Compare commits

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Author SHA1 Message Date
ys-ll 18e0be4596 ssh: add aes192-cbc and aes256-cbc cipher modes
Some legacy devices only offer AES-256 in CBC mode, which the package
did not implement. Register both the 192-bit and 256-bit variants of
the existing AES-CBC packet cipher so they can be enabled through a
custom Config. aes.NewCipher already handles 24- and 32-byte keys, so
both registrations reuse the existing implementation.
2026-09-22 10:35:51 +08:00
Xiaolin Zhao 7a4a4d6bea salsa20: add loong64 SIMD implementation
Benchmark results on Loongson-3C6000 @ 2.20GHz:

goos: linux
goarch: loong64
pkg: golang.org/x/crypto/salsa20
cpu: Loongson-3C6000/S @ 2200.00MHz
      |  old.bench   |              new.bench              |
      |    sec/op    |   sec/op     vs base                |
XOR1K   3835.5n ± 0%   493.9n ± 0%  -87.12% (p=0.000 n=10)

      |  old.bench   |               new.bench                |
      |     B/s      |      B/s       vs base                 |
XOR1K   254.6Mi ± 0%   1977.4Mi ± 0%  +676.64% (p=0.000 n=10)

Change-Id: I9f795e7f4e2c467ba9a41c9e6f460612536021ba
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/683255
Reviewed-by: abner chenc <chenguoqi@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Junyang Shao <shaojunyang@google.com>
2026-09-21 00:02:45 -07:00
Xiaolin Zhao 1f7c531b64 blake2b: add loong64 SIMD implementation
Benchmark results on Loongson-3C6000 @ 2.20GHz:

goos: linux
goarch: loong64
pkg: golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b
cpu: Loongson-3C6000/S @ 2200.00MHz
         |  old.bench  |              new.bench              |
         |   sec/op    |   sec/op     vs base                |
Write128   350.0n ± 0%   178.3n ± 0%  -49.06% (p=0.000 n=10)
Write1K    2.687µ ± 0%   1.286µ ± 0%  -52.14% (p=0.000 n=10)
Sum128     362.6n ± 0%   183.7n ± 0%  -49.34% (p=0.000 n=10)
Sum1K      2.788µ ± 0%   1.295µ ± 0%  -53.54% (p=0.000 n=10)
geomean    987.4n        483.3n       -51.06%

         |  old.bench   |               new.bench               |
         |     B/s      |     B/s       vs base                 |
Write128   348.8Mi ± 0%   684.8Mi ± 0%   +96.31% (p=0.000 n=10)
Write1K    363.5Mi ± 0%   759.6Mi ± 0%  +108.99% (p=0.000 n=10)
Sum128     336.6Mi ± 0%   664.4Mi ± 0%   +97.37% (p=0.000 n=10)
Sum1K      350.3Mi ± 0%   754.0Mi ± 0%  +115.23% (p=0.000 n=10)
geomean    349.7Mi        714.5Mi       +104.32%

Change-Id: I181a0284c5913cca34f074466f7d83439554e450
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/659775
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: abner chenc <chenguoqi@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Junyang Shao <shaojunyang@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
2026-09-19 18:40:00 -07:00
Xiaolin Zhao 234d0b5a5f chacha20: add loong64 SIMD implementation
Add an assembly implementation of ChaCha20 for Loong64 using LSX SIMD
instructions. This significantly improves performance across all message
sizes on LoongArch machines.

Benchmark results on Loongson-3C6000 @ 2.20GHz:

goos: linux
goarch: loong64
pkg: golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20
cpu: Loongson-3C6000/S @ 2200.00MHz
                 │  old.bench   │              new.bench              │
                 │    sec/op    │   sec/op     vs base                │
ChaCha20/64         188.4n ± 0%   156.9n ± 0%  -16.72% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/256        666.4n ± 0%   151.5n ± 0%  -77.27% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/10x25     1037.0n ± 0%   578.9n ± 0%  -44.18% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/4096      10.207µ ± 0%   1.955µ ± 0%  -80.85% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/100x40    11.856µ ± 0%   5.785µ ± 0%  -51.21% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/65536     162.99µ ± 0%   31.60µ ± 0%  -80.61% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/1000x65   165.57µ ± 0%   41.93µ ± 0%  -74.67% (p=0.000 n=10)
geomean             6.369µ        2.141µ       -66.38%

                 │  old.bench   │               new.bench                │
                 │     B/s      │      B/s       vs base                 │
ChaCha20/64        323.9Mi ± 0%    389.0Mi ± 0%   +20.10% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/256       366.4Mi ± 0%   1611.2Mi ± 0%  +339.80% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/10x25     229.8Mi ± 0%    411.8Mi ± 0%   +79.19% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/4096      382.7Mi ± 0%   1998.1Mi ± 0%  +422.08% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/100x40    321.8Mi ± 0%    659.4Mi ± 0%  +104.94% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/65536     383.5Mi ± 0%   1977.8Mi ± 0%  +415.78% (p=0.000 n=10)
ChaCha20/1000x65   374.4Mi ± 0%   1478.4Mi ± 0%  +294.86% (p=0.000 n=10)
geomean            335.9Mi         999.2Mi       +197.50%

Change-Id: I6b8d243819d0ab1a1d6540648ed9bd00ecad5a2e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/683196
Reviewed-by: Junyang Shao <shaojunyang@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: abner chenc <chenguoqi@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
2026-09-19 18:39:20 -07:00
XiaolinZhao a083cb74b6 argon2: add loong64 LSX implementation of blamka
Benchmark results on Loongson-3C6000 @ 2.20GHz:

goos: linux
goarch: loong64
pkg: golang.org/x/crypto/argon2
cpu: Loongson-3C6000/S @ 2200.00MHz
                                             |  old.bench   |              new.bench              |
                                             |    sec/op    |   sec/op     vs base                |
Argon2i/_Time:_3_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1     123.36m ± 0%   76.67m ± 0%  -37.85% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2i/_Time:_4_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1      163.7m ± 0%   101.3m ± 0%  -38.09% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2i/_Time:_5_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1      195.0m ± 0%   116.5m ± 8%  -40.24% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2i/_Time:_3_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4      259.4m ± 0%   165.3m ± 0%  -36.28% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2i/_Time:_4_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4      349.9m ± 0%   220.8m ± 0%  -36.92% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2i/_Time:_5_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4      437.6m ± 0%   276.0m ± 0%  -36.92% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2d/_Time:_3,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1    116.34m ± 0%   72.07m ± 0%  -38.06% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2d/_Time:_4,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1    154.42m ± 0%   95.28m ± 0%  -38.30% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2d/_Time:_5,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1     192.4m ± 0%   115.9m ± 2%  -39.73% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2d/_Time:_3,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4     254.4m ± 0%   165.2m ± 0%  -35.06% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2d/_Time:_4,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4     345.5m ± 1%   221.0m ± 0%  -36.04% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2d/_Time:_5,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4     432.1m ± 0%   276.2m ± 0%  -36.09% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2id/_Time:_3,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1   116.49m ± 0%   72.38m ± 0%  -37.86% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2id/_Time:_4,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1   154.59m ± 0%   95.71m ± 3%  -38.09% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2id/_Time:_5,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1    192.5m ± 0%   115.0m ± 0%  -40.25% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2id/_Time:_3,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4    255.6m ± 0%   165.7m ± 0%  -35.18% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2id/_Time:_4,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4    345.4m ± 0%   221.5m ± 0%  -35.87% (p=0.000 n=10)
Argon2id/_Time:_5,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4    431.9m ± 0%   276.6m ± 0%  -35.96% (p=0.000 n=10)
geomean                                         227.7m        142.6m       -37.40%

                                             |  old.bench   |               new.bench               |
                                             |     B/op     |     B/op      vs base                 |
Argon2i/_Time:_3_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1     32.00Mi ± 0%   32.00Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_4_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1     32.00Mi ± 0%   32.00Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_5_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1     32.00Mi ± 0%   32.00Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_3_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4     64.01Mi ± 0%   64.01Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_4_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4     64.01Mi ± 0%   64.01Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_5_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4     64.01Mi ± 0%   64.01Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_3,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1    32.00Mi ± 0%   32.00Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_4,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1    32.00Mi ± 0%   32.00Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_5,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1    32.00Mi ± 0%   32.00Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_3,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4    64.01Mi ± 0%   64.01Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_4,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4    64.01Mi ± 0%   64.01Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_5,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4    64.01Mi ± 0%   64.01Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_3,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1   32.00Mi ± 0%   32.00Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_4,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1   32.00Mi ± 0%   32.00Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_5,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1   32.00Mi ± 0%   32.00Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_3,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4   64.01Mi ± 0%   64.01Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_4,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4   64.01Mi ± 0%   64.01Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_5,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4   64.01Mi ± 0%   64.01Mi ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
geomean                                        45.26Mi        45.26Mi       +0.00%
¹ all samples are equal

                                             | old.bench  |              new.bench              |
                                             | allocs/op  | allocs/op   vs base                 |
Argon2i/_Time:_3_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1     31.00 ± 0%   31.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_4_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1     39.00 ± 0%   39.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_5_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1     47.00 ± 0%   47.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_3_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4     73.00 ± 0%   73.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_4_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4     93.00 ± 0%   93.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2i/_Time:_5_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4     113.0 ± 0%   113.0 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_3,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1    31.00 ± 0%   31.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_4,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1    39.00 ± 0%   39.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_5,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1    47.00 ± 0%   47.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_3,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4    73.00 ± 0%   73.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_4,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4    93.00 ± 0%   93.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2d/_Time:_5,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4    113.0 ± 0%   113.0 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_3,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1   31.00 ± 0%   31.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_4,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1   39.00 ± 0%   39.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_5,_Memory:_32_MB,_Threads:_1   47.00 ± 0%   47.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_3,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4   73.00 ± 0%   73.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_4,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4   93.00 ± 0%   93.00 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
Argon2id/_Time:_5,_Memory:_64_MB,_Threads:_4   113.0 ± 0%   113.0 ± 0%       ~ (p=1.000 n=10) ¹
geomean                                        59.32        59.32       +0.00%
¹ all samples are equal

Change-Id: Ia814057ddfdefbe1d23431fa366189ffe5852b96
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/826304
Reviewed-by: Junyang Shao <shaojunyang@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: abner chenc <chenguoqi@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
2026-09-19 18:38:21 -07:00
Daniel McCarney b4dcfb54b8 acme: support standards-compliant order finalization
When an order finalization response is not immediately valid,
Client.CreateOrderCert depends on the ACME server returning a Location
header. The header value is used as the URL for polling the updated
order status. RFC 8555 does not require this header, so CreateOrderCert
does not interoperate with ACME servers that omit it (e.g. Pebble
v2.9.0+).

This commit adds Client.CreateCertFromOrder, which accepts an *Order and
uses its URI for polling instead of relying on the finalization
response's Location header. It also updates existing callers and
documentation to use the new method and updates the integration tests to
Pebble v2.10.1 (the latest available version), which omits the
finalization Location header.

Fixes golang/go#77704

Change-Id: I0852f19c5d18d6debc9c9686fa2c14a2e39663c2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/817000
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2026-09-18 12:05:15 -07:00
Gopher Robot b853e4b620 x509roots/fallback: update bundle
This is an automated CL which updates the NSS root bundle.

[git-generate]
go generate ./x509roots

Change-Id: I975f934aabe6eaf6b9f256db2b6942c45c9bd7b4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/833664
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
2026-09-16 08:43:51 -07:00
Gopher Robot 3f62bf119e go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.

Change-Id: I39f495ef42016b2ab0c91f54b792ac16b967006f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/829324
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
2026-09-08 11:05:01 -07:00
Nicola Murino 86efde54dc ssh: reject unexpected message types on established channels
ch.msg is only read while the channel open or a channel request with a
reply is pending, so anything the default arm of channel.handlePacket
delivered to it was never consumed. The blocking send there let a
misbehaving peer fill the buffer with well-formed but unexpected message
types carrying a valid channel id and stall the mux read loop,
deadlocking the whole connection.

No conforming peer sends such messages during the connection protocol.
Treat them as a protocol error and tear the connection down, as
handleUnknownChannelPacket already does for the same messages when the
channel id is not in use.

Fixes CVE-2026-56855
Fixes golang/go#81317

Change-Id: I87420dfe68fcb62a17df4b47dc5ffb6ccd72ba26
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/826524
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <husin@google.com>
2026-09-02 11:02:47 -07:00
Nicola Murino a6cdac6084 ssh: drop traffic on undecided channels
A channel in the mux's chanList is not usable until it is established:
an outbound channel has no confirmed remote id until the peer's open
confirmation, and an inbound channel is not serviced by the application
until it is accepted. handlePacket processed any channel message on it,
so a misbehaving peer could flood channel requests and block the mux
read loop on the send to incomingRequests, deadlocking the connection,
or close an outbound channel before confirming it, making the victim
tear down a half-initialized channel and emit a close for remote id 0,
an unrelated channel of the peer.

