Revert "chacha20: don't panic encrypting the final blocks"

This reverts CL 224279.

Reason for revert: broken on arm64, ppc64le and s390x 😢

Change-Id: I8632ee78a79696a3117c81729904797233e0071d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/229118
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
This commit is contained in:
Filippo Valsorda
2020-04-20 19:28:32 +00:00
parent 1c2c788b11
commit a76a400e30
2 changed files with 23 additions and 88 deletions
+18 -40
View File
@@ -42,14 +42,10 @@ type Cipher struct {
// The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous
// XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are
// computed at a time by xorKeyStreamBlocks.
// computed at a time.
buf [bufSize]byte
len int
// overflow is set when the counter overflowed, no more blocks can be
// generated, and the next XORKeyStream call should panic.
overflow bool
// The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they
// are computed the first time.
precompDone bool
@@ -143,18 +139,15 @@ func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
// SetCounter sets the Cipher counter. The next invocation of XORKeyStream will
// behave as if (64 * counter) bytes had been encrypted so far.
//
// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is less
// than the current value.
//
// Note that the execution time of XORKeyStream is not independent of the
// counter value.
// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is
// less than the current value.
func (s *Cipher) SetCounter(counter uint32) {
// Internally, s may buffer multiple blocks, which complicates this
// implementation slightly. When checking whether the counter has rolled
// back, we must use both s.counter and s.len to determine how many blocks
// we have already output.
outputCounter := s.counter - uint32(s.len)/blockSize
if s.overflow || counter < outputCounter {
if counter < outputCounter {
panic("chacha20: SetCounter attempted to rollback counter")
}
@@ -203,52 +196,34 @@ func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
dst[i] = src[i] ^ b
}
s.len -= len(keyStream)
dst, src = dst[len(keyStream):], src[len(keyStream):]
}
if len(src) == 0 {
return
src = src[len(keyStream):]
dst = dst[len(keyStream):]
}
// If we'd need to let the counter overflow and keep generating output,
// panic immediately. If instead we'd only reach the last block, remember
// not to generate any more output after the buffer is drained.
numBlocks := (uint64(len(src)) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
if s.overflow || uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks > 1<<32 {
const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
numBufs := (uint64(len(src)) + bufSize - 1) / bufSize
if uint64(s.counter)+numBufs*blocksPerBuf >= 1<<32 {
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
} else if uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks == 1<<32 {
s.overflow = true
}
// xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a
// multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a
// time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize.
full := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
rem := len(src) % bufSize
full := len(src) - rem
if full > 0 {
s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full])
}
dst, src = dst[full:], src[full:]
// If using a multi-block xorKeyStreamBlocks would overflow, use the generic
// one that does one block at a time.
const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
if uint64(s.counter)+blocksPerBuf > 1<<32 {
s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
numBlocks := (len(src) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
buf := s.buf[bufSize-numBlocks*blockSize:]
copy(buf, src)
s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(buf, buf)
s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, buf)
return
}
// If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and
// keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation.
if len(src) > 0 {
if rem > 0 {
s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
copy(s.buf[:], src)
copy(s.buf[:], src[full:])
s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:])
s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, s.buf[:])
s.len = bufSize - copy(dst[full:], s.buf[:])
}
}
@@ -329,6 +304,9 @@ func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) {
x15 += c15
s.counter += 1
if s.counter == 0 {
panic("chacha20: internal error: counter overflow")
}
in, out := src[i:], dst[i:]
in, out = in[:blockSize], out[:blockSize] // bounds check elimination hint
+5 -48
View File
@@ -148,54 +148,11 @@ func TestSetCounter(t *testing.T) {
if !panics(func() { s.SetCounter(0) }) {
t.Error("counter decreasing should trigger a panic")
}
}
func TestLastBlock(t *testing.T) {
panics := func(fn func()) (p bool) {
defer func() { p = recover() != nil }()
fn()
return
}
// setting the counter to 0xffffffff and crypting multiple blocks should
// trigger a panic
s, _ := NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
s.SetCounter(0xffffffff)
blocks := make([]byte, blockSize*2)
if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(blocks, blocks) }) {
t.Error("crypting multiple blocks should trigger a panic")
}
// setting the counter to 0xffffffff - 1 and crypting two blocks should not
// trigger a panic
s, _ = NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
s.SetCounter(0xffffffff - 1)
if panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(blocks, blocks) }) {
t.Error("crypting the last blocks should not trigger a panic")
}
// once all the keystream is spent, setting the counter should panic
if !panics(func() { s.SetCounter(0xffffffff) }) {
t.Error("setting the counter after overflow should trigger a panic")
}
// crypting a subsequent block *should* panic
block := make([]byte, blockSize)
if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block, block) }) {
t.Error("crypting after overflow should trigger a panic")
}
// if we crypt less than a full block, we should be able to crypt the rest
// in a subsequent call without panicking
s, _ = NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, KeySize), make([]byte, NonceSize))
s.SetCounter(0xffffffff)
if panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block[7:], block[7:]) }) {
t.Error("crypting part of the last block should not trigger a panic")
}
if panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block[:7], block[:7]) }) {
t.Error("crypting part of the last block should not trigger a panic")
}
// as before, a third call should trigger a panic because all keystream is spent
if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream(block[:1], block[:1]) }) {
t.Error("crypting after overflow should trigger a panic")
// advancing to ^uint32(0) and then calling XORKeyStream should cause a panic
s = newCipher()
s.SetCounter(^uint32(0))
if !panics(func() { s.XORKeyStream([]byte{0}, []byte{0}) }) {
t.Error("counter overflowing should trigger a panic")
}
}