitOrder(context.Background(), s.url("/orders/1"))
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("WaitOrder returned nil error")
}
e, ok := err.(*OrderError)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("err = %v (%T); want OrderError", err, err)
}
if e.OrderURL != s.url("/orders/1") {
t.Errorf("e.OrderURL = %q; want %q", e.OrderURL, s.url("/orders/1"))
}
if e.Status != StatusInvalid {
t.Errorf("e.Status = %q; want %q", e.Status, StatusInvalid)
}
}
@@ -705,8 +948,7 @@ func TestRFC_CreateOrderCert(t *testing.T) {
})
s.start()
defer s.close()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
defer cancel()
ctx := context.Background()
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
cert, curl, err := cl.CreateOrderCert(ctx, s.url("/pleaseissue"), csr, true)
@@ -741,3 +983,35 @@ func TestRFC_AlreadyRevokedCert(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("RevokeCert: %v", err)
}
}
func TestRFC_ListCertAlternates(t *testing.T) {
s := newACMEServer()
s.handle("/crt", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pem-certificate-chain")
w.Header().Add("Link", `<https://example.com/crt/2>;rel="alternate"`)
w.Header().Add("Link", `<https://example.com/crt/3>; rel="alternate"`)
w.Header().Add("Link", `<https://example.com/acme>; rel="index"`)
})
s.handle("/crt2", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pem-certificate-chain")
})
s.start()
defer s.close()
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
crts, err := cl.ListCertAlternates(context.Background(), s.url("/crt"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ListCertAlternates: %v", err)
}
want := []string{"https://example.com/crt/2", "https://example.com/crt/3"}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(crts, want) {
t.Errorf("ListCertAlternates(/crt): %v; want %v", crts, want)
}
crts, err = cl.ListCertAlternates(context.Background(), s.url("/crt2"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ListCertAlternates: %v", err)
}
if crts != nil {
t.Errorf("ListCertAlternates(/crt2): %v; want nil", crts)
}
}
+83 -17
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,32 @@ var (
ErrNoAccount = errors.New("acme: account does not exist")
)
// A Subproblem describes an ACME subproblem as reported in an Error.
type Subproblem struct {
// Type is a URI reference that identifies the problem type,
// typically in a "urn:acme:error:xxx" form.
Type string
// Detail is a human-readable explanation specific to this occurrence of the problem.
Detail string
// Instance indicates a URL that the client should direct a human user to visit
// in order for instructions on how to agree to the updated Terms of Service.
// In such an event CA sets StatusCode to 403, Type to
// "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:userActionRequired", and adds a Link header with relation
// "terms-of-service" containing the latest TOS URL.
Instance string
// Identifier may contain the ACME identifier that the error is for.
Identifier *AuthzID
}
func (sp Subproblem) String() string {
str := fmt.Sprintf("%s: ", sp.Type)
if sp.Identifier != nil {
str += fmt.Sprintf("[%s: %s] ", sp.Identifier.Type, sp.Identifier.Value)
}
str += sp.Detail
return str
}
// Error is an ACME error, defined in Problem Details for HTTP APIs doc
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-appsawg-http-problem.
type Error struct {
@@ -76,10 +102,21 @@ type Error struct {
// Header is the original server error response headers.
// It may be nil.
Header http.Header
// Subproblems may contain more detailed information about the individual problems
// that caused the error. This field is only sent by RFC 8555 compatible ACME
// servers. Defined in RFC 8555 Section 6.7.1.
Subproblems []Subproblem
}
func (e *Error) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%d %s: %s", e.StatusCode, e.ProblemType, e.Detail)
str := fmt.Sprintf("%d %s: %s", e.StatusCode, e.ProblemType, e.Detail)
if len(e.Subproblems) > 0 {
str += fmt.Sprintf("; subproblems:")
for _, sp := range e.Subproblems {
str += fmt.Sprintf("\n\t%s", sp)
}
}
return str
}
// AuthorizationError indicates that an authorization for an identifier
@@ -102,7 +139,12 @@ func (a *AuthorizationError) Error() string {
for i, err := range a.Errors {
e[i] = err.Error()
}
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error for %s: %s", a.Identifier, strings.Join(e, "; "))
if a.Identifier != "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error for %s: %s", a.Identifier, strings.Join(e, "; "))
}
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error: %s", strings.Join(e, "; "))
}
// OrderError is returned from Client's order related methods.
@@ -194,6 +236,28 @@ type Account struct {
//
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL.
Certificates string
// ExternalAccountBinding represents an arbitrary binding to an account of
// the CA which the ACME server is tied to.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3.4 for more details.
ExternalAccountBinding *ExternalAccountBinding
}
// ExternalAccountBinding contains the data needed to form a request with
// an external account binding.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3.4 for more details.
type ExternalAccountBinding struct {
// KID is the Key ID of the symmetric MAC key that the CA provides to
// identify an external account from ACME.
KID string
// Key is the bytes of the symmetric key that the CA provides to identify
// the account. Key must correspond to the KID.
Key []byte
}
func (e *ExternalAccountBinding) String() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("&{KID: %q, Key: redacted}", e.KID)
}
// Directory is ACME server discovery data.
@@ -233,7 +297,7 @@ type Directory struct {
// CAA consists of lowercase hostname elements, which the ACME server
// recognises as referring to itself for the purposes of CAA record validation
// as defined in RFC6844.
// as defined in RFC 6844.
CAA []string
// ExternalAccountRequired indicates that the CA requires for all account-related
@@ -241,14 +305,6 @@ type Directory struct {
ExternalAccountRequired bool
}
// rfcCompliant reports whether the ACME server implements RFC 8555.
// Note that some servers may have incomplete RFC implementation
// even if the returned value is true.
// If rfcCompliant reports false, the server most likely implements draft-02.
func (d *Directory) rfcCompliant() bool {
return d.OrderURL != ""
}
// Order represents a client's request for a certificate.
// It tracks the request flow progress through to issuance.
type Order struct {
@@ -384,7 +440,7 @@ func DomainIDs(names ...string) []AuthzID {
// IPIDs creates a slice of AuthzID with "ip" identifier type.
// Each element of addr is textual form of an address as defined
// in RFC1123 Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in RFC5952 Section 4 for IPv6.
// in RFC 1123 Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in RFC 5952 Section 4 for IPv6.
func IPIDs(addr ...string) []AuthzID {
a := make([]AuthzID, len(addr))
for i, v := range addr {
@@ -407,6 +463,7 @@ type wireAuthz struct {
Wildcard bool
Challenges []wireChallenge
Combinations [][]int
Error *wireError
}
func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization {
@@ -430,11 +487,17 @@ func (z *wireAuthz) error(uri string) *AuthorizationError {
URI: uri,
Identifier: z.Identifier.Value,
}
if z.Error != nil {
err.Errors = append(err.Errors, z.Error.error(nil))
}
for _, raw := range z.Challenges {
if raw.Error != nil {
err.Errors = append(err.Errors, raw.Error.error(nil))
}
}
return err
}
@@ -499,20 +562,23 @@ func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge {
// wireError is a subset of fields of the Problem Details object
// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7807#section-3.1.
type wireError struct {
Status int
Type string
Detail string
Instance string
Status int
Type string
Detail string
Instance string
Subproblems []Subproblem
}
func (e *wireError) error(h http.Header) *Error {
return &Error{
err := &Error{
StatusCode: e.Status,
ProblemType: e.Type,
Detail: e.Detail,
Instance: e.Instance,
Header: h,
Subproblems: e.Subproblems,
}
return err
}
// CertOption is an optional argument type for the TLS ChallengeCert methods for
+156
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,23 @@ package acme
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestExternalAccountBindingString(t *testing.T) {
eab := ExternalAccountBinding{
KID: "kid",
Key: []byte("key"),
}
got := eab.String()
want := `&{KID: "kid", Key: redacted}`
if got != want {
t.Errorf("eab.String() = %q, want: %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2017, 04, 27, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
f := timeNow
@@ -61,3 +74,146 @@ func TestRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
func TestAuthorizationError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
desc string
err *AuthorizationError
msg string
}{
{
desc: "when auth error identifier is set",
err: &AuthorizationError{
Identifier: "domain.com",
Errors: []error{
(&wireError{
Status: 403,
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa",
Detail: "CAA record for domain.com prevents issuance",
}).error(nil),
},
},
msg: "acme: authorization error for domain.com: 403 urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa: CAA record for domain.com prevents issuance",
},
{
desc: "when auth error identifier is unset",
err: &AuthorizationError{
Errors: []error{
(&wireError{
Status: 403,
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa",
Detail: "CAA record for domain.com prevents issuance",
}).error(nil),
},
},
msg: "acme: authorization error: 403 urn:ietf:params:acme:error:caa: CAA record for domain.com prevents issuance",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
if tt.err.Error() != tt.msg {
t.Errorf("got: %s\nwant: %s", tt.err, tt.msg)
}
}
}
func TestSubproblems(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
wire wireError
expectedOut Error
}{
{
wire: wireError{
Status: 1,
Type: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
},
expectedOut: Error{
StatusCode: 1,
ProblemType: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
},
},
{
wire: wireError{
Status: 1,
Type: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
},
},
},
expectedOut: Error{
StatusCode: 1,
ProblemType: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
},
},
},
},
{
wire: wireError{
Status: 1,
Type: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
Identifier: &AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: "example"},
},
},
},
expectedOut: Error{
StatusCode: 1,
ProblemType: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
Identifier: &AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: "example"},
},
},
},
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
out := tc.wire.error(nil)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(*out, tc.expectedOut) {
t.Errorf("Unexpected error: wanted %v, got %v", tc.expectedOut, *out)
}
}
}
func TestErrorStringerWithSubproblems(t *testing.T) {
err := Error{
StatusCode: 1,
ProblemType: "urn:error",
Detail: "it's an error",
Subproblems: []Subproblem{
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
},
{
Type: "urn:error:sub",
Detail: "it's a subproblem",
Identifier: &AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: "example"},
},
},
}
expectedStr := "1 urn:error: it's an error; subproblems:\n\turn:error:sub: it's a subproblem\n\turn:error:sub: [dns: example] it's a subproblem"
if err.Error() != expectedStr {
t.Errorf("Unexpected error string: wanted %q, got %q", expectedStr, err.Error())
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build go1.12
// +build go1.12
package acme
+4 -6
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,7 @@
// If you aren't sure which function you need, use Argon2id (IDKey) and
// the parameter recommendations for your scenario.
//
//
// Argon2i
// # Argon2i
//
// Argon2i (implemented by Key) is the side-channel resistant version of Argon2.
// It uses data-independent memory access, which is preferred for password
@@ -21,8 +20,7 @@
// parameters (taken from [2]) for non-interactive operations are time=3 and to
// use the maximum available memory.
//
//
// Argon2id
// # Argon2id
//
// Argon2id (implemented by IDKey) is a hybrid version of Argon2 combining
// Argon2i and Argon2d. It uses data-independent memory access for the first
@@ -59,7 +57,7 @@ const (
// For example, you can get a derived key for e.g. AES-256 (which needs a
// 32-byte key) by doing:
//
// key := argon2.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 3, 32*1024, 4, 32)
// key := argon2.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 3, 32*1024, 4, 32)
//
// The draft RFC recommends[2] time=3, and memory=32*1024 is a sensible number.
// If using that amount of memory (32 MB) is not possible in some contexts then
@@ -83,7 +81,7 @@ func Key(password, salt []byte, time, memory uint32, threads uint8, keyLen uint3
// For example, you can get a derived key for e.g. AES-256 (which needs a
// 32-byte key) by doing:
//
// key := argon2.IDKey([]byte("some password"), salt, 1, 64*1024, 4, 32)
// key := argon2.IDKey([]byte("some password"), salt, 1, 64*1024, 4, 32)
//
// The draft RFC recommends[2] time=1, and memory=64*1024 is a sensible number.
// If using that amount of memory (64 MB) is not possible in some contexts then
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build amd64,gc,!purego
package argon2
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build amd64,gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !amd64 appengine gccgo
//go:build !amd64 || purego || !gc
// +build !amd64 purego !gc
package argon2
+10 -1
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func (ih InvalidHashPrefixError) Error() string {
type InvalidCostError int
func (ic InvalidCostError) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("crypto/bcrypt: cost %d is outside allowed range (%d,%d)", int(ic), int(MinCost), int(MaxCost))
return fmt.Sprintf("crypto/bcrypt: cost %d is outside allowed range (%d,%d)", int(ic), MinCost, MaxCost)
}
const (
@@ -82,11 +82,20 @@ type hashed struct {
minor byte
}
// ErrPasswordTooLong is returned when the password passed to
// GenerateFromPassword is too long (i.e. > 72 bytes).
var ErrPasswordTooLong = errors.New("bcrypt: password length exceeds 72 bytes")
// GenerateFromPassword returns the bcrypt hash of the password at the given
// cost. If the cost given is less than MinCost, the cost will be set to
// DefaultCost, instead. Use CompareHashAndPassword, as defined in this package,
// to compare the returned hashed password with its cleartext version.
// GenerateFromPassword does not accept passwords longer than 72 bytes, which
// is the longest password bcrypt will operate on.
func GenerateFromPassword(password []byte, cost int) ([]byte, error) {
if len(password) > 72 {
return nil, ErrPasswordTooLong
}
p, err := newFromPassword(password, cost)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
+7
View File
@@ -241,3 +241,10 @@ func TestNoSideEffectsFromCompare(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("got=%q want=%q", got, want)
}
}
func TestPasswordTooLong(t *testing.T) {
_, err := GenerateFromPassword(make([]byte, 73), 1)
if err != ErrPasswordTooLong {
t.Errorf("unexpected error: got %q, want %q", err, ErrPasswordTooLong)
}
}
+2
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
// Package blake2b implements the BLAKE2b hash algorithm defined by RFC 7693
// and the extendable output function (XOF) BLAKE2Xb.
//
// BLAKE2b is optimized for 64-bit platforms—including NEON-enabled ARMs—and
// produces digests of any size between 1 and 64 bytes.
// For a detailed specification of BLAKE2b see https://blake2.net/blake2.pdf
// and for BLAKE2Xb see https://blake2.net/blake2x.pdf
//
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.7,amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build go1.7 && amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build go1.7,amd64,gc,!purego
package blake2b
+46 -51
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.7,amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build go1.7 && amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build go1.7,amd64,gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
@@ -282,14 +283,12 @@ TEXT ·hashBlocksAVX2(SB), 4, $320-48 // frame size = 288 + 32 byte alignment
MOVQ blocks_len+32(FP), DI
MOVQ SP, DX
MOVQ SP, R9
ADDQ $31, R9
ANDQ $~31, R9
MOVQ R9, SP
ADDQ $31, DX
ANDQ $~31, DX
MOVQ CX, 16(SP)
MOVQ CX, 16(DX)
XORQ CX, CX
MOVQ CX, 24(SP)
MOVQ CX, 24(DX)
VMOVDQU ·AVX2_c40<>(SB), Y4
VMOVDQU ·AVX2_c48<>(SB), Y5
@@ -301,33 +300,33 @@ TEXT ·hashBlocksAVX2(SB), 4, $320-48 // frame size = 288 + 32 byte alignment
MOVQ 0(BX), R8
MOVQ 8(BX), R9
MOVQ R9, 8(SP)
MOVQ R9, 8(DX)
loop:
ADDQ $128, R8
MOVQ R8, 0(SP)
MOVQ R8, 0(DX)
CMPQ R8, $128
JGE noinc
INCQ R9
MOVQ R9, 8(SP)
MOVQ R9, 8(DX)
noinc:
VMOVDQA Y8, Y0
VMOVDQA Y9, Y1
VMOVDQA Y6, Y2
VPXOR 0(SP), Y7, Y3
VPXOR 0(DX), Y7, Y3
LOAD_MSG_AVX2_0_2_4_6_1_3_5_7_8_10_12_14_9_11_13_15()
VMOVDQA Y12, 32(SP)
VMOVDQA Y13, 64(SP)
VMOVDQA Y14, 96(SP)
VMOVDQA Y15, 128(SP)
VMOVDQA Y12, 32(DX)
VMOVDQA Y13, 64(DX)
VMOVDQA Y14, 96(DX)
VMOVDQA Y15, 128(DX)
ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5)
LOAD_MSG_AVX2_14_4_9_13_10_8_15_6_1_0_11_5_12_2_7_3()
VMOVDQA Y12, 160(SP)
VMOVDQA Y13, 192(SP)
VMOVDQA Y14, 224(SP)
VMOVDQA Y15, 256(SP)
VMOVDQA Y12, 160(DX)
VMOVDQA Y13, 192(DX)
VMOVDQA Y14, 224(DX)
VMOVDQA Y15, 256(DX)
ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5)
LOAD_MSG_AVX2_11_12_5_15_8_0_2_13_10_3_7_9_14_6_1_4()
@@ -347,8 +346,8 @@ noinc:
LOAD_MSG_AVX2_10_8_7_1_2_4_6_5_15_9_3_13_11_14_12_0()
ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5)
ROUND_AVX2(32(SP), 64(SP), 96(SP), 128(SP), Y10, Y4, Y5)
ROUND_AVX2(160(SP), 192(SP), 224(SP), 256(SP), Y10, Y4, Y5)
ROUND_AVX2(32(DX), 64(DX), 96(DX), 128(DX), Y10, Y4, Y5)
ROUND_AVX2(160(DX), 192(DX), 224(DX), 256(DX), Y10, Y4, Y5)
VPXOR Y0, Y8, Y8
VPXOR Y1, Y9, Y9
@@ -366,7 +365,6 @@ noinc:
VMOVDQU Y9, 32(AX)
VZEROUPPER
MOVQ DX, SP
RET
#define VPUNPCKLQDQ_X2_X2_X15 BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x69; BYTE $0x6C; BYTE $0xFA
@@ -584,11 +582,9 @@ TEXT ·hashBlocksAVX(SB), 4, $288-48 // frame size = 272 + 16 byte alignment
MOVQ blocks_base+24(FP), SI
MOVQ blocks_len+32(FP), DI
MOVQ SP, BP
MOVQ SP, R9
ADDQ $15, R9
ANDQ $~15, R9
MOVQ R9, SP
MOVQ SP, R10
ADDQ $15, R10
ANDQ $~15, R10
VMOVDQU ·AVX_c40<>(SB), X0
VMOVDQU ·AVX_c48<>(SB), X1
@@ -596,8 +592,8 @@ TEXT ·hashBlocksAVX(SB), 4, $288-48 // frame size = 272 + 16 byte alignment
VMOVDQA X1, X9
VMOVDQU ·AVX_iv3<>(SB), X0
VMOVDQA X0, 0(SP)
XORQ CX, 0(SP) // 0(SP) = ·AVX_iv3 ^ (CX || 0)
VMOVDQA X0, 0(R10)
XORQ CX, 0(R10) // 0(R10) = ·AVX_iv3 ^ (CX || 0)
VMOVDQU 0(AX), X10
VMOVDQU 16(AX), X11
@@ -624,35 +620,35 @@ noinc:
VMOVDQU ·AVX_iv2<>(SB), X6
VPXOR X15, X6, X6
VMOVDQA 0(SP), X7
VMOVDQA 0(R10), X7
LOAD_MSG_AVX_0_2_4_6_1_3_5_7()
VMOVDQA X12, 16(SP)
VMOVDQA X13, 32(SP)
VMOVDQA X14, 48(SP)
VMOVDQA X15, 64(SP)
VMOVDQA X12, 16(R10)
VMOVDQA X13, 32(R10)
VMOVDQA X14, 48(R10)
VMOVDQA X15, 64(R10)
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9)
SHUFFLE_AVX()
LOAD_MSG_AVX(8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15)
VMOVDQA X12, 80(SP)
VMOVDQA X13, 96(SP)
VMOVDQA X14, 112(SP)
VMOVDQA X15, 128(SP)
VMOVDQA X12, 80(R10)
VMOVDQA X13, 96(R10)
VMOVDQA X14, 112(R10)
VMOVDQA X15, 128(R10)
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9)
SHUFFLE_AVX_INV()
LOAD_MSG_AVX(14, 4, 9, 13, 10, 8, 15, 6)
VMOVDQA X12, 144(SP)
VMOVDQA X13, 160(SP)
VMOVDQA X14, 176(SP)
VMOVDQA X15, 192(SP)
VMOVDQA X12, 144(R10)
VMOVDQA X13, 160(R10)
VMOVDQA X14, 176(R10)
VMOVDQA X15, 192(R10)
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9)
SHUFFLE_AVX()
LOAD_MSG_AVX_1_0_11_5_12_2_7_3()
VMOVDQA X12, 208(SP)
VMOVDQA X13, 224(SP)
VMOVDQA X14, 240(SP)
VMOVDQA X15, 256(SP)
VMOVDQA X12, 208(R10)
VMOVDQA X13, 224(R10)
VMOVDQA X14, 240(R10)
VMOVDQA X15, 256(R10)
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9)
SHUFFLE_AVX_INV()
@@ -712,14 +708,14 @@ noinc:
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9)
SHUFFLE_AVX_INV()
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(SP), 32(SP), 48(SP), 64(SP), X15, X8, X9)
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(R10), 32(R10), 48(R10), 64(R10), X15, X8, X9)
SHUFFLE_AVX()
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 80(SP), 96(SP), 112(SP), 128(SP), X15, X8, X9)
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 80(R10), 96(R10), 112(R10), 128(R10), X15, X8, X9)
SHUFFLE_AVX_INV()
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 144(SP), 160(SP), 176(SP), 192(SP), X15, X8, X9)
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 144(R10), 160(R10), 176(R10), 192(R10), X15, X8, X9)
SHUFFLE_AVX()
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 208(SP), 224(SP), 240(SP), 256(SP), X15, X8, X9)
HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 208(R10), 224(R10), 240(R10), 256(R10), X15, X8, X9)
SHUFFLE_AVX_INV()
VMOVDQU 32(AX), X14
@@ -746,5 +742,4 @@ noinc:
MOVQ R9, 8(BX)
VZEROUPPER
MOVQ BP, SP
RET
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !go1.7,amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build !go1.7 && amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build !go1.7,amd64,gc,!purego
package blake2b
+28 -30
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build amd64,gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
@@ -118,15 +119,13 @@ TEXT ·hashBlocksSSE4(SB), 4, $288-48 // frame size = 272 + 16 byte alignment
MOVQ blocks_base+24(FP), SI
MOVQ blocks_len+32(FP), DI
MOVQ SP, BP
MOVQ SP, R9
ADDQ $15, R9
ANDQ $~15, R9
MOVQ R9, SP
MOVQ SP, R10
ADDQ $15, R10
ANDQ $~15, R10
MOVOU ·iv3<>(SB), X0
MOVO X0, 0(SP)
XORQ CX, 0(SP) // 0(SP) = ·iv3 ^ (CX || 0)
MOVO X0, 0(R10)
XORQ CX, 0(R10) // 0(R10) = ·iv3 ^ (CX || 0)
MOVOU ·c40<>(SB), X13
MOVOU ·c48<>(SB), X14
@@ -156,35 +155,35 @@ noinc:
MOVOU ·iv2<>(SB), X6
PXOR X8, X6
MOVO 0(SP), X7
MOVO 0(R10), X7
LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 0, 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7)
MOVO X8, 16(SP)
MOVO X9, 32(SP)
MOVO X10, 48(SP)
MOVO X11, 64(SP)
MOVO X8, 16(R10)
MOVO X9, 32(R10)
MOVO X10, 48(R10)
MOVO X11, 64(R10)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14)
SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15)
MOVO X8, 80(SP)
MOVO X9, 96(SP)
MOVO X10, 112(SP)
MOVO X11, 128(SP)
MOVO X8, 80(R10)
MOVO X9, 96(R10)
MOVO X10, 112(R10)
MOVO X11, 128(R10)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14)
SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 14, 4, 9, 13, 10, 8, 15, 6)
MOVO X8, 144(SP)
MOVO X9, 160(SP)
MOVO X10, 176(SP)
MOVO X11, 192(SP)
MOVO X8, 144(R10)
MOVO X9, 160(R10)
MOVO X10, 176(R10)
MOVO X11, 192(R10)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14)
SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 1, 0, 11, 5, 12, 2, 7, 3)
MOVO X8, 208(SP)
MOVO X9, 224(SP)
MOVO X10, 240(SP)
MOVO X11, 256(SP)
MOVO X8, 208(R10)
MOVO X9, 224(R10)
MOVO X10, 240(R10)
MOVO X11, 256(R10)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14)
SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
@@ -244,14 +243,14 @@ noinc:
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14)
SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(SP), 32(SP), 48(SP), 64(SP), X11, X13, X14)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(R10), 32(R10), 48(R10), 64(R10), X11, X13, X14)
SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 80(SP), 96(SP), 112(SP), 128(SP), X11, X13, X14)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 80(R10), 96(R10), 112(R10), 128(R10), X11, X13, X14)
SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 144(SP), 160(SP), 176(SP), 192(SP), X11, X13, X14)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 144(R10), 160(R10), 176(R10), 192(R10), X11, X13, X14)
SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 208(SP), 224(SP), 240(SP), 256(SP), X11, X13, X14)
HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 208(R10), 224(R10), 240(R10), 256(R10), X11, X13, X14)
SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
MOVOU 32(AX), X10
@@ -277,5 +276,4 @@ noinc:
MOVQ R8, 0(BX)
MOVQ R9, 8(BX)
MOVQ BP, SP
RET
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !amd64 appengine gccgo
//go:build !amd64 || purego || !gc
// +build !amd64 purego !gc
package blake2b
+1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build go1.9
// +build go1.9
package blake2b
+2
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
// Package blake2s implements the BLAKE2s hash algorithm defined by RFC 7693
// and the extendable output function (XOF) BLAKE2Xs.