No such packet can be legitimate: the peer learns an inbound channel's
local id only from the confirmation we have not sent yet, and on an
outbound channel RFC 4254 lets it answer the open request only with a
confirmation or a failure.

Add an established flag, set when the channel becomes usable: for an
outbound channel when the open response is received, for an inbound
channel by Accept before the confirmation is sent. Until then
handlePacket drops every packet other than the open response. The flag
is separate from decided, which Reject also sets: a rejected channel is
decided but must never carry traffic.

Fixes CVE-2026-78662
Fixes golang/go#81316

Change-Id: Ib0983bb216a49808a2db1f4a4d92ee9fe38a3c51
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/826504
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <husin@google.com>
2026-09-02 10:48:31 -07:00
Nicola Murino 39dc44e69c ssh: don't skip the source-address critical option in CheckCert
CertChecker.CheckCert ignored source-address on the assumption that
serverAuthenticate would enforce it, but that only happens in the
server-side user authentication path. Nothing enforced it in the host key
path, so CheckHostKey accepted CA-signed host certificates carrying
source-address regardless of the server's address, and the same applied to
applications calling CheckCert directly.

Drop the special case: every critical option must be listed in
SupportedCriticalOptions, host and user certificates alike. Authenticate,
the only path where serverAuthenticate does enforce source-address, checks
against a copy of the CertChecker with that option appended.

Fixes golang/go#80872

Change-Id: I3c3554b71ea2a4ce4b17696a9596b973b7d74b00
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/816840
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
2026-08-30 20:04:51 -07:00
Dmitri Shuralyov afebf4cb4e x509roots/fallback/bundle: make subjectsEqual stricter on Go 1.27+
This gradual step towards removing/inlining subjectsEqual can happen
after Go 1.27.0 is released and the bundle starts being generated
with it.

Change-Id: Ib315bae69c45922c3f0aac5d2c0155fb5d94229f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/775782
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
2026-08-26 07:40:58 -07:00
Gopher Robot 89f4e9bb5b x509roots/fallback: update bundle
This is an automated CL which updates the NSS root bundle.

[git-generate]
go generate ./x509roots

Change-Id: I3be04cd4cb6e44856beaa074fdb62a58ff8ce35b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/820300
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
2026-08-24 13:54:08 -07:00
Nicola Murino 71488c48c2 ssh/knownhosts: compare only public key portions for revocation
Revocation matching compared full marshaled key blobs, so a @revoked
line containing a plain host key did not revoke a certificate
certifying that key: when the server presented such a certificate,
IsRevoked only matched the whole certificate blob or the CA key, and
verification succeeded even though the underlying host key was revoked.

OpenSSH's check_key_not_revoked compares keys with sshkey_equal_public,
which considers only the public portions and explicitly allows
comparisons between certificates and plain keys. Match that behavior by
normalizing both @revoked entries and lookups to the underlying public
key: for a certificate, the certified key rather than the certificate
blob. This also makes a @revoked line containing a certificate revoke
the plain key it certifies

Change-Id: I3029d59e68fb01f2340763e2eae25cac23c6193d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/816841
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
2026-08-23 06:53:19 -07:00
Daniel McCarney 82adefa711 ssh: synchronize unexpected response test
Wait for an ordered channel request after sending the unsolicited
response flood. This ensures that the client mux has discarded the
entire flood before SendRequest opens its response gate, avoiding
confusion between an in-flight unsolicited response and the expected
reply.

This fixes TestChannelUnexpectedResponsesDiscarded from flaking, where
otherwise running 1000000 iterations of the test with GOMAXPROCS=16
produced ~15 distinct failures of the form  "expected success reply".

Change-Id: Ic1125c1f44bd919a5cf32b889d331bbc94c06c25
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/817140
Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <neal@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
2026-08-19 13:42:46 -07:00
Gopher Robot c757c9851f all: upgrade go directive to at least 1.26.0 [generated]
By now Go 1.27.0 has been released, and Go 1.25 is no longer supported
per the Go Release Policy (see https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#policy).

See https://go.dev/doc/godebug#go-126 for GODEBUG setting changes
relevant to Go 1.26.

For golang/go#69095.

[git-generate]
(cd . && go get go@1.26.0 && go mod tidy)
(cd x509roots/fallback && go get go@1.26.0 && go mod tidy)

Change-Id: I54826e019edd4e12ad821915b1d102de719bfb31
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/817981
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
2026-08-19 10:16:24 -07:00
Damien Miller 593c81af8a ssh: correctly ignore pre-banner lines
Reading the peer's benner in readVersion() was incorrectly counting
lines sent by the server before the actual `SSH-2.0` banner against
the line limit for the banner itself.

This is incorrect per RFC 4253 section 4.2, where the limit of 255
characters is written to apply only to the `SSH-` banner string
itself.

This instead limits pre-banner lines to 255 characters each but
instead allows a maximum of 1024 lines.

Change-Id: Ief014bb3413e26e8d2077d3eb204ceaea9dc9444
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/811320
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
2026-08-17 08:34:06 -07:00
Daniel McCarney 46efc8bc62 acme: add crypto.SignMessage test coverage
This commit updates the pre-existing TestJWSEncodeJSONCustom test to
also verify JWS signature production works with a crypto.MessageSigner.

Change-Id: I5156cb4da9a7feee98340ff4fb75848da5827055
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/815480
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
2026-08-17 08:22:44 -07:00
Daniel Tang e0a54fdc4b acme: use crypto.SignMessage instead of calling (crypto.Signer).Sign
crypto.SignMessage allows using crypto.Signers that only usefully
implement SignMessage to be used for the ACME account key.

This would be useful for opening up integrations with opinionated
remote signing APIs that don't support pre-hashing.

