Previously if you created a new Entity then ran `Serialize` _before_ running `SerializePrivate`, the resulting armored public key was corrupted, giving the error of `unexpected EOF`. This fix signs the public key with the private key upon creation of a NewEntity. Since SerializePrivate only is applicable to entities created with NewEntity per the docs we can also safely remove the signing portion from that function.
Fixes#25463
Change-Id: I58b808987ee173079f33bce3d6c3527f9233b2cd
GitHub-Last-Rev: 2c4b8e4d630a06d782816f8fbd3d59f01ece2565
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#47
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/114001
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
MPIs are (supposed to be) stripped of leading zeroes. Avoid passing
such short values into crypto/rsa, even if it currently happens to work.
Change-Id: I5a5f4813b8358e83fcc2deeda1272d2733814542
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/100844
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Rather than rounding the `type || X || Y` byte sequence to the next
8-bit boundary, packet.NewECDSAPublicKey() now rounds the X and Y
coordinates individually, then adds the bitlength 3 of type 4
(compressed). For NIST P-256, this leads to a bit length of 515,
rather than 520. GnuPG calculates 515 as well, and
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6637#section-6 explicitly states that
"the exact size of the MPI payload is 515 bits for 'Curve P-256,'"
so the new formula is consistent.
Fixesgolang/go#23460
Change-Id: I64b340d1c761bfd795a1a64dc2f7a831c8b2ff32
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/87995
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
The openpgp package promotes bad defaults by not setting the
preferred cipher and hash of new entities created by
`openpgp.NewEntity`.
The preferred hash can be set by passing a `packet.Config`
with a `DefaultHash` set, but the same cannot be done for
the preferred cipher.
This change copies the DefaultCipher into the self-signature, similar to
DefaultHash.
Change-Id: I80e1289d67b7cd4079be8c1d5ba603a555dbe5c1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/66430
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Confusingly, `Identity.Name` should actually refer to `uid.Id` and not
`uid.Name`. This fixes the code in NewEntity, and creates a test case to
verify.
Change-Id: Id46de876fc7b0359faecfeb9b09a8e454710d485
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/92595
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
None are "wrong" per se, but there are a lot of good suggestions and
in one case a docstring that was not present in godoc due to the
presence of an extra newline.
Changed "Id" in struct properties to "ID" in some non-exported
structs. Removed a trailing period from some error messages; I believe
the exact contents of error strings are not covered by the Go
compatibility promise.
Change-Id: I7c620582dc247396f72c52d38c909ccc0ec87b83
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/80145
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The existing implementation checks to see if the session key size is a
multiple of the cipher blocksize. This fails for AES-192, which has a
keysize of 24 bytes and a 16 byte block size. Instead it should simply
check to ensure that the Session Key length is equal to the cipher
KeySize.
Fixesgolang/go#17060
Change-Id: I1dc78129f7fb2ca5ec71b650a2adcb3752dca885
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/35848
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
This adds support for crypto.Signer-based RSA and ECDSA private keys.
This enables using opaque signing keys as explained in the documentation
for crypto.Signer.
The support is in the form of a new NewSignerPrivateKey function which
makes a PrivateKey from a crypto.Signer.
Fixesgolang/go#15841.
Change-Id: Ice2ec2793a9f5409a5bfd4e5e49d919e14ede1e0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/23802
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Say the user wants to create a NewEntity, then Serialize the private and public
keys. Then call Encrypt. The Hash used first for Encrypt will be `RIPEMD160`,
which is not compiled in by default. So say they _specifically_ pass
crypto.SHA256 as the Default hash to NewEntity, this should set the
PreferredHash in the SelfSignature so they can be encrypted with that hash.
Related to golang/go#12153
Change-Id: I3d89f9d60f9abb29ec8365f81da38b8cd0594587
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/23209
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Signature#SignUserId was ignoring the error returned by userIdSignatureHash.
