passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey decodes the bcrypt round count from
the key file and passes it directly to bcrypt_pbkdf.Key, whose
running time is linear in that count. Files specifying very large
round values cause the decryption to consume excessive CPU time:
a uint32 maximum is several months of work on commodity hardware.
Cap the accepted round count at 2048 (128x the default of 16, a
few seconds of CPU on a modern core). OpenSSH itself does not
impose an upper bound, but accepting arbitrary values turns key
loading into a resource-exhaustion footgun for any code that
processes files supplied by end users.
This issue was found during a security audit by NCC Group
Cryptography Services, sponsored by Teleport, and was assessed
and is being fixed as a non-security bug.
Change-Id: I01112bdf1b484ae4fab5dc8841d1a272f112df74
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/782422
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Junyang Shao <shaojunyang@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Nicola Murino
b315afd69a