Fixes golang/go#80877

Change-Id: I86bb76cf5865d3d2b8606a6dbd813cbb26447c86
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/815340
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Sean Liao <sean@liao.dev>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
2026-08-17 08:21:42 -07:00
41 changed files with 2111 additions and 123 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ func (c *Client) directoryURL() string {
// CreateCert was part of the old version of ACME. It is incompatible with RFC 8555.
//
// Deprecated: this was for the pre-RFC 8555 version of ACME. Callers should use CreateOrderCert.
// Deprecated: this was for the pre-RFC 8555 version of ACME. Callers should use CreateCertFromOrder.
func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) {
return nil, "", errPreRFC
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck cert
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
chain, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true)
chain, _, err := client.CreateCertFromOrder(ctx, o, csr, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -182,9 +182,9 @@ func (p *prober) runOrder(ctx context.Context, identifiers []acme.AuthzID) {
log.Fatalf("WaitOrder(%q): %v", o.URI, err)
}
csr, certkey := newCSR(identifiers)
der, curl, err := p.client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true)
der, curl, err := p.client.CreateCertFromOrder(ctx, o, csr, true)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("CreateOrderCert: %v", err)
log.Fatalf("CreateCertFromOrder: %v", err)
}
log.Printf("cert URL: %s", curl)
if err := checkCert(der, identifiers); err != nil {
@@ -247,9 +247,9 @@ func (p *prober) runPreauthz(ctx context.Context, identifiers []acme.AuthzID) {
log.Fatalf("WaitOrder(%q): %v", o.URI, err)
}
csr, certkey := newCSR(identifiers)
der, curl, err := p.client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true)
der, curl, err := p.client.CreateCertFromOrder(ctx, o, csr, true)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("CreateOrderCert: %v", err)
log.Fatalf("CreateCertFromOrder: %v", err)
}
log.Printf("cert URL: %s", curl)
if err := checkCert(der, identifiers); err != nil {
+5 -8
View File
@@ -103,9 +103,7 @@ func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, kid KeyID, nonce, ur
}
payload = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs)
}
hash := sha.New()
hash.Write([]byte(phead + "." + payload))
sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, hash.Sum(nil))
sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, []byte(phead+"."+payload))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -195,14 +193,13 @@ func jwkEncode(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
return "", ErrUnsupportedKey
}
// jwsSign signs the digest using the given key.
// The hash is unused for ECDSA keys.
func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error) {
// jwsSign signs the payload using the given key.
func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, payload []byte) ([]byte, error) {
switch pub := key.Public().(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash)
return crypto.SignMessage(key, rand.Reader, payload, hash)
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
sigASN1, err := key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash)
sigASN1, err := crypto.SignMessage(key, rand.Reader, payload, hash)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+39 -5
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
@@ -353,6 +354,22 @@ func (s *customTestSigner) Sign(io.Reader, []byte, crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, e
return s.sig, nil
}
type customTestMessageSigner struct {
customTestSigner
msg []byte
opts crypto.SignerOpts
}
func (s *customTestMessageSigner) Sign(io.Reader, []byte, crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, errors.New("customTestSigner: Sign() called instead of SignMessage()")
}
func (s *customTestMessageSigner) SignMessage(_ io.Reader, msg []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error) {
s.msg = msg
s.opts = opts
return s.sig, nil
}
func TestJWSEncodeJSONCustom(t *testing.T) {
claims := struct{ Msg string }{"hello"}
const (
@@ -391,24 +408,33 @@ func TestJWSEncodeJSONCustom(t *testing.T) {
)
tt := []struct {
alg, phead string
name, phead string
pub crypto.PublicKey
stdsig, jwsig string
msgSigner bool
}{
{"ES256", es256phead, testKeyEC.Public(), es256stdsig, es256jwsig},
{"RS256", rs256phead, testKey.Public(), testsig, testsig},
{"ES256", es256phead, testKeyEC.Public(), es256stdsig, es256jwsig, false},
{"RS256", rs256phead, testKey.Public(), testsig, testsig, false},
{"ES256-MessageSigner", es256phead, testKeyEC.Public(), es256stdsig, es256jwsig, true},
{"RS256-MessageSigner", rs256phead, testKey.Public(), testsig, testsig, true},
}
for _, tc := range tt {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.alg, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
stdsig, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(tc.stdsig)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("couldn't decode test vector: %v", err)
}
signer := &customTestSigner{
cs := customTestSigner{
sig: stdsig,
pub: tc.pub,
}
var signer crypto.Signer = &cs
var ms *customTestMessageSigner
if tc.msgSigner {
ms = &customTestMessageSigner{customTestSigner: cs}
signer = ms
}
b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(claims, signer, noKeyID, "nonce", "url")
if err != nil {
@@ -427,6 +453,14 @@ func TestJWSEncodeJSONCustom(t *testing.T) {
if j.Sig != tc.jwsig {
t.Errorf("j.Sig = %q\nwant %q", j.Sig, tc.jwsig)
}
if ms != nil {
if want := tc.phead + "." + payload; string(ms.msg) != want {
t.Errorf("msg = %q; want %q", ms.msg, want)
}
if ms.opts != crypto.SHA256 {
t.Errorf("opts = %v; want %v", ms.opts, crypto.SHA256)
}
}
})
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ import (
const (
// pebbleModVersion is the module version used for Pebble and Pebble's
// challenge test server. It is ignored if `-pebble-local-dir` is provided.
pebbleModVersion = "v2.7.0"
pebbleModVersion = "v2.10.1"
// startingPort is the first port number used for binding interface
// addresses. Each call to takeNextPort() will increment a port number
// starting at this value.
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ func testIssuance(t *testing.T, env *environment, challSrv challengeServer) {
}
// Finalize the order by creating a certificate with our CSR.
chain, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, order.FinalizeURL, csrDer, true)
chain, _, err := client.CreateCertFromOrder(ctx, order, csrDer, true)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to finalize order %s with finalize URL %s: %v",
orderURL, order.FinalizeURL, err)
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ func startPebbleEnvironment(t *testing.T, config *environmentConfig) environment
// Note: we specify -defaultIPv6 "" so that no AAAA records are served.
// The LUCI CI runners have issues with IPv6 connectivity on localhost.
spawnServerProcess(t, binDir, "pebble-challtestsrv",
"-dns01", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", config.dnsPort),
"-dnsserver", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", config.dnsPort),
"-defaultIPv6", "",
"-management", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", takeNextPort()),
"-doh", "",
+47 -5
View File
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ func (c *Client) accountKeyRollover(ctx context.Context, newKey crypto.Signer) e
// identify those with StatusPending status and fulfill a challenge using Accept.
// Once all authorizations are satisfied, the caller will typically want to poll
// order status using WaitOrder until it's in StatusReady state.
// To finalize the order and obtain a certificate, the caller submits a CSR with CreateOrderCert.
// To finalize the order and obtain a certificate, the caller submits a CSR with CreateCertFromOrder.
func (c *Client) AuthorizeOrder(ctx context.Context, id []AuthzID, opt ...OrderOption) (*Order, error) {
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
if err != nil {
@@ -250,7 +250,11 @@ func (c *Client) GetOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
return responseOrder(res)
o, err := responseOrder(res)
if err == nil && o.URI == "" {
o.URI = url
}
return o, err
}
// WaitOrder polls an order from the given URL until it is in one of the final states,
@@ -271,6 +275,9 @@ func (c *Client) WaitOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) {
}
o, err := responseOrder(res)
res.Body.Close()
if err == nil && o.URI == "" {
o.URI = url
}
switch {
case err != nil:
// Skip and retry.
@@ -338,11 +345,43 @@ func responseOrder(res *http.Response) (*Order, error) {
// certificate chain. Otherwise, only a leaf certificate is returned.
// The returned URL can be used to re-fetch the certificate using FetchCert.
//
// This method is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555. See CreateCert for pre-RFC CAs.
// This method is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555 that return a
// Location header for order finalization responses. Most users should prefer
// CreateCertFromOrder, an alternative that has better interoperation with RFC 8555
// compliant CAs. See CreateCert for pre-RFC CAs.
//
// CreateOrderCert returns an error if the CA's response is unreasonably large.
// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid and has the expected features.
func (c *Client) CreateOrderCert(ctx context.Context, url string, csr []byte, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) {
return c.createOrderCert(ctx, url, "", csr, bundle)
}
// CreateCertFromOrder submits the CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a CA for
// the specified Order created with AuthorizeOrder.
//
// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value also contain the CA (issuer)
// certificate chain. Otherwise, only a leaf certificate is returned.
// The returned URL can be used to re-fetch the certificate using FetchCert.
//
// This method is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555.
// See CreateCert for pre-RFC CAs.
//
// CreateCertFromOrder returns an error if the CA's response is unreasonably large.
// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid and has the expected features.
func (c *Client) CreateCertFromOrder(ctx context.Context, order *Order, csr []byte, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) {
if order == nil {
return nil, "", errors.New("acme: nil order")
}
if order.URI == "" {
return nil, "", errors.New("acme: order URI is empty")
}
if order.FinalizeURL == "" {
return nil, "", errors.New("acme: order finalize URL is empty")
}
return c.createOrderCert(ctx, order.FinalizeURL, order.URI, csr, bundle)
}
func (c *Client) createOrderCert(ctx context.Context, finalizeURL, orderURL string, csr []byte, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { // required by c.accountKID
return nil, "", err
}
@@ -353,7 +392,7 @@ func (c *Client) CreateOrderCert(ctx context.Context, url string, csr []byte, bu
}{
CSR: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(csr),
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, finalizeURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
@@ -365,7 +404,10 @@ func (c *Client) CreateOrderCert(ctx context.Context, url string, csr []byte, bu
// Wait for CA to issue the cert if they haven't.
if o.Status != StatusValid {
o, err = c.WaitOrder(ctx, o.URI)
if orderURL == "" {
orderURL = o.URI
}
o, err = c.WaitOrder(ctx, orderURL)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
+74
View File
@@ -979,6 +979,80 @@ func TestRFC_CreateOrderCert(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestRFC_CreateCertFromOrder tests that finalization responses work even when
// they omit a Location header. Such a header isn't required by RFC 8555 in this
// context and we should be able to complete an order without needing it.