//
// BLAKE2s is optimized for 8- to 32-bit platforms and produces digests of any
// size between 1 and 32 bytes.
// For a detailed specification of BLAKE2s see https://blake2.net/blake2.pdf
// and for BLAKE2Xs see https://blake2.net/blake2x.pdf
//
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build 386,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build 386 && gc && !purego
// +build 386,gc,!purego
package blake2s
+44 -49
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build 386,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build 386 && gc && !purego
// +build 386,gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
@@ -297,19 +298,17 @@ TEXT ·hashBlocksSSE2(SB), 0, $672-24 // frame = 656 + 16 byte alignment
MOVL blocks_base+12(FP), SI
MOVL blocks_len+16(FP), DX
MOVL SP, BP
MOVL SP, DI
ADDL $15, DI
ANDL $~15, DI
MOVL DI, SP
MOVL CX, 8(SP)
MOVL CX, 8(DI)
MOVL 0(BX), CX
MOVL CX, 0(SP)
MOVL CX, 0(DI)
MOVL 4(BX), CX
MOVL CX, 4(SP)
MOVL CX, 4(DI)
XORL CX, CX
MOVL CX, 12(SP)
MOVL CX, 12(DI)
MOVOU 0(AX), X0
MOVOU 16(AX), X1
@@ -321,22 +320,22 @@ loop:
MOVOU iv0<>(SB), X6
MOVOU iv1<>(SB), X7
MOVO 0(SP), X3
MOVO 0(DI), X3
PADDQ X2, X3
PXOR X3, X7
MOVO X3, 0(SP)
MOVO X3, 0(DI)
PRECOMPUTE(SP, 16, SI, CX)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(SP), 32(SP), 48(SP), 64(SP), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(SP), 32+64(SP), 48+64(SP), 64+64(SP), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(SP), 32+128(SP), 48+128(SP), 64+128(SP), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(SP), 32+192(SP), 48+192(SP), 64+192(SP), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(SP), 32+256(SP), 48+256(SP), 64+256(SP), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(SP), 32+320(SP), 48+320(SP), 64+320(SP), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(SP), 32+384(SP), 48+384(SP), 64+384(SP), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(SP), 32+448(SP), 48+448(SP), 64+448(SP), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(SP), 32+512(SP), 48+512(SP), 64+512(SP), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(SP), 32+576(SP), 48+576(SP), 64+576(SP), X3)
PRECOMPUTE(DI, 16, SI, CX)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(DI), 32(DI), 48(DI), 64(DI), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(DI), 32+64(DI), 48+64(DI), 64+64(DI), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(DI), 32+128(DI), 48+128(DI), 64+128(DI), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(DI), 32+192(DI), 48+192(DI), 64+192(DI), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(DI), 32+256(DI), 48+256(DI), 64+256(DI), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(DI), 32+320(DI), 48+320(DI), 64+320(DI), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(DI), 32+384(DI), 48+384(DI), 64+384(DI), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(DI), 32+448(DI), 48+448(DI), 64+448(DI), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(DI), 32+512(DI), 48+512(DI), 64+512(DI), X3)
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(DI), 32+576(DI), 48+576(DI), 64+576(DI), X3)
PXOR X4, X0
PXOR X5, X1
@@ -347,15 +346,14 @@ loop:
SUBL $64, DX
JNE loop
MOVL 0(SP), CX
MOVL 0(DI), CX
MOVL CX, 0(BX)
MOVL 4(SP), CX
MOVL 4(DI), CX
MOVL CX, 4(BX)
MOVOU X0, 0(AX)
MOVOU X1, 16(AX)
MOVL BP, SP
RET
// func hashBlocksSSSE3(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte)
@@ -366,54 +364,52 @@ TEXT ·hashBlocksSSSE3(SB), 0, $704-24 // frame = 688 + 16 byte alignment
MOVL blocks_base+12(FP), SI
MOVL blocks_len+16(FP), DX
MOVL SP, BP
MOVL SP, DI
ADDL $15, DI
ANDL $~15, DI
MOVL DI, SP
MOVL CX, 8(SP)
MOVL CX, 8(DI)
MOVL 0(BX), CX
MOVL CX, 0(SP)
MOVL CX, 0(DI)
MOVL 4(BX), CX
MOVL CX, 4(SP)
MOVL CX, 4(DI)
XORL CX, CX
MOVL CX, 12(SP)
MOVL CX, 12(DI)
MOVOU 0(AX), X0
MOVOU 16(AX), X1
MOVOU counter<>(SB), X2
loop:
MOVO X0, 656(SP)
MOVO X1, 672(SP)
MOVO X0, 656(DI)
MOVO X1, 672(DI)
MOVO X0, X4
MOVO X1, X5
MOVOU iv0<>(SB), X6
MOVOU iv1<>(SB), X7
MOVO 0(SP), X3
MOVO 0(DI), X3
PADDQ X2, X3
PXOR X3, X7
MOVO X3, 0(SP)
MOVO X3, 0(DI)
MOVOU rol16<>(SB), X0
MOVOU rol8<>(SB), X1
PRECOMPUTE(SP, 16, SI, CX)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(SP), 32(SP), 48(SP), 64(SP), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(SP), 32+64(SP), 48+64(SP), 64+64(SP), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(SP), 32+128(SP), 48+128(SP), 64+128(SP), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(SP), 32+192(SP), 48+192(SP), 64+192(SP), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(SP), 32+256(SP), 48+256(SP), 64+256(SP), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(SP), 32+320(SP), 48+320(SP), 64+320(SP), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(SP), 32+384(SP), 48+384(SP), 64+384(SP), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(SP), 32+448(SP), 48+448(SP), 64+448(SP), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(SP), 32+512(SP), 48+512(SP), 64+512(SP), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(SP), 32+576(SP), 48+576(SP), 64+576(SP), X3, X0, X1)
PRECOMPUTE(DI, 16, SI, CX)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(DI), 32(DI), 48(DI), 64(DI), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(DI), 32+64(DI), 48+64(DI), 64+64(DI), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(DI), 32+128(DI), 48+128(DI), 64+128(DI), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(DI), 32+192(DI), 48+192(DI), 64+192(DI), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(DI), 32+256(DI), 48+256(DI), 64+256(DI), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(DI), 32+320(DI), 48+320(DI), 64+320(DI), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(DI), 32+384(DI), 48+384(DI), 64+384(DI), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(DI), 32+448(DI), 48+448(DI), 64+448(DI), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(DI), 32+512(DI), 48+512(DI), 64+512(DI), X3, X0, X1)
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(DI), 32+576(DI), 48+576(DI), 64+576(DI), X3, X0, X1)
MOVO 656(SP), X0
MOVO 672(SP), X1
MOVO 656(DI), X0
MOVO 672(DI), X1
PXOR X4, X0
PXOR X5, X1
PXOR X6, X0
@@ -423,13 +419,12 @@ loop:
SUBL $64, DX
JNE loop
MOVL 0(SP), CX
MOVL 0(DI), CX
MOVL CX, 0(BX)
MOVL 4(SP), CX
MOVL 4(DI), CX
MOVL CX, 4(BX)
MOVOU X0, 0(AX)
MOVOU X1, 16(AX)
MOVL BP, SP
RET
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build amd64,gc,!purego
package blake2s
+32 -37
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build amd64,gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
@@ -317,30 +318,30 @@ GLOBL counter<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16
MOVL R15, 8*4+off+576(dst)
#define BLAKE2s_SSE2() \
PRECOMPUTE_MSG(SP, 16, SI, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(SP), 32(SP), 48(SP), 64(SP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(SP), 32+64(SP), 48+64(SP), 64+64(SP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(SP), 32+128(SP), 48+128(SP), 64+128(SP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(SP), 32+192(SP), 48+192(SP), 64+192(SP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(SP), 32+256(SP), 48+256(SP), 64+256(SP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(SP), 32+320(SP), 48+320(SP), 64+320(SP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(SP), 32+384(SP), 48+384(SP), 64+384(SP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(SP), 32+448(SP), 48+448(SP), 64+448(SP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(SP), 32+512(SP), 48+512(SP), 64+512(SP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(SP), 32+576(SP), 48+576(SP), 64+576(SP), X8)
PRECOMPUTE_MSG(BP, 16, SI, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(BP), 32(BP), 48(BP), 64(BP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(BP), 32+64(BP), 48+64(BP), 64+64(BP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(BP), 32+128(BP), 48+128(BP), 64+128(BP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(BP), 32+192(BP), 48+192(BP), 64+192(BP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(BP), 32+256(BP), 48+256(BP), 64+256(BP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(BP), 32+320(BP), 48+320(BP), 64+320(BP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(BP), 32+384(BP), 48+384(BP), 64+384(BP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(BP), 32+448(BP), 48+448(BP), 64+448(BP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(BP), 32+512(BP), 48+512(BP), 64+512(BP), X8); \
ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(BP), 32+576(BP), 48+576(BP), 64+576(BP), X8)
#define BLAKE2s_SSSE3() \
PRECOMPUTE_MSG(SP, 16, SI, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(SP), 32(SP), 48(SP), 64(SP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(SP), 32+64(SP), 48+64(SP), 64+64(SP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(SP), 32+128(SP), 48+128(SP), 64+128(SP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(SP), 32+192(SP), 48+192(SP), 64+192(SP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(SP), 32+256(SP), 48+256(SP), 64+256(SP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(SP), 32+320(SP), 48+320(SP), 64+320(SP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(SP), 32+384(SP), 48+384(SP), 64+384(SP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(SP), 32+448(SP), 48+448(SP), 64+448(SP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(SP), 32+512(SP), 48+512(SP), 64+512(SP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(SP), 32+576(SP), 48+576(SP), 64+576(SP), X8, X13, X14)
PRECOMPUTE_MSG(BP, 16, SI, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(BP), 32(BP), 48(BP), 64(BP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(BP), 32+64(BP), 48+64(BP), 64+64(BP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(BP), 32+128(BP), 48+128(BP), 64+128(BP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(BP), 32+192(BP), 48+192(BP), 64+192(BP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(BP), 32+256(BP), 48+256(BP), 64+256(BP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(BP), 32+320(BP), 48+320(BP), 64+320(BP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(BP), 32+384(BP), 48+384(BP), 64+384(BP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(BP), 32+448(BP), 48+448(BP), 64+448(BP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(BP), 32+512(BP), 48+512(BP), 64+512(BP), X8, X13, X14); \
ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(BP), 32+576(BP), 48+576(BP), 64+576(BP), X8, X13, X14)
#define BLAKE2s_SSE4() \
LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 0, 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15); \
@@ -372,16 +373,12 @@ GLOBL counter<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16
MOVQ blocks_len, DX; \
\
MOVQ SP, BP; \
MOVQ SP, R9; \
ADDQ $15, R9; \
ANDQ $~15, R9; \
MOVQ R9, SP; \
ADDQ $15, BP; \
ANDQ $~15, BP; \
\
MOVQ 0(BX), R9; \
MOVQ R9, 0(SP); \
XORQ R9, R9; \
MOVQ R9, 8(SP); \
MOVL CX, 8(SP); \
MOVQ R9, 0(BP); \
MOVQ CX, 8(BP); \
\
MOVOU 0(AX), X0; \
MOVOU 16(AX), X1; \
@@ -391,7 +388,7 @@ GLOBL counter<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16
MOVOU counter<>(SB), X12; \
MOVOU rol16<>(SB), X13; \
MOVOU rol8<>(SB), X14; \
MOVO 0(SP), X15; \
MOVO 0(BP), X15; \
\
loop: \
MOVO X0, X4; \
@@ -413,14 +410,12 @@ GLOBL counter<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16
SUBQ $64, DX; \
JNE loop; \
\
MOVO X15, 0(SP); \
MOVQ 0(SP), R9; \
MOVO X15, 0(BP); \
MOVQ 0(BP), R9; \
MOVQ R9, 0(BX); \
\
MOVOU X0, 0(AX); \
MOVOU X1, 16(AX); \
\
MOVQ BP, SP
MOVOU X1, 16(AX)
// func hashBlocksSSE2(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte)
TEXT ·hashBlocksSSE2(SB), 0, $672-48 // frame = 656 + 16 byte alignment
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !amd64,!386 gccgo appengine
//go:build (!amd64 && !386) || !gc || purego
// +build !amd64,!386 !gc purego
package blake2s
+1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build go1.9
// +build go1.9
package blake2s
+1 -1
View File
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ type G2 struct {
p *twistPoint
}
// RandomG1 returns x and g₂ˣ where x is a random, non-zero number read from r.
// RandomG2 returns x and g₂ˣ where x is a random, non-zero number read from r.
func RandomG2(r io.Reader) (*big.Int, *G2, error) {
var k *big.Int
var err error
+7 -4
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@
// golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305).
package cast5 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/cast5"
import "errors"
import (
"errors"
"math/bits"
)
const BlockSize = 8
const KeySize = 16
@@ -241,19 +244,19 @@ func (c *Cipher) keySchedule(in []byte) {
// These are the three 'f' functions. See RFC 2144, section 2.2.
func f1(d, m uint32, r uint8) uint32 {
t := m + d
I := (t << r) | (t >> (32 - r))
I := bits.RotateLeft32(t, int(r))
return ((sBox[0][I>>24] ^ sBox[1][(I>>16)&0xff]) - sBox[2][(I>>8)&0xff]) + sBox[3][I&0xff]
}
func f2(d, m uint32, r uint8) uint32 {
t := m ^ d
I := (t << r) | (t >> (32 - r))
I := bits.RotateLeft32(t, int(r))
return ((sBox[0][I>>24] - sBox[1][(I>>16)&0xff]) + sBox[2][(I>>8)&0xff]) ^ sBox[3][I&0xff]
}
func f3(d, m uint32, r uint8) uint32 {
t := m - d
I := (t << r) | (t >> (32 - r))
I := bits.RotateLeft32(t, int(r))
return ((sBox[0][I>>24] + sBox[1][(I>>16)&0xff]) ^ sBox[2][(I>>8)&0xff]) - sBox[3][I&0xff]
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.11
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
//go:build go1.11 && gc && !purego
// +build go1.11,gc,!purego
package chacha20
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.11
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
//go:build go1.11 && gc && !purego
// +build go1.11,gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
+89 -55
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"math/bits"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias"
)
const (
@@ -42,10 +42,14 @@ type Cipher struct {
// The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous
// XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are
// computed at a time.
// computed at a time by xorKeyStreamBlocks.
buf [bufSize]byte
len int
// overflow is set when the counter overflowed, no more blocks can be
// generated, and the next XORKeyStream call should panic.
overflow bool
// The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they
// are computed the first time.
precompDone bool
@@ -89,6 +93,7 @@ func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size")
}
key, nonce = key[:KeySize], nonce[:NonceSize] // bounds check elimination hint
c.key = [8]uint32{
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]),
@@ -136,6 +141,36 @@ func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
return a, b, c, d
}
// SetCounter sets the Cipher counter. The next invocation of XORKeyStream will
// behave as if (64 * counter) bytes had been encrypted so far.
//
// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is less
// than the current value.
//
// Note that the execution time of XORKeyStream is not independent of the
// counter value.
func (s *Cipher) SetCounter(counter uint32) {
// Internally, s may buffer multiple blocks, which complicates this
// implementation slightly. When checking whether the counter has rolled
// back, we must use both s.counter and s.len to determine how many blocks
// we have already output.
outputCounter := s.counter - uint32(s.len)/blockSize
if s.overflow || counter < outputCounter {
panic("chacha20: SetCounter attempted to rollback counter")
}
// In the general case, we set the new counter value and reset s.len to 0,
// causing the next call to XORKeyStream to refill the buffer. However, if
// we're advancing within the existing buffer, we can save work by simply
// setting s.len.
if counter < s.counter {
s.len = int(s.counter-counter) * blockSize
} else {
s.counter = counter
s.len = 0
}
}
// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the
// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
//
@@ -154,7 +189,7 @@ func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
panic("chacha20: output smaller than input")
}
dst = dst[:len(src)]
if subtle.InexactOverlap(dst, src) {
if alias.InexactOverlap(dst, src) {
panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap")
}
@@ -169,34 +204,52 @@ func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
dst[i] = src[i] ^ b
}
s.len -= len(keyStream)
src = src[len(keyStream):]
dst = dst[len(keyStream):]
dst, src = dst[len(keyStream):], src[len(keyStream):]
}
if len(src) == 0 {
return
}
const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
numBufs := (uint64(len(src)) + bufSize - 1) / bufSize
if uint64(s.counter)+numBufs*blocksPerBuf >= 1<<32 {
// If we'd need to let the counter overflow and keep generating output,
// panic immediately. If instead we'd only reach the last block, remember
// not to generate any more output after the buffer is drained.
numBlocks := (uint64(len(src)) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
if s.overflow || uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks > 1<<32 {
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
} else if uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks == 1<<32 {
s.overflow = true
}
// xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a
// multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a
// time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize.
rem := len(src) % bufSize
full := len(src) - rem
full := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
if full > 0 {
s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full])
}
dst, src = dst[full:], src[full:]
// If using a multi-block xorKeyStreamBlocks would overflow, use the generic
// one that does one block at a time.
const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
if uint64(s.counter)+blocksPerBuf > 1<<32 {
s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
numBlocks := (len(src) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
buf := s.buf[bufSize-numBlocks*blockSize:]
copy(buf, src)
s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(buf, buf)
s.len = len(buf) - copy(dst, buf)
return
}
// If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and
// keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation.
if rem > 0 {
if len(src) > 0 {
s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
copy(s.buf[:], src[full:])
copy(s.buf[:], src)
s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:])
s.len = bufSize - copy(dst[full:], s.buf[:])
s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, s.buf[:])
}
}
@@ -233,7 +286,9 @@ func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) {
s.precompDone = true
}
for i := 0; i < len(src); i += blockSize {
// A condition of len(src) > 0 would be sufficient, but this also
// acts as a bounds check elimination hint.
for len(src) >= 64 && len(dst) >= 64 {
// The remainder of the first column round.
fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter)
@@ -258,49 +313,28 @@ func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) {
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
}
// Finally, add back the initial state to generate the key stream.
x0 += c0
x1 += c1
x2 += c2
x3 += c3
x4 += c4
x5 += c5
x6 += c6
x7 += c7
x8 += c8
x9 += c9
x10 += c10
x11 += c11
x12 += s.counter
x13 += c13
x14 += c14
x15 += c15
// Add back the initial state to generate the key stream, then
// XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result.
addXor(dst[0:4], src[0:4], x0, c0)
addXor(dst[4:8], src[4:8], x1, c1)
addXor(dst[8:12], src[8:12], x2, c2)
addXor(dst[12:16], src[12:16], x3, c3)
addXor(dst[16:20], src[16:20], x4, c4)
addXor(dst[20:24], src[20:24], x5, c5)
addXor(dst[24:28], src[24:28], x6, c6)
addXor(dst[28:32], src[28:32], x7, c7)
addXor(dst[32:36], src[32:36], x8, c8)
addXor(dst[36:40], src[36:40], x9, c9)
addXor(dst[40:44], src[40:44], x10, c10)
addXor(dst[44:48], src[44:48], x11, c11)
addXor(dst[48:52], src[48:52], x12, s.counter)
addXor(dst[52:56], src[52:56], x13, c13)
addXor(dst[56:60], src[56:60], x14, c14)
addXor(dst[60:64], src[60:64], x15, c15)
s.counter += 1
if s.counter == 0 {
panic("chacha20: internal error: counter overflow")
}
in, out := src[i:], dst[i:]
in, out = in[:blockSize], out[:blockSize] // bounds check elimination hint
// XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result.
xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0)
xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1)
xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2)
xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3)
xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4)
xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5)
xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6)
xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7)
xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8)
xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9)
xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10)
xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11)
xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12)
xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13)
xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14)
xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15)
src, dst = src[blockSize:], dst[blockSize:]
}
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !arm64,!s390x,!ppc64le arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine
//go:build (!arm64 && !s390x && !ppc64le) || (arm64 && !go1.11) || !gc || purego
// +build !arm64,!s390x,!ppc64le arm64,!go1.11 !gc purego
package chacha20
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
//go:build gc && !purego
// +build gc,!purego
package chacha20
+2 -1
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
// The differences in this and the original implementation are
// due to the calling conventions and initialization of constants.
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
//go:build gc && !purego
// +build gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
+3 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
//go:build gc && !purego
// +build gc,!purego
package chacha20
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ const bufSize = 256
// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only
// be called when the vector facility is available. Implementation in asm_s390x.s.
//
//go:noescape
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
//go:build gc && !purego
// +build gc,!purego
#include "go_asm.h"
#include "textflag.h"
+102 -1
View File
@@ -110,6 +110,107 @@ func TestStep(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestSetCounter(t *testing.T) {
newCipher := func() *Cipher {
s, _ := NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
return s
}
s := newCipher()
src := bytes.Repeat([]byte("test"), 32) // two 64-byte blocks
dst1 := make([]byte, len(src))
s.XORKeyStream(dst1, src)
// advance counter to 1 and xor second block
s = newCipher()
s.SetCounter(1)
dst2 := make([]byte, len(src))
s.XORKeyStream(dst2[64:], src[64:])
if !bytes.Equal(dst1[64:], dst2[64:]) {
t.Error("failed to produce identical output using SetCounter")
}
// test again with unaligned blocks; SetCounter should reset the buffer
s = newCipher()
s.XORKeyStream(dst1[:70], src[:70])
s = newCipher()
s.XORKeyStream([]byte{0}, []byte{0})
s.SetCounter(1)
s.XORKeyStream(dst2[64:70], src[64:70])
if !bytes.Equal(dst1[64:70], dst2[64:70]) {
t.Error("SetCounter did not reset buffer")
}
// advancing to a lower counter value should cause a panic
panics := func(fn func()) (p bool) {
defer func() { p = recover() != nil }()
fn()
return
}
if !panics(func() { s.SetCounter(0) }) {
t.Error("counter decreasing should trigger a panic")
}
}
func TestLastBlock(t *testing.T) {
panics := func(fn func()) (p bool) {
defer func() { p = recover() != nil }()
fn()
return
}
checkLastBlock := func(b []byte) {
t.Helper()
// Hardcoded result to check all implementations generate the same output.
lastBlock := "ace4cd09e294d1912d4ad205d06f95d9c2f2bfcf453e8753f128765b62215f4d" +
"92c74f2f626c6a640c0b1284d839ec81f1696281dafc3e684593937023b58b1d"
if got := hex.EncodeToString(b); got != lastBlock {
t.Errorf("wrong output for the last block, got %q, want %q", got, lastBlock)
}
}
// setting the counter to 0xffffffff and crypting multiple blocks should
// trigger a panic
s, _ := NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
s.SetCounter(0xffffffff)
blocks := make([]byte, blockSize*2)
if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(blocks, blocks) }) {
t.Error("crypting multiple blocks should trigger a panic")
}
// setting the counter to 0xffffffff - 1 and crypting two blocks should not
// trigger a panic
s, _ = NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
s.SetCounter(0xffffffff - 1)
if panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(blocks, blocks) }) {
t.Error("crypting the last blocks should not trigger a panic")
}
checkLastBlock(blocks[blockSize:])
// once all the keystream is spent, setting the counter should panic
if !panics(func() { s.SetCounter(0xffffffff) }) {
t.Error("setting the counter after overflow should trigger a panic")
}
// crypting a subsequent block *should* panic
block := make([]byte, blockSize)
if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block, block) }) {
t.Error("crypting after overflow should trigger a panic")
}
// if we crypt less than a full block, we should be able to crypt the rest
// in a subsequent call without panicking
s, _ = NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
s.SetCounter(0xffffffff)
if panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block[:7], block[:7]) }) {
t.Error("crypting part of the last block should not trigger a panic")
}
if panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block[7:], block[7:]) }) {
t.Error("crypting part of the last block should not trigger a panic")
}
checkLastBlock(block)
// as before, a third call should trigger a panic because all keystream is spent
if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block[:1], block[:1]) }) {
t.Error("crypting after overflow should trigger a panic")
}
}
func benchmarkChaCha20(b *testing.B, step, count int) {
tot := step * count
src := make([]byte, tot)
@@ -137,7 +238,7 @@ func BenchmarkChaCha20(b *testing.B) {
benchmarkChaCha20(b, 10, 25)
})
b.Run("4096", func(b *testing.B) {
benchmarkChaCha20(b, 256, 1)
benchmarkChaCha20(b, 4096, 1)
})
b.Run("100x40", func(b *testing.B) {
benchmarkChaCha20(b, 100, 40)
+9 -8
View File
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "s390x"
// xor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with u and
// addXor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with (a + b) and
// places the result in little endian byte order in dst.
func xor(dst, src []byte, u uint32) {
_, _ = src[3], dst[3] // eliminate bounds checks
func addXor(dst, src []byte, a, b uint32) {
_, _ = src[3], dst[3] // bounds check elimination hint
if unaligned {
// The compiler should optimize this code into
// 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores.