This error can happen, for example, when the Signature's Hash property is
uninitialized. Not returning the error makes it hard for the user to detect
the problem.
Change-Id: I0ae0033e77bfb1ea1c06b0769f949e48c713adc6
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/27997
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Previously, only V4 signatures were allowed in PGP messages,
and attempts to digest a message with a V3 signature would
yield an `errors.StructuralError("LiteralData not followed by Signature")`.
This patch fixes this shortcoming, by trying to consume either
signature type and verifying accordingly.
Change-Id: I27c8ea781b75b0f7dfc42c01e7de40f3323e9579
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/14794
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
When parsing a truncated clearsigned message (one that includes the
opening header but no armored data), the existing implementation of
clearsign.Decode() hangs in an infinite loop. This commit changes
Decode() to detect the end of the buffer and return as if no
clearsigned message was found.
Change-Id: Ibc85b29a08d22868470f48fe300bf8fcb4749768
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/17693
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
When writing keys that contain ElGamal subkeys, the openpgp
package would previously return an error.
Change-Id: I1c487f4a9cfb92b40e99e9be6aa4ed5928e36dbe
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/18254
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
SymmetricKeyEncrypted cached the results of decryption so, if a bad
password was given, ReadMessage would prompt forever because a later,
correct password wouldn't override the cached decryption.
The SymmetricKeyEncrypted object can't know whether a given passphrase
is correct so it should never have been a mutable object in the first
place. This change makes it so that it doesn't cache anything.
Fixes#9315
Change-Id: Ic2b75f7f60a575e2182ac7e5c5d4198597c5d0a2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/14038
Reviewed-by: Andrew Gerrand <adg@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
clearsign.Encode currently creates bad signatures for inputs containing
lines that that consist of only whitespace (gpg --verify and
clearsign.Decode both agree the signature is bad).
RFC 4880 section 7.1 says trailing whitespace is removed when generating
the signature. The previous code correctly handled this for the case of
not being at the beginning of the line by buffering the whitespace.
The previous code had incorrect behavior for the case of being at the
beginning of a line. It was only special-casing dashes and newlines,
directly hashing all other characters.
This happened to work for lines that had leading whitespace followed by
non-whitespace characters, since in that case the leading whitespace is
not trailing.
However, this behavior is incorrect for whitespace-only lines: The
previous code would incorrectly add the first whitespace character to
the hash, when instead it should have been dropped.
This commit moves the whitespace check so that it always happens,
regardless of whether we are at the beginning of a line.
This adds a few tests to capture the expected behavior. The last three
tests fail without the included code change.
Change-Id: I17848b8aaad6f7a4cee414d486be236f7edddd0b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/13681
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
parseRSAPrivateKey calls rsa.PrivateKey.Precompute which triggers
divide-by-zero panic if either p or q is 1. Sanity check the parsed
values by calling rsa.PrivateKey.Validate.
Fixesgolang/go#11505
Change-Id: Ia6c9eccca0cfa49aaa58716e708c557a788bb204
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/12356
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Some invalid input may be parsed so that the length of an opaque
subpacket turns out to be 0. In such cases, arrange for a
StructuralError to be returned indicating truncation.
Found using gofuzz.
Fixesgolang/go#11503
Change-Id: Ib9ce8c604f35a31f852adfcd56a22dfd143a9443
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/12634
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
The new function allows an existing encrypted key packet
to be serialized to a Writer.
Change-Id: I20d82ca473d8ae738d239068626897c1ff868a15
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/3167
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
packet/packet.go: add ECDSA to the algorithms in CanSign()
packet/signature.go: add support for the features subpacket (which is
used to signal support for the MDC packet)
openpgp/read_test.go: add a key generated by End-to-End as a testcase
(End-to-End's keys are unusual: they set critical bits)
Change-Id: Ifaf3922cd35ea27cf1276d7a8238dd50536eb4ed
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/2058
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
This patch allows the user to choose the strength of the
passphrase mangling during the process in which the key is
produced from the passphrase. It only affects symmetric
encryption.