func TestRFC_CreateCertFromOrder(t *testing.T) {
q := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "example.org"},
}
csr, err := x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, q, testKeyEC)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1)}
leaf, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &testKeyEC.PublicKey, testKeyEC)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s := newACMEServer()
s.handle("/acme/new-account", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Location", s.url("/accounts/1"))
w.Write([]byte(`{"status": "valid"}`))
})
s.handle("/finalize", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"status":"processing"}`)
})
s.handle("/orders/1", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"valid", "certificate":%q}`, s.url("/crt"))
})
s.handle("/crt", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pem-certificate-chain")
pem.Encode(w, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: leaf})
})
s.start()
defer s.close()
cl := &Client{Key: testKeyEC, DirectoryURL: s.url("/")}
order := &Order{URI: s.url("/orders/1"), FinalizeURL: s.url("/finalize")}
cert, curl, err := cl.CreateCertFromOrder(context.Background(), order, csr, true)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateCertFromOrder: %v", err)
}
if _, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert[0]); err != nil {
t.Errorf("ParseCertificate: %v", err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(cert[0], leaf) {
t.Errorf("cert and leaf bytes don't match")
}
if u := s.url("/crt"); curl != u {
t.Errorf("curl = %q; want %q", curl, u)
}
}
// TestRFC_CreateCertFromOrderInvalidOrder tests that invalid CreateCertFromOrder
// calls fail before making a request.
func TestRFC_CreateCertFromOrderInvalidOrder(t *testing.T) {
cl := new(Client)
tests := []struct {
name string
order *Order
}{
{"nil", nil},
{"empty URI", &Order{FinalizeURL: "https://example.com/finalize"}},
{"empty finalize URL", &Order{URI: "https://example.com/order/1"}},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, _, err := cl.CreateCertFromOrder(context.Background(), tt.order, nil, false); err == nil {
t.Fatal("CreateCertFromOrder returned nil error")
}
})
}
}
func TestRFC_AlreadyRevokedCert(t *testing.T) {
s := newACMEServer()
s.handle("/acme/revoke-cert", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ type Order struct {
// Possible values are StatusPending, StatusReady, StatusProcessing, StatusValid and StatusInvalid.
// Pending means the CA does not believe that the client has fulfilled the requirements.
// Ready indicates that the client has fulfilled all the requirements and can submit a CSR
// to obtain a certificate. This is done with Client's CreateOrderCert.
// to obtain a certificate. This is done with Client's CreateCertFromOrder.
// Processing means the certificate is being issued.
// Valid indicates the CA has issued the certificate. It can be downloaded
// from the Order's CertURL. This is done with Client's FetchCert.
+9
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ var (
func TestArgon2(t *testing.T) {
defer func(sse4 bool) { useSSE4 = sse4 }(useSSE4)
defer func(lsx bool) { useLSX = lsx }(useLSX)
if useSSE4 {
t.Log("SSE4.1 version")
@@ -32,6 +33,14 @@ func TestArgon2(t *testing.T) {
testArgon2id(t)
useSSE4 = false
}
if useLSX {
t.Log("LSX version")
testArgon2i(t)
testArgon2d(t)
testArgon2id(t)
useLSX = false
}
t.Log("generic version")
testArgon2i(t)
testArgon2d(t)
+4
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ package argon2
var useSSE4 bool
// useLSX reports whether the loong64 LSX vector implementation should be
// used. It is set from cpu.Loong64.HasLSX in blamka_loong64.go's init().
var useLSX bool
func processBlockGeneric(out, in1, in2 *block, xor bool) {
var t block
for i := range t {
+49
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build loong64 && gc && !purego
package argon2
import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
func init() {
// useLSX (declared in blamka_generic.go) gates the LSX vector path.
// If the running CPU lacks LSX support, processBlockVX falls back
// to processBlockGeneric.
useLSX = cpu.Loong64.HasLSX
}
//go:noescape
func blamkaLOONG64(b *block)
//go:noescape
func mixBlocksVX(out, a, b, c *block)
//go:noescape
func xorBlocksVX(out, a, b, c *block)
func processBlock(out, in1, in2 *block) {
processBlockVX(out, in1, in2, false)
}
func processBlockXOR(out, in1, in2 *block) {
processBlockVX(out, in1, in2, true)
}
func processBlockVX(out, in1, in2 *block, xor bool) {
if !useLSX {
processBlockGeneric(out, in1, in2, xor)
return
}
var t block
mixBlocksVX(&t, in1, in2, &t)
blamkaLOONG64(&t)
if xor {
xorBlocksVX(out, in1, in2, &t)
} else {
mixBlocksVX(out, in1, in2, &t)
}
}
+240
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build loong64 && gc && !purego
#include "textflag.h"
// HALF_ROUND applies one BlaMka half-round (mul-add-xor-rotate) to two
// groups of 4 columns, each packed 2-wide into V registers (v0/v2/v4/v6
// hold one pair of columns in lane0/lane1, v1/v3/v5/v7 hold the other).
// t0, t1 are scratch registers, one per independent column group.
#define HALF_ROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, t0, t1) \
VMULWEVVWU v0, v2, t0; \
VADDV t0, t0, t0; \
VADDV v0, v2, v0; \
VADDV v0, t0, v0; \
VXORV v6, v0, v6; \
VROTRV $32, v6, v6; \
VMULWEVVWU v1, v3, t1; \
VADDV t1, t1, t1; \
VADDV v1, v3, v1; \
VADDV v1, t1, v1; \
VXORV v7, v1, v7; \
VROTRV $32, v7, v7; \
VMULWEVVWU v4, v6, t0; \
VADDV t0, t0, t0; \
VADDV v4, v6, v4; \
VADDV v4, t0, v4; \
VXORV v2, v4, v2; \
VROTRV $24, v2, v2; \
VMULWEVVWU v5, v7, t1; \
VADDV t1, t1, t1; \
VADDV v5, v7, v5; \
VADDV v5, t1, v5; \
VXORV v3, v5, v3; \
VROTRV $24, v3, v3; \
VMULWEVVWU v0, v2, t0; \
VADDV t0, t0, t0; \
VADDV v0, v2, v0; \
VADDV v0, t0, v0; \
VXORV v6, v0, v6; \
VROTRV $16, v6, v6; \
VMULWEVVWU v1, v3, t1; \
VADDV t1, t1, t1; \
VADDV v1, v3, v1; \
VADDV v1, t1, v1; \
VXORV v7, v1, v7; \
VROTRV $16, v7, v7; \
VMULWEVVWU v4, v6, t0; \
VADDV t0, t0, t0; \
VADDV v4, v6, v4; \
VADDV v4, t0, v4; \
VXORV v2, v4, v2; \
VROTRV $63, v2, v2; \
VMULWEVVWU v5, v7, t1; \
VADDV t1, t1, t1; \
VADDV v5, v7, v5; \
VADDV v5, t1, v5; \
VXORV v3, v5, v3; \
VROTRV $63, v3, v3
// SHUFFLE / SHUFFLE_INV: reused verbatim from blake2b_loong64.s -- amd64
// avo source confirms argon2's SHUFFLE/SHUFFLE_INV and blake2b's SHUFFLE
// are byte-for-byte identical macros (diagonalize / undiagonalize),
// operating only on V2..V7 (V0/V1 untouched), with V13 held at zero.
#define SHUFFLE \
VADDV V2, V13, V12; \
VADDV V6, V13, V16; \
VADDV V4, V13, V14; \
VADDV V5, V13, V4; \
VADDV V14, V13, V5; \
VSHUF4IV $9, V3, V2; \
VSHUF4IV $9, V12, V3; \
VSHUF4IV $3, V7, V6; \
VSHUF4IV $3, V16, V7
#define SHUFFLE_INV \
VADDV V2, V13, V12; \
VADDV V6, V13, V16; \
VADDV V4, V13, V14; \
VADDV V5, V13, V4; \
VADDV V14, V13, V5; \
VSHUF4IV $3, V3, V2; \
VSHUF4IV $3, V12, V3; \
VSHUF4IV $9, V7, V6; \
VSHUF4IV $9, V16, V7
// LOAD_MSG_0 / STORE_MSG_0: row pass. `off` is the byte offset of the
// 128-byte (16-uint64) row group; within the macro the 8 loads step by
// 16B (2 uint64 per V register). Called from blamkaLOONG64 with off
// stepping by 128B across the 8 row groups -- do not confuse the two
// strides.
#define LOAD_MSG_0(off) \
VMOVQ (off+0)(R4), V0; \
VMOVQ (off+16)(R4), V1; \
VMOVQ (off+32)(R4), V2; \
VMOVQ (off+48)(R4), V3; \
VMOVQ (off+64)(R4), V4; \
VMOVQ (off+80)(R4), V5; \
VMOVQ (off+96)(R4), V6; \
VMOVQ (off+112)(R4), V7
#define STORE_MSG_0(off) \
VMOVQ V0, (off+0)(R4); \
VMOVQ V1, (off+16)(R4); \
VMOVQ V2, (off+32)(R4); \
VMOVQ V3, (off+48)(R4); \
VMOVQ V4, (off+64)(R4); \
VMOVQ V5, (off+80)(R4); \
VMOVQ V6, (off+96)(R4); \
VMOVQ V7, (off+112)(R4)
// LOAD_MSG_1 / STORE_MSG_1: diagonal pass. `off` is the byte offset within
// a 128-byte row group; within the macro the 8 loads step by 128B (one
// element from each of the 8 row groups, mirroring blamka_generic.go's
// t[off], t[128+off], t[256+off], ...). Called from blamkaLOONG64 with
// off stepping by 16B (2 uint64) across the 8 diagonal groups -- the
// inner/outer strides are swapped relative to LOAD_MSG_0/STORE_MSG_0.
#define LOAD_MSG_1(off) \
VMOVQ (off+0)(R4), V0; \
VMOVQ (off+128)(R4), V1; \
VMOVQ (off+256)(R4), V2; \
VMOVQ (off+384)(R4), V3; \
VMOVQ (off+512)(R4), V4; \
VMOVQ (off+640)(R4), V5; \
VMOVQ (off+768)(R4), V6; \
VMOVQ (off+896)(R4), V7
#define STORE_MSG_1(off) \
VMOVQ V0, (off+0)(R4); \
VMOVQ V1, (off+128)(R4); \
VMOVQ V2, (off+256)(R4); \
VMOVQ V3, (off+384)(R4); \
VMOVQ V4, (off+512)(R4); \
VMOVQ V5, (off+640)(R4); \
VMOVQ V6, (off+768)(R4); \
VMOVQ V7, (off+896)(R4)
// BLAMKA_ROUND_0(off): one full row pass over the 16-uint64 group at
// byte offset off -- corresponds to a single call to blamkaGeneric
// with the "row" argument order (t[off]..t[off+15]).
#define BLAMKA_ROUND_0(off) \
LOAD_MSG_0(off); \
HALF_ROUND(V0, V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7, V8, V9); \
SHUFFLE; \
HALF_ROUND(V0, V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7, V8, V9); \
SHUFFLE_INV; \
STORE_MSG_0(off)
// BLAMKA_ROUND_1(off): one full diagonal pass over the 16 uint64s at
// diagonal offset off -- corresponds to a single call to blamkaGeneric
// with the "diagonal" argument order (t[off], t[off+1], t[16+off], ...).
#define BLAMKA_ROUND_1(off) \
LOAD_MSG_1(off); \
HALF_ROUND(V0, V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7, V8, V9); \
SHUFFLE; \
HALF_ROUND(V0, V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7, V8, V9); \
SHUFFLE_INV; \
STORE_MSG_1(off)
// func blamkaLOONG64(b *block)
TEXT ·blamkaLOONG64(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-8
MOVV b+0(FP), R4
VXORV V13, V13, V13 // V13 = 0, used by SHUFFLE/SHUFFLE_INV
// Round 0: 8 row passes, stride 128 bytes (16 uint64s).
BLAMKA_ROUND_0(0)
BLAMKA_ROUND_0(128)
BLAMKA_ROUND_0(256)
BLAMKA_ROUND_0(384)
BLAMKA_ROUND_0(512)
BLAMKA_ROUND_0(640)
BLAMKA_ROUND_0(768)
BLAMKA_ROUND_0(896)
// Round 1: 8 diagonal passes, stride 16 bytes (2 uint64s).
BLAMKA_ROUND_1(0)
BLAMKA_ROUND_1(16)
BLAMKA_ROUND_1(32)
BLAMKA_ROUND_1(48)
BLAMKA_ROUND_1(64)
BLAMKA_ROUND_1(80)
BLAMKA_ROUND_1(96)
BLAMKA_ROUND_1(112)
RET
// func mixBlocksVX(out, a, b, c *block)
TEXT ·mixBlocksVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-32
MOVV out+0(FP), R4
MOVV a+8(FP), R5
MOVV b+16(FP), R6
MOVV c+24(FP), R7
MOVV $1024, R8
PCALIGN $16
mixloop:
VMOVQ (R5), V0
VMOVQ (R6), V1
VMOVQ (R7), V2
VXORV V0, V1, V0
VXORV V0, V2, V0
VMOVQ V0, (R4)
ADDV $16, R4
ADDV $16, R5
ADDV $16, R6
ADDV $16, R7
SUBV $16, R8
BNE R8, R0, mixloop
RET
// func xorBlocksVX(out, a, b, c *block)
TEXT ·xorBlocksVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-32
MOVV out+0(FP), R4
MOVV a+8(FP), R5
MOVV b+16(FP), R6
MOVV c+24(FP), R7
MOVV $1024, R8
PCALIGN $16
xorloop:
VMOVQ (R5), V0
VMOVQ (R6), V1
VMOVQ (R7), V2
VMOVQ (R4), V3
VXORV V0, V1, V0
VXORV V0, V2, V0
VXORV V0, V3, V0
VMOVQ V0, (R4)
ADDV $16, R4
ADDV $16, R5
ADDV $16, R6
ADDV $16, R7
SUBV $16, R8
BNE R8, R0, xorloop
RET
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !amd64 || purego || !gc
//go:build (!amd64 && !loong64) || purego || !gc
package argon2
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// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build loong64 && gc && !purego
package blake2b
import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
//go:noescape
func hashBlocksVX(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte)
func hashBlocks(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) {
if cpu.Loong64.HasLSX {
hashBlocksVX(h, c, flag, blocks)
} else {
hashBlocksGeneric(h, c, flag, blocks)
}
}
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// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build loong64 && gc && !purego
#include "textflag.h"
DATA ·iv0<>+0(SB)/8, $0x6a09e667f3bcc908
DATA ·iv0<>+8(SB)/8, $0xbb67ae8584caa73b
GLOBL ·iv0<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $16