@@ -27,15 +27,16 @@ func xor(dst, src []byte, u uint32) {
v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8
v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16
v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24
v ^= u
v ^= a + b
dst[0] = byte(v)
dst[1] = byte(v >> 8)
dst[2] = byte(v >> 16)
dst[3] = byte(v >> 24)
} else {
dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(u)
dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(u>>8)
dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(u>>16)
dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(u>>24)
a += b
dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(a)
dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(a>>8)
dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(a>>16)
dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(a>>24)
}
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ const (
// NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20-Poly1305
// variant of this AEAD, in bytes.
NonceSizeX = 24
// Overhead is the size of the Poly1305 authentication tag, and the
// difference between a ciphertext length and its plaintext.
Overhead = 16
)
type chacha20poly1305 struct {
@@ -47,7 +51,7 @@ func (c *chacha20poly1305) NonceSize() int {
}
func (c *chacha20poly1305) Overhead() int {
return 16
return Overhead
}
func (c *chacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
+5 -4
View File
@@ -2,14 +2,15 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.7,amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build gc && !purego
// +build gc,!purego
package chacha20poly1305
import (
"encoding/binary"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias"
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
)
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ func (c *chacha20poly1305) seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []
setupState(&state, &c.key, nonce)
ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+16)
if subtle.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) {
if alias.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) {
panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap")
}
chacha20Poly1305Seal(out[:], state[:], plaintext, additionalData)
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ func (c *chacha20poly1305) open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) (
ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-16]
ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
if subtle.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
if alias.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap")
}
if !chacha20Poly1305Open(out, state[:], ciphertext, additionalData) {
+2 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
// This file was originally from https://golang.org/cl/24717 by Vlad Krasnov of CloudFlare.
// +build go1.7,amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
//go:build gc && !purego
// +build gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
// General register allocation
+36 -28
View File
@@ -8,60 +8,68 @@ import (
"encoding/binary"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
"golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305"
)
func roundTo16(n int) int {
return 16 * ((n + 15) / 16)
func writeWithPadding(p *poly1305.MAC, b []byte) {
p.Write(b)
if rem := len(b) % 16; rem != 0 {
var buf [16]byte
padLen := 16 - rem
p.Write(buf[:padLen])
}
}
func writeUint64(p *poly1305.MAC, n int) {
var buf [8]byte
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], uint64(n))
p.Write(buf[:])
}
func (c *chacha20poly1305) sealGeneric(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+poly1305.TagSize)
if subtle.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) {
ciphertext, tag := out[:len(plaintext)], out[len(plaintext):]
if alias.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) {
panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap")
}
var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte
var polyKey [32]byte
s, _ := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.key[:], nonce)
s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes
s.XORKeyStream(out, plaintext)
s.SetCounter(1) // set the counter to 1, skipping 32 bytes
s.XORKeyStream(ciphertext, plaintext)
polyInput := make([]byte, roundTo16(len(additionalData))+roundTo16(len(plaintext))+8+8)
copy(polyInput, additionalData)
copy(polyInput[roundTo16(len(additionalData)):], out[:len(plaintext)])
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(polyInput[len(polyInput)-16:], uint64(len(additionalData)))
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(polyInput[len(polyInput)-8:], uint64(len(plaintext)))
var tag [poly1305.TagSize]byte
poly1305.Sum(&tag, polyInput, &polyKey)
copy(out[len(plaintext):], tag[:])
p := poly1305.New(&polyKey)
writeWithPadding(p, additionalData)
writeWithPadding(p, ciphertext)
writeUint64(p, len(additionalData))
writeUint64(p, len(plaintext))
p.Sum(tag[:0])
return ret
}
func (c *chacha20poly1305) openGeneric(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var tag [poly1305.TagSize]byte
copy(tag[:], ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-16:])
tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-16:]
ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-16]
var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte
var polyKey [32]byte
s, _ := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.key[:], nonce)
s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes
s.SetCounter(1) // set the counter to 1, skipping 32 bytes
polyInput := make([]byte, roundTo16(len(additionalData))+roundTo16(len(ciphertext))+8+8)
copy(polyInput, additionalData)
copy(polyInput[roundTo16(len(additionalData)):], ciphertext)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(polyInput[len(polyInput)-16:], uint64(len(additionalData)))
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(polyInput[len(polyInput)-8:], uint64(len(ciphertext)))
p := poly1305.New(&polyKey)
writeWithPadding(p, additionalData)
writeWithPadding(p, ciphertext)
writeUint64(p, len(additionalData))
writeUint64(p, len(ciphertext))
ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
if subtle.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
if alias.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap")
}
if !poly1305.Verify(&tag, polyInput, &polyKey) {
if !p.Verify(tag) {
for i := range out {
out[i] = 0
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !amd64 !go1.7 gccgo appengine
//go:build !amd64 || !gc || purego
// +build !amd64 !gc purego
package chacha20poly1305
+32 -19
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
cryptorand "crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"log"
mathrand "math/rand"
"strconv"
"testing"
@@ -220,36 +219,50 @@ func BenchmarkChacha20Poly1305(b *testing.B) {
}
}
var key = make([]byte, KeySize)
func ExampleNewX() {
aead, err := NewX(key)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalln("Failed to instantiate XChaCha20-Poly1305:", err)
// key should be randomly generated or derived from a function like Argon2.
key := make([]byte, KeySize)
if _, err := cryptorand.Read(key); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
for _, msg := range []string{
"Attack at dawn.",
"The eagle has landed.",
"Gophers, gophers, gophers everywhere!",
} {
// Encryption.
nonce := make([]byte, NonceSizeX)
aead, err := NewX(key)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
// Encryption.
var encryptedMsg []byte
{
msg := []byte("Gophers, gophers, gophers everywhere!")
// Select a random nonce, and leave capacity for the ciphertext.
nonce := make([]byte, aead.NonceSize(), aead.NonceSize()+len(msg)+aead.Overhead())
if _, err := cryptorand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
ciphertext := aead.Seal(nil, nonce, []byte(msg), nil)
// Decryption.
// Encrypt the message and append the ciphertext to the nonce.
encryptedMsg = aead.Seal(nonce, nonce, msg, nil)
}
// Decryption.
{
if len(encryptedMsg) < aead.NonceSize() {
panic("ciphertext too short")
}
// Split nonce and ciphertext.
nonce, ciphertext := encryptedMsg[:aead.NonceSize()], encryptedMsg[aead.NonceSize():]
// Decrypt the message and check it wasn't tampered with.
plaintext, err := aead.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalln("Failed to decrypt or authenticate message:", err)
panic(err)
}
fmt.Printf("%s\n", plaintext)
}
// Output: Attack at dawn.
// The eagle has landed.
// Gophers, gophers, gophers everywhere!
// Output: Gophers, gophers, gophers everywhere!
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func (*xchacha20poly1305) NonceSize() int {
}
func (*xchacha20poly1305) Overhead() int {
return 16
return Overhead
}
func (x *xchacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
+104 -40
View File
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func (b *Builder) AddASN1BigInt(n *big.Int) {
for i := range bytes {
bytes[i] ^= 0xff
}
if bytes[0]&0x80 == 0 {
if len(bytes) == 0 || bytes[0]&0x80 == 0 {
c.add(0xff)
}
c.add(bytes...)
@@ -117,6 +117,19 @@ func (b *Builder) AddASN1GeneralizedTime(t time.Time) {
})
}
// AddASN1UTCTime appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 UTCTime.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1UTCTime(t time.Time) {
b.AddASN1(asn1.UTCTime, func(c *Builder) {
// As utilized by the X.509 profile, UTCTime can only
// represent the years 1950 through 2049.
if t.Year() < 1950 || t.Year() >= 2050 {
b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: cannot represent %v as a UTCTime", t)
return
}
c.AddBytes([]byte(t.Format(defaultUTCTimeFormatStr)))
})
}
// AddASN1BitString appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 BIT STRING. This does not
// support BIT STRINGs that are not a whole number of bytes.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1BitString(data []byte) {
@@ -230,12 +243,12 @@ func (b *Builder) AddASN1(tag asn1.Tag, f BuilderContinuation) {
// String
// ReadASN1Boolean decodes an ASN.1 INTEGER and converts it to a boolean
// ReadASN1Boolean decodes an ASN.1 BOOLEAN and converts it to a boolean
// representation into out and advances. It reports whether the read
// was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1Boolean(out *bool) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || len(bytes) != 1 {
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.BOOLEAN) || len(bytes) != 1 {
return false
}
@@ -251,36 +264,35 @@ func (s *String) ReadASN1Boolean(out *bool) bool {
return true
}
var bigIntType = reflect.TypeOf((*big.Int)(nil)).Elem()
// ReadASN1Integer decodes an ASN.1 INTEGER into out and advances. If out does
// not point to an integer or to a big.Int, it panics. It reports whether the
// read was successful.
// not point to an integer, to a big.Int, or to a []byte it panics. Only
// positive and zero values can be decoded into []byte, and they are returned as
// big-endian binary values that share memory with s. Positive values will have
// no leading zeroes, and zero will be returned as a single zero byte.
// ReadASN1Integer reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1Integer(out interface{}) bool {
if reflect.TypeOf(out).Kind() != reflect.Ptr {
panic("out is not a pointer")
}
switch reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().Kind() {
case reflect.Int, reflect.Int8, reflect.Int16, reflect.Int32, reflect.Int64:
switch out := out.(type) {
case *int, *int8, *int16, *int32, *int64:
var i int64
if !s.readASN1Int64(&i) || reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().OverflowInt(i) {
return false
}
reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().SetInt(i)
return true
case reflect.Uint, reflect.Uint8, reflect.Uint16, reflect.Uint32, reflect.Uint64:
case *uint, *uint8, *uint16, *uint32, *uint64:
var u uint64
if !s.readASN1Uint64(&u) || reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().OverflowUint(u) {
return false
}
reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().SetUint(u)
return true
case reflect.Struct:
if reflect.TypeOf(out).Elem() == bigIntType {
return s.readASN1BigInt(out.(*big.Int))
}
case *big.Int:
return s.readASN1BigInt(out)
case *[]byte:
return s.readASN1Bytes(out)
default:
panic("out does not point to an integer type")
}
panic("out does not point to an integer type")
}
func checkASN1Integer(bytes []byte) bool {
@@ -320,6 +332,21 @@ func (s *String) readASN1BigInt(out *big.Int) bool {
return true
}
func (s *String) readASN1Bytes(out *[]byte) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) {
return false
}
if bytes[0]&0x80 == 0x80 {
return false
}
for len(bytes) > 1 && bytes[0] == 0 {
bytes = bytes[1:]
}
*out = bytes
return true
}
func (s *String) readASN1Int64(out *int64) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) || !asn1Signed(out, bytes) {
@@ -394,7 +421,12 @@ func (s *String) ReadASN1Enum(out *int) bool {
func (s *String) readBase128Int(out *int) bool {
ret := 0
for i := 0; len(*s) > 0; i++ {
if i == 4 {
if i == 5 {
return false
}
// Avoid overflowing int on a 32-bit platform.
// We don't want different behavior based on the architecture.
if ret >= 1<<(31-7) {
return false
}
ret <<= 7
@@ -466,6 +498,45 @@ func (s *String) ReadASN1GeneralizedTime(out *time.Time) bool {
return true
}
const defaultUTCTimeFormatStr = "060102150405Z0700"
// ReadASN1UTCTime decodes an ASN.1 UTCTime into out and advances.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1UTCTime(out *time.Time) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.UTCTime) {
return false
}
t := string(bytes)
formatStr := defaultUTCTimeFormatStr
var err error
res, err := time.Parse(formatStr, t)
if err != nil {
// Fallback to minute precision if we can't parse second
// precision. If we are following X.509 or X.690 we shouldn't
// support this, but we do.
formatStr = "0601021504Z0700"
res, err = time.Parse(formatStr, t)
}
if err != nil {
return false
}
if serialized := res.Format(formatStr); serialized != t {
return false
}
if res.Year() >= 2050 {
// UTCTime interprets the low order digits 50-99 as 1950-99.
// This only applies to its use in the X.509 profile.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.5.1
res = res.AddDate(-100, 0, 0)
}
*out = res
return true
}
// ReadASN1BitString decodes an ASN.1 BIT STRING into out and advances.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1BitString(out *encoding_asn1.BitString) bool {
@@ -475,7 +546,7 @@ func (s *String) ReadASN1BitString(out *encoding_asn1.BitString) bool {
return false
}
paddingBits := uint8(bytes[0])
paddingBits := bytes[0]
bytes = bytes[1:]
if paddingBits > 7 ||
len(bytes) == 0 && paddingBits != 0 ||
@@ -488,7 +559,7 @@ func (s *String) ReadASN1BitString(out *encoding_asn1.BitString) bool {
return true
}
// ReadASN1BitString decodes an ASN.1 BIT STRING into out and advances. It is
// ReadASN1BitStringAsBytes decodes an ASN.1 BIT STRING into out and advances. It is
// an error if the BIT STRING is not a whole number of bytes. It reports
// whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1BitStringAsBytes(out *[]byte) bool {
@@ -497,7 +568,7 @@ func (s *String) ReadASN1BitStringAsBytes(out *[]byte) bool {
return false
}
paddingBits := uint8(bytes[0])
paddingBits := bytes[0]
if paddingBits != 0 {
return false
}
@@ -597,34 +668,27 @@ func (s *String) SkipOptionalASN1(tag asn1.Tag) bool {
return s.ReadASN1(&unused, tag)
}
// ReadOptionalASN1Integer attempts to read an optional ASN.1 INTEGER
// explicitly tagged with tag into out and advances. If no element with a
// matching tag is present, it writes defaultValue into out instead. If out
// does not point to an integer or to a big.Int, it panics. It reports
// whether the read was successful.
// ReadOptionalASN1Integer attempts to read an optional ASN.1 INTEGER explicitly
// tagged with tag into out and advances. If no element with a matching tag is
// present, it writes defaultValue into out instead. Otherwise, it behaves like
// ReadASN1Integer.
func (s *String) ReadOptionalASN1Integer(out interface{}, tag asn1.Tag, defaultValue interface{}) bool {
if reflect.TypeOf(out).Kind() != reflect.Ptr {
panic("out is not a pointer")
}
var present bool
var i String
if !s.ReadOptionalASN1(&i, &present, tag) {
return false
}
if !present {
switch reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().Kind() {
case reflect.Int, reflect.Int8, reflect.Int16, reflect.Int32, reflect.Int64,
reflect.Uint, reflect.Uint8, reflect.Uint16, reflect.Uint32, reflect.Uint64:
switch out.(type) {
case *int, *int8, *int16, *int32, *int64,
*uint, *uint8, *uint16, *uint32, *uint64, *[]byte:
reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().Set(reflect.ValueOf(defaultValue))
case reflect.Struct:
if reflect.TypeOf(out).Elem() != bigIntType {
panic("invalid integer type")
}
if reflect.TypeOf(defaultValue).Kind() != reflect.Ptr ||
reflect.TypeOf(defaultValue).Elem() != bigIntType {
case *big.Int:
if defaultValue, ok := defaultValue.(*big.Int); ok {
out.(*big.Int).Set(defaultValue)
} else {
panic("out points to big.Int, but defaultValue does not")
}
out.(*big.Int).Set(defaultValue.(*big.Int))
default:
panic("invalid integer type")
}
+97
View File
@@ -154,6 +154,32 @@ func TestReadASN1IntegerSigned(t *testing.T) {
}
})
// Repeat the same cases, reading into a []byte.
t.Run("bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
for i, test := range testData64 {
in := String(test.in)
var out []byte
ok := in.ReadASN1Integer(&out)
if test.out < 0 {
if ok {
t.Errorf("#%d: in.ReadASN1Integer(%d) = %v, want false", i, test.out, ok)
}
continue
}
if !ok {
t.Errorf("#%d: in.ReadASN1Integer() = %v, want true", i, ok)
continue
}
n := new(big.Int).SetBytes(out).Int64()
if n != test.out {
t.Errorf("#%d: in.ReadASN1Integer() = %v, want true; out = %x, want %d", i, ok, out, test.out)
}
if out[0] == 0 && len(out) > 1 {
t.Errorf("#%d: in.ReadASN1Integer() = %v; out = %x, has leading zeroes", i, ok, out)
}
}
})
// Repeat with the implicit-tagging functions
t.Run("WithTag", func(t *testing.T) {
for i, test := range testData64 {
@@ -247,6 +273,9 @@ func TestASN1ObjectIdentifier(t *testing.T) {
{[]byte{6, 4, 85, 0x02, 0xc0, 0x00}, true, []int{2, 5, 2, 0x2000}},
{[]byte{6, 3, 0x81, 0x34, 0x03}, true, []int{2, 100, 3}},
{[]byte{6, 7, 85, 0x02, 0xc0, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80}, false, []int{}},
{[]byte{6, 7, 85, 0x02, 0x85, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0xfb, 0x01}, true, []int{2, 5, 2, 1492336001}},
{[]byte{6, 7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x87, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f}, true, []int{2, 5, 2, 2147483647}}, // 2**31-1
{[]byte{6, 7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x88, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x00}, false, []int{}}, // 2**31
}
for i, test := range testData {
@@ -311,6 +340,37 @@ func TestReadASN1GeneralizedTime(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestReadASN1UTCTime(t *testing.T) {
testData := []struct {
in string
ok bool
out time.Time
}{
{"000102030405Z", true, time.Date(2000, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 0, time.UTC)},
{"500102030405Z", true, time.Date(1950, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 0, time.UTC)},
{"490102030405Z", true, time.Date(2049, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 0, time.UTC)},
{"990102030405Z", true, time.Date(1999, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 0, time.UTC)},
{"250102030405Z", true, time.Date(2025, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 0, time.UTC)},
{"750102030405Z", true, time.Date(1975, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 0, time.UTC)},
{"000102030405+0905", true, time.Date(2000, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 0, time.FixedZone("", 9*60*60+5*60))},
{"000102030405-0905", true, time.Date(2000, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 0, time.FixedZone("", -9*60*60-5*60))},
{"0001020304Z", true, time.Date(2000, 01, 02, 03, 04, 0, 0, time.UTC)},
{"5001020304Z", true, time.Date(1950, 01, 02, 03, 04, 00, 0, time.UTC)},
{"0001020304+0905", true, time.Date(2000, 01, 02, 03, 04, 0, 0, time.FixedZone("", 9*60*60+5*60))},
{"0001020304-0905", true, time.Date(2000, 01, 02, 03, 04, 0, 0, time.FixedZone("", -9*60*60-5*60))},
{"000102030405Z0700", false, time.Time{}},
{"000102030405", false, time.Time{}},
}
for i, test := range testData {
in := String(append([]byte{byte(asn1.UTCTime), byte(len(test.in))}, test.in...))
var out time.Time
ok := in.ReadASN1UTCTime(&out)
if ok != test.ok || ok && !reflect.DeepEqual(out, test.out) {
t.Errorf("#%d: in.ReadASN1UTCTime() = %v, want %v; out = %q, want %q", i, ok, test.ok, out, test.out)
}
}
}
func TestReadASN1BitString(t *testing.T) {
testData := []struct {
in []byte
@@ -335,3 +395,40 @@ func TestReadASN1BitString(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
func TestAddASN1BigInt(t *testing.T) {
x := big.NewInt(-1)
var b Builder
b.AddASN1BigInt(x)
got, err := b.Bytes()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error adding -1: %v", err)
}
s := String(got)
var y big.Int
ok := s.ReadASN1Integer(&y)
if !ok || x.Cmp(&y) != 0 {
t.Errorf("unexpected bytes %v, want %v", &y, x)
}
}
func TestReadASN1Boolean(t *testing.T) {
testData := []struct {
in []byte
ok bool
out bool
}{
{[]byte{}, false, false},
{[]byte{0x01, 0x01, 0x00}, true, false},
{[]byte{0x01, 0x01, 0xff}, true, true},
{[]byte{0x01, 0x01, 0x01}, false, false},
}
for i, test := range testData {
in := String(test.in)
var out bool
ok := in.ReadASN1Boolean(&out)
if ok != test.ok || ok && (out != test.out) {
t.Errorf("#%d: in.ReadASN1Boolean() = %v, want %v; out = %v, want %v", i, ok, test.ok, out, test.out)
}
}
}
+18 -10
View File
@@ -95,6 +95,11 @@ func (b *Builder) AddUint32(v uint32) {
b.add(byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v))
}
// AddUint64 appends a big-endian, 64-bit value to the byte string.
func (b *Builder) AddUint64(v uint64) {
b.add(byte(v>>56), byte(v>>48), byte(v>>40), byte(v>>32), byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v))
}
// AddBytes appends a sequence of bytes to the byte string.
func (b *Builder) AddBytes(v []byte) {
b.add(v...)
@@ -106,13 +111,13 @@ func (b *Builder) AddBytes(v []byte) {
// supplied to them. The child builder passed to the continuation can be used
// to build the content of the length-prefixed sequence. For example:
//
// parent := cryptobyte.NewBuilder()
// parent.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func (child *Builder) {
// child.AddUint8(42)
// child.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func (grandchild *Builder) {
// grandchild.AddUint8(5)
// })
// })
// parent := cryptobyte.NewBuilder()
// parent.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func (child *Builder) {
// child.AddUint8(42)
// child.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func (grandchild *Builder) {
// grandchild.AddUint8(5)
// })
// })
//
// It is an error to write more bytes to the child than allowed by the reserved
// length prefix. After the continuation returns, the child must be considered
@@ -298,9 +303,9 @@ func (b *Builder) add(bytes ...byte) {
b.result = append(b.result, bytes...)
}
// Unwrite rolls back n bytes written directly to the Builder. An attempt by a
// child builder passed to a continuation to unwrite bytes from its parent will
// panic.
// Unwrite rolls back non-negative n bytes written directly to the Builder.