Unmodified code that calls openpgp.SymmetricallyEncrypt() will
continue to get the now-default count of 65536. Otherwise, a
count in the range [1024, 65011712] may be configured. Illegal
values in and outside this range will silently be rounded up
to legal values within the said range.
The test to s2k.Serialize() has been modified to test a
variety of non-default counts with all the valid hashes and
ensure that the decoding component of s2k can parse and
decrypt the result.
Additional testing has been done with GPG to ensure that the
latter can parse and decrypt files encrypted/encoded with
various counts.
LGTM=agl
R=golang-codereviews, agl
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/176080043
This patch/CL allows the user to configure the hash function
used in the s2k key-stretching transformation during
encryption. It fixes the current limitation in which SHA1 is
hard-coded for that task.
With this change, packet.Config.DefaultHash is used by default
for the mode 3 s2k key-stretching that is currently used for
encryption, but the user may choose any other valid openpgp
hash by passing a new (possibly nil) pointer argument to
s2k.Serialize().
Note that this change introduces an API change to
s2k.Serialize() in the form of an additional
argument. However, the s2k package is a low-level facility
that (as far as I could tell) is used directly by
go.crypto/openpgp only.
The CL comes with an modified test to check the use and
decoding of all the valid hash functions with regard to
s2k.Serialize().
This patch should be followed by one that allows the user to
configure the iteration count in mode 3 s2k, and it is a
prerequisite for that forthcoming change.
R=golang-codereviews, agl
CC=agl, golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/160110045
Since the decryption was done in place, if an incorrect key was given,
the encrypted data would be corrupted.
Fixesgolang/go#8439.
R=bradfitz
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/115550043
In the event that a detached signature fails to verify, the code would
continue trying to find other keys with the same key ID and eventually
conclude that the signature was issued by someone unknown
(ErrUnknownIssuer).
With this change, the signature verification error would be returned
instead. (Technically the last error if several keys had a matching key
id and neither verified.)
Fixesgolang/go#8509.
LGTM=bradfitz
R=bradfitz
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/125030043
At some point in the distant past, crypto.Hash.New() changed from
returning nil when a hash function wasn't provided, to panicing. Some
of the code in openpgp predates this and was still using the nil check.
LGTM=bradfitz
R=sburford, bradfitz
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/104850045
Entity.SignIdentity used the wrong signature function and produced invalid
certification signatures. Fixed.
VerifyUserIdSignature was used for checking the self-signature on an identity,
but didn't support anything but a self-signature. This change alters the
low-level API so that checking cross-signatures is possible.
Fixesgolang/go#7371.
LGTM=bradfitz
R=bradfitz
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/96240043
Although the package doesn't attempt to fully support ancient, version
3 messages, supporting v3 detached signatures is fairly easy and some
projects (in this case, Ubuntu) are using them for unknown reasons.
R=golang-dev, r
CC=golang-dev
https://golang.org/cl/14590043
Necessary to reproduce the same hash for verifying a UserAttribute signature.
Reuse and fix defect in serializeSubpacketLength, RFC 4880, Section 4.2.2.2.
R=agl
CC=golang-dev
https://golang.org/cl/13464044
Ryan Canty
Filippo Valsorda
Mike Tsao
Lars Lehtonen
Damien Tournoud
Yaron de Leeuw
Kevin Burke
namusyaka
Russ Cox
mdp
Joe Tsai
Samuele Pedroni
Alok Menghrajani
Jessica Frazelle
Reinaldo de Souza Jr
Martin Hamrle
Artyom Pervukhin
Maxwell Krohn
Jacob H. Haven
Benjamin Wester
Sami Commerot
Adam Langley
SeanBurford
Peter Tseng
Michael Gehring
Jeff R. Allen
Brian Gitonga Marete
Giovanni Bajo
KB Sriram
Keith Ball
David Leon Gil
David Symonds
Andrew Gerrand
Casey Marshall