DATA ·iv1<>+0(SB)/8, $0x3c6ef372fe94f82b
DATA ·iv1<>+8(SB)/8, $0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1
GLOBL ·iv1<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $16
DATA ·iv2<>+0(SB)/8, $0x510e527fade682d1
DATA ·iv2<>+8(SB)/8, $0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f
GLOBL ·iv2<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $16
DATA ·iv3<>+0(SB)/8, $0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b
DATA ·iv3<>+8(SB)/8, $0x5be0cd19137e2179
GLOBL ·iv3<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $16
#define SHUFFLE_1 \
VADDV V2, V13, V12; \ // V12 = V2
VADDV V6, V13, V16; \ // V16 = V6
VADDV V4, V13, V14; \ // V14 = V4
VADDV V5, V13, V4; \ // V4 = V5
VADDV V14, V13, V5; \ // V5 = V4
VSHUF4IV $9, V3, V2; \
VSHUF4IV $9, V12, V3; \
VSHUF4IV $3, V7, V6; \
VSHUF4IV $3, V16, V7; \
#define SHUFFLE_2 \
VADDV V2, V13, V12; \ // V12 = V2
VADDV V6, V13, V16; \ // V16 = V6
VADDV V4, V13, V14; \ // V14 = V4
VADDV V5, V13, V4; \ // V4 = V5
VADDV V14, V13, V5; \ // V5 = V4
VSHUF4IV $3, V3, V2; \
VSHUF4IV $3, V12, V3; \
VSHUF4IV $9, V7, V6; \
VSHUF4IV $9, V16, V7; \
#define LOAD_M(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \
VMOVQ a, V8.V[0]; \
VMOVQ b, V8.V[1]; \
VMOVQ c, V9.V[0]; \
VMOVQ d, V9.V[1]; \
VMOVQ e, V10.V[0]; \
VMOVQ f, V10.V[1]; \
VMOVQ g, V11.V[0]; \
VMOVQ h, V11.V[1]; \
#define ROUND_0 \
VADDV V0, V8, V0; \
VADDV V1, V9, V1; \
VADDV V0, V2, V0; \
VADDV V1, V3, V1; \
VXORV V6, V0, V6; \
VXORV V7, V1, V7; \
VROTRV $32, V6, V6; \
VROTRV $32, V7, V7; \
VADDV V4, V6, V4; \
VADDV V5, V7, V5; \
VXORV V2, V4, V2; \
VXORV V3, V5, V3; \
VROTRV $24, V2, V2; \
VROTRV $24, V3, V3; \
VADDV V0, V10, V0; \
VADDV V1, V11, V1; \
VADDV V0, V2, V0; \
VADDV V1, V3, V1; \
VXORV V6, V0, V6; \
VXORV V7, V1, V7; \
VROTRV $16, V6, V6; \
VROTRV $16, V7, V7; \
VADDV V4, V6, V4; \
VADDV V5, V7, V5; \
VXORV V2, V4, V2; \
VXORV V3, V5, V3; \
VROTRV $63, V2, V2; \
VROTRV $63, V3, V3; \
#define ROUND_8 ROUND_0
// func hashBlocksVX(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte)
TEXT ·hashBlocksVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-48
MOVV h+0(FP), R4
MOVV c+8(FP), R5
MOVV flag+16(FP), R6
MOVV blocks_base+24(FP), R7
MOVV blocks_len+32(FP), R8
MOVV (R5), R9 // c0
MOVV 8(R5), R10 // c1
loop:
ADDV $0x80, R9
SGTU $0x80, R9, R11
ADDV R10, R11, R10
VMOVQ R9, V8.V[0]
VMOVQ R10, V8.V[1]
MOVV $·iv0<>(SB), R11
MOVV $·iv1<>(SB), R12
MOVV $·iv2<>(SB), R13
MOVV $·iv3<>(SB), R14
VMOVQ (R13), V6
VMOVQ (R11), V4
VMOVQ (R12), V5
MOVV (R14), R15 // v14
MOVV 8(R14), R16
VXORV V6, V8, V6
XOR R15, R6, R15
VMOVQ R16, V7.V[1]
VMOVQ R15, V7.V[0]
VMOVQ (R4), V0
VMOVQ 16(R4), V1
VMOVQ 32(R4), V2
VMOVQ 48(R4), V3
MOVV 0(R7), R11
MOVV 8(R7), R12
MOVV 16(R7), R13
MOVV 24(R7), R14
MOVV 32(R7), R15
MOVV 40(R7), R16
MOVV 48(R7), R17
MOVV 56(R7), R18
MOVV 64(R7), R19
MOVV 72(R7), R24
MOVV 80(R7), R25
MOVV 88(R7), R26
MOVV 96(R7), R27
MOVV 104(R7), R28
MOVV 112(R7), R29
MOVV 120(R7), R30
VXORV V13, V13, V13 // V13=0
LOAD_M(R11, R13, R15, R17, R12, R14, R16, R18)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R19, R25, R27, R29, R24, R26, R28, R30)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R29, R15, R24, R28, R25, R19, R30, R17)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R12, R11, R26, R16, R27, R13, R18, R14)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R26, R27, R16, R30, R19, R11, R13, R28)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R25, R14, R18, R24, R29, R17, R12, R15)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R18, R14, R28, R26, R24, R12, R27, R29)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R13, R16, R15, R30, R17, R25, R11, R19)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R24, R16, R13, R25, R11, R18, R15, R30)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R29, R26, R17, R14, R12, R27, R19, R28)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R13, R17, R11, R19, R27, R25, R26, R14)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R15, R18, R30, R12, R28, R16, R29, R24)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R27, R12, R29, R15, R16, R30, R28, R25)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R11, R17, R24, R19, R18, R14, R13, R26)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R28, R18, R27, R14, R26, R29, R12, R24)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R16, R30, R19, R13, R11, R15, R17, R25)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R17, R29, R26, R11, R30, R24, R14, R19)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R27, R28, R12, R25, R13, R18, R15, R16)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R25, R19, R18, R12, R13, R15, R17, R16)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R30, R24, R14, R28, R26, R29, R27, R11)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R11, R13, R15, R17, R12, R14, R16, R18)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R19, R25, R27, R29, R24, R26, R28, R30)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
LOAD_M(R29, R15, R24, R28, R25, R19, R30, R17)
ROUND_0
SHUFFLE_1
LOAD_M(R12, R11, R26, R16, R27, R13, R18, R14)
ROUND_8
SHUFFLE_2
VMOVQ (R4), V8
VMOVQ 16(R4), V9
VMOVQ 32(R4), V10
VMOVQ 48(R4), V11
VXORV V0, V4, V0
VXORV V1, V5, V1
VXORV V2, V6, V2
VXORV V3, V7, V3
VXORV V0, V8, V0
VXORV V1, V9, V1
VXORV V2, V10, V2
VXORV V3, V11, V3
VMOVQ V0, (R4)
VMOVQ V1, 16(R4)
VMOVQ V2, 32(R4)
VMOVQ V3, 48(R4)
SUBV $128, R8
ADDV $128, R7
BNE R8, R0, loop
MOVV R9, (R5)
MOVV R10, 8(R5)
RET
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !amd64 || purego || !gc
//go:build (!amd64 && !loong64) || purego || !gc
package blake2b
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// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build gc && !purego
package chacha20
import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
const bufSize = 256
//go:noescape
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) {
if cpu.Loong64.HasLSX {
xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter)
} else {
c.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src)
}
}
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// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// derived from chacha_arm64.s
//go:build gc && !purego
#include "textflag.h"
DATA ·constants+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865
DATA ·constants+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e
DATA ·constants+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32
DATA ·constants+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574
GLOBL ·constants(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x00(SB)/4, $0x00000000
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x04(SB)/4, $0x00000001
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x08(SB)/4, $0x00000002
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x00000003
GLOBL ·incRotMatrix(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32
#define NUM_ROUNDS 10
// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
MOVV dst+0(FP), R4
MOVV src+24(FP), R5
MOVV src_len+32(FP), R6
MOVV key+48(FP), R7
MOVV nonce+56(FP), R8
MOVV counter+64(FP), R9
MOVV $·constants(SB), R10
MOVV $·incRotMatrix(SB), R11
MOVW (R9), R12
loop:
MOVV $NUM_ROUNDS, R15
// load 4-32bit data from incRotMatrix added to counter
VMOVQ (R11), V30
// load contants
VMOVQ (R10), V0.W4
VMOVQ 4(R10), V1.W4
VMOVQ 8(R10), V2.W4
VMOVQ 12(R10), V3.W4
// load keys
VMOVQ (R7), V4.W4
VMOVQ 4(R7), V5.W4
VMOVQ 8(R7), V6.W4
VMOVQ 12(R7), V7.W4
VMOVQ 16(R7), V8.W4
VMOVQ 20(R7), V9.W4
VMOVQ 24(R7), V10.W4
VMOVQ 28(R7), V11.W4
// load counter + nonce
VMOVQ (R9), V12.W4
VMOVQ (R8), V13.W4
VMOVQ 4(R8), V14.W4
VMOVQ 8(R8), V15.W4
// update counter
VADDW V30, V12, V12
chacha:
// V0..V3 += V4..V7
// V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 16)
VADDW V0, V4, V0
VADDW V1, V5, V1
VADDW V2, V6, V2
VADDW V3, V7, V3
VXORV V12, V0, V12
VXORV V13, V1, V13
VXORV V14, V2, V14
VXORV V15, V3, V15
VROTRW $16, V12, V12
VROTRW $16, V13, V13
VROTRW $16, V14, V14
VROTRW $16, V15, V15
// V8..V11 += V12..V15
// V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 12)
VADDW V8, V12, V8
VADDW V9, V13, V9
VADDW V10, V14, V10
VADDW V11, V15, V11
VXORV V4, V8, V4
VXORV V5, V9, V5
VXORV V6, V10, V6
VXORV V7, V11, V7
VROTRW $20, V4, V4
VROTRW $20, V5, V5
VROTRW $20, V6, V6
VROTRW $20, V7, V7
// V0..V3 += V4..V7
// V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 8)
VADDW V0, V4, V0
VADDW V1, V5, V1
VADDW V2, V6, V2
VADDW V3, V7, V3
VXORV V12, V0, V12
VXORV V13, V1, V13
VXORV V14, V2, V14
VXORV V15, V3, V15
VROTRW $24, V12, V12
VROTRW $24, V13, V13
VROTRW $24, V14, V14
VROTRW $24, V15, V15
// V8..V11 += V12..V15
// V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 7)
VADDW V12, V8, V8
VADDW V13, V9, V9
VADDW V14, V10, V10
VADDW V15, V11, V11
VXORV V4, V8, V4
VXORV V5, V9, V5
VXORV V6, V10, V6
VXORV V7, V11, V7
VROTRW $25, V4, V4
VROTRW $25, V5, V5
VROTRW $25, V6, V6
VROTRW $25, V7, V7
// V0..V3 += V5..V7, V4
// V15,V12-V14 <<<= ((V15,V12-V14 XOR V0..V3), 16)
VADDW V0, V5, V0
VADDW V1, V6, V1
VADDW V2, V7, V2
VADDW V3, V4, V3
VXORV V15, V0, V15
VXORV V12, V1, V12
VXORV V13, V2, V13
VXORV V14, V3, V14
VROTRW $16, V15, V15
VROTRW $16, V12, V12
VROTRW $16, V13, V13
VROTRW $16, V14, V14
// V10,V11,V8,V9 += V15,V12,V13,V14
// V5,V6,V7,V4 <<<= ((V5,V6,V7,V4 XOR V10,V11,V8,V9), 12)
VADDW V10, V15, V10
VADDW V11, V12, V11
VADDW V8, V13, V8
VADDW V9, V14, V9
VXORV V5, V10, V5
VXORV V6, V11, V6
VXORV V7, V8, V7
VXORV V4, V9, V4
VROTRW $20, V5, V5
VROTRW $20, V6, V6
VROTRW $20, V7, V7
VROTRW $20, V4, V4
// V0..V3 += V5..V7, V4
// V15,V12-V14 <<<= ((V15,V12-V14 XOR V0..V3), 8)
VADDW V5, V0, V0
VADDW V6, V1, V1
VADDW V7, V2, V2
VADDW V4, V3, V3
VXORV V15, V0, V15
VXORV V12, V1, V12
VXORV V13, V2, V13
VXORV V14, V3, V14
VROTRW $24, V15, V15
VROTRW $24, V12, V12
VROTRW $24, V13, V13
VROTRW $24, V14, V14
// V10,V11,V8,V9 += V15,V12,V13,V14
// V5,V6,V7,V4 <<<= ((V5,V6,V7,V4 XOR V10,V11,V8,V9), 7)
VADDW V15, V10, V10
VADDW V12, V11, V11
VADDW V13, V8, V8
VADDW V14, V9, V9
VXORV V5, V10, V5
VXORV V6, V11, V6
VXORV V7, V8, V7
VXORV V4, V9, V4
VROTRW $25, V5, V5
VROTRW $25, V6, V6
VROTRW $25, V7, V7
VROTRW $25, V4, V4
SUBV $1, R15
BNE R15, R0, chacha
// load origin contants
VMOVQ (R10), V16.W4
VMOVQ 4(R10), V17.W4
VMOVQ 8(R10), V18.W4
VMOVQ 12(R10), V19.W4
// load origin keys
VMOVQ (R7), V20.W4
VMOVQ 4(R7), V21.W4
VMOVQ 8(R7), V22.W4
VMOVQ 12(R7), V23.W4
VMOVQ 16(R7), V24.W4
VMOVQ 20(R7), V25.W4
VMOVQ 24(R7), V26.W4
VMOVQ 28(R7), V27.W4
// add back the initial state to generate the key stream
VADDW V30, V12, V12 // update counter in advance to prevent V30 from being overwritten
VADDW V16, V0, V0
VADDW V17, V1, V1
VADDW V18, V2, V2
VADDW V19, V3, V3
// load origin counter + nonce
VMOVQ (R9), V28.W4
VMOVQ (R8), V29.W4
VMOVQ 4(R8), V30.W4
VMOVQ 8(R8), V31.W4
VADDW V20, V4, V4
VADDW V21, V5, V5
VADDW V22, V6, V6
VADDW V23, V7, V7
VADDW V24, V8, V8
VADDW V25, V9, V9
VADDW V26, V10, V10
VADDW V27, V11, V11
VADDW V28, V12, V12
VADDW V29, V13, V13
VADDW V30, V14, V14
VADDW V31, V15, V15
// shuffle
VILVLW V0, V1, V16
VILVHW V0, V1, V17
VILVLW V2, V3, V18
VILVHW V2, V3, V19
VILVLW V4, V5 ,V20
VILVHW V4, V5, V21
VILVLW V6, V7, V22
VILVHW V6, V7, V23
VILVLW V8, V9, V24
VILVHW V8, V9, V25
VILVLW V10, V11, V26
VILVHW V10, V11, V27
VILVLW V12, V13, V28
VILVHW V12, V13, V29
VILVLW V14, V15, V30
VILVHW V14, V15, V31
VILVLV V16, V18, V0
VILVHV V16, V18, V4
VILVLV V17, V19, V8
VILVHV V17, V19, V12
// load src data from R5
VMOVQ 0(R5), V16
VMOVQ 16(R5), V17
VMOVQ 32(R5), V18
VMOVQ 48(R5), V19
VILVLV V20, V22, V1
VILVHV V20, V22, V5
VILVLV V21, V23, V9
VILVHV V21, V23, V13
VMOVQ 64(R5), V20
VMOVQ 80(R5), V21
VMOVQ 96(R5), V22
VMOVQ 112(R5), V23
VILVLV V24, V26, V2
VILVHV V24, V26, V6
VILVLV V25, V27, V10
VILVHV V25, V27, V14
VMOVQ 128(R5), V24
VMOVQ 144(R5), V25
VMOVQ 160(R5), V26
VMOVQ 176(R5), V27
VILVLV V28, V30, V3