// An attempt by a child builder passed to a continuation to unwrite bytes
// from its parent will panic.
func (b *Builder) Unwrite(n int) {
if b.err != nil {
return
@@ -312,6 +317,9 @@ func (b *Builder) Unwrite(n int) {
if length < 0 {
panic("cryptobyte: internal error")
}
if n < 0 {
panic("cryptobyte: attempted to unwrite negative number of bytes")
}
if n > length {
panic("cryptobyte: attempted to unwrite more than was written")
}
+22 -2
View File
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ func TestUint24(t *testing.T) {
var s String = b.BytesOrPanic()
var v uint32
if !s.ReadUint24(&v) {
t.Error("ReadUint8() = false, want true")
t.Error("ReadUint24() = false, want true")
}
if v != 0xfffefd {
t.Errorf("v = %d, want fffefd", v)
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ func TestUint32(t *testing.T) {
var s String = b.BytesOrPanic()
var v uint32
if !s.ReadUint32(&v) {
t.Error("ReadUint8() = false, want true")
t.Error("ReadUint32() = false, want true")
}
if v != 0xfffefdfc {
t.Errorf("v = %x, want fffefdfc", v)
@@ -179,6 +179,26 @@ func TestUint32(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestUint64(t *testing.T) {
var b Builder
b.AddUint64(0xf2fefefcff3cfdfc)
if err := builderBytesEq(&b, 242, 254, 254, 252, 255, 60, 253, 252); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
var s String = b.BytesOrPanic()
var v uint64
if !s.ReadUint64(&v) {
t.Error("ReadUint64() = false, want true")
}
if v != 0xf2fefefcff3cfdfc {
t.Errorf("v = %x, want f2fefefcff3cfdfc", v)
}
if len(s) != 0 {
t.Errorf("len(s) = %d, want 0", len(s))
}
}
func TestUMultiple(t *testing.T) {
var b Builder
b.AddUint8(23)
+11
View File
@@ -81,6 +81,17 @@ func (s *String) ReadUint32(out *uint32) bool {
return true
}
// ReadUint64 decodes a big-endian, 64-bit value into out and advances over it.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint64(out *uint64) bool {
v := s.read(8)
if v == nil {
return false
}
*out = uint64(v[0])<<56 | uint64(v[1])<<48 | uint64(v[2])<<40 | uint64(v[3])<<32 | uint64(v[4])<<24 | uint64(v[5])<<16 | uint64(v[6])<<8 | uint64(v[7])
return true
}
func (s *String) readUnsigned(out *uint32, length int) bool {
v := s.read(length)
if v == nil {
+56 -5
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,10 @@ package curve25519 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
import (
"crypto/subtle"
"fmt"
"errors"
"strconv"
"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field"
)
// ScalarMult sets dst to the product scalar * point.
@@ -18,7 +21,55 @@ import (
// zeroes, irrespective of the scalar. Instead, use the X25519 function, which
// will return an error.
func ScalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) {
scalarMult(dst, scalar, point)
var e [32]byte
copy(e[:], scalar[:])
e[0] &= 248
e[31] &= 127
e[31] |= 64
var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 field.Element
x1.SetBytes(point[:])
x2.One()
x3.Set(&x1)
z3.One()
swap := 0
for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- {
b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7)
b &= 1
swap ^= int(b)
x2.Swap(&x3, swap)
z2.Swap(&z3, swap)
swap = int(b)
tmp0.Subtract(&x3, &z3)
tmp1.Subtract(&x2, &z2)
x2.Add(&x2, &z2)
z2.Add(&x3, &z3)
z3.Multiply(&tmp0, &x2)
z2.Multiply(&z2, &tmp1)
tmp0.Square(&tmp1)
tmp1.Square(&x2)
x3.Add(&z3, &z2)
z2.Subtract(&z3, &z2)
x2.Multiply(&tmp1, &tmp0)
tmp1.Subtract(&tmp1, &tmp0)
z2.Square(&z2)
z3.Mult32(&tmp1, 121666)
x3.Square(&x3)
tmp0.Add(&tmp0, &z3)
z3.Multiply(&x1, &z2)
z2.Multiply(&tmp1, &tmp0)
}
x2.Swap(&x3, swap)
z2.Swap(&z3, swap)
z2.Invert(&z2)
x2.Multiply(&x2, &z2)
copy(dst[:], x2.Bytes())
}
// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product scalar * base where base is the
@@ -74,10 +125,10 @@ func X25519(scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) {
func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var in [32]byte
if l := len(scalar); l != 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad scalar length: %d, expected %d", l, 32)
return nil, errors.New("bad scalar length: " + strconv.Itoa(l) + ", expected 32")
}
if l := len(point); l != 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad point length: %d, expected %d", l, 32)
return nil, errors.New("bad point length: " + strconv.Itoa(l) + ", expected 32")
}
copy(in[:], scalar)
if &point[0] == &Basepoint[0] {
@@ -88,7 +139,7 @@ func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) {
copy(base[:], point)
ScalarMult(dst, &in, &base)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(dst[:], zero[:]) == 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad input point: low order point")
return nil, errors.New("bad input point: low order point")
}
}
return dst[:], nil
-240
View File
@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine,!purego
package curve25519
// These functions are implemented in the .s files. The names of the functions
// in the rest of the file are also taken from the SUPERCOP sources to help
// people following along.
//go:noescape
func cswap(inout *[5]uint64, v uint64)
//go:noescape
func ladderstep(inout *[5][5]uint64)
//go:noescape
func freeze(inout *[5]uint64)
//go:noescape
func mul(dest, a, b *[5]uint64)
//go:noescape
func square(out, in *[5]uint64)
// mladder uses a Montgomery ladder to calculate (xr/zr) *= s.
func mladder(xr, zr *[5]uint64, s *[32]byte) {
var work [5][5]uint64
work[0] = *xr
setint(&work[1], 1)
setint(&work[2], 0)
work[3] = *xr
setint(&work[4], 1)
j := uint(6)
var prevbit byte
for i := 31; i >= 0; i-- {
for j < 8 {
bit := ((*s)[i] >> j) & 1
swap := bit ^ prevbit
prevbit = bit
cswap(&work[1], uint64(swap))
ladderstep(&work)
j--
}
j = 7
}
*xr = work[1]
*zr = work[2]
}
func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) {
var e [32]byte
copy(e[:], (*in)[:])
e[0] &= 248
e[31] &= 127
e[31] |= 64
var t, z [5]uint64
unpack(&t, base)
mladder(&t, &z, &e)
invert(&z, &z)
mul(&t, &t, &z)
pack(out, &t)
}
func setint(r *[5]uint64, v uint64) {
r[0] = v
r[1] = 0
r[2] = 0
r[3] = 0
r[4] = 0
}
// unpack sets r = x where r consists of 5, 51-bit limbs in little-endian
// order.
func unpack(r *[5]uint64, x *[32]byte) {
r[0] = uint64(x[0]) |
uint64(x[1])<<8 |
uint64(x[2])<<16 |
uint64(x[3])<<24 |
uint64(x[4])<<32 |
uint64(x[5])<<40 |
uint64(x[6]&7)<<48
r[1] = uint64(x[6])>>3 |
uint64(x[7])<<5 |
uint64(x[8])<<13 |
uint64(x[9])<<21 |
uint64(x[10])<<29 |
uint64(x[11])<<37 |
uint64(x[12]&63)<<45
r[2] = uint64(x[12])>>6 |
uint64(x[13])<<2 |
uint64(x[14])<<10 |
uint64(x[15])<<18 |
uint64(x[16])<<26 |
uint64(x[17])<<34 |
uint64(x[18])<<42 |
uint64(x[19]&1)<<50
r[3] = uint64(x[19])>>1 |
uint64(x[20])<<7 |
uint64(x[21])<<15 |
uint64(x[22])<<23 |
uint64(x[23])<<31 |
uint64(x[24])<<39 |
uint64(x[25]&15)<<47
r[4] = uint64(x[25])>>4 |
uint64(x[26])<<4 |
uint64(x[27])<<12 |
uint64(x[28])<<20 |
uint64(x[29])<<28 |
uint64(x[30])<<36 |
uint64(x[31]&127)<<44
}
// pack sets out = x where out is the usual, little-endian form of the 5,
// 51-bit limbs in x.
func pack(out *[32]byte, x *[5]uint64) {
t := *x
freeze(&t)
out[0] = byte(t[0])
out[1] = byte(t[0] >> 8)
out[2] = byte(t[0] >> 16)
out[3] = byte(t[0] >> 24)
out[4] = byte(t[0] >> 32)
out[5] = byte(t[0] >> 40)
out[6] = byte(t[0] >> 48)
out[6] ^= byte(t[1]<<3) & 0xf8
out[7] = byte(t[1] >> 5)
out[8] = byte(t[1] >> 13)
out[9] = byte(t[1] >> 21)
out[10] = byte(t[1] >> 29)
out[11] = byte(t[1] >> 37)
out[12] = byte(t[1] >> 45)
out[12] ^= byte(t[2]<<6) & 0xc0
out[13] = byte(t[2] >> 2)
out[14] = byte(t[2] >> 10)
out[15] = byte(t[2] >> 18)
out[16] = byte(t[2] >> 26)
out[17] = byte(t[2] >> 34)
out[18] = byte(t[2] >> 42)
out[19] = byte(t[2] >> 50)
out[19] ^= byte(t[3]<<1) & 0xfe
out[20] = byte(t[3] >> 7)
out[21] = byte(t[3] >> 15)
out[22] = byte(t[3] >> 23)
out[23] = byte(t[3] >> 31)
out[24] = byte(t[3] >> 39)
out[25] = byte(t[3] >> 47)
out[25] ^= byte(t[4]<<4) & 0xf0
out[26] = byte(t[4] >> 4)
out[27] = byte(t[4] >> 12)
out[28] = byte(t[4] >> 20)
out[29] = byte(t[4] >> 28)
out[30] = byte(t[4] >> 36)
out[31] = byte(t[4] >> 44)
}
// invert calculates r = x^-1 mod p using Fermat's little theorem.
func invert(r *[5]uint64, x *[5]uint64) {
var z2, z9, z11, z2_5_0, z2_10_0, z2_20_0, z2_50_0, z2_100_0, t [5]uint64
square(&z2, x) /* 2 */
square(&t, &z2) /* 4 */
square(&t, &t) /* 8 */
mul(&z9, &t, x) /* 9 */
mul(&z11, &z9, &z2) /* 11 */
square(&t, &z11) /* 22 */
mul(&z2_5_0, &t, &z9) /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */
square(&t, &z2_5_0) /* 2^6 - 2^1 */
for i := 1; i < 5; i++ { /* 2^20 - 2^10 */
square(&t, &t)
}
mul(&z2_10_0, &t, &z2_5_0) /* 2^10 - 2^0 */
square(&t, &z2_10_0) /* 2^11 - 2^1 */
for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { /* 2^20 - 2^10 */
square(&t, &t)
}
mul(&z2_20_0, &t, &z2_10_0) /* 2^20 - 2^0 */
square(&t, &z2_20_0) /* 2^21 - 2^1 */
for i := 1; i < 20; i++ { /* 2^40 - 2^20 */
square(&t, &t)
}
mul(&t, &t, &z2_20_0) /* 2^40 - 2^0 */
square(&t, &t) /* 2^41 - 2^1 */
for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { /* 2^50 - 2^10 */
square(&t, &t)
}
mul(&z2_50_0, &t, &z2_10_0) /* 2^50 - 2^0 */
square(&t, &z2_50_0) /* 2^51 - 2^1 */
for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { /* 2^100 - 2^50 */
square(&t, &t)
}
mul(&z2_100_0, &t, &z2_50_0) /* 2^100 - 2^0 */
square(&t, &z2_100_0) /* 2^101 - 2^1 */
for i := 1; i < 100; i++ { /* 2^200 - 2^100 */
square(&t, &t)
}
mul(&t, &t, &z2_100_0) /* 2^200 - 2^0 */
square(&t, &t) /* 2^201 - 2^1 */
for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { /* 2^250 - 2^50 */
square(&t, &t)
}
mul(&t, &t, &z2_50_0) /* 2^250 - 2^0 */
square(&t, &t) /* 2^251 - 2^1 */
square(&t, &t) /* 2^252 - 2^2 */
square(&t, &t) /* 2^253 - 2^3 */
square(&t, &t) /* 2^254 - 2^4 */
square(&t, &t) /* 2^255 - 2^5 */
mul(r, &t, &z11) /* 2^255 - 21 */
}
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// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package curve25519
import "encoding/binary"
// This code is a port of the public domain, "ref10" implementation of
// curve25519 from SUPERCOP 20130419 by D. J. Bernstein.
// fieldElement represents an element of the field GF(2^255 - 19). An element
// t, entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77
// t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on
// context.
type fieldElement [10]int32
func feZero(fe *fieldElement) {
for i := range fe {
fe[i] = 0
}
}
func feOne(fe *fieldElement) {
feZero(fe)
fe[0] = 1
}
func feAdd(dst, a, b *fieldElement) {
for i := range dst {
dst[i] = a[i] + b[i]
}
}
func feSub(dst, a, b *fieldElement) {
for i := range dst {
dst[i] = a[i] - b[i]
}
}
func feCopy(dst, src *fieldElement) {
for i := range dst {
dst[i] = src[i]
}
}
// feCSwap replaces (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1; replaces (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0.
//
// Preconditions: b in {0,1}.
func feCSwap(f, g *fieldElement, b int32) {
b = -b
for i := range f {
t := b & (f[i] ^ g[i])
f[i] ^= t
g[i] ^= t
}
}
// load3 reads a 24-bit, little-endian value from in.
func load3(in []byte) int64 {
var r int64
r = int64(in[0])
r |= int64(in[1]) << 8
r |= int64(in[2]) << 16
return r
}
// load4 reads a 32-bit, little-endian value from in.
func load4(in []byte) int64 {
return int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in))
}
func feFromBytes(dst *fieldElement, src *[32]byte) {
h0 := load4(src[:])
h1 := load3(src[4:]) << 6
h2 := load3(src[7:]) << 5
h3 := load3(src[10:]) << 3
h4 := load3(src[13:]) << 2
h5 := load4(src[16:])
h6 := load3(src[20:]) << 7
h7 := load3(src[23:]) << 5
h8 := load3(src[26:]) << 4
h9 := (load3(src[29:]) & 0x7fffff) << 2
var carry [10]int64
carry[9] = (h9 + 1<<24) >> 25
h0 += carry[9] * 19
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
carry[1] = (h1 + 1<<24) >> 25
h2 += carry[1]
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
carry[3] = (h3 + 1<<24) >> 25
h4 += carry[3]
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
carry[5] = (h5 + 1<<24) >> 25
h6 += carry[5]
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
carry[7] = (h7 + 1<<24) >> 25
h8 += carry[7]
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
carry[0] = (h0 + 1<<25) >> 26
h1 += carry[0]
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
carry[2] = (h2 + 1<<25) >> 26
h3 += carry[2]
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
carry[4] = (h4 + 1<<25) >> 26
h5 += carry[4]
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
carry[6] = (h6 + 1<<25) >> 26
h7 += carry[6]
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
carry[8] = (h8 + 1<<25) >> 26
h9 += carry[8]
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
dst[0] = int32(h0)
dst[1] = int32(h1)
dst[2] = int32(h2)
dst[3] = int32(h3)
dst[4] = int32(h4)
dst[5] = int32(h5)
dst[6] = int32(h6)
dst[7] = int32(h7)
dst[8] = int32(h8)
dst[9] = int32(h9)
}
// feToBytes marshals h to s.
// Preconditions:
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
//
// Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p).
// Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))).
//
// Proof:
// Have |h|<=p so |q|<=1 so |19^2 2^(-255) q|<1/4.
// Also have |h-2^230 h9|<2^230 so |19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9)|<1/4.
//
// Write y=2^(-1)-19^2 2^(-255)q-19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9).
// Then 0<y<1.
//
// Write r=h-pq.
// Have 0<=r<=p-1=2^255-20.
// Thus 0<=r+19(2^-255)r<r+19(2^-255)2^255<=2^255-1.
//
// Write x=r+19(2^-255)r+y.
// Then 0<x<2^255 so floor(2^(-255)x) = 0 so floor(q+2^(-255)x) = q.
//
// Have q+2^(-255)x = 2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))
// so floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))) = q.
func feToBytes(s *[32]byte, h *fieldElement) {
var carry [10]int32
q := (19*h[9] + (1 << 24)) >> 25
q = (h[0] + q) >> 26
q = (h[1] + q) >> 25
q = (h[2] + q) >> 26
q = (h[3] + q) >> 25
q = (h[4] + q) >> 26
q = (h[5] + q) >> 25
q = (h[6] + q) >> 26
q = (h[7] + q) >> 25
q = (h[8] + q) >> 26
q = (h[9] + q) >> 25
// Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
h[0] += 19 * q
// Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
carry[0] = h[0] >> 26
h[1] += carry[0]
h[0] -= carry[0] << 26
carry[1] = h[1] >> 25
h[2] += carry[1]
h[1] -= carry[1] << 25
carry[2] = h[2] >> 26
h[3] += carry[2]
h[2] -= carry[2] << 26
carry[3] = h[3] >> 25
h[4] += carry[3]
h[3] -= carry[3] << 25
carry[4] = h[4] >> 26
h[5] += carry[4]
h[4] -= carry[4] << 26
carry[5] = h[5] >> 25
h[6] += carry[5]
h[5] -= carry[5] << 25
carry[6] = h[6] >> 26
h[7] += carry[6]
h[6] -= carry[6] << 26
carry[7] = h[7] >> 25
h[8] += carry[7]
h[7] -= carry[7] << 25
carry[8] = h[8] >> 26
h[9] += carry[8]
h[8] -= carry[8] << 26
carry[9] = h[9] >> 25
h[9] -= carry[9] << 25
// h10 = carry9
// Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
// Have h[0]+...+2^230 h[9] between 0 and 2^255-1;
// evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0.
// Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^230 h[9].
s[0] = byte(h[0] >> 0)
s[1] = byte(h[0] >> 8)
s[2] = byte(h[0] >> 16)
s[3] = byte((h[0] >> 24) | (h[1] << 2))
s[4] = byte(h[1] >> 6)
s[5] = byte(h[1] >> 14)
s[6] = byte((h[1] >> 22) | (h[2] << 3))
s[7] = byte(h[2] >> 5)
s[8] = byte(h[2] >> 13)
s[9] = byte((h[2] >> 21) | (h[3] << 5))
s[10] = byte(h[3] >> 3)
s[11] = byte(h[3] >> 11)
s[12] = byte((h[3] >> 19) | (h[4] << 6))
s[13] = byte(h[4] >> 2)
s[14] = byte(h[4] >> 10)
s[15] = byte(h[4] >> 18)
s[16] = byte(h[5] >> 0)
s[17] = byte(h[5] >> 8)
s[18] = byte(h[5] >> 16)
s[19] = byte((h[5] >> 24) | (h[6] << 1))
s[20] = byte(h[6] >> 7)
s[21] = byte(h[6] >> 15)
s[22] = byte((h[6] >> 23) | (h[7] << 3))
s[23] = byte(h[7] >> 5)
s[24] = byte(h[7] >> 13)
s[25] = byte((h[7] >> 21) | (h[8] << 4))
s[26] = byte(h[8] >> 4)
s[27] = byte(h[8] >> 12)
s[28] = byte((h[8] >> 20) | (h[9] << 6))
s[29] = byte(h[9] >> 2)
s[30] = byte(h[9] >> 10)
s[31] = byte(h[9] >> 18)
}
// feMul calculates h = f * g
// Can overlap h with f or g.
//
// Preconditions:
// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
// |g| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
//
// Postconditions:
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
//
// Notes on implementation strategy:
//
// Using schoolbook multiplication.
// Karatsuba would save a little in some cost models.
//
// Most multiplications by 2 and 19 are 32-bit precomputations;
// cheaper than 64-bit postcomputations.
//
// There is one remaining multiplication by 19 in the carry chain;
// one *19 precomputation can be merged into this,
// but the resulting data flow is considerably less clean.
//
// There are 12 carries below.
// 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable.
// Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper.
//
// With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32.
func feMul(h, f, g *fieldElement) {
f0 := f[0]
f1 := f[1]
f2 := f[2]
f3 := f[3]
f4 := f[4]
f5 := f[5]
f6 := f[6]
f7 := f[7]
f8 := f[8]
f9 := f[9]
g0 := g[0]
g1 := g[1]
g2 := g[2]
g3 := g[3]
g4 := g[4]
g5 := g[5]
g6 := g[6]
g7 := g[7]
g8 := g[8]
g9 := g[9]
g1_19 := 19 * g1 // 1.4*2^29
g2_19 := 19 * g2 // 1.4*2^30; still ok
g3_19 := 19 * g3
g4_19 := 19 * g4
g5_19 := 19 * g5
g6_19 := 19 * g6
g7_19 := 19 * g7
g8_19 := 19 * g8
g9_19 := 19 * g9
f1_2 := 2 * f1
f3_2 := 2 * f3
f5_2 := 2 * f5
f7_2 := 2 * f7
f9_2 := 2 * f9
f0g0 := int64(f0) * int64(g0)
f0g1 := int64(f0) * int64(g1)
f0g2 := int64(f0) * int64(g2)
f0g3 := int64(f0) * int64(g3)
f0g4 := int64(f0) * int64(g4)
f0g5 := int64(f0) * int64(g5)
f0g6 := int64(f0) * int64(g6)
f0g7 := int64(f0) * int64(g7)
f0g8 := int64(f0) * int64(g8)
f0g9 := int64(f0) * int64(g9)
f1g0 := int64(f1) * int64(g0)
f1g1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g1)
f1g2 := int64(f1) * int64(g2)
f1g3_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g3)
f1g4 := int64(f1) * int64(g4)
f1g5_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g5)
f1g6 := int64(f1) * int64(g6)
f1g7_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g7)
f1g8 := int64(f1) * int64(g8)
f1g9_38 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g9_19)
f2g0 := int64(f2) * int64(g0)
f2g1 := int64(f2) * int64(g1)
f2g2 := int64(f2) * int64(g2)
f2g3 := int64(f2) * int64(g3)
f2g4 := int64(f2) * int64(g4)
f2g5 := int64(f2) * int64(g5)
f2g6 := int64(f2) * int64(g6)
f2g7 := int64(f2) * int64(g7)
f2g8_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g8_19)
f2g9_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g9_19)
f3g0 := int64(f3) * int64(g0)
f3g1_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g1)
f3g2 := int64(f3) * int64(g2)
f3g3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g3)
f3g4 := int64(f3) * int64(g4)
f3g5_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g5)
f3g6 := int64(f3) * int64(g6)
f3g7_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g7_19)
f3g8_19 := int64(f3) * int64(g8_19)
f3g9_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g9_19)
f4g0 := int64(f4) * int64(g0)
f4g1 := int64(f4) * int64(g1)
f4g2 := int64(f4) * int64(g2)
f4g3 := int64(f4) * int64(g3)
f4g4 := int64(f4) * int64(g4)
f4g5 := int64(f4) * int64(g5)
f4g6_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g6_19)
f4g7_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g7_19)
f4g8_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g8_19)
f4g9_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g9_19)
f5g0 := int64(f5) * int64(g0)
f5g1_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g1)
f5g2 := int64(f5) * int64(g2)
f5g3_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g3)
f5g4 := int64(f5) * int64(g4)
f5g5_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g5_19)
f5g6_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g6_19)
f5g7_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g7_19)
f5g8_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g8_19)
f5g9_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g9_19)
f6g0 := int64(f6) * int64(g0)
f6g1 := int64(f6) * int64(g1)
f6g2 := int64(f6) * int64(g2)
f6g3 := int64(f6) * int64(g3)
f6g4_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g4_19)
f6g5_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g5_19)
f6g6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g6_19)
f6g7_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g7_19)
f6g8_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g8_19)
f6g9_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g9_19)
f7g0 := int64(f7) * int64(g0)
f7g1_2 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g1)
f7g2 := int64(f7) * int64(g2)
f7g3_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g3_19)
f7g4_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g4_19)
f7g5_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g5_19)
f7g6_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g6_19)
f7g7_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g7_19)
f7g8_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g8_19)
f7g9_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g9_19)
f8g0 := int64(f8) * int64(g0)
f8g1 := int64(f8) * int64(g1)
f8g2_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g2_19)
f8g3_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g3_19)
f8g4_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g4_19)
f8g5_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g5_19)
f8g6_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g6_19)
f8g7_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g7_19)
f8g8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g8_19)
f8g9_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g9_19)
f9g0 := int64(f9) * int64(g0)
f9g1_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g1_19)
f9g2_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g2_19)
f9g3_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g3_19)
f9g4_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g4_19)
f9g5_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g5_19)
f9g6_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g6_19)
f9g7_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g7_19)
f9g8_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g8_19)
f9g9_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g9_19)
h0 := f0g0 + f1g9_38 + f2g8_19 + f3g7_38 + f4g6_19 + f5g5_38 + f6g4_19 + f7g3_38 + f8g2_19 + f9g1_38
h1 := f0g1 + f1g0 + f2g9_19 + f3g8_19 + f4g7_19 + f5g6_19 + f6g5_19 + f7g4_19 + f8g3_19 + f9g2_19
h2 := f0g2 + f1g1_2 + f2g0 + f3g9_38 + f4g8_19 + f5g7_38 + f6g6_19 + f7g5_38 + f8g4_19 + f9g3_38
h3 := f0g3 + f1g2 + f2g1 + f3g0 + f4g9_19 + f5g8_19 + f6g7_19 + f7g6_19 + f8g5_19 + f9g4_19
h4 := f0g4 + f1g3_2 + f2g2 + f3g1_2 + f4g0 + f5g9_38 + f6g8_19 + f7g7_38 + f8g6_19 + f9g5_38
h5 := f0g5 + f1g4 + f2g3 + f3g2 + f4g1 + f5g0 + f6g9_19 + f7g8_19 + f8g7_19 + f9g6_19
h6 := f0g6 + f1g5_2 + f2g4 + f3g3_2 + f4g2 + f5g1_2 + f6g0 + f7g9_38 + f8g8_19 + f9g7_38
h7 := f0g7 + f1g6 + f2g5 + f3g4 + f4g3 + f5g2 + f6g1 + f7g0 + f8g9_19 + f9g8_19
h8 := f0g8 + f1g7_2 + f2g6 + f3g5_2 + f4g4 + f5g3_2 + f6g2 + f7g1_2 + f8g0 + f9g9_38
h9 := f0g9 + f1g8 + f2g7 + f3g6 + f4g5 + f5g4 + f6g3 + f7g2 + f8g1 + f9g0
var carry [10]int64
// |h0| <= (1.1*1.1*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.1*1.1*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38))
// i.e. |h0| <= 1.2*2^59; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8
// |h1| <= (1.1*1.1*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19))
// i.e. |h1| <= 1.5*2^58; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h1 += carry[0]
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h5 += carry[4]
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
// |h0| <= 2^25
// |h4| <= 2^25
// |h1| <= 1.51*2^58
// |h5| <= 1.51*2^58
carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h2 += carry[1]
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h6 += carry[5]
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
// |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32
// |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32
// |h2| <= 1.21*2^59
// |h6| <= 1.21*2^59
carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h3 += carry[2]
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h7 += carry[6]
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
// |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
// |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
// |h3| <= 1.51*2^58
// |h7| <= 1.51*2^58
carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h4 += carry[3]
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h8 += carry[7]
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
// |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
// |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
// |h4| <= 1.52*2^33
// |h8| <= 1.52*2^33
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h5 += carry[4]
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h9 += carry[8]
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
// |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
// |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
// |h5| <= 1.01*2^24
// |h9| <= 1.51*2^58
carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h0 += carry[9] * 19
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
// |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
// |h0| <= 1.8*2^37
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h1 += carry[0]
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
// |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
// |h1| <= 1.01*2^24
h[0] = int32(h0)
h[1] = int32(h1)
h[2] = int32(h2)
h[3] = int32(h3)
h[4] = int32(h4)
h[5] = int32(h5)
h[6] = int32(h6)
h[7] = int32(h7)
h[8] = int32(h8)
h[9] = int32(h9)
}
// feSquare calculates h = f*f. Can overlap h with f.
