Revert "chacha20: don't panic encrypting the final blocks"
This reverts CL 224279. Reason for revert: broken on arm64, ppc64le and s390x 😢 Change-Id: I8632ee78a79696a3117c81729904797233e0071d Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/229118 Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
This commit is contained in:
+18
-40
@@ -42,14 +42,10 @@ type Cipher struct {
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// The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous
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// XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are
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// computed at a time by xorKeyStreamBlocks.
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// computed at a time.
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buf [bufSize]byte
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len int
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// overflow is set when the counter overflowed, no more blocks can be
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// generated, and the next XORKeyStream call should panic.
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overflow bool
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// The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they
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// are computed the first time.
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precompDone bool
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@@ -143,18 +139,15 @@ func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
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// SetCounter sets the Cipher counter. The next invocation of XORKeyStream will
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// behave as if (64 * counter) bytes had been encrypted so far.
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//
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// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is less
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// than the current value.
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//
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// Note that the execution time of XORKeyStream is not independent of the
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// counter value.
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// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is
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// less than the current value.
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func (s *Cipher) SetCounter(counter uint32) {
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// Internally, s may buffer multiple blocks, which complicates this
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// implementation slightly. When checking whether the counter has rolled
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// back, we must use both s.counter and s.len to determine how many blocks
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// we have already output.
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outputCounter := s.counter - uint32(s.len)/blockSize
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if s.overflow || counter < outputCounter {
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if counter < outputCounter {
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panic("chacha20: SetCounter attempted to rollback counter")
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}
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@@ -203,52 +196,34 @@ func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
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dst[i] = src[i] ^ b
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}
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s.len -= len(keyStream)
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dst, src = dst[len(keyStream):], src[len(keyStream):]
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}
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if len(src) == 0 {
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return
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src = src[len(keyStream):]
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dst = dst[len(keyStream):]
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}
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// If we'd need to let the counter overflow and keep generating output,
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// panic immediately. If instead we'd only reach the last block, remember
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// not to generate any more output after the buffer is drained.
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numBlocks := (uint64(len(src)) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
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if s.overflow || uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks > 1<<32 {
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const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
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numBufs := (uint64(len(src)) + bufSize - 1) / bufSize
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if uint64(s.counter)+numBufs*blocksPerBuf >= 1<<32 {
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panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
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} else if uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks == 1<<32 {
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s.overflow = true
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}
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// xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a
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// multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a
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// time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize.
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full := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
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rem := len(src) % bufSize
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full := len(src) - rem
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if full > 0 {
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s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full])
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}
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dst, src = dst[full:], src[full:]
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// If using a multi-block xorKeyStreamBlocks would overflow, use the generic
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// one that does one block at a time.
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const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
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if uint64(s.counter)+blocksPerBuf > 1<<32 {
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s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
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numBlocks := (len(src) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
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buf := s.buf[bufSize-numBlocks*blockSize:]
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copy(buf, src)
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s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(buf, buf)
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s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, buf)
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return
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}
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// If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and
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// keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation.
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if len(src) > 0 {
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if rem > 0 {
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s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
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copy(s.buf[:], src)
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copy(s.buf[:], src[full:])
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s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:])
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s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, s.buf[:])
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s.len = bufSize - copy(dst[full:], s.buf[:])
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}
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}
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@@ -329,6 +304,9 @@ func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) {
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x15 += c15
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s.counter += 1
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if s.counter == 0 {
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panic("chacha20: internal error: counter overflow")
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}
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in, out := src[i:], dst[i:]
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in, out = in[:blockSize], out[:blockSize] // bounds check elimination hint
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+5
-48
@@ -148,54 +148,11 @@ func TestSetCounter(t *testing.T) {
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if !panics(func() { s.SetCounter(0) }) {
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t.Error("counter decreasing should trigger a panic")
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}
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}
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func TestLastBlock(t *testing.T) {
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panics := func(fn func()) (p bool) {
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defer func() { p = recover() != nil }()
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fn()
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return
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}
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// setting the counter to 0xffffffff and crypting multiple blocks should
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// trigger a panic
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s, _ := NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
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s.SetCounter(0xffffffff)
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blocks := make([]byte, blockSize*2)
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if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(blocks, blocks) }) {
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t.Error("crypting multiple blocks should trigger a panic")
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}
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// setting the counter to 0xffffffff - 1 and crypting two blocks should not
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// trigger a panic
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s, _ = NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
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s.SetCounter(0xffffffff - 1)
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if panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(blocks, blocks) }) {
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t.Error("crypting the last blocks should not trigger a panic")
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}
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// once all the keystream is spent, setting the counter should panic
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if !panics(func() { s.SetCounter(0xffffffff) }) {
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t.Error("setting the counter after overflow should trigger a panic")
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}
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// crypting a subsequent block *should* panic
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block := make([]byte, blockSize)
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if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block, block) }) {
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t.Error("crypting after overflow should trigger a panic")
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}
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// if we crypt less than a full block, we should be able to crypt the rest
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// in a subsequent call without panicking
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s, _ = NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
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s.SetCounter(0xffffffff)
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if panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block[7:], block[7:]) }) {
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t.Error("crypting part of the last block should not trigger a panic")
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}
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if panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block[:7], block[:7]) }) {
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t.Error("crypting part of the last block should not trigger a panic")
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}
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// as before, a third call should trigger a panic because all keystream is spent
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if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block[:1], block[:1]) }) {
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t.Error("crypting after overflow should trigger a panic")
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// advancing to ^uint32(0) and then calling XORKeyStream should cause a panic
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s = newCipher()
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s.SetCounter(^uint32(0))
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if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream([]byte{0}, []byte{0}) }) {
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t.Error("counter overflowing should trigger a panic")
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}
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}
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