VILVHV V28, V30, V7
VILVLV V29, V31, V11
VILVHV V29, V31, V15
VMOVQ 192(R5), V28
VMOVQ 208(R5), V29
VMOVQ 224(R5), V30
VMOVQ 240(R5), V31
VXORV V0, V16, V16
VXORV V1, V17, V17
VXORV V2, V18, V18
VXORV V3, V19, V19
VMOVQ V16, 0(R4)
VMOVQ V17, 16(R4)
VMOVQ V18, 32(R4)
VMOVQ V19, 48(R4)
VXORV V4, V20, V20
VXORV V5, V21, V21
VXORV V6, V22, V22
VXORV V7, V23, V23
VMOVQ V20, 64(R4)
VMOVQ V21, 80(R4)
VMOVQ V22, 96(R4)
VMOVQ V23, 112(R4)
VXORV V8, V24, V24
VXORV V9, V25, V25
VXORV V10, V26, V26
VXORV V11, V27, V27
VMOVQ V24, 128(R4)
VMOVQ V25, 144(R4)
VMOVQ V26, 160(R4)
VMOVQ V27, 176(R4)
VXORV V12, V28, V28
VXORV V13, V29, V29
VXORV V14, V30, V30
VXORV V15, V31, V31
VMOVQ V28, 192(R4)
VMOVQ V29, 208(R4)
VMOVQ V30, 224(R4)
VMOVQ V31, 240(R4)
ADD $4, R12, R12
MOVW R12, (R9) // update counter
ADDV $256, R4, R4
ADDV $256, R5, R5
SUBV $256, R6, R6
BNE R6, R0, loop
RET
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build (!arm64 && !s390x && !ppc64 && !ppc64le) || !gc || purego
//go:build (!arm64 && !loong64 && !s390x && !ppc64 && !ppc64le) || !gc || purego
package chacha20
+5 -5
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
module golang.org/x/crypto
go 1.25.0
go 1.26.0
require (
golang.org/x/net v0.57.0 // tagx:ignore
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
golang.org/x/term v0.45.0
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 // tagx:ignore
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0
golang.org/x/term v0.46.0
)
require golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 // indirect
require golang.org/x/text v0.42.0 // indirect
+8 -8
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
golang.org/x/net v0.57.0 h1:K5+3DljvIuDG9/Jv9rvyMywYNFCQ9RSUY6OOTTkT+tE=
golang.org/x/net v0.57.0/go.mod h1:KpXc8iv+r3XplLAG/f7Jsf9RPszJzdR0f58q9vGOuEU=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/term v0.45.0 h1:NwWyBmoJCbfTHpxrWoZ9C6/VxOf7ic219I8xZZFdrf0=
golang.org/x/term v0.45.0/go.mod h1:9aqxs0blBcrm/n0L9QW0aRVD+ktan8ssZromtqJC43w=
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 h1:vz/seA0lnX87Othu2f/0L24RcgrXD9/YFTSuGjj3rH8=
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0/go.mod h1:jvf1O8ajNzZqhSrQBPbutR/EB83Cc0CFrezNQIwbb5M=
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 h1:ynWG7rqYi4ccpTEuPZ2QGWHktVEM9DMCj9yzDE0Q7To=
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0/go.mod h1:YwCddHnFlT7eLQqVprV19OnhLGtc5xOKgE0RyqgfWAU=
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 h1:bbX/i/6MgT9BVLM9RT1thmxL04yeTAhbEz4SyadbXoo=
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
golang.org/x/term v0.46.0 h1:3+OXuTbaKDgwk8jTi3aSLHRlmWqHEUDUtxnbFigO4YE=
golang.org/x/term v0.46.0/go.mod h1:+K02xbkittuwc0Am4abfA3Fc+XRGXkvBXNO88NCXPoc=
golang.org/x/text v0.42.0 h1:JbOZXgfeCPU9gacVtYliJqOhD+zhrEqK4LfdpmlUZqI=
golang.org/x/text v0.42.0/go.mod h1:ojzP1Z+2QtioaF8DTtO8K5q7JWVVYwZKenzujK0Zd0E=
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build loong64 && !purego && gc
package salsa
import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
// xorKeyStreamVX is implemented in salsa20_loong64.s.
//
//go:noescape
func xorKeyStreamVX(out, in *byte, n uint64, nonce, key *byte)
// XORKeyStream crypts bytes from in to out using the given key and counters.
// In and out must overlap entirely or not at all. Counter
// contains the raw salsa20 counter bytes (both nonce and block counter).
func XORKeyStream(out, in []byte, counter *[16]byte, key *[32]byte) {
if len(in) == 0 {
return
}
_ = out[len(in)-1]
if cpu.Loong64.HasLSX {
xorKeyStreamVX(&out[0], &in[0], uint64(len(in)), &counter[0], &key[0])
} else {
genericXORKeyStream(out, in, counter, key)
}
}
+454
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !purego && gc
#include "textflag.h"
DATA ·constants+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865
DATA ·constants+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e
DATA ·constants+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32
DATA ·constants+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574
GLOBL ·constants(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32
#define NUM_ROUNDS 10
// func xorKeyStreamVX(out, in *byte, n uint64, counter, key *byte)
TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), $0-40
MOVV out+0(FP), R4
MOVV in+8(FP), R5
MOVV n+16(FP), R6
MOVV counter+24(FP), R7
MOVV key+32(FP), R8
MOVV $·constants(SB), R10
BGE R0, R6, ret
MOVV 8(R7), R9 // counter[8:16]
loop256:
MOVV $NUM_ROUNDS, R15
VXORV V30, V30, V30 // V30 = 0
// load contants
VMOVQ (R10), V0.W4
VMOVQ 4(R10), V5.W4
VMOVQ 8(R10), V10.W4
VMOVQ 12(R10), V15.W4
// load keys
VMOVQ (R8), V1.W4
VMOVQ 4(R8), V2.W4
VMOVQ 8(R8), V3.W4
VMOVQ 12(R8), V4.W4
VMOVQ 16(R8), V11.W4
VMOVQ 20(R8), V12.W4
VMOVQ 24(R8), V13.W4
VMOVQ 28(R8), V14.W4
// load and update counter
VMOVQ (R7), V6.W4
VMOVQ 4(R7), V7.W4
ADDV $1, R9, R11
ADDV $2, R9, R12
ADDV $3, R9, R13
VMOVQ R9, V8.W[0]
VMOVQ R11, V8.W[1]
VMOVQ R12, V8.W[2]
VMOVQ R13, V8.W[3]
SRLV $32, R9, R14
SRLV $32, R11, R11
SRLV $32, R12, R12
SRLV $32, R13, R13
VMOVQ R14, V9.W[0]
VMOVQ R11, V9.W[1]
VMOVQ R12, V9.W[2]
VMOVQ R13, V9.W[3]
// backup V8 and V9
VADDV V8, V30, V24 // V21 = V8
VADDV V9, V30, V25 // V22 = V9
salsa20_256:
VADDW V0, V12, V26
VADDW V5, V1, V27
VADDW V10, V6, V28
VADDW V15, V11, V29
VROTRW $25, V26, V26
VROTRW $25, V27, V27
VROTRW $25, V28, V28
VROTRW $25, V29, V29
VXORV V4, V26, V4
VXORV V9, V27, V9
VXORV V14, V28, V14
VXORV V3, V29, V3
VADDW V4, V0, V26
VADDW V9, V5, V27
VADDW V14, V10, V28
VADDW V3, V15, V29
VROTRW $23, V26, V26
VROTRW $23, V27, V27
VROTRW $23, V28, V28
VROTRW $23, V29, V29
VXORV V8, V26, V8
VXORV V13, V27, V13
VXORV V2, V28, V2
VXORV V7, V29, V7
VADDW V8, V4, V26
VADDW V13, V9, V27
VADDW V2, V14, V28
VADDW V7, V3, V29
VROTRW $19, V26, V26
VROTRW $19, V27, V27
VROTRW $19, V28, V28
VROTRW $19, V29, V29
VXORV V12, V26, V12
VXORV V1, V27, V1
VXORV V6, V28, V6
VXORV V11, V29, V11
VADDW V12, V8, V26
VADDW V1, V13, V27
VADDW V6, V2, V28
VADDW V11, V7, V29
VROTRW $14, V26, V26
VROTRW $14, V27, V27
VROTRW $14, V28, V28
VROTRW $14, V29, V29
VXORV V0, V26, V0
VXORV V5, V27, V5
VXORV V10, V28, V10
VXORV V15, V29, V15
VADDW V0, V3, V26
VADDW V5, V4, V27
VADDW V10, V9, V28
VADDW V15, V14, V29
VROTRW $25, V26, V26
VROTRW $25, V27, V27
VROTRW $25, V28, V28
VROTRW $25, V29, V29
VXORV V1, V26, V1
VXORV V6, V27, V6
VXORV V11, V28, V11
VXORV V12, V29, V12
VADDW V1, V0, V26
VADDW V6, V5, V27
VADDW V11, V10, V28
VADDW V12, V15, V29
VROTRW $23, V26, V26
VROTRW $23, V27, V27
VROTRW $23, V28, V28
VROTRW $23, V29, V29
VXORV V2, V26, V2
VXORV V7, V27, V7
VXORV V8, V28, V8
VXORV V13, V29, V13
VADDW V2, V1, V26
VADDW V7, V6, V27
VADDW V8, V11, V28
VADDW V13, V12, V29
VROTRW $19, V26, V26
VROTRW $19, V27, V27
VROTRW $19, V28, V28
VROTRW $19, V29, V29
VXORV V3, V26, V3
VXORV V4, V27, V4
VXORV V9, V28, V9
VXORV V14, V29, V14
VADDW V3, V2, V26
VADDW V4, V7, V27
VADDW V9, V8, V28
VADDW V14, V13, V29
VROTRW $14, V26, V26
VROTRW $14, V27, V27
VROTRW $14, V28, V28
VROTRW $14, V29, V29
VXORV V0, V26, V0
VXORV V5, V27, V5
VXORV V10, V28, V10
VXORV V15, V29, V15
SUBV $1, R15
BNE R15, R0, salsa20_256
// load origin contants
VMOVQ (R10), V16.W4
VMOVQ 4(R10), V21.W4
VMOVQ 8(R10), V26.W4
VMOVQ 12(R10), V31.W4
// load origin keys
VMOVQ (R8), V17.W4
VMOVQ 4(R8), V18.W4
VMOVQ 8(R8), V19.W4
VMOVQ 12(R8), V20.W4
VMOVQ 16(R8), V27.W4
VMOVQ 20(R8), V28.W4
VMOVQ 24(R8), V29.W4
VMOVQ 28(R8), V30.W4
// load origin counter
VMOVQ (R7), V22.W4
VMOVQ 4(R7), V23.W4
// add back the initial state to generate the key stream
VADDW V0, V16, V0
VADDW V1, V17, V1
VADDW V2, V18, V2
VADDW V3, V19, V3
VADDW V4, V20, V4
VADDW V5, V21, V5
VADDW V6, V22, V6
VADDW V7, V23, V7
VADDW V8, V24, V8
VADDW V9, V25, V9
VADDW V10, V26, V10
VADDW V11, V27, V11
VADDW V12, V28, V12
VADDW V13, V29, V13
VADDW V14, V30, V14
VADDW V15, V31, V15
// shuffle
VILVLW V0, V1, V16
VILVHW V0, V1, V17
VILVLW V2, V3, V18
VILVHW V2, V3, V19
VILVLW V4, V5 ,V20
VILVHW V4, V5, V21
VILVLW V6, V7, V22
VILVHW V6, V7, V23
VILVLW V8, V9, V24
VILVHW V8, V9, V25
VILVLW V10, V11, V26
VILVHW V10, V11, V27
VILVLW V12, V13, V28
VILVHW V12, V13, V29
VILVLW V14, V15, V30
VILVHW V14, V15, V31
VILVLV V16, V18, V0
VILVHV V16, V18, V4
VILVLV V17, V19, V8
VILVHV V17, V19, V12
VILVLV V20, V22, V1
VILVHV V20, V22, V5
VILVLV V21, V23, V9
VILVHV V21, V23, V13
VILVLV V24, V26, V2
VILVHV V24, V26, V6
VILVLV V25, V27, V10
VILVHV V25, V27, V14
VILVLV V28, V30, V3
VILVHV V28, V30, V7
VILVLV V29, V31, V11
VILVHV V29, V31, V15
SGTU $256, R6, R11
BNE R11, R0, less_than_256
// load src data from R5
VMOVQ 0(R5), V16
VMOVQ 16(R5), V17
VMOVQ 32(R5), V18
VMOVQ 48(R5), V19
VMOVQ 64(R5), V20
VMOVQ 80(R5), V21
VMOVQ 96(R5), V22
VMOVQ 112(R5), V23
VMOVQ 128(R5), V24
VMOVQ 144(R5), V25
VMOVQ 160(R5), V26
VMOVQ 176(R5), V27
VMOVQ 192(R5), V28
VMOVQ 208(R5), V29
VMOVQ 224(R5), V30
VMOVQ 240(R5), V31
VXORV V0, V16, V16
VXORV V1, V17, V17
VXORV V2, V18, V18
VXORV V3, V19, V19
VXORV V4, V20, V20
VXORV V5, V21, V21
VXORV V6, V22, V22
VXORV V7, V23, V23
VXORV V8, V24, V24
VXORV V9, V25, V25
VXORV V10, V26, V26
VXORV V11, V27, V27
VXORV V12, V28, V28
VXORV V13, V29, V29
VXORV V14, V30, V30
VXORV V15, V31, V31
VMOVQ V16, 0(R4)
VMOVQ V17, 16(R4)
VMOVQ V18, 32(R4)
VMOVQ V19, 48(R4)
VMOVQ V20, 64(R4)
VMOVQ V21, 80(R4)
VMOVQ V22, 96(R4)
VMOVQ V23, 112(R4)
VMOVQ V24, 128(R4)
VMOVQ V25, 144(R4)
VMOVQ V26, 160(R4)
VMOVQ V27, 176(R4)
VMOVQ V28, 192(R4)
VMOVQ V29, 208(R4)
VMOVQ V30, 224(R4)
VMOVQ V31, 240(R4)
ADDV $4, R9, R9 // update counter
SUBV $256, R6, R6
ADDV $256, R4, R4
ADDV $256, R5, R5
SGTU $256, R6, R11
BEQ R11, R0, loop256
BEQ R6, R0, ret
less_than_256:
VXORV V30, V30, V30 // V30=0
SGTU $128, R6, R11
BNE R11, R0, less_than_128
SUBV $128, R6
VMOVQ (R5), V16
VMOVQ 16(R5), V17
VMOVQ 32(R5), V18
VMOVQ 48(R5), V19
VMOVQ 64(R5), V20
VMOVQ 80(R5), V21
VMOVQ 96(R5), V22
VMOVQ 112(R5), V23
VXORV V0, V16, V16
VXORV V1, V17, V17
VXORV V2, V18, V18
VXORV V3, V19, V19
VXORV V4, V20, V20
VXORV V5, V21, V21
VXORV V6, V22, V22
VXORV V7, V23, V23
VMOVQ V16, (R4)
VMOVQ V17, 16(R4)
VMOVQ V18, 32(R4)
VMOVQ V19, 48(R4)
VMOVQ V20, 64(R4)
VMOVQ V21, 80(R4)
VMOVQ V22, 96(R4)
VMOVQ V23, 112(R4)
BEQ R6, R0, ret
ADDV $128, R5, R5
ADDV $128, R4, R4
VADDV V8, V30, V0
VADDV V9, V30, V1
VADDV V10, V30, V2
VADDV V11, V30, V3
VADDV V12, V30, V4
VADDV V13, V30, V5
VADDV V14, V30, V6
VADDV V15, V30, V7
less_than_128:
SGTU $64, R6, R11
BNE R11, R0, less_than_64
SUBV $64, R6
VMOVQ (R5), V16
VMOVQ 16(R5), V17
VMOVQ 32(R5), V18
VMOVQ 48(R5), V19
VXORV V0, V16, V16
VXORV V1, V17, V17
VXORV V2, V18, V18
VXORV V3, V19, V19
VMOVQ V16, (R4)
VMOVQ V17, 16(R4)
VMOVQ V18, 32(R4)
VMOVQ V19, 48(R4)
BEQ R6, R0, ret
ADDV $64, R5
ADDV $64, R4
VADDV V4, V30, V0
VADDV V5, V30, V1
VADDV V6, V30, V2
VADDV V7, V30, V3
less_than_64:
SGTU $32, R6, R11
BNE R11, R0, less_than_32
SUBV $32, R6
VMOVQ (R5), V16
VMOVQ 16(R5), V17
VXORV V0, V16, V16
VXORV V1, V17, V17
VMOVQ V16, (R4)
VMOVQ V17, 16(R4)
BEQ R6, R0, ret
ADDV $32, R5
ADDV $32, R4
VADDV V2, V30, V0
VADDV V3, V30, V1
less_than_32:
SGTU $16, R6, R11
BNE R11, R0, less_than_16
SUBV $16, R6
VMOVQ (R5), V16
VXORV V16, V0, V16
VMOVQ V16, (R4)
BEQ R6, R0, ret
ADDV $16, R5
ADDV $16, R4
VADDV V1, V30, V0
less_than_16:
SGTU $8, R6, R11
BNE R11, R0, less_than_8
SUBV $8, R6
VMOVQ V0.V[0], R11
VMOVQ V0.V[1], R13
MOVV (R5), R12
XOR R11, R12, R12
MOVV R12, (R4)
BEQ R6, R0, ret
ADDV $8, R5
ADDV $8, R4
VMOVQ R13, V0.V[0]
less_than_8:
SGTU $4, R6, R11
BNE R11, R0, less_than_4
SUBV $4, R6
VMOVQ V0.W[0], R11
VMOVQ V0.W[1], R13
MOVWU (R5), R12
XOR R11, R12, R12
MOVWU R12, (R4)
BEQ R6, R0, ret
ADDV $4, R5
ADDV $4, R4
VMOVQ R13, V0.W[0]
less_than_4:
SGTU $2, R6, R11
BNE R11, R0, less_than_2
SUBV $2, R6
VMOVQ V0.H[0], R11
VMOVQ V0.H[1], R13
MOVHU (R5), R12
XOR R11, R12, R12
MOVHU R12, (R4)
BEQ R6, R0, ret
ADDV $2, R5
ADDV $2, R4
VMOVQ R13, V0.H[0]
less_than_2:
VMOVQ V0.B[0], R11
MOVBU (R5), R12
XOR R11, R12, R12
MOVBU R12, (R4)
ret:
RET