//
// Preconditions:
// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
//
// Postconditions:
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
func feSquare(h, f *fieldElement) {
f0 := f[0]
f1 := f[1]
f2 := f[2]
f3 := f[3]
f4 := f[4]
f5 := f[5]
f6 := f[6]
f7 := f[7]
f8 := f[8]
f9 := f[9]
f0_2 := 2 * f0
f1_2 := 2 * f1
f2_2 := 2 * f2
f3_2 := 2 * f3
f4_2 := 2 * f4
f5_2 := 2 * f5
f6_2 := 2 * f6
f7_2 := 2 * f7
f5_38 := 38 * f5 // 1.31*2^30
f6_19 := 19 * f6 // 1.31*2^30
f7_38 := 38 * f7 // 1.31*2^30
f8_19 := 19 * f8 // 1.31*2^30
f9_38 := 38 * f9 // 1.31*2^30
f0f0 := int64(f0) * int64(f0)
f0f1_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f1)
f0f2_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f2)
f0f3_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f3)
f0f4_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f4)
f0f5_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f5)
f0f6_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f6)
f0f7_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f7)
f0f8_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f8)
f0f9_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f9)
f1f1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f1)
f1f2_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f2)
f1f3_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f3_2)
f1f4_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f4)
f1f5_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f5_2)
f1f6_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f6)
f1f7_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f7_2)
f1f8_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f8)
f1f9_76 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f9_38)
f2f2 := int64(f2) * int64(f2)
f2f3_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f3)
f2f4_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f4)
f2f5_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f5)
f2f6_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f6)
f2f7_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f7)
f2f8_38 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f8_19)
f2f9_38 := int64(f2) * int64(f9_38)
f3f3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f3)
f3f4_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f4)
f3f5_4 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f5_2)
f3f6_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f6)
f3f7_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f7_38)
f3f8_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f8_19)
f3f9_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f9_38)
f4f4 := int64(f4) * int64(f4)
f4f5_2 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f5)
f4f6_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f6_19)
f4f7_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f7_38)
f4f8_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f8_19)
f4f9_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f9_38)
f5f5_38 := int64(f5) * int64(f5_38)
f5f6_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f6_19)
f5f7_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f7_38)
f5f8_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f8_19)
f5f9_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f9_38)
f6f6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(f6_19)
f6f7_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f7_38)
f6f8_38 := int64(f6_2) * int64(f8_19)
f6f9_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f9_38)
f7f7_38 := int64(f7) * int64(f7_38)
f7f8_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f8_19)
f7f9_76 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f9_38)
f8f8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(f8_19)
f8f9_38 := int64(f8) * int64(f9_38)
f9f9_38 := int64(f9) * int64(f9_38)
h0 := f0f0 + f1f9_76 + f2f8_38 + f3f7_76 + f4f6_38 + f5f5_38
h1 := f0f1_2 + f2f9_38 + f3f8_38 + f4f7_38 + f5f6_38
h2 := f0f2_2 + f1f1_2 + f3f9_76 + f4f8_38 + f5f7_76 + f6f6_19
h3 := f0f3_2 + f1f2_2 + f4f9_38 + f5f8_38 + f6f7_38
h4 := f0f4_2 + f1f3_4 + f2f2 + f5f9_76 + f6f8_38 + f7f7_38
h5 := f0f5_2 + f1f4_2 + f2f3_2 + f6f9_38 + f7f8_38
h6 := f0f6_2 + f1f5_4 + f2f4_2 + f3f3_2 + f7f9_76 + f8f8_19
h7 := f0f7_2 + f1f6_2 + f2f5_2 + f3f4_2 + f8f9_38
h8 := f0f8_2 + f1f7_4 + f2f6_2 + f3f5_4 + f4f4 + f9f9_38
h9 := f0f9_2 + f1f8_2 + f2f7_2 + f3f6_2 + f4f5_2
var carry [10]int64
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h1 += carry[0]
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h5 += carry[4]
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h2 += carry[1]
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h6 += carry[5]
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h3 += carry[2]
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h7 += carry[6]
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h4 += carry[3]
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h8 += carry[7]
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h5 += carry[4]
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h9 += carry[8]
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h0 += carry[9] * 19
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h1 += carry[0]
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
h[0] = int32(h0)
h[1] = int32(h1)
h[2] = int32(h2)
h[3] = int32(h3)
h[4] = int32(h4)
h[5] = int32(h5)
h[6] = int32(h6)
h[7] = int32(h7)
h[8] = int32(h8)
h[9] = int32(h9)
}
// feMul121666 calculates h = f * 121666. Can overlap h with f.
//
// Preconditions:
// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
//
// Postconditions:
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
func feMul121666(h, f *fieldElement) {
h0 := int64(f[0]) * 121666
h1 := int64(f[1]) * 121666
h2 := int64(f[2]) * 121666
h3 := int64(f[3]) * 121666
h4 := int64(f[4]) * 121666
h5 := int64(f[5]) * 121666
h6 := int64(f[6]) * 121666
h7 := int64(f[7]) * 121666
h8 := int64(f[8]) * 121666
h9 := int64(f[9]) * 121666
var carry [10]int64
carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h0 += carry[9] * 19
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h2 += carry[1]
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h4 += carry[3]
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h6 += carry[5]
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
h8 += carry[7]
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h1 += carry[0]
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h3 += carry[2]
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h5 += carry[4]
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h7 += carry[6]
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
h9 += carry[8]
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
h[0] = int32(h0)
h[1] = int32(h1)
h[2] = int32(h2)
h[3] = int32(h3)
h[4] = int32(h4)
h[5] = int32(h5)
h[6] = int32(h6)
h[7] = int32(h7)
h[8] = int32(h8)
h[9] = int32(h9)
}
// feInvert sets out = z^-1.
func feInvert(out, z *fieldElement) {
var t0, t1, t2, t3 fieldElement
var i int
feSquare(&t0, z)
for i = 1; i < 1; i++ {
feSquare(&t0, &t0)
}
feSquare(&t1, &t0)
for i = 1; i < 2; i++ {
feSquare(&t1, &t1)
}
feMul(&t1, z, &t1)
feMul(&t0, &t0, &t1)
feSquare(&t2, &t0)
for i = 1; i < 1; i++ {
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
}
feMul(&t1, &t1, &t2)
feSquare(&t2, &t1)
for i = 1; i < 5; i++ {
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
}
feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
feSquare(&t2, &t1)
for i = 1; i < 10; i++ {
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
}
feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1)
feSquare(&t3, &t2)
for i = 1; i < 20; i++ {
feSquare(&t3, &t3)
}
feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2)
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
for i = 1; i < 10; i++ {
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
}
feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
feSquare(&t2, &t1)
for i = 1; i < 50; i++ {
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
}
feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1)
feSquare(&t3, &t2)
for i = 1; i < 100; i++ {
feSquare(&t3, &t3)
}
feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2)
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
for i = 1; i < 50; i++ {
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
}
feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
feSquare(&t1, &t1)
for i = 1; i < 5; i++ {
feSquare(&t1, &t1)
}
feMul(out, &t1, &t0)
}
func scalarMultGeneric(out, in, base *[32]byte) {
var e [32]byte
copy(e[:], in[:])
e[0] &= 248
e[31] &= 127
e[31] |= 64
var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 fieldElement
feFromBytes(&x1, base)
feOne(&x2)
feCopy(&x3, &x1)
feOne(&z3)
swap := int32(0)
for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- {
b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7)
b &= 1
swap ^= int32(b)
feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap)
feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap)
swap = int32(b)
feSub(&tmp0, &x3, &z3)
feSub(&tmp1, &x2, &z2)
feAdd(&x2, &x2, &z2)
feAdd(&z2, &x3, &z3)
feMul(&z3, &tmp0, &x2)
feMul(&z2, &z2, &tmp1)
feSquare(&tmp0, &tmp1)
feSquare(&tmp1, &x2)
feAdd(&x3, &z3, &z2)
feSub(&z2, &z3, &z2)
feMul(&x2, &tmp1, &tmp0)
feSub(&tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp0)
feSquare(&z2, &z2)
feMul121666(&z3, &tmp1)
feSquare(&x3, &x3)
feAdd(&tmp0, &tmp0, &z3)
feMul(&z3, &x1, &z2)
feMul(&z2, &tmp1, &tmp0)
}
feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap)
feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap)
feInvert(&z2, &z2)
feMul(&x2, &x2, &z2)
feToBytes(out, &x2)
}
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !amd64 gccgo appengine purego
package curve25519
func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) {
scalarMultGeneric(out, in, base)
}
+39 -9
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ package curve25519
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/rand"
"fmt"
"encoding/hex"
"testing"
)
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func TestX25519Basepoint(t *testing.T) {
}
}
result := fmt.Sprintf("%x", x)
result := hex.EncodeToString(x)
if result != expectedHex {
t.Errorf("incorrect result: got %s, want %s", result, expectedHex)
}
@@ -48,8 +48,7 @@ func TestLowOrderPoints(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestTestVectors(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("Generic", func(t *testing.T) { testTestVectors(t, scalarMultGeneric) })
t.Run("Native", func(t *testing.T) { testTestVectors(t, ScalarMult) })
t.Run("Legacy", func(t *testing.T) { testTestVectors(t, ScalarMult) })
t.Run("X25519", func(t *testing.T) {
testTestVectors(t, func(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) {
out, err := X25519(scalar[:], point[:])
@@ -99,12 +98,43 @@ func TestHighBitIgnored(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func BenchmarkScalarBaseMult(b *testing.B) {
var in, out [32]byte
in[0] = 1
var benchmarkSink byte
b.SetBytes(32)
func BenchmarkX25519Basepoint(b *testing.B) {
scalar := make([]byte, ScalarSize)
if _, err := rand.Read(scalar); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
ScalarBaseMult(&out, &in)
out, err := X25519(scalar, Basepoint)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
benchmarkSink ^= out[0]
}
}
func BenchmarkX25519(b *testing.B) {
scalar := make([]byte, ScalarSize)
if _, err := rand.Read(scalar); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
point, err := X25519(scalar, Basepoint)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := rand.Read(scalar); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
out, err := X25519(scalar, point)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
benchmarkSink ^= out[0]
}
}
+7
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
This package is kept in sync with crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/field in
the standard library.
If there are any changes in the standard library that need to be synced to this
package, run sync.sh. It will not overwrite any local changes made since the
previous sync, so it's ok to land changes in this package first, and then sync
to the standard library later.
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
// Copyright (c) 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package main
import (
"fmt"
. "github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/build"
. "github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/gotypes"
. "github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/operand"
. "github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/reg"
// Ensure "go mod tidy" doesn't remove the golang.org/x/crypto module
// dependency, which is necessary to access the field.Element type.
_ "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
)
//go:generate go run . -out ../fe_amd64.s -stubs ../fe_amd64.go -pkg field
func main() {
Package("golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field")
ConstraintExpr("amd64,gc,!purego")
feMul()
feSquare()
Generate()
}
type namedComponent struct {
Component
name string
}
func (c namedComponent) String() string { return c.name }
type uint128 struct {
name string
hi, lo GPVirtual
}
func (c uint128) String() string { return c.name }
func feSquare() {
TEXT("feSquare", NOSPLIT, "func(out, a *Element)")
Doc("feSquare sets out = a * a. It works like feSquareGeneric.")
Pragma("noescape")
a := Dereference(Param("a"))
l0 := namedComponent{a.Field("l0"), "l0"}
l1 := namedComponent{a.Field("l1"), "l1"}
l2 := namedComponent{a.Field("l2"), "l2"}
l3 := namedComponent{a.Field("l3"), "l3"}
l4 := namedComponent{a.Field("l4"), "l4"}
// r0 = l0×l0 + 19×2×(l1×l4 + l2×l3)
r0 := uint128{"r0", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r0, 1, l0, l0)
addMul64(r0, 38, l1, l4)
addMul64(r0, 38, l2, l3)
// r1 = 2×l0×l1 + 19×2×l2×l4 + 19×l3×l3
r1 := uint128{"r1", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r1, 2, l0, l1)
addMul64(r1, 38, l2, l4)
addMul64(r1, 19, l3, l3)
// r2 = = 2×l0×l2 + l1×l1 + 19×2×l3×l4
r2 := uint128{"r2", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r2, 2, l0, l2)
addMul64(r2, 1, l1, l1)
addMul64(r2, 38, l3, l4)
// r3 = = 2×l0×l3 + 2×l1×l2 + 19×l4×l4
r3 := uint128{"r3", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r3, 2, l0, l3)
addMul64(r3, 2, l1, l2)
addMul64(r3, 19, l4, l4)
// r4 = = 2×l0×l4 + 2×l1×l3 + l2×l2
r4 := uint128{"r4", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r4, 2, l0, l4)
addMul64(r4, 2, l1, l3)
addMul64(r4, 1, l2, l2)
Comment("First reduction chain")
maskLow51Bits := GP64()
MOVQ(Imm((1<<51)-1), maskLow51Bits)
c0, r0lo := shiftRightBy51(&r0)
c1, r1lo := shiftRightBy51(&r1)
c2, r2lo := shiftRightBy51(&r2)
c3, r3lo := shiftRightBy51(&r3)
c4, r4lo := shiftRightBy51(&r4)
maskAndAdd(r0lo, maskLow51Bits, c4, 19)
maskAndAdd(r1lo, maskLow51Bits, c0, 1)
maskAndAdd(r2lo, maskLow51Bits, c1, 1)
maskAndAdd(r3lo, maskLow51Bits, c2, 1)
maskAndAdd(r4lo, maskLow51Bits, c3, 1)
Comment("Second reduction chain (carryPropagate)")
// c0 = r0 >> 51
MOVQ(r0lo, c0)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c0)
// c1 = r1 >> 51
MOVQ(r1lo, c1)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c1)
// c2 = r2 >> 51
MOVQ(r2lo, c2)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c2)
// c3 = r3 >> 51
MOVQ(r3lo, c3)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c3)
// c4 = r4 >> 51
MOVQ(r4lo, c4)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c4)
maskAndAdd(r0lo, maskLow51Bits, c4, 19)
maskAndAdd(r1lo, maskLow51Bits, c0, 1)
maskAndAdd(r2lo, maskLow51Bits, c1, 1)
maskAndAdd(r3lo, maskLow51Bits, c2, 1)
maskAndAdd(r4lo, maskLow51Bits, c3, 1)
Comment("Store output")
out := Dereference(Param("out"))
Store(r0lo, out.Field("l0"))
Store(r1lo, out.Field("l1"))
Store(r2lo, out.Field("l2"))
Store(r3lo, out.Field("l3"))
Store(r4lo, out.Field("l4"))
RET()
}
func feMul() {
TEXT("feMul", NOSPLIT, "func(out, a, b *Element)")
Doc("feMul sets out = a * b. It works like feMulGeneric.")
Pragma("noescape")
a := Dereference(Param("a"))
a0 := namedComponent{a.Field("l0"), "a0"}
a1 := namedComponent{a.Field("l1"), "a1"}
a2 := namedComponent{a.Field("l2"), "a2"}
a3 := namedComponent{a.Field("l3"), "a3"}
a4 := namedComponent{a.Field("l4"), "a4"}
b := Dereference(Param("b"))
b0 := namedComponent{b.Field("l0"), "b0"}
b1 := namedComponent{b.Field("l1"), "b1"}
b2 := namedComponent{b.Field("l2"), "b2"}
b3 := namedComponent{b.Field("l3"), "b3"}
b4 := namedComponent{b.Field("l4"), "b4"}
// r0 = a0×b0 + 19×(a1×b4 + a2×b3 + a3×b2 + a4×b1)
r0 := uint128{"r0", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r0, 1, a0, b0)
addMul64(r0, 19, a1, b4)
addMul64(r0, 19, a2, b3)
addMul64(r0, 19, a3, b2)
addMul64(r0, 19, a4, b1)
// r1 = a0×b1 + a1×b0 + 19×(a2×b4 + a3×b3 + a4×b2)
r1 := uint128{"r1", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r1, 1, a0, b1)
addMul64(r1, 1, a1, b0)
addMul64(r1, 19, a2, b4)
addMul64(r1, 19, a3, b3)
addMul64(r1, 19, a4, b2)
// r2 = a0×b2 + a1×b1 + a2×b0 + 19×(a3×b4 + a4×b3)
r2 := uint128{"r2", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r2, 1, a0, b2)
addMul64(r2, 1, a1, b1)
addMul64(r2, 1, a2, b0)
addMul64(r2, 19, a3, b4)
addMul64(r2, 19, a4, b3)
// r3 = a0×b3 + a1×b2 + a2×b1 + a3×b0 + 19×a4×b4
r3 := uint128{"r3", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r3, 1, a0, b3)
addMul64(r3, 1, a1, b2)
addMul64(r3, 1, a2, b1)
addMul64(r3, 1, a3, b0)
addMul64(r3, 19, a4, b4)
// r4 = a0×b4 + a1×b3 + a2×b2 + a3×b1 + a4×b0
r4 := uint128{"r4", GP64(), GP64()}
mul64(r4, 1, a0, b4)
addMul64(r4, 1, a1, b3)
addMul64(r4, 1, a2, b2)
addMul64(r4, 1, a3, b1)
addMul64(r4, 1, a4, b0)
Comment("First reduction chain")
maskLow51Bits := GP64()
MOVQ(Imm((1<<51)-1), maskLow51Bits)
c0, r0lo := shiftRightBy51(&r0)
c1, r1lo := shiftRightBy51(&r1)
c2, r2lo := shiftRightBy51(&r2)
c3, r3lo := shiftRightBy51(&r3)
c4, r4lo := shiftRightBy51(&r4)
maskAndAdd(r0lo, maskLow51Bits, c4, 19)
maskAndAdd(r1lo, maskLow51Bits, c0, 1)
maskAndAdd(r2lo, maskLow51Bits, c1, 1)
maskAndAdd(r3lo, maskLow51Bits, c2, 1)
maskAndAdd(r4lo, maskLow51Bits, c3, 1)
Comment("Second reduction chain (carryPropagate)")
// c0 = r0 >> 51
MOVQ(r0lo, c0)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c0)
// c1 = r1 >> 51
MOVQ(r1lo, c1)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c1)
// c2 = r2 >> 51
MOVQ(r2lo, c2)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c2)
// c3 = r3 >> 51
MOVQ(r3lo, c3)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c3)
// c4 = r4 >> 51
MOVQ(r4lo, c4)
SHRQ(Imm(51), c4)
maskAndAdd(r0lo, maskLow51Bits, c4, 19)
maskAndAdd(r1lo, maskLow51Bits, c0, 1)
maskAndAdd(r2lo, maskLow51Bits, c1, 1)
maskAndAdd(r3lo, maskLow51Bits, c2, 1)
maskAndAdd(r4lo, maskLow51Bits, c3, 1)
Comment("Store output")
out := Dereference(Param("out"))
Store(r0lo, out.Field("l0"))
Store(r1lo, out.Field("l1"))
Store(r2lo, out.Field("l2"))
Store(r3lo, out.Field("l3"))
Store(r4lo, out.Field("l4"))
RET()
}
// mul64 sets r to i * aX * bX.
func mul64(r uint128, i int, aX, bX namedComponent) {
switch i {
case 1:
Comment(fmt.Sprintf("%s = %s×%s", r, aX, bX))
Load(aX, RAX)
case 2:
Comment(fmt.Sprintf("%s = 2×%s×%s", r, aX, bX))
Load(aX, RAX)
SHLQ(Imm(1), RAX)
default:
panic("unsupported i value")
}
MULQ(mustAddr(bX)) // RDX, RAX = RAX * bX
MOVQ(RAX, r.lo)
MOVQ(RDX, r.hi)
}
// addMul64 sets r to r + i * aX * bX.
func addMul64(r uint128, i uint64, aX, bX namedComponent) {
switch i {
case 1:
Comment(fmt.Sprintf("%s += %s×%s", r, aX, bX))
Load(aX, RAX)
default:
Comment(fmt.Sprintf("%s += %d×%s×%s", r, i, aX, bX))
IMUL3Q(Imm(i), Load(aX, GP64()), RAX)
}
MULQ(mustAddr(bX)) // RDX, RAX = RAX * bX
ADDQ(RAX, r.lo)
ADCQ(RDX, r.hi)
}
// shiftRightBy51 returns r >> 51 and r.lo.
//
// After this function is called, the uint128 may not be used anymore.
func shiftRightBy51(r *uint128) (out, lo GPVirtual) {
out = r.hi
lo = r.lo
SHLQ(Imm(64-51), r.lo, r.hi)
r.lo, r.hi = nil, nil // make sure the uint128 is unusable
return
}
// maskAndAdd sets r = r&mask + c*i.
func maskAndAdd(r, mask, c GPVirtual, i uint64) {
ANDQ(mask, r)
if i != 1 {
IMUL3Q(Imm(i), c, c)
}
ADDQ(c, r)
}
func mustAddr(c Component) Op {
b, err := c.Resolve()
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return b.Addr
}
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
module asm
go 1.16
require (
github.com/mmcloughlin/avo v0.4.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0
)
replace golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0 => ../../../..