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !amd64 || purego || !gc
//go:build (!amd64 && !loong64) || purego || !gc
package salsa
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build amd64 && !purego && gc
//go:build (amd64 || loong64) && !purego && gc
package salsa
+17 -21
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"slices"
"sort"
"time"
)
@@ -305,8 +306,11 @@ const sourceAddressCriticalOption = "source-address"
// minimally, the IsAuthority callback should be set.
type CertChecker struct {
// SupportedCriticalOptions lists the CriticalOptions that the
// server application layer understands. These are only used
// for user certificates.
// application layer understands. A certificate carrying a critical
// option that is not listed here is rejected.
// CertChecker.Authenticate additionally accepts the source-address
// option, which the server enforces on the Permissions that
// Authenticate returns.
SupportedCriticalOptions []string
// IsUserAuthority should return true if the key is recognized as an
@@ -369,8 +373,9 @@ func (c *CertChecker) CheckHostKey(addr string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey)
return c.CheckCert(hostname, cert)
}
// Authenticate checks a user certificate. Authenticate can be used as
// a value for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback.
// Authenticate checks a user certificate. Authenticate can be used as a value
// for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. The source-address critical option is
// allowed, as it will be enforced by the server.
func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
cert, ok := pubKey.(*Certificate)
if !ok {
@@ -389,8 +394,11 @@ func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permis
if !c.IsUserAuthority(cert.SignatureKey) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signed by unrecognized authority")
}
if err := c.CheckCert(conn.User(), cert); err != nil {
// The source-address critical option is enforced by serverAuthenticate,
// so it is supported regardless of SupportedCriticalOptions
cc := *c
cc.SupportedCriticalOptions = append(slices.Clip(cc.SupportedCriticalOptions), sourceAddressCriticalOption)
if err := cc.CheckCert(conn.User(), cert); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -398,27 +406,15 @@ func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permis
}
// CheckCert checks CriticalOptions, ValidPrincipals, revocation, timestamp and
// the signature of the certificate.
// the signature of the certificate. Critical options that are not listed in
// SupportedCriticalOptions are rejected.
func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error {
if c.IsRevoked != nil && c.IsRevoked(cert) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial)
}
for opt := range cert.CriticalOptions {
// sourceAddressCriticalOption will be enforced by
// serverAuthenticate
if opt == sourceAddressCriticalOption {
continue
}
found := false
for _, supp := range c.SupportedCriticalOptions {
if supp == opt {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
if !slices.Contains(c.SupportedCriticalOptions, opt) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported critical option %q in certificate", opt)
}
}
+76
View File
@@ -385,6 +385,82 @@ func TestHostKeyCert(t *testing.T) {
}
}
type testConnMeta struct {
ConnMetadata
user string
}
func (c testConnMeta) User() string { return c.user }
func TestCertCriticalOptions(t *testing.T) {
appended := make([]string, 2)
appended[0], appended[1] = "supported-option", "appended-option"
supported := appended[:1]
checker := &CertChecker{
SupportedCriticalOptions: supported,
IsHostAuthority: func(p PublicKey, addr string) bool {
return bytes.Equal(testPublicKeys["ecdsa"].Marshal(), p.Marshal())
},
IsUserAuthority: func(p PublicKey) bool {
return bytes.Equal(testPublicKeys["ecdsa"].Marshal(), p.Marshal())
},
}
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
opts map[string]string
// succeed is the expected outcome of CheckHostKey, for a host
// certificate, and of CheckCert, for a user certificate.
succeed bool
// authSucceed is the expected outcome of Authenticate.
authSucceed bool
}{
{name: "no critical options", opts: nil, succeed: true, authSucceed: true},
{name: "source-address", opts: map[string]string{sourceAddressCriticalOption: "192.168.1.0/24"}, authSucceed: true},
{name: "unknown option", opts: map[string]string{"unknown-option": ""}},
{name: "supported option", opts: map[string]string{"supported-option": ""}, succeed: true, authSucceed: true},
} {
hostCert := &Certificate{
ValidPrincipals: []string{"hostname"},
Key: testPublicKeys["rsa"],
ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
CertType: HostCert,
Permissions: Permissions{CriticalOptions: test.opts},
}
if err := hostCert.SignCert(rand.Reader, testSigners["ecdsa"]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SignCert: %v", err)
}
if err := checker.CheckHostKey("hostname:22", nil, hostCert); (err == nil) != test.succeed {
t.Errorf("CheckHostKey(%s): got %v, want success=%v", test.name, err, test.succeed)
}
userCert := &Certificate{
ValidPrincipals: []string{"user"},
Key: testPublicKeys["rsa"],
ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
CertType: UserCert,
Permissions: Permissions{CriticalOptions: test.opts},
}
if err := userCert.SignCert(rand.Reader, testSigners["ecdsa"]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SignCert: %v", err)
}
if err := checker.CheckCert("user", userCert); (err == nil) != test.succeed {
t.Errorf("CheckCert(%s): got %v, want success=%v", test.name, err, test.succeed)
}
if _, err := checker.Authenticate(testConnMeta{user: "user"}, userCert); (err == nil) != test.authSucceed {
t.Errorf("Authenticate(%s): got %v, want success=%v", test.name, err, test.authSucceed)
}
}
if appended[1] != "appended-option" {
t.Errorf("Authenticate overwrote the caller's slice: got %q, want %q", appended[1], "appended-option")
}
}
type legacyRSASigner struct {
Signer
}
+19 -1
View File
@@ -173,6 +173,12 @@ type channel struct {
// (for outbound channels) or received (for inbound channels).
decided bool
// established is set to true once the channel is open and may carry normal
// channel traffic: for an outbound channel when the peer's open
// confirmation is received, for an inbound channel when the local side
// accepts it. It is set and read from different goroutines.
established atomic.Bool
// direction contains either channelOutbound, for channels created
// locally, or channelInbound, for channels created by the peer.
direction channelDirection
@@ -434,10 +440,20 @@ func (ch *channel) responseMessageReceived() error {
return errors.New("ssh: duplicate response received for channel")
}
ch.decided = true
ch.established.Store(true)
return nil
}
func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
// Only the open response is expected before the channel is established.
if !ch.established.Load() {
switch packet[0] {
case msgChannelOpenConfirm, msgChannelOpenFailure:
default:
return nil
}
}
switch packet[0] {
case msgChannelData, msgChannelExtendedData:
return ch.handleData(packet)
@@ -503,7 +519,8 @@ func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
default:
}
default:
ch.msg <- msg
// No other message type is expected on an established channel.
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d on channel %d", packet[0], ch.localId)
}
return nil
}
@@ -554,6 +571,7 @@ func (ch *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) {
MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload,
}
ch.decided = true
ch.established.Store(true)
if err := ch.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
+4
View File
@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ func init() {
// You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if
// you do.
cipherModes[InsecureCipherAES128CBC] = &cipherMode{16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher}
// AES-192 and AES-256 reuse the same CBC packet cipher; aes.NewCipher
// selects the key schedule from the key length.
cipherModes[InsecureCipherAES192CBC] = &cipherMode{24, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher}
cipherModes[InsecureCipherAES256CBC] = &cipherMode{32, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher}
cipherModes[InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC] = &cipherMode{24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher}
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ const (
CipherAES192CTR = "aes192-ctr"
CipherAES256CTR = "aes256-ctr"
InsecureCipherAES128CBC = "aes128-cbc"
InsecureCipherAES192CBC = "aes192-cbc"
InsecureCipherAES256CBC = "aes256-cbc"
InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC = "3des-cbc"
InsecureCipherRC4 = "arcfour"
InsecureCipherRC4128 = "arcfour128"
@@ -128,6 +130,8 @@ var (
// package and which have security issues.
insecureCiphers = []string{
InsecureCipherAES128CBC,
InsecureCipherAES192CBC,
InsecureCipherAES256CBC,
InsecureCipherTripleDESCBC,
InsecureCipherRC4256,
InsecureCipherRC4128,
@@ -437,7 +441,7 @@ func (a *DirectionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 {
// 2^(BLOCKSIZE/4) blocks. For all AES flavors BLOCKSIZE is
// 128.
switch a.Cipher {
case CipherAES128CTR, CipherAES192CTR, CipherAES256CTR, CipherAES128GCM, CipherAES256GCM, InsecureCipherAES128CBC:
case CipherAES128CTR, CipherAES192CTR, CipherAES256CTR, CipherAES128GCM, CipherAES256GCM, InsecureCipherAES128CBC, InsecureCipherAES192CBC, InsecureCipherAES256CBC:
return 16 * (1 << 32)
}
+13 -4
View File
@@ -142,6 +142,15 @@ func keyEq(a, b ssh.PublicKey) bool {
return bytes.Equal(a.Marshal(), b.Marshal())
}
// plainKeyBlob returns the serialized public portion of key: for a
// certificate this is the certified key, otherwise the key itself.
func plainKeyBlob(key ssh.PublicKey) string {
if cert, ok := key.(*ssh.Certificate); ok {
return string(cert.Key.Marshal())
}
return string(key.Marshal())
}
// IsHostAuthority can be used as a callback in ssh.CertChecker
func (db *hostKeyDB) IsHostAuthority(remote ssh.PublicKey, address string) bool {
h, p, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
@@ -160,10 +169,10 @@ func (db *hostKeyDB) IsHostAuthority(remote ssh.PublicKey, address string) bool
// IsRevoked can be used as a callback in ssh.CertChecker
func (db *hostKeyDB) IsRevoked(key *ssh.Certificate) bool {
if _, ok := db.revoked[string(key.Marshal())]; ok {
if _, ok := db.revoked[plainKeyBlob(key)]; ok {
return true
}
if _, ok := db.revoked[string(key.SignatureKey.Marshal())]; ok {
if _, ok := db.revoked[plainKeyBlob(key.SignatureKey)]; ok {
return true
}
return false
@@ -228,7 +237,7 @@ func (db *hostKeyDB) parseLine(line []byte, filename string, linenum int) error
}
if marker == markerRevoked {
db.revoked[string(key.Marshal())] = &KnownKey{
db.revoked[plainKeyBlob(key)] = &KnownKey{
Key: key,
Filename: filename,
Line: linenum,
@@ -341,7 +350,7 @@ func (r *RevokedError) Error() string {
// check checks a key against the host database. This should not be
// used for verifying certificates.
func (db *hostKeyDB) check(address string, remote net.Addr, remoteKey ssh.PublicKey) error {
if revoked := db.revoked[string(remoteKey.Marshal())]; revoked != nil {
if revoked := db.revoked[plainKeyBlob(remoteKey)]; revoked != nil {
return &RevokedError{Revoked: *revoked}
}
+62
View File
@@ -316,6 +316,68 @@ func TestRevokedCA(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRevokedCertifiedKey(t *testing.T) {
_, caPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
caSigner, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(caPriv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, hostPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
hostKey, err := ssh.NewPublicKey(hostPriv.Public())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
signCert := func(serial uint64, principal string) *ssh.Certificate {
cert := &ssh.Certificate{
CertType: ssh.HostCert,