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
github.com/mmcloughlin/avo v0.4.0 h1:jeHDRktVD+578ULxWpQHkilor6pkdLF7u7EiTzDbfcU=
github.com/mmcloughlin/avo v0.4.0/go.mod h1:RW9BfYA3TgO9uCdNrKU2h6J8cPD8ZLznvfgHAeszb1s=
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.4.0/go.mod h1:mwnBkeHKe2W/ZEtQ+71ViKU8L12m81fl3OWwC1Zlc8k=
golang.org/x/arch v0.0.0-20210923205945-b76863e36670/go.mod h1:5om86z9Hs0C8fWVUuoMHwpExlXzs5Tkyp9hOrfG7pp8=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
golang.org/x/mod v0.4.2 h1:Gz96sIWK3OalVv/I/qNygP42zyoKp3xptRVCWRFEBvo=
golang.org/x/mod v0.4.2/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190404232315-eb5bcb51f2a3/go.mod h1:t9HGtf8HONx5eT2rtn7q6eTqICYqUVnKs3thJo3Qplg=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190620200207-3b0461eec859/go.mod h1:z5CRVTTTmAJ677TzLLGU+0bjPO0LkuOLi4/5GtJWs/s=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210805182204-aaa1db679c0d/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20211112202133-69e39bad7dc2/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190423024810-112230192c58/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20210220032951-036812b2e83c/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190412213103-97732733099d/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201119102817-f84b799fce68/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210423082822-04245dca01da/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210615035016-665e8c7367d1/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210809222454-d867a43fc93e/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20211030160813-b3129d9d1021 h1:giLT+HuUP/gXYrG2Plg9WTjj4qhfgaW424ZIFog3rlk=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20211030160813-b3129d9d1021/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.6/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtnZ6UAqBI28+e2cm9otk0dWdXHAEo=
golang.org/x/tools v0.1.7 h1:6j8CgantCy3yc8JGBqkDLMKWqZ0RDU2g1HVgacojGWQ=
golang.org/x/tools v0.1.7/go.mod h1:LGqMHiF4EqQNHR1JncWGqT5BVaXmza+X+BDGol+dOxo=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20190717185122-a985d3407aa7/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191011141410-1b5146add898/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20200804184101-5ec99f83aff1 h1:go1bK/D/BFZV2I8cIQd1NKEZ+0owSTG1fDTci4IqFcE=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20200804184101-5ec99f83aff1/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
rsc.io/pdf v0.1.1/go.mod h1:n8OzWcQ6Sp37PL01nO98y4iUCRdTGarVfzxY20ICaU4=
+416
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package field implements fast arithmetic modulo 2^255-19.
package field
import (
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/binary"
"math/bits"
)
// Element represents an element of the field GF(2^255-19). Note that this
// is not a cryptographically secure group, and should only be used to interact
// with edwards25519.Point coordinates.
//
// This type works similarly to math/big.Int, and all arguments and receivers
// are allowed to alias.
//
// The zero value is a valid zero element.
type Element struct {
// An element t represents the integer
// t.l0 + t.l1*2^51 + t.l2*2^102 + t.l3*2^153 + t.l4*2^204
//
// Between operations, all limbs are expected to be lower than 2^52.
l0 uint64
l1 uint64
l2 uint64
l3 uint64
l4 uint64
}
const maskLow51Bits uint64 = (1 << 51) - 1
var feZero = &Element{0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
// Zero sets v = 0, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Zero() *Element {
*v = *feZero
return v
}
var feOne = &Element{1, 0, 0, 0, 0}
// One sets v = 1, and returns v.
func (v *Element) One() *Element {
*v = *feOne
return v
}
// reduce reduces v modulo 2^255 - 19 and returns it.
func (v *Element) reduce() *Element {
v.carryPropagate()
// After the light reduction we now have a field element representation
// v < 2^255 + 2^13 * 19, but need v < 2^255 - 19.
// If v >= 2^255 - 19, then v + 19 >= 2^255, which would overflow 2^255 - 1,
// generating a carry. That is, c will be 0 if v < 2^255 - 19, and 1 otherwise.
c := (v.l0 + 19) >> 51
c = (v.l1 + c) >> 51
c = (v.l2 + c) >> 51
c = (v.l3 + c) >> 51
c = (v.l4 + c) >> 51
// If v < 2^255 - 19 and c = 0, this will be a no-op. Otherwise, it's
// effectively applying the reduction identity to the carry.
v.l0 += 19 * c
v.l1 += v.l0 >> 51
v.l0 = v.l0 & maskLow51Bits
v.l2 += v.l1 >> 51
v.l1 = v.l1 & maskLow51Bits
v.l3 += v.l2 >> 51
v.l2 = v.l2 & maskLow51Bits
v.l4 += v.l3 >> 51
v.l3 = v.l3 & maskLow51Bits
// no additional carry
v.l4 = v.l4 & maskLow51Bits
return v
}
// Add sets v = a + b, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Add(a, b *Element) *Element {
v.l0 = a.l0 + b.l0
v.l1 = a.l1 + b.l1
v.l2 = a.l2 + b.l2
v.l3 = a.l3 + b.l3
v.l4 = a.l4 + b.l4
// Using the generic implementation here is actually faster than the
// assembly. Probably because the body of this function is so simple that
// the compiler can figure out better optimizations by inlining the carry
// propagation. TODO
return v.carryPropagateGeneric()
}
// Subtract sets v = a - b, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Subtract(a, b *Element) *Element {
// We first add 2 * p, to guarantee the subtraction won't underflow, and
// then subtract b (which can be up to 2^255 + 2^13 * 19).
v.l0 = (a.l0 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFDA) - b.l0
v.l1 = (a.l1 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l1
v.l2 = (a.l2 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l2
v.l3 = (a.l3 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l3
v.l4 = (a.l4 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l4
return v.carryPropagate()
}
// Negate sets v = -a, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Negate(a *Element) *Element {
return v.Subtract(feZero, a)
}
// Invert sets v = 1/z mod p, and returns v.
//
// If z == 0, Invert returns v = 0.
func (v *Element) Invert(z *Element) *Element {
// Inversion is implemented as exponentiation with exponent p − 2. It uses the
// same sequence of 255 squarings and 11 multiplications as [Curve25519].
var z2, z9, z11, z2_5_0, z2_10_0, z2_20_0, z2_50_0, z2_100_0, t Element
z2.Square(z) // 2
t.Square(&z2) // 4
t.Square(&t) // 8
z9.Multiply(&t, z) // 9
z11.Multiply(&z9, &z2) // 11
t.Square(&z11) // 22
z2_5_0.Multiply(&t, &z9) // 31 = 2^5 - 2^0
t.Square(&z2_5_0) // 2^6 - 2^1
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
t.Square(&t) // 2^10 - 2^5
}
z2_10_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_5_0) // 2^10 - 2^0
t.Square(&z2_10_0) // 2^11 - 2^1
for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
t.Square(&t) // 2^20 - 2^10
}
z2_20_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_10_0) // 2^20 - 2^0
t.Square(&z2_20_0) // 2^21 - 2^1
for i := 0; i < 19; i++ {
t.Square(&t) // 2^40 - 2^20
}
t.Multiply(&t, &z2_20_0) // 2^40 - 2^0
t.Square(&t) // 2^41 - 2^1
for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
t.Square(&t) // 2^50 - 2^10
}
z2_50_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_10_0) // 2^50 - 2^0
t.Square(&z2_50_0) // 2^51 - 2^1
for i := 0; i < 49; i++ {
t.Square(&t) // 2^100 - 2^50
}
z2_100_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_50_0) // 2^100 - 2^0
t.Square(&z2_100_0) // 2^101 - 2^1
for i := 0; i < 99; i++ {
t.Square(&t) // 2^200 - 2^100
}
t.Multiply(&t, &z2_100_0) // 2^200 - 2^0
t.Square(&t) // 2^201 - 2^1
for i := 0; i < 49; i++ {
t.Square(&t) // 2^250 - 2^50
}
t.Multiply(&t, &z2_50_0) // 2^250 - 2^0
t.Square(&t) // 2^251 - 2^1
t.Square(&t) // 2^252 - 2^2
t.Square(&t) // 2^253 - 2^3
t.Square(&t) // 2^254 - 2^4
t.Square(&t) // 2^255 - 2^5
return v.Multiply(&t, &z11) // 2^255 - 21
}
// Set sets v = a, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Set(a *Element) *Element {
*v = *a
return v
}
// SetBytes sets v to x, which must be a 32-byte little-endian encoding.
//
// Consistent with RFC 7748, the most significant bit (the high bit of the
// last byte) is ignored, and non-canonical values (2^255-19 through 2^255-1)
// are accepted. Note that this is laxer than specified by RFC 8032.
func (v *Element) SetBytes(x []byte) *Element {
if len(x) != 32 {
panic("edwards25519: invalid field element input size")
}
// Bits 0:51 (bytes 0:8, bits 0:64, shift 0, mask 51).
v.l0 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[0:8])
v.l0 &= maskLow51Bits
// Bits 51:102 (bytes 6:14, bits 48:112, shift 3, mask 51).
v.l1 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[6:14]) >> 3
v.l1 &= maskLow51Bits
// Bits 102:153 (bytes 12:20, bits 96:160, shift 6, mask 51).
v.l2 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[12:20]) >> 6
v.l2 &= maskLow51Bits
// Bits 153:204 (bytes 19:27, bits 152:216, shift 1, mask 51).
v.l3 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[19:27]) >> 1
v.l3 &= maskLow51Bits
// Bits 204:251 (bytes 24:32, bits 192:256, shift 12, mask 51).
// Note: not bytes 25:33, shift 4, to avoid overread.
v.l4 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[24:32]) >> 12
v.l4 &= maskLow51Bits
return v
}
// Bytes returns the canonical 32-byte little-endian encoding of v.
func (v *Element) Bytes() []byte {
// This function is outlined to make the allocations inline in the caller
// rather than happen on the heap.
var out [32]byte
return v.bytes(&out)
}
func (v *Element) bytes(out *[32]byte) []byte {
t := *v
t.reduce()
var buf [8]byte
for i, l := range [5]uint64{t.l0, t.l1, t.l2, t.l3, t.l4} {
bitsOffset := i * 51
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], l<<uint(bitsOffset%8))
for i, bb := range buf {
off := bitsOffset/8 + i
if off >= len(out) {
break
}
out[off] |= bb
}
}
return out[:]
}
// Equal returns 1 if v and u are equal, and 0 otherwise.
func (v *Element) Equal(u *Element) int {
sa, sv := u.Bytes(), v.Bytes()
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(sa, sv)
}
// mask64Bits returns 0xffffffff if cond is 1, and 0 otherwise.
func mask64Bits(cond int) uint64 { return ^(uint64(cond) - 1) }
// Select sets v to a if cond == 1, and to b if cond == 0.
func (v *Element) Select(a, b *Element, cond int) *Element {
m := mask64Bits(cond)
v.l0 = (m & a.l0) | (^m & b.l0)
v.l1 = (m & a.l1) | (^m & b.l1)
v.l2 = (m & a.l2) | (^m & b.l2)
v.l3 = (m & a.l3) | (^m & b.l3)
v.l4 = (m & a.l4) | (^m & b.l4)
return v
}
// Swap swaps v and u if cond == 1 or leaves them unchanged if cond == 0, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Swap(u *Element, cond int) {
m := mask64Bits(cond)
t := m & (v.l0 ^ u.l0)
v.l0 ^= t
u.l0 ^= t
t = m & (v.l1 ^ u.l1)
v.l1 ^= t
u.l1 ^= t
t = m & (v.l2 ^ u.l2)
v.l2 ^= t
u.l2 ^= t
t = m & (v.l3 ^ u.l3)
v.l3 ^= t
u.l3 ^= t
t = m & (v.l4 ^ u.l4)
v.l4 ^= t
u.l4 ^= t
}
// IsNegative returns 1 if v is negative, and 0 otherwise.
func (v *Element) IsNegative() int {
return int(v.Bytes()[0] & 1)
}
// Absolute sets v to |u|, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Absolute(u *Element) *Element {
return v.Select(new(Element).Negate(u), u, u.IsNegative())
}
// Multiply sets v = x * y, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Multiply(x, y *Element) *Element {
feMul(v, x, y)
return v
}
// Square sets v = x * x, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Square(x *Element) *Element {
feSquare(v, x)
return v
}
// Mult32 sets v = x * y, and returns v.
func (v *Element) Mult32(x *Element, y uint32) *Element {
x0lo, x0hi := mul51(x.l0, y)
x1lo, x1hi := mul51(x.l1, y)
x2lo, x2hi := mul51(x.l2, y)
x3lo, x3hi := mul51(x.l3, y)
x4lo, x4hi := mul51(x.l4, y)
v.l0 = x0lo + 19*x4hi // carried over per the reduction identity
v.l1 = x1lo + x0hi
v.l2 = x2lo + x1hi
v.l3 = x3lo + x2hi
v.l4 = x4lo + x3hi
// The hi portions are going to be only 32 bits, plus any previous excess,
// so we can skip the carry propagation.
return v
}
// mul51 returns lo + hi * 2⁵¹ = a * b.
func mul51(a uint64, b uint32) (lo uint64, hi uint64) {
mh, ml := bits.Mul64(a, uint64(b))
lo = ml & maskLow51Bits
hi = (mh << 13) | (ml >> 51)
return
}
// Pow22523 set v = x^((p-5)/8), and returns v. (p-5)/8 is 2^252-3.
func (v *Element) Pow22523(x *Element) *Element {
var t0, t1, t2 Element
t0.Square(x) // x^2
t1.Square(&t0) // x^4
t1.Square(&t1) // x^8
t1.Multiply(x, &t1) // x^9
t0.Multiply(&t0, &t1) // x^11
t0.Square(&t0) // x^22
t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // x^31
t1.Square(&t0) // x^62
for i := 1; i < 5; i++ { // x^992
t1.Square(&t1)
}
t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // x^1023 -> 1023 = 2^10 - 1
t1.Square(&t0) // 2^11 - 2
for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { // 2^20 - 2^10
t1.Square(&t1)
}
t1.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^20 - 1
t2.Square(&t1) // 2^21 - 2
for i := 1; i < 20; i++ { // 2^40 - 2^20
t2.Square(&t2)
}
t1.Multiply(&t2, &t1) // 2^40 - 1
t1.Square(&t1) // 2^41 - 2
for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { // 2^50 - 2^10
t1.Square(&t1)
}
t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^50 - 1
t1.Square(&t0) // 2^51 - 2
for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { // 2^100 - 2^50
t1.Square(&t1)
}
t1.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^100 - 1
t2.Square(&t1) // 2^101 - 2
for i := 1; i < 100; i++ { // 2^200 - 2^100
t2.Square(&t2)
}
t1.Multiply(&t2, &t1) // 2^200 - 1
t1.Square(&t1) // 2^201 - 2
for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { // 2^250 - 2^50
t1.Square(&t1)
}
t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^250 - 1
t0.Square(&t0) // 2^251 - 2
t0.Square(&t0) // 2^252 - 4
return v.Multiply(&t0, x) // 2^252 - 3 -> x^(2^252-3)
}
// sqrtM1 is 2^((p-1)/4), which squared is equal to -1 by Euler's Criterion.
var sqrtM1 = &Element{1718705420411056, 234908883556509,
2233514472574048, 2117202627021982, 765476049583133}
// SqrtRatio sets r to the non-negative square root of the ratio of u and v.
//
// If u/v is square, SqrtRatio returns r and 1. If u/v is not square, SqrtRatio
// sets r according to Section 4.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-ristretto255-decaf448-00,
// and returns r and 0.
func (r *Element) SqrtRatio(u, v *Element) (rr *Element, wasSquare int) {
var a, b Element
// r = (u * v3) * (u * v7)^((p-5)/8)
v2 := a.Square(v)
uv3 := b.Multiply(u, b.Multiply(v2, v))
uv7 := a.Multiply(uv3, a.Square(v2))
r.Multiply(uv3, r.Pow22523(uv7))
check := a.Multiply(v, a.Square(r)) // check = v * r^2
uNeg := b.Negate(u)
correctSignSqrt := check.Equal(u)
flippedSignSqrt := check.Equal(uNeg)
flippedSignSqrtI := check.Equal(uNeg.Multiply(uNeg, sqrtM1))
rPrime := b.Multiply(r, sqrtM1) // r_prime = SQRT_M1 * r
// r = CT_SELECT(r_prime IF flipped_sign_sqrt | flipped_sign_sqrt_i ELSE r)
r.Select(rPrime, r, flippedSignSqrt|flippedSignSqrtI)
r.Absolute(r) // Choose the nonnegative square root.
return r, correctSignSqrt | flippedSignSqrt
}
+126
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// Copyright (c) 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package field
import (
"testing"
"testing/quick"
)
func checkAliasingOneArg(f func(v, x *Element) *Element) func(v, x Element) bool {
return func(v, x Element) bool {
x1, v1 := x, x
// Calculate a reference f(x) without aliasing.
if out := f(&v, &x); out != &v && isInBounds(out) {
return false
}
// Test aliasing the argument and the receiver.
if out := f(&v1, &v1); out != &v1 || v1 != v {
return false
}
// Ensure the arguments was not modified.
return x == x1
}
}
func checkAliasingTwoArgs(f func(v, x, y *Element) *Element) func(v, x, y Element) bool {
return func(v, x, y Element) bool {
x1, y1, v1 := x, y, Element{}
// Calculate a reference f(x, y) without aliasing.
if out := f(&v, &x, &y); out != &v && isInBounds(out) {
return false
}
// Test aliasing the first argument and the receiver.
v1 = x
if out := f(&v1, &v1, &y); out != &v1 || v1 != v {
return false
}
// Test aliasing the second argument and the receiver.
v1 = y
if out := f(&v1, &x, &v1); out != &v1 || v1 != v {
return false
}
// Calculate a reference f(x, x) without aliasing.
if out := f(&v, &x, &x); out != &v {
return false
}
// Test aliasing the first argument and the receiver.
v1 = x
if out := f(&v1, &v1, &x); out != &v1 || v1 != v {
return false
}
// Test aliasing the second argument and the receiver.
v1 = x
if out := f(&v1, &x, &v1); out != &v1 || v1 != v {
return false
}
// Test aliasing both arguments and the receiver.
v1 = x
if out := f(&v1, &v1, &v1); out != &v1 || v1 != v {
return false
}
// Ensure the arguments were not modified.
return x == x1 && y == y1
}
}
// TestAliasing checks that receivers and arguments can alias each other without
// leading to incorrect results. That is, it ensures that it's safe to write
//
// v.Invert(v)
//
// or
//
// v.Add(v, v)
//
// without any of the inputs getting clobbered by the output being written.
func TestAliasing(t *testing.T) {
type target struct {
name string
oneArgF func(v, x *Element) *Element
twoArgsF func(v, x, y *Element) *Element
}
for _, tt := range []target{
{name: "Absolute", oneArgF: (*Element).Absolute},
{name: "Invert", oneArgF: (*Element).Invert},
{name: "Negate", oneArgF: (*Element).Negate},
{name: "Set", oneArgF: (*Element).Set},
{name: "Square", oneArgF: (*Element).Square},
{name: "Multiply", twoArgsF: (*Element).Multiply},
{name: "Add", twoArgsF: (*Element).Add},
{name: "Subtract", twoArgsF: (*Element).Subtract},
{
name: "Select0",
twoArgsF: func(v, x, y *Element) *Element {
return (*Element).Select(v, x, y, 0)
},
},
{
name: "Select1",
twoArgsF: func(v, x, y *Element) *Element {
return (*Element).Select(v, x, y, 1)
},
},
} {
var err error
switch {
case tt.oneArgF != nil:
err = quick.Check(checkAliasingOneArg(tt.oneArgF), &quick.Config{MaxCountScale: 1 << 8})
case tt.twoArgsF != nil:
err = quick.Check(checkAliasingTwoArgs(tt.twoArgsF), &quick.Config{MaxCountScale: 1 << 8})
}
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("%v: %v", tt.name, err)
}
}
}
+16
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// Code generated by command: go run fe_amd64_asm.go -out ../fe_amd64.s -stubs ../fe_amd64.go -pkg field. DO NOT EDIT.
//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build amd64,gc,!purego
package field
// feMul sets out = a * b. It works like feMulGeneric.
//
//go:noescape
func feMul(out *Element, a *Element, b *Element)
// feSquare sets out = a * a. It works like feSquareGeneric.
//
//go:noescape
func feSquare(out *Element, a *Element)
+379
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@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
// Code generated by command: go run fe_amd64_asm.go -out ../fe_amd64.s -stubs ../fe_amd64.go -pkg field. DO NOT EDIT.
//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build amd64,gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
// func feMul(out *Element, a *Element, b *Element)
TEXT ·feMul(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-24
MOVQ a+8(FP), CX
MOVQ b+16(FP), BX
// r0 = a0×b0
MOVQ (CX), AX
MULQ (BX)
MOVQ AX, DI
MOVQ DX, SI
// r0 += 19×a1×b4
MOVQ 8(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 32(BX)
ADDQ AX, DI
ADCQ DX, SI
// r0 += 19×a2×b3
MOVQ 16(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 24(BX)
ADDQ AX, DI
ADCQ DX, SI
// r0 += 19×a3×b2
MOVQ 24(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 16(BX)
ADDQ AX, DI
ADCQ DX, SI
// r0 += 19×a4×b1
MOVQ 32(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 8(BX)
ADDQ AX, DI
ADCQ DX, SI
// r1 = a0×b1
MOVQ (CX), AX
MULQ 8(BX)
MOVQ AX, R9
MOVQ DX, R8
// r1 += a1×b0
MOVQ 8(CX), AX
MULQ (BX)
ADDQ AX, R9
ADCQ DX, R8
// r1 += 19×a2×b4
MOVQ 16(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 32(BX)
ADDQ AX, R9
ADCQ DX, R8
// r1 += 19×a3×b3
MOVQ 24(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 24(BX)
ADDQ AX, R9
ADCQ DX, R8
// r1 += 19×a4×b2
MOVQ 32(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 16(BX)
ADDQ AX, R9
ADCQ DX, R8
// r2 = a0×b2
MOVQ (CX), AX
MULQ 16(BX)
MOVQ AX, R11
MOVQ DX, R10
// r2 += a1×b1
MOVQ 8(CX), AX
MULQ 8(BX)
ADDQ AX, R11
ADCQ DX, R10
// r2 += a2×b0
MOVQ 16(CX), AX
MULQ (BX)
ADDQ AX, R11
ADCQ DX, R10
// r2 += 19×a3×b4
MOVQ 24(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 32(BX)
ADDQ AX, R11
ADCQ DX, R10
// r2 += 19×a4×b3
MOVQ 32(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 24(BX)
ADDQ AX, R11
ADCQ DX, R10
// r3 = a0×b3
MOVQ (CX), AX
MULQ 24(BX)
MOVQ AX, R13
MOVQ DX, R12
// r3 += a1×b2
MOVQ 8(CX), AX
MULQ 16(BX)
ADDQ AX, R13
ADCQ DX, R12
// r3 += a2×b1
MOVQ 16(CX), AX
MULQ 8(BX)
ADDQ AX, R13
ADCQ DX, R12
// r3 += a3×b0
MOVQ 24(CX), AX
MULQ (BX)
ADDQ AX, R13
ADCQ DX, R12
// r3 += 19×a4×b4
MOVQ 32(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 32(BX)
ADDQ AX, R13
ADCQ DX, R12
// r4 = a0×b4
MOVQ (CX), AX
MULQ 32(BX)
MOVQ AX, R15
MOVQ DX, R14
// r4 += a1×b3
MOVQ 8(CX), AX
MULQ 24(BX)
ADDQ AX, R15
ADCQ DX, R14
// r4 += a2×b2
MOVQ 16(CX), AX
MULQ 16(BX)
ADDQ AX, R15
ADCQ DX, R14
// r4 += a3×b1
MOVQ 24(CX), AX
MULQ 8(BX)
ADDQ AX, R15
ADCQ DX, R14
// r4 += a4×b0
MOVQ 32(CX), AX
MULQ (BX)
ADDQ AX, R15
ADCQ DX, R14
// First reduction chain
MOVQ $0x0007ffffffffffff, AX
SHLQ $0x0d, DI, SI
SHLQ $0x0d, R9, R8
SHLQ $0x0d, R11, R10
SHLQ $0x0d, R13, R12
SHLQ $0x0d, R15, R14
ANDQ AX, DI
IMUL3Q $0x13, R14, R14
ADDQ R14, DI
ANDQ AX, R9
ADDQ SI, R9
ANDQ AX, R11
ADDQ R8, R11
ANDQ AX, R13
ADDQ R10, R13
ANDQ AX, R15
ADDQ R12, R15
// Second reduction chain (carryPropagate)
MOVQ DI, SI
SHRQ $0x33, SI
MOVQ R9, R8
SHRQ $0x33, R8
MOVQ R11, R10
SHRQ $0x33, R10
MOVQ R13, R12
SHRQ $0x33, R12
MOVQ R15, R14
SHRQ $0x33, R14
ANDQ AX, DI
IMUL3Q $0x13, R14, R14
ADDQ R14, DI
ANDQ AX, R9
ADDQ SI, R9
ANDQ AX, R11
ADDQ R8, R11
ANDQ AX, R13
ADDQ R10, R13
ANDQ AX, R15
ADDQ R12, R15
// Store output
MOVQ out+0(FP), AX
MOVQ DI, (AX)
MOVQ R9, 8(AX)
MOVQ R11, 16(AX)
MOVQ R13, 24(AX)
MOVQ R15, 32(AX)
RET
// func feSquare(out *Element, a *Element)
TEXT ·feSquare(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-16
MOVQ a+8(FP), CX
// r0 = l0×l0
MOVQ (CX), AX
MULQ (CX)
MOVQ AX, SI
MOVQ DX, BX
// r0 += 38×l1×l4
MOVQ 8(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX
MULQ 32(CX)
ADDQ AX, SI
ADCQ DX, BX
// r0 += 38×l2×l3
MOVQ 16(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX
MULQ 24(CX)
ADDQ AX, SI
ADCQ DX, BX
// r1 = 2×l0×l1
MOVQ (CX), AX
SHLQ $0x01, AX
MULQ 8(CX)
MOVQ AX, R8
MOVQ DX, DI
// r1 += 38×l2×l4
MOVQ 16(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX
MULQ 32(CX)
ADDQ AX, R8
ADCQ DX, DI
// r1 += 19×l3×l3
MOVQ 24(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 24(CX)
ADDQ AX, R8
ADCQ DX, DI
// r2 = 2×l0×l2
MOVQ (CX), AX
SHLQ $0x01, AX
MULQ 16(CX)
MOVQ AX, R10
MOVQ DX, R9
// r2 += l1×l1
MOVQ 8(CX), AX
MULQ 8(CX)
ADDQ AX, R10
ADCQ DX, R9
// r2 += 38×l3×l4
MOVQ 24(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX
MULQ 32(CX)
ADDQ AX, R10
ADCQ DX, R9
// r3 = 2×l0×l3
MOVQ (CX), AX
SHLQ $0x01, AX
MULQ 24(CX)
MOVQ AX, R12
MOVQ DX, R11
// r3 += 2×l1×l2
MOVQ 8(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x02, AX, AX
MULQ 16(CX)
ADDQ AX, R12
ADCQ DX, R11
// r3 += 19×l4×l4
MOVQ 32(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX
MULQ 32(CX)
ADDQ AX, R12
ADCQ DX, R11
// r4 = 2×l0×l4
MOVQ (CX), AX
SHLQ $0x01, AX
MULQ 32(CX)
MOVQ AX, R14
MOVQ DX, R13
// r4 += 2×l1×l3
MOVQ 8(CX), AX
IMUL3Q $0x02, AX, AX
MULQ 24(CX)
ADDQ AX, R14
ADCQ DX, R13
// r4 += l2×l2
MOVQ 16(CX), AX
MULQ 16(CX)
ADDQ AX, R14
ADCQ DX, R13
// First reduction chain
MOVQ $0x0007ffffffffffff, AX
SHLQ $0x0d, SI, BX
SHLQ $0x0d, R8, DI
SHLQ $0x0d, R10, R9
SHLQ $0x0d, R12, R11
SHLQ $0x0d, R14, R13
ANDQ AX, SI
IMUL3Q $0x13, R13, R13
ADDQ R13, SI
ANDQ AX, R8
ADDQ BX, R8
ANDQ AX, R10
ADDQ DI, R10
ANDQ AX, R12
ADDQ R9, R12
ANDQ AX, R14
ADDQ R11, R14
// Second reduction chain (carryPropagate)
MOVQ SI, BX
SHRQ $0x33, BX
MOVQ R8, DI
SHRQ $0x33, DI
MOVQ R10, R9
SHRQ $0x33, R9
MOVQ R12, R11
SHRQ $0x33, R11
MOVQ R14, R13
SHRQ $0x33, R13
ANDQ AX, SI
IMUL3Q $0x13, R13, R13
ADDQ R13, SI
ANDQ AX, R8
ADDQ BX, R8
ANDQ AX, R10
ADDQ DI, R10
ANDQ AX, R12
ADDQ R9, R12
ANDQ AX, R14
ADDQ R11, R14
// Store output
MOVQ out+0(FP), AX
MOVQ SI, (AX)
MOVQ R8, 8(AX)
MOVQ R10, 16(AX)
MOVQ R12, 24(AX)
MOVQ R14, 32(AX)
RET
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
// Copyright (c) 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !amd64 || !gc || purego
// +build !amd64 !gc purego
package field
func feMul(v, x, y *Element) { feMulGeneric(v, x, y) }
func feSquare(v, x *Element) { feSquareGeneric(v, x) }
+16
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
// Copyright (c) 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build arm64 && gc && !purego
// +build arm64,gc,!purego
package field
//go:noescape
func carryPropagate(v *Element)
func (v *Element) carryPropagate() *Element {
carryPropagate(v)
return v
}
+43
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@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
// Copyright (c) 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build arm64 && gc && !purego
// +build arm64,gc,!purego
#include "textflag.h"
// carryPropagate works exactly like carryPropagateGeneric and uses the
// same AND, ADD, and LSR+MADD instructions emitted by the compiler, but
// avoids loading R0-R4 twice and uses LDP and STP.
//
// See https://golang.org/issues/43145 for the main compiler issue.
//
// func carryPropagate(v *Element)
TEXT ·carryPropagate(SB),NOFRAME|NOSPLIT,$0-8
MOVD v+0(FP), R20
LDP 0(R20), (R0, R1)
LDP 16(R20), (R2, R3)
MOVD 32(R20), R4
AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R0, R10
AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R1, R11
AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R2, R12
AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R3, R13
AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R4, R14
ADD R0>>51, R11, R11
ADD R1>>51, R12, R12
ADD R2>>51, R13, R13
ADD R3>>51, R14, R14
// R4>>51 * 19 + R10 -> R10
LSR $51, R4, R21
MOVD $19, R22
MADD R22, R10, R21, R10
STP (R10, R11), 0(R20)
STP (R12, R13), 16(R20)
MOVD R14, 32(R20)
RET
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
// Copyright (c) 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !arm64 || !gc || purego
// +build !arm64 !gc purego
package field
func (v *Element) carryPropagate() *Element {
return v.carryPropagateGeneric()
}
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
// Copyright (c) 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package field
import "testing"
func BenchmarkAdd(b *testing.B) {
var x, y Element
x.One()
y.Add(feOne, feOne)
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
x.Add(&x, &y)
}
}
func BenchmarkMultiply(b *testing.B) {
var x, y Element
x.One()
y.Add(feOne, feOne)
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
x.Multiply(&x, &y)
}
}
func BenchmarkMult32(b *testing.B) {
var x Element
x.One()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
x.Mult32(&x, 0xaa42aa42)
}
}
+264
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// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package field
import "math/bits"
// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the
// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics.
type uint128 struct {
lo, hi uint64
}
// mul64 returns a * b.
func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 {
hi, lo := bits.Mul64(a, b)
return uint128{lo, hi}
}
// addMul64 returns v + a * b.
func addMul64(v uint128, a, b uint64) uint128 {
hi, lo := bits.Mul64(a, b)
lo, c := bits.Add64(lo, v.lo, 0)
hi, _ = bits.Add64(hi, v.hi, c)
return uint128{lo, hi}
}
// shiftRightBy51 returns a >> 51. a is assumed to be at most 115 bits.
func shiftRightBy51(a uint128) uint64 {
return (a.hi << (64 - 51)) | (a.lo >> 51)
}
func feMulGeneric(v, a, b *Element) {
a0 := a.l0
a1 := a.l1
a2 := a.l2
a3 := a.l3
a4 := a.l4
b0 := b.l0
b1 := b.l1
b2 := b.l2
b3 := b.l3
b4 := b.l4
// Limb multiplication works like pen-and-paper columnar multiplication, but
// with 51-bit limbs instead of digits.
//
// a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 x
// b4 b3 b2 b1 b0 =
// ------------------------
// a4b0 a3b0 a2b0 a1b0 a0b0 +
// a4b1 a3b1 a2b1 a1b1 a0b1 +
// a4b2 a3b2 a2b2 a1b2 a0b2 +
// a4b3 a3b3 a2b3 a1b3 a0b3 +
// a4b4 a3b4 a2b4 a1b4 a0b4 =
// ----------------------------------------------
// r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0
//
// We can then use the reduction identity (a * 2²⁵⁵ + b = a * 19 + b) to
// reduce the limbs that would overflow 255 bits. r5 * 2²⁵⁵ becomes 19 * r5,
// r6 * 2³⁰⁶ becomes 19 * r6 * 2⁵¹, etc.
//
// Reduction can be carried out simultaneously to multiplication. For
// example, we do not compute r5: whenever the result of a multiplication
// belongs to r5, like a1b4, we multiply it by 19 and add the result to r0.
//
// a4b0 a3b0 a2b0 a1b0 a0b0 +
// a3b1 a2b1 a1b1 a0b1 19×a4b1 +
// a2b2 a1b2 a0b2 19×a4b2 19×a3b2 +
// a1b3 a0b3 19×a4b3 19×a3b3 19×a2b3 +
// a0b4 19×a4b4 19×a3b4 19×a2b4 19×a1b4 =
// --------------------------------------
// r4 r3 r2 r1 r0
//
// Finally we add up the columns into wide, overlapping limbs.
a1_19 := a1 * 19
a2_19 := a2 * 19
a3_19 := a3 * 19
a4_19 := a4 * 19
// r0 = a0×b0 + 19×(a1×b4 + a2×b3 + a3×b2 + a4×b1)
r0 := mul64(a0, b0)
r0 = addMul64(r0, a1_19, b4)
r0 = addMul64(r0, a2_19, b3)
r0 = addMul64(r0, a3_19, b2)
r0 = addMul64(r0, a4_19, b1)
// r1 = a0×b1 + a1×b0 + 19×(a2×b4 + a3×b3 + a4×b2)
r1 := mul64(a0, b1)
r1 = addMul64(r1, a1, b0)
r1 = addMul64(r1, a2_19, b4)
r1 = addMul64(r1, a3_19, b3)
r1 = addMul64(r1, a4_19, b2)
// r2 = a0×b2 + a1×b1 + a2×b0 + 19×(a3×b4 + a4×b3)
r2 := mul64(a0, b2)
r2 = addMul64(r2, a1, b1)
r2 = addMul64(r2, a2, b0)
r2 = addMul64(r2, a3_19, b4)
r2 = addMul64(r2, a4_19, b3)
// r3 = a0×b3 + a1×b2 + a2×b1 + a3×b0 + 19×a4×b4
r3 := mul64(a0, b3)
r3 = addMul64(r3, a1, b2)
r3 = addMul64(r3, a2, b1)
r3 = addMul64(r3, a3, b0)
r3 = addMul64(r3, a4_19, b4)
// r4 = a0×b4 + a1×b3 + a2×b2 + a3×b1 + a4×b0
r4 := mul64(a0, b4)
r4 = addMul64(r4, a1, b3)
r4 = addMul64(r4, a2, b2)
r4 = addMul64(r4, a3, b1)
r4 = addMul64(r4, a4, b0)
// After the multiplication, we need to reduce (carry) the five coefficients
// to obtain a result with limbs that are at most slightly larger than 2⁵¹,
// to respect the Element invariant.
//
// Overall, the reduction works the same as carryPropagate, except with
// wider inputs: we take the carry for each coefficient by shifting it right
// by 51, and add it to the limb above it. The top carry is multiplied by 19
// according to the reduction identity and added to the lowest limb.
//
// The largest coefficient (r0) will be at most 111 bits, which guarantees
// that all carries are at most 111 - 51 = 60 bits, which fits in a uint64.
//
// r0 = a0×b0 + 19×(a1×b4 + a2×b3 + a3×b2 + a4×b1)
// r0 < 2⁵²×2⁵² + 19×(2⁵²×2⁵² + 2⁵²×2⁵² + 2⁵²×2⁵² + 2⁵²×2⁵²)
// r0 < (1 + 19 × 4) × 2⁵² × 2⁵²
// r0 < 2⁷ × 2⁵² × 2⁵²
// r0 < 2¹¹¹
//
// Moreover, the top coefficient (r4) is at most 107 bits, so c4 is at most
// 56 bits, and c4 * 19 is at most 61 bits, which again fits in a uint64 and
// allows us to easily apply the reduction identity.
//
// r4 = a0×b4 + a1×b3 + a2×b2 + a3×b1 + a4×b0
// r4 < 5 × 2⁵² × 2⁵²
// r4 < 2¹⁰⁷
//
c0 := shiftRightBy51(r0)
c1 := shiftRightBy51(r1)
c2 := shiftRightBy51(r2)
c3 := shiftRightBy51(r3)
c4 := shiftRightBy51(r4)
rr0 := r0.lo&maskLow51Bits + c4*19
rr1 := r1.lo&maskLow51Bits + c0
rr2 := r2.lo&maskLow51Bits + c1
rr3 := r3.lo&maskLow51Bits + c2
rr4 := r4.lo&maskLow51Bits + c3
// Now all coefficients fit into 64-bit registers but are still too large to
// be passed around as a Element. We therefore do one last carry chain,
// where the carries will be small enough to fit in the wiggle room above 2⁵¹.
*v = Element{rr0, rr1, rr2, rr3, rr4}
v.carryPropagate()
}
func feSquareGeneric(v, a *Element) {
l0 := a.l0
l1 := a.l1
l2 := a.l2
l3 := a.l3
l4 := a.l4
// Squaring works precisely like multiplication above, but thanks to its
// symmetry we get to group a few terms together.
//
// l4 l3 l2 l1 l0 x
// l4 l3 l2 l1 l0 =
// ------------------------
// l4l0 l3l0 l2l0 l1l0 l0l0 +
// l4l1 l3l1 l2l1 l1l1 l0l1 +
// l4l2 l3l2 l2l2 l1l2 l0l2 +
// l4l3 l3l3 l2l3 l1l3 l0l3 +
// l4l4 l3l4 l2l4 l1l4 l0l4 =
// ----------------------------------------------
// r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0
//
// l4l0 l3l0 l2l0 l1l0 l0l0 +
// l3l1 l2l1 l1l1 l0l1 19×l4l1 +
// l2l2 l1l2 l0l2 19×l4l2 19×l3l2 +
// l1l3 l0l3 19×l4l3 19×l3l3 19×l2l3 +
// l0l4 19×l4l4 19×l3l4 19×l2l4 19×l1l4 =
// --------------------------------------
// r4 r3 r2 r1 r0
//
// With precomputed 2×, 19×, and 2×19× terms, we can compute each limb with
// only three Mul64 and four Add64, instead of five and eight.
l0_2 := l0 * 2
l1_2 := l1 * 2
l1_38 := l1 * 38
l2_38 := l2 * 38
l3_38 := l3 * 38
l3_19 := l3 * 19
l4_19 := l4 * 19
// r0 = l0×l0 + 19×(l1×l4 + l2×l3 + l3×l2 + l4×l1) = l0×l0 + 19×2×(l1×l4 + l2×l3)
r0 := mul64(l0, l0)
r0 = addMul64(r0, l1_38, l4)
r0 = addMul64(r0, l2_38, l3)
// r1 = l0×l1 + l1×l0 + 19×(l2×l4 + l3×l3 + l4×l2) = 2×l0×l1 + 19×2×l2×l4 + 19×l3×l3
r1 := mul64(l0_2, l1)
r1 = addMul64(r1, l2_38, l4)
r1 = addMul64(r1, l3_19, l3)
// r2 = l0×l2 + l1×l1 + l2×l0 + 19×(l3×l4 + l4×l3) = 2×l0×l2 + l1×l1 + 19×2×l3×l4
r2 := mul64(l0_2, l2)
r2 = addMul64(r2, l1, l1)
r2 = addMul64(r2, l3_38, l4)
// r3 = l0×l3 + l1×l2 + l2×l1 + l3×l0 + 19×l4×l4 = 2×l0×l3 + 2×l1×l2 + 19×l4×l4
r3 := mul64(l0_2, l3)
r3 = addMul64(r3, l1_2, l2)
r3 = addMul64(r3, l4_19, l4)
// r4 = l0×l4 + l1×l3 + l2×l2 + l3×l1 + l4×l0 = 2×l0×l4 + 2×l1×l3 + l2×l2
r4 := mul64(l0_2, l4)
r4 = addMul64(r4, l1_2, l3)
r4 = addMul64(r4, l2, l2)
c0 := shiftRightBy51(r0)
c1 := shiftRightBy51(r1)
c2 := shiftRightBy51(r2)
c3 := shiftRightBy51(r3)
c4 := shiftRightBy51(r4)
rr0 := r0.lo&maskLow51Bits + c4*19
rr1 := r1.lo&maskLow51Bits + c0
rr2 := r2.lo&maskLow51Bits + c1
rr3 := r3.lo&maskLow51Bits + c2
rr4 := r4.lo&maskLow51Bits + c3
*v = Element{rr0, rr1, rr2, rr3, rr4}
v.carryPropagate()
}
// carryPropagateGeneric brings the limbs below 52 bits by applying the reduction
// identity (a * 2²⁵⁵ + b = a * 19 + b) to the l4 carry. TODO inline
func (v *Element) carryPropagateGeneric() *Element {
c0 := v.l0 >> 51
c1 := v.l1 >> 51
c2 := v.l2 >> 51
c3 := v.l3 >> 51
c4 := v.l4 >> 51
v.l0 = v.l0&maskLow51Bits + c4*19
v.l1 = v.l1&maskLow51Bits + c0
v.l2 = v.l2&maskLow51Bits + c1
v.l3 = v.l3&maskLow51Bits + c2
v.l4 = v.l4&maskLow51Bits + c3
return v
}
+558
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@@ -0,0 +1,558 @@
// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package field
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"io"
"math/big"
"math/bits"
mathrand "math/rand"
"reflect"
"testing"
"testing/quick"
)
func (v Element) String() string {
return hex.EncodeToString(v.Bytes())
}
// quickCheckConfig1024 will make each quickcheck test run (1024 * -quickchecks)
// times. The default value of -quickchecks is 100.
var quickCheckConfig1024 = &quick.Config{MaxCountScale: 1 << 10}
func generateFieldElement(rand *mathrand.Rand) Element {
const maskLow52Bits = (1 << 52) - 1
return Element{
rand.Uint64() & maskLow52Bits,
rand.Uint64() & maskLow52Bits,
rand.Uint64() & maskLow52Bits,
rand.Uint64() & maskLow52Bits,
rand.Uint64() & maskLow52Bits,
}
}
// weirdLimbs can be combined to generate a range of edge-case field elements.
// 0 and -1 are intentionally more weighted, as they combine well.
var (
weirdLimbs51 = []uint64{
0, 0, 0, 0,
1,
19 - 1,
19,
0x2aaaaaaaaaaaa,
0x5555555555555,
(1 << 51) - 20,
(1 << 51) - 19,
(1 << 51) - 1, (1 << 51) - 1,
(1 << 51) - 1, (1 << 51) - 1,
}
weirdLimbs52 = []uint64{
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
1,
19 - 1,
19,
0x2aaaaaaaaaaaa,
0x5555555555555,
(1 << 51) - 20,
(1 << 51) - 19,
(1 << 51) - 1, (1 << 51) - 1,
(1 << 51) - 1, (1 << 51) - 1,
(1 << 51) - 1, (1 << 51) - 1,
1 << 51,
(1 << 51) + 1,
(1 << 52) - 19,
(1 << 52) - 1,
}
)
func generateWeirdFieldElement(rand *mathrand.Rand) Element {
return Element{
weirdLimbs52[rand.Intn(len(weirdLimbs52))],
weirdLimbs51[rand.Intn(len(weirdLimbs51))],
weirdLimbs51[rand.Intn(len(weirdLimbs51))],
weirdLimbs51[rand.Intn(len(weirdLimbs51))],
weirdLimbs51[rand.Intn(len(weirdLimbs51))],
}
}
func (Element) Generate(rand *mathrand.Rand, size int) reflect.Value {
if rand.Intn(2) == 0 {
return reflect.ValueOf(generateWeirdFieldElement(rand))
}
return reflect.ValueOf(generateFieldElement(rand))
}
// isInBounds returns whether the element is within the expected bit size bounds
// after a light reduction.
func isInBounds(x *Element) bool {
return bits.Len64(x.l0) <= 52 &&
bits.Len64(x.l1) <= 52 &&
bits.Len64(x.l2) <= 52 &&
bits.Len64(x.l3) <= 52 &&
bits.Len64(x.l4) <= 52
}
func TestMultiplyDistributesOverAdd(t *testing.T) {
multiplyDistributesOverAdd := func(x, y, z Element) bool {
// Compute t1 = (x+y)*z
t1 := new(Element)
t1.Add(&x, &y)
t1.Multiply(t1, &z)
// Compute t2 = x*z + y*z
t2 := new(Element)
t3 := new(Element)
t2.Multiply(&x, &z)
t3.Multiply(&y, &z)
t2.Add(t2, t3)
return t1.Equal(t2) == 1 && isInBounds(t1) && isInBounds(t2)
}
if err := quick.Check(multiplyDistributesOverAdd, quickCheckConfig1024); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
}
func TestMul64to128(t *testing.T) {
a := uint64(5)
b := uint64(5)
r := mul64(a, b)
if r.lo != 0x19 || r.hi != 0 {
t.Errorf("lo-range wide mult failed, got %d + %d*(2**64)", r.lo, r.hi)
}
a = uint64(18014398509481983) // 2^54 - 1
b = uint64(18014398509481983) // 2^54 - 1
r = mul64(a, b)
if r.lo != 0xff80000000000001 || r.hi != 0xfffffffffff {
t.Errorf("hi-range wide mult failed, got %d + %d*(2**64)", r.lo, r.hi)
}
a = uint64(1125899906842661)
b = uint64(2097155)
r = mul64(a, b)
r = addMul64(r, a, b)
r = addMul64(r, a, b)
r = addMul64(r, a, b)
r = addMul64(r, a, b)
if r.lo != 16888498990613035 || r.hi != 640 {
t.Errorf("wrong answer: %d + %d*(2**64)", r.lo, r.hi)
}
}
func TestSetBytesRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
f1 := func(in [32]byte, fe Element) bool {
fe.SetBytes(in[:])
// Mask the most significant bit as it's ignored by SetBytes. (Now
// instead of earlier so we check the masking in SetBytes is working.)
in[len(in)-1] &= (1 << 7) - 1
return bytes.Equal(in[:], fe.Bytes()) && isInBounds(&fe)
}
if err := quick.Check(f1, nil); err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed bytes->FE->bytes round-trip: %v", err)
}
f2 := func(fe, r Element) bool {
r.SetBytes(fe.Bytes())
// Intentionally not using Equal not to go through Bytes again.
// Calling reduce because both Generate and SetBytes can produce
// non-canonical representations.
fe.reduce()
r.reduce()
return fe == r
}
if err := quick.Check(f2, nil); err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed FE->bytes->FE round-trip: %v", err)
}
// Check some fixed vectors from dalek
type feRTTest struct {
fe Element
b []byte
}
var tests = []feRTTest{
{
fe: Element{358744748052810, 1691584618240980, 977650209285361, 1429865912637724, 560044844278676},
b: []byte{74, 209, 69, 197, 70, 70, 161, 222, 56, 226, 229, 19, 112, 60, 25, 92, 187, 74, 222, 56, 50, 153, 51, 233, 40, 74, 57, 6, 160, 185, 213, 31},
},
{
fe: Element{84926274344903, 473620666599931, 365590438845504, 1028470286882429, 2146499180330972},
b: []byte{199, 23, 106, 112, 61, 77, 216, 79, 186, 60, 11, 118, 13, 16, 103, 15, 42, 32, 83, 250, 44, 57, 204, 198, 78, 199, 253, 119, 146, 172, 3, 122},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
b := tt.fe.Bytes()
if !bytes.Equal(b, tt.b) || new(Element).SetBytes(tt.b).Equal(&tt.fe) != 1 {
t.Errorf("Failed fixed roundtrip: %v", tt)
}
}
}
func swapEndianness(buf []byte) []byte {
for i := 0; i < len(buf)/2; i++ {
buf[i], buf[len(buf)-i-1] = buf[len(buf)-i-1], buf[i]
}
return buf
}
func TestBytesBigEquivalence(t *testing.T) {
f1 := func(in [32]byte, fe, fe1 Element) bool {
fe.SetBytes(in[:])
in[len(in)-1] &= (1 << 7) - 1 // mask the most significant bit
b := new(big.Int).SetBytes(swapEndianness(in[:]))
fe1.fromBig(b)
if fe != fe1 {
return false
}
buf := make([]byte, 32) // pad with zeroes
copy(buf, swapEndianness(fe1.toBig().Bytes()))
return bytes.Equal(fe.Bytes(), buf) && isInBounds(&fe) && isInBounds(&fe1)
}
if err := quick.Check(f1, nil); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
}
// fromBig sets v = n, and returns v. The bit length of n must not exceed 256.
func (v *Element) fromBig(n *big.Int) *Element {
if n.BitLen() > 32*8 {
panic("edwards25519: invalid field element input size")
}
buf := make([]byte, 0, 32)
for _, word := range n.Bits() {
for i := 0; i < bits.UintSize; i += 8 {
if len(buf) >= cap(buf) {
break
}
buf = append(buf, byte(word))
word >>= 8
}
}
return v.SetBytes(buf[:32])
}
func (v *Element) fromDecimal(s string) *Element {
n, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(s, 10)
if !ok {
panic("not a valid decimal: " + s)
}
return v.fromBig(n)
}
// toBig returns v as a big.Int.
func (v *Element) toBig() *big.Int {
buf := v.Bytes()
words := make([]big.Word, 32*8/bits.UintSize)
for n := range words {
for i := 0; i < bits.UintSize; i += 8 {
if len(buf) == 0 {
break
}
words[n] |= big.Word(buf[0]) << big.Word(i)
buf = buf[1:]
}
}
return new(big.Int).SetBits(words)
}
func TestDecimalConstants(t *testing.T) {
sqrtM1String := "19681161376707505956807079304988542015446066515923890162744021073123829784752"
if exp := new(Element).fromDecimal(sqrtM1String); sqrtM1.Equal(exp) != 1 {
t.Errorf("sqrtM1 is %v, expected %v", sqrtM1, exp)
}
// d is in the parent package, and we don't want to expose d or fromDecimal.
// dString := "37095705934669439343138083508754565189542113879843219016388785533085940283555"
// if exp := new(Element).fromDecimal(dString); d.Equal(exp) != 1 {
// t.Errorf("d is %v, expected %v", d, exp)
// }
}
func TestSetBytesRoundTripEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
// TODO: values close to 0, close to 2^255-19, between 2^255-19 and 2^255-1,
// and between 2^255 and 2^256-1. Test both the documented SetBytes
// behavior, and that Bytes reduces them.
}
// Tests self-consistency between Multiply and Square.
func TestConsistency(t *testing.T) {
var x Element
var x2, x2sq Element
x = Element{1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
x2.Multiply(&x, &x)
x2sq.Square(&x)
if x2 != x2sq {
t.Fatalf("all ones failed\nmul: %x\nsqr: %x\n", x2, x2sq)
}
var bytes [32]byte
_, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, bytes[:])
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
x.SetBytes(bytes[:])
x2.Multiply(&x, &x)
x2sq.Square(&x)
if x2 != x2sq {
t.Fatalf("all ones failed\nmul: %x\nsqr: %x\n", x2, x2sq)
}
}
func TestEqual(t *testing.T) {
x := Element{1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
y := Element{5, 4, 3, 2, 1}
eq := x.Equal(&x)
if eq != 1 {
t.Errorf("wrong about equality")
}
eq = x.Equal(&y)
if eq != 0 {
t.Errorf("wrong about inequality")
}
}
func TestInvert(t *testing.T) {
x := Element{1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
one := Element{1, 0, 0, 0, 0}
var xinv, r Element
xinv.Invert(&x)
r.Multiply(&x, &xinv)
r.reduce()
if one != r {
t.Errorf("inversion identity failed, got: %x", r)
}
var bytes [32]byte
_, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, bytes[:])
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
x.SetBytes(bytes[:])
xinv.Invert(&x)
r.Multiply(&x, &xinv)
r.reduce()
if one != r {
t.Errorf("random inversion identity failed, got: %x for field element %x", r, x)
}
zero := Element{}
x.Set(&zero)
if xx := xinv.Invert(&x); xx != &xinv {
t.Errorf("inverting zero did not return the receiver")
} else if xinv.Equal(&zero) != 1 {
t.Errorf("inverting zero did not return zero")
}
}
func TestSelectSwap(t *testing.T) {
a := Element{358744748052810, 1691584618240980, 977650209285361, 1429865912637724, 560044844278676}
b := Element{84926274344903, 473620666599931, 365590438845504, 1028470286882429, 2146499180330972}
var c, d Element
c.Select(&a, &b, 1)
d.Select(&a, &b, 0)
if c.Equal(&a) != 1 || d.Equal(&b) != 1 {
t.Errorf("Select failed")
}
c.Swap(&d, 0)
if c.Equal(&a) != 1 || d.Equal(&b) != 1 {
t.Errorf("Swap failed")
}
c.Swap(&d, 1)
if c.Equal(&b) != 1 || d.Equal(&a) != 1 {
t.Errorf("Swap failed")
}
}
func TestMult32(t *testing.T) {
mult32EquivalentToMul := func(x Element, y uint32) bool {
t1 := new(Element)
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
t1.Mult32(&x, y)
}
ty := new(Element)
ty.l0 = uint64(y)
t2 := new(Element)
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
t2.Multiply(&x, ty)
}
return t1.Equal(t2) == 1 && isInBounds(t1) && isInBounds(t2)
}
if err := quick.Check(mult32EquivalentToMul, quickCheckConfig1024); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
}
func TestSqrtRatio(t *testing.T) {
// From draft-irtf-cfrg-ristretto255-decaf448-00, Appendix A.4.
type test struct {
u, v string
wasSquare int
r string
}
var tests = []test{
// If u is 0, the function is defined to return (0, TRUE), even if v
// is zero. Note that where used in this package, the denominator v
// is never zero.
{
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
1, "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
},
// 0/1 == 0²
{
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
1, "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
},
// If u is non-zero and v is zero, defined to return (0, FALSE).
{
"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
0, "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
},
// 2/1 is not square in this field.
{
"0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
0, "3c5ff1b5d8e4113b871bd052f9e7bcd0582804c266ffb2d4f4203eb07fdb7c54",
},
// 4/1 == 2²
{
"0400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
1, "0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
},
// 1/4 == (2⁻¹)² == (2^(p-2))² per Euler's theorem
{
"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
1, "f6ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff3f",
},
}
for i, tt := range tests {
u := new(Element).SetBytes(decodeHex(tt.u))
v := new(Element).SetBytes(decodeHex(tt.v))
want := new(Element).SetBytes(decodeHex(tt.r))
got, wasSquare := new(Element).SqrtRatio(u, v)
if got.Equal(want) == 0 || wasSquare != tt.wasSquare {
t.Errorf("%d: got (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)", i, got, wasSquare, want, tt.wasSquare)
}
}
}
func TestCarryPropagate(t *testing.T) {
asmLikeGeneric := func(a [5]uint64) bool {
t1 := &Element{a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3], a[4]}
t2 := &Element{a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3], a[4]}
t1.carryPropagate()
t2.carryPropagateGeneric()
if *t1 != *t2 {
t.Logf("got: %#v,\nexpected: %#v", t1, t2)
}
return *t1 == *t2 && isInBounds(t2)
}
if err := quick.Check(asmLikeGeneric, quickCheckConfig1024); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
if !asmLikeGeneric([5]uint64{0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff}) {
t.Errorf("failed for {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff}")
}
}
func TestFeSquare(t *testing.T) {
asmLikeGeneric := func(a Element) bool {
t1 := a
t2 := a
feSquareGeneric(&t1, &t1)
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
if t1 != t2 {
t.Logf("got: %#v,\nexpected: %#v", t1, t2)
}
return t1 == t2 && isInBounds(&t2)
}
if err := quick.Check(asmLikeGeneric, quickCheckConfig1024); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
}
func TestFeMul(t *testing.T) {
asmLikeGeneric := func(a, b Element) bool {
a1 := a
a2 := a
b1 := b
b2 := b
feMulGeneric(&a1, &a1, &b1)
feMul(&a2, &a2, &b2)
if a1 != a2 || b1 != b2 {
t.Logf("got: %#v,\nexpected: %#v", a1, a2)
t.Logf("got: %#v,\nexpected: %#v", b1, b2)
}
return a1 == a2 && isInBounds(&a2) &&
b1 == b2 && isInBounds(&b2)
}
if err := quick.Check(asmLikeGeneric, quickCheckConfig1024); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
}
func decodeHex(s string) []byte {
b, err := hex.DecodeString(s)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return b
}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
b0c49ae9f59d233526f8934262c5bbbe14d4358d
+19
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
#! /bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
STD_PATH=src/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/field
LOCAL_PATH=curve25519/internal/field
LAST_SYNC_REF=$(cat $LOCAL_PATH/sync.checkpoint)
git fetch https://go.googlesource.com/go master
if git diff --quiet $LAST_SYNC_REF:$STD_PATH FETCH_HEAD:$STD_PATH; then
echo "No changes."
else
NEW_REF=$(git rev-parse FETCH_HEAD | tee $LOCAL_PATH/sync.checkpoint)
echo "Applying changes from $LAST_SYNC_REF to $NEW_REF..."
git diff $LAST_SYNC_REF:$STD_PATH FETCH_HEAD:$STD_PATH | \
git apply -3 --directory=$LOCAL_PATH
fi
+18 -169
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// In Go 1.13, the ed25519 package was promoted to the standard library as
// crypto/ed25519, and this package became a wrapper for the standard library one.
//
// +build !go1.13
// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm. See
// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/.
//
@@ -15,21 +10,15 @@
// representation includes a public key suffix to make multiple signing
// operations with the same key more efficient. This package refers to the RFC
// 8032 private key as the “seed”.
//
// Beginning with Go 1.13, the functionality of this package was moved to the
// standard library as crypto/ed25519. This package only acts as a compatibility
// wrapper.
package ed25519
// This code is a port of the public domain, “ref10” implementation of ed25519
// from SUPERCOP.
import (
"bytes"
"crypto"
cryptorand "crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha512"
"errors"
"crypto/ed25519"
"io"
"strconv"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519"
)
const (
@@ -44,57 +33,21 @@ const (
)
// PublicKey is the type of Ed25519 public keys.
type PublicKey []byte
//
// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PublicKey type.
// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
type PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey
// PrivateKey is the type of Ed25519 private keys. It implements crypto.Signer.
type PrivateKey []byte
// Public returns the PublicKey corresponding to priv.
func (priv PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
publicKey := make([]byte, PublicKeySize)
copy(publicKey, priv[32:])
return PublicKey(publicKey)
}
// Seed returns the private key seed corresponding to priv. It is provided for
// interoperability with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds
// in this package.
func (priv PrivateKey) Seed() []byte {
seed := make([]byte, SeedSize)
copy(seed, priv[:32])
return seed
}
// Sign signs the given message with priv.
// Ed25519 performs two passes over messages to be signed and therefore cannot
// handle pre-hashed messages. Thus opts.HashFunc() must return zero to
// indicate the message hasn't been hashed. This can be achieved by passing
// crypto.Hash(0) as the value for opts.
func (priv PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, message []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (signature []byte, err error) {
if opts.HashFunc() != crypto.Hash(0) {
return nil, errors.New("ed25519: cannot sign hashed message")
}
return Sign(priv, message), nil
}
//
// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PrivateKey type.
// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
type PrivateKey = ed25519.PrivateKey
// GenerateKey generates a public/private key pair using entropy from rand.
// If rand is nil, crypto/rand.Reader will be used.
func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) {
if rand == nil {
rand = cryptorand.Reader
}
seed := make([]byte, SeedSize)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, seed); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
privateKey := NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
publicKey := make([]byte, PublicKeySize)
copy(publicKey, privateKey[32:])
return publicKey, privateKey, nil
return ed25519.GenerateKey(rand)
}
// NewKeyFromSeed calculates a private key from a seed. It will panic if
@@ -102,121 +55,17 @@ func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) {
// with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds in this
// package.
func NewKeyFromSeed(seed []byte) PrivateKey {
if l := len(seed); l != SeedSize {
panic("ed25519: bad seed length: " + strconv.Itoa(l))
}
digest := sha512.Sum512(seed)
digest[0] &= 248
digest[31] &= 127
digest[31] |= 64
var A edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
var hBytes [32]byte
copy(hBytes[:], digest[:])
edwards25519.GeScalarMultBase(&A, &hBytes)
var publicKeyBytes [32]byte
A.ToBytes(&publicKeyBytes)
privateKey := make([]byte, PrivateKeySize)
copy(privateKey, seed)
copy(privateKey[32:], publicKeyBytes[:])
return privateKey
return ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
}
// Sign signs the message with privateKey and returns a signature. It will
// panic if len(privateKey) is not PrivateKeySize.
func Sign(privateKey PrivateKey, message []byte) []byte {
if l := len(privateKey); l != PrivateKeySize {
panic("ed25519: bad private key length: " + strconv.Itoa(l))
}
h := sha512.New()
h.Write(privateKey[:32])
var digest1, messageDigest, hramDigest [64]byte
var expandedSecretKey [32]byte
h.Sum(digest1[:0])
copy(expandedSecretKey[:], digest1[:])
expandedSecretKey[0] &= 248
expandedSecretKey[31] &= 63
expandedSecretKey[31] |= 64
h.Reset()
h.Write(digest1[32:])
h.Write(message)
h.Sum(messageDigest[:0])
var messageDigestReduced [32]byte
edwards25519.ScReduce(&messageDigestReduced, &messageDigest)
var R edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
edwards25519.GeScalarMultBase(&R, &messageDigestReduced)
var encodedR [32]byte
R.ToBytes(&encodedR)
h.Reset()
h.Write(encodedR[:])
h.Write(privateKey[32:])
h.Write(message)
h.Sum(hramDigest[:0])
var hramDigestReduced [32]byte
edwards25519.ScReduce(&hramDigestReduced, &hramDigest)
var s [32]byte
edwards25519.ScMulAdd(&s, &hramDigestReduced, &expandedSecretKey, &messageDigestReduced)
signature := make([]byte, SignatureSize)
copy(signature[:], encodedR[:])
copy(signature[32:], s[:])
return signature
return ed25519.Sign(privateKey, message)
}
// Verify reports whether sig is a valid signature of message by publicKey. It
// will panic if len(publicKey) is not PublicKeySize.
func Verify(publicKey PublicKey, message, sig []byte) bool {
if l := len(publicKey); l != PublicKeySize {
panic("ed25519: bad public key length: " + strconv.Itoa(l))
}
if len(sig) != SignatureSize || sig[63]&224 != 0 {
return false
}
var A edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
var publicKeyBytes [32]byte
copy(publicKeyBytes[:], publicKey)
if !A.FromBytes(&publicKeyBytes) {
return false
}
edwards25519.FeNeg(&A.X, &A.X)
edwards25519.FeNeg(&A.T, &A.T)
h := sha512.New()
h.Write(sig[:32])
h.Write(publicKey[:])
h.Write(message)
var digest [64]byte
h.Sum(digest[:0])
var hReduced [32]byte
edwards25519.ScReduce(&hReduced, &digest)
var R edwards25519.ProjectiveGroupElement
var s [32]byte
copy(s[:], sig[32:])
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7 requires that s be in
// the range [0, order) in order to prevent signature malleability.
if !edwards25519.ScMinimal(&s) {
return false
}
edwards25519.GeDoubleScalarMultVartime(&R, &hReduced, &A, &s)
var checkR [32]byte
R.ToBytes(&checkR)
return bytes.Equal(sig[:32], checkR[:])
return ed25519.Verify(publicKey, message, sig)
}
-73
View File
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.13
// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm. See
// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/.
//
// These functions are also compatible with the “Ed25519” function defined in
// RFC 8032. However, unlike RFC 8032's formulation, this package's private key
// representation includes a public key suffix to make multiple signing
// operations with the same key more efficient. This package refers to the RFC
// 8032 private key as the “seed”.
//
// Beginning with Go 1.13, the functionality of this package was moved to the
// standard library as crypto/ed25519. This package only acts as a compatibility
// wrapper.
package ed25519
import (
"crypto/ed25519"
"io"
)
const (
// PublicKeySize is the size, in bytes, of public keys as used in this package.
PublicKeySize = 32
// PrivateKeySize is the size, in bytes, of private keys as used in this package.
PrivateKeySize = 64
// SignatureSize is the size, in bytes, of signatures generated and verified by this package.
SignatureSize = 64
// SeedSize is the size, in bytes, of private key seeds. These are the private key representations used by RFC 8032.
SeedSize = 32
)
// PublicKey is the type of Ed25519 public keys.
//
// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PublicKey type.
// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
type PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey
// PrivateKey is the type of Ed25519 private keys. It implements crypto.Signer.
//
// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PrivateKey type.
// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
type PrivateKey = ed25519.PrivateKey
// GenerateKey generates a public/private key pair using entropy from rand.
// If rand is nil, crypto/rand.Reader will be used.
func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) {
return ed25519.GenerateKey(rand)
}
// NewKeyFromSeed calculates a private key from a seed. It will panic if
// len(seed) is not SeedSize. This function is provided for interoperability
// with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds in this
// package.
func NewKeyFromSeed(seed []byte) PrivateKey {
return ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
}
// Sign signs the message with privateKey and returns a signature. It will
// panic if len(privateKey) is not PrivateKeySize.
func Sign(privateKey PrivateKey, message []byte) []byte {
return ed25519.Sign(privateKey, message)
}
// Verify reports whether sig is a valid signature of message by publicKey. It
// will panic if len(publicKey) is not PublicKeySize.
func Verify(publicKey PublicKey, message, sig []byte) bool {
return ed25519.Verify(publicKey, message, sig)
}
+4 -203
View File
@@ -1,221 +1,22 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ed25519_test
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"crypto"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"os"
"strings"
ed25519std "crypto/ed25519"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519"
)
type zeroReader struct{}
func (zeroReader) Read(buf []byte) (int, error) {
for i := range buf {
buf[i] = 0
}
return len(buf), nil
}
func TestUnmarshalMarshal(t *testing.T) {
pub, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
var A edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
var pubBytes [32]byte
copy(pubBytes[:], pub)
if !A.FromBytes(&pubBytes) {
t.Fatalf("ExtendedGroupElement.FromBytes failed")
}
var pub2 [32]byte
A.ToBytes(&pub2)
if pubBytes != pub2 {
t.Errorf("FromBytes(%v)->ToBytes does not round-trip, got %x\n", pubBytes, pub2)
}
}
func TestSignVerify(t *testing.T) {
var zero zeroReader
public, private, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(zero)
func TestTypeAlias(t *testing.T) {
public, private, _ := ed25519std.GenerateKey(nil)
message := []byte("test message")
sig := ed25519.Sign(private, message)
if !ed25519.Verify(public, message, sig) {
t.Errorf("valid signature rejected")
}
wrongMessage := []byte("wrong message")
if ed25519.Verify(public, wrongMessage, sig) {
t.Errorf("signature of different message accepted")
}
}
func TestCryptoSigner(t *testing.T) {
var zero zeroReader
public, private, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(zero)
signer := crypto.Signer(private)
publicInterface := signer.Public()
public2, ok := publicInterface.(ed25519.PublicKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected PublicKey from Public() but got %T", publicInterface)
}
if !bytes.Equal(public, public2) {
t.Errorf("public keys do not match: original:%x vs Public():%x", public, public2)
}
message := []byte("message")
var noHash crypto.Hash
signature, err := signer.Sign(zero, message, noHash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("error from Sign(): %s", err)
}
if !ed25519.Verify(public, message, signature) {
t.Errorf("Verify failed on signature from Sign()")
}
}
func TestGolden(t *testing.T) {
// sign.input.gz is a selection of test cases from
// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/python/sign.input
testDataZ, err := os.Open("testdata/sign.input.gz")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer testDataZ.Close()
testData, err := gzip.NewReader(testDataZ)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer testData.Close()
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(testData)
lineNo := 0
for scanner.Scan() {
lineNo++
line := scanner.Text()
parts := strings.Split(line, ":")
if len(parts) != 5 {
t.Fatalf("bad number of parts on line %d", lineNo)
}
privBytes, _ := hex.DecodeString(parts[0])
pubKey, _ := hex.DecodeString(parts[1])
msg, _ := hex.DecodeString(parts[2])
sig, _ := hex.DecodeString(parts[3])
// The signatures in the test vectors also include the message
// at the end, but we just want R and S.
sig = sig[:ed25519.SignatureSize]
if l := len(pubKey); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
t.Fatalf("bad public key length on line %d: got %d bytes", lineNo, l)
}
var priv [ed25519.PrivateKeySize]byte
copy(priv[:], privBytes)
copy(priv[32:], pubKey)
sig2 := ed25519.Sign(priv[:], msg)
if !bytes.Equal(sig, sig2[:]) {
t.Errorf("different signature result on line %d: %x vs %x", lineNo, sig, sig2)
}
if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, msg, sig2) {
t.Errorf("signature failed to verify on line %d", lineNo)
}
priv2 := ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(priv[:32])
if !bytes.Equal(priv[:], priv2) {
t.Errorf("recreating key pair gave different private key on line %d: %x vs %x", lineNo, priv[:], priv2)
}
if pubKey2 := priv2.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey); !bytes.Equal(pubKey, pubKey2) {
t.Errorf("recreating key pair gave different public key on line %d: %x vs %x", lineNo, pubKey, pubKey2)
}
if seed := priv2.Seed(); !bytes.Equal(priv[:32], seed) {
t.Errorf("recreating key pair gave different seed on line %d: %x vs %x", lineNo, priv[:32], seed)
}
}
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("error reading test data: %s", err)
}
}
func TestMalleability(t *testing.T) {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7 adds an additional test
// that s be in [0, order). This prevents someone from adding a multiple of
// order to s and obtaining a second valid signature for the same message.
msg := []byte{0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74}
sig := []byte{
0x7c, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x26, 0xf2, 0x9e, 0x14, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0x05, 0x9a,
0x0f, 0x2d, 0xb8, 0xb0, 0xcd, 0x78, 0x30, 0x40, 0x60, 0x9a, 0x8b,
0xe6, 0x84, 0xdb, 0x12, 0xf8, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x77, 0x4a, 0xb0, 0x67,
0x65, 0x4b, 0xce, 0x38, 0x32, 0xc2, 0xd7, 0x6f, 0x8f, 0x6f, 0x5d,
0xaf, 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x39, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xf6, 0x76, 0x57, 0x33,
0x36, 0xa5, 0xc5, 0x1e, 0xb6, 0xf9, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x1d,
}
publicKey := []byte{
0x7d, 0x4d, 0x0e, 0x7f, 0x61, 0x53, 0xa6, 0x9b, 0x62, 0x42, 0xb5,
0x22, 0xab, 0xbe, 0xe6, 0x85, 0xfd, 0xa4, 0x42, 0x0f, 0x88, 0x34,
0xb1, 0x08, 0xc3, 0xbd, 0xae, 0x36, 0x9e, 0xf5, 0x49, 0xfa,
}
if ed25519.Verify(publicKey, msg, sig) {
t.Fatal("non-canonical signature accepted")
}
}
func BenchmarkKeyGeneration(b *testing.B) {
var zero zeroReader
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if _, _, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(zero); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
func BenchmarkSigning(b *testing.B) {
var zero zeroReader
_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(zero)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
message := []byte("Hello, world!")
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
ed25519.Sign(priv, message)
}
}
func BenchmarkVerification(b *testing.B) {
var zero zeroReader
pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(zero)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
message := []byte("Hello, world!")
signature := ed25519.Sign(priv, message)
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
ed25519.Verify(pub, message, signature)
}
}
-24
View File
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.13
package ed25519_test
import (
ed25519std "crypto/ed25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
"testing"
)
func TestTypeAlias(t *testing.T) {
var zero zeroReader
public, private, _ := ed25519std.GenerateKey(zero)
message := []byte("test message")
sig := ed25519.Sign(private, message)
if !ed25519.Verify(public, message, sig) {
t.Errorf("valid signature rejected")
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
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BIN
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+6 -3
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
module golang.org/x/crypto
go 1.11
go 1.17
require (
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190404232315-eb5bcb51f2a3
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190412213103-97732733099d
golang.org/x/net v0.8.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0
golang.org/x/term v0.6.0
)
require golang.org/x/text v0.8.0 // indirect

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