Key: hostKey,
Serial: serial,
ValidBefore: ssh.CertTimeInfinity,
ValidPrincipals: []string{principal},
}
if err := cert.SignCert(rand.Reader, caSigner); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return cert
}
cert := signCert(1, "server.org")
// Revoking the host key revokes any certificate for it, even when
// the CA is trusted, matching OpenSSH's check_key_not_revoked.
db := testDB(t, "@revoked server.org "+serialize(hostKey)+"\n"+
"@cert-authority server.org "+serialize(caSigner.PublicKey())+"\n")
if !db.IsRevoked(cert) {
t.Error("IsRevoked returned false for certificate with revoked certified key")
}
// Conversely, a @revoked line containing a certificate revokes the
// plain key it certifies.
db = testDB(t, "@revoked server.org "+serialize(cert)+"\n")
if err := db.check("server.org:22", testAddr, hostKey); err == nil {
t.Error("no error for plain key revoked via certificate")
} else if _, ok := err.(*RevokedError); !ok {
t.Errorf("got %T (%v), want *RevokedError", err, err)
}
// Since only public portions are compared, revoking a certificate
// also revokes any sibling certificate certifying the same key,
// whatever its serial number and principals.
sibling := signCert(2, "other.org")
db = testDB(t, "@revoked * "+serialize(cert)+"\n"+
"@cert-authority * "+serialize(caSigner.PublicKey())+"\n")
if !db.IsRevoked(sibling) {
t.Error("IsRevoked returned false for sibling certificate of a revoked certificate")
}
}
const testHostname = "hostname"
// generated with keygen -H -f
+198 -1
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,11 @@
package ssh
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -1181,6 +1183,13 @@ func TestChannelUnexpectedResponsesDiscarded(t *testing.T) {
return
}
}
// Follow the flood with a request so the client can synchronize with
// its mux loop. Once the client receives this request, the mux loop has
// necessarily processed (and discarded) all the preceding responses.
if _, err := serverCh.SendRequest("sync", false, nil); err != nil {
done <- fmt.Errorf("send sync request: %w", err)
return
}
// Echo any legitimate request back.
for req := range serverCh.incomingRequests {
if req.WantReply {
@@ -1193,9 +1202,17 @@ func TestChannelUnexpectedResponsesDiscarded(t *testing.T) {
done <- nil
}()
req, ok := <-clientCh.incomingRequests
if !ok {
t.Fatal("channel closed before sync request")
}
if req.Type != "sync" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected sync request type %q", req.Type)
}
// If the flood had wedged the mux loop, this SendRequest would never
// receive a reply.
ok, err := clientCh.SendRequest("ping", true, []byte("hello"))
ok, err = clientCh.SendRequest("ping", true, []byte("hello"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SendRequest: %v", err)
}
@@ -1213,6 +1230,186 @@ func TestChannelUnexpectedResponsesDiscarded(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestChannelUndecidedOutboundDropsTraffic(t *testing.T) {
// Traffic on an outbound channel the peer has not confirmed yet is dropped;
// the open confirmation is still processed.
a, b := memPipe()
defer a.Close()
defer b.Close()
// Drain the peer end so that a write would not block.
go func() {
for {
if _, err := b.readPacket(); err != nil {
return
}
}
}()
m := newMux(a)
ch := m.newChannel("session", channelOutbound, nil)
if ch.decided {
t.Fatal("freshly opened outbound channel should not be decided")
}
// Flooding channel requests must not block.
reqPacket := Marshal(channelRequestMsg{PeersID: ch.localId, Request: "x"})
for range chanSize * 4 {
if err := ch.handlePacket(reqPacket); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("handlePacket(channelRequest): %v", err)
}
}
if n := len(ch.incomingRequests); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("incomingRequests should be empty, has %d entries", n)
}
// A close before the confirmation must not remove or close the channel, and
// must not emit a close for the still-unknown remote id.
if err := ch.handlePacket(Marshal(channelCloseMsg{PeersID: ch.localId})); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("handlePacket(channelClose): %v", err)
}
if m.chanList.getChan(ch.localId) != ch {
t.Fatal("premature close removed the channel from the chanList")
}
// The open confirmation is still processed and decides the channel.
confirm := Marshal(channelOpenConfirmMsg{
PeersID: ch.localId,
MyID: 42,
MyWindow: 1 << 20,
MaxPacketSize: 1 << 15,
})
if err := ch.handlePacket(confirm); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("handlePacket(openConfirm): %v", err)
}
if !ch.decided {
t.Fatal("channel not decided after open confirmation")
}
if _, ok := (<-ch.msg).(*channelOpenConfirmMsg); !ok {
t.Fatal("open confirmation was not delivered on ch.msg")
}
}
func TestChannelUndecidedInboundDropsRequests(t *testing.T) {
// Channel requests on an inbound channel the local application has not
// accepted or rejected yet are dropped.
serverMux, clientMux := muxPair()
defer serverMux.Close()
defer clientMux.Close()
go DiscardRequests(serverMux.incomingRequests)
// The server assigns its first inbound channel id 0; open such a channel
// and flood it before it is decided. The channel is left undecided, as it
// would be in the window before the server accepts or rejects it: its
// NewChannel is never received from incomingChannels.
ch := clientMux.newChannel("chan", channelOutbound, nil)
if err := clientMux.sendMessage(channelOpenMsg{
ChanType: "chan",
PeersWindow: ch.myWindow,
MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload,
PeersID: ch.localId,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("send open: %v", err)
}
for range chanSize * 4 {
if err := clientMux.sendMessage(channelRequestMsg{PeersID: 0, Request: "x"}); err != nil {
break // the server may have closed the connection
}
}
// The server loop keeps reading: closing the client makes it observe EOF
// and return from Wait.
clientMux.Close()
serverMux.Wait()
}
func TestChannelRejectedInboundDropsTraffic(t *testing.T) {
// A rejected channel is decided but is never established, and traffic on it
// is dropped.
a, b := memPipe()
defer a.Close()
defer b.Close()
go func() {
for {
if _, err := b.readPacket(); err != nil {
return
}
}
}()
m := newMux(a)
ch := m.newChannel("session", channelInbound, nil)
ch.remoteId = 42
if err := ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "no thanks"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Reject: %v", err)
}
if !ch.decided {
t.Fatal("a rejected channel should be decided")
}
if ch.established.Load() {
t.Fatal("a rejected channel should not be established")
}
// Flooding channel requests must not block.
reqPacket := Marshal(channelRequestMsg{PeersID: ch.localId, Request: "x"})
for range chanSize * 4 {
if err := ch.handlePacket(reqPacket); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("handlePacket(channelRequest): %v", err)
}
}
if n := len(ch.incomingRequests); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("incomingRequests should be empty, has %d entries", n)
}
}
func TestChannelBogusMessageTearsDownMux(t *testing.T) {
// A message that is well-formed on the wire but is not a type expected on
// an established channel is a protocol error that tears the mux down.
clientMux, serverMux := muxPair()
defer serverMux.Close()
defer clientMux.Close()
serverRes := make(chan *channel, 1)
go func() {
newCh, ok := <-serverMux.incomingChannels
if !ok {
close(serverRes)
return
}
c, _, err := newCh.Accept()
if err != nil {
close(serverRes)
return
}
serverRes <- c.(*channel)
}()
if _, err := clientMux.openChannel("chan", nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("openChannel: %v", err)
}
serverCh := <-serverRes
if serverCh == nil {
t.Fatal("server did not accept channel")
}
// Craft a packet that the client mux routes to clientCh (bytes 1:5 hold the
// peer's channel id) and that decode accepts, but whose type is unexpected
// on a channel. The service-string length equals the channel id, so the
// same four bytes serve both as the routing id and as the string length.
id := serverCh.remoteId
packet := []byte{msgServiceRequest, 0, 0, 0, 0}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], id)
packet = append(packet, make([]byte, id)...)
if err := serverMux.conn.writePacket(packet); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writePacket: %v", err)
}
// The mux loop exits with the protocol error.
if err := clientMux.Wait(); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unexpected message type") {
t.Fatalf("mux error = %v, want unexpected message type", err)
}
}
func TestChannelCloseIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
a, b := memPipe()
defer a.Close()
+9 -3
View File
@@ -331,13 +331,19 @@ func exchangeVersions(rw io.ReadWriter, versionLine []byte) (them []byte, err er
// chars
const maxVersionStringBytes = 255
// maxPreVersionLines is the maximum number of lines sent by the peer
// before the version string. Each of these lines is limited to a maximum
// of maxVersionStringBytes chars. Lines sent before the version string
// are silently ignored.
const maxPreVersionLines = 1024
// Read version string as specified by RFC 4253, section 4.2.
func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
versionString := make([]byte, 0, 64)
var ok bool
var buf [1]byte
for length := 0; length < maxVersionStringBytes; length++ {
for lines := 0; len(versionString) < maxVersionStringBytes && lines < maxPreVersionLines; {
_, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -347,9 +353,9 @@ func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
if buf[0] == '\n' {
if !bytes.HasPrefix(versionString, []byte("SSH-")) {
// RFC 4253 says we need to ignore all version string lines
// except the one containing the SSH version (provided that
// all the lines do not exceed 255 bytes in total).
// except the one containing the SSH version.
versionString = versionString[:0]
lines++
continue
}
ok = true
+16 -4
View File
@@ -35,11 +35,15 @@ func TestReadVersion(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestReadVersionError(t *testing.T) {
longVersion := strings.Repeat("SSH-2.0-bla", 50)[:253]
multiLineVersion := strings.Repeat("ignored\r\n", 50) + "SSH-2.0-bla\r\n"
tooLongVersion := strings.Repeat("SSH-2.0-bla", 60) + "\r\n"
multiLine := strings.Repeat("ignored\r\n", 50)
tooManyLines := strings.Repeat("ignored\r\n", 2000)
tooLongLine := strings.Repeat("blah ", 100) + "\r\n"
cases := []string{
longVersion + "too-long\r\n",
multiLineVersion,
tooLongVersion,
multiLine + tooLongVersion,
tooManyLines + "SSH-2.0-bla\r\n",
tooLongLine + "SSH-2.0-bla\r\n",
}
for _, in := range cases {
if _, err := readVersion(bytes.NewBufferString(in)); err == nil {
@@ -48,6 +52,14 @@ func TestReadVersionError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestIgnorePreVersion(t *testing.T) {
longishLine := strings.Repeat("blah ", 30) + "\r\n"
multiLineVersion := strings.Repeat(longishLine, 100) + "SSH-2.0-bla\r\n"
if _, err := readVersion(bytes.NewBufferString(multiLineVersion)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("readVersion() got error %v, expected success", err)
}
}
func TestExchangeVersionsBasic(t *testing.T) {
v := "SSH-2.0-bla"
buf := bytes.NewBufferString(v + "\r\n")
+9 -8
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ package bundle
var unparsedCertificates = []unparsedCertificate{
{
cn: "CN=AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS,OU=Ceres,O=FNMT-RCM,C=ES,2.5.4.97=#130f56415445532d51323832363030344a",
cn: "CN=AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS,OU=Ceres,O=FNMT-RCM,C=ES,2.5.4.97=VATES-Q2826004J",
sha256Hash: "554153b13d2cf9ddb753bfbe1a4e0ae08d0aa4187058fe60a2b862b2e4b87bcb",
certStartOff: 0,
certLength: 626,
@@ -358,13 +358,14 @@ var unparsedCertificates = []unparsedCertificate{
certLength: 1386,
},
{
cn: "CN=Izenpe.com,O=IZENPE S.A.,C=ES",
sha256Hash: "2530cc8e98321502bad96f9b1fba1b099e2d299e0f4548bb914f363bc0d4531f",
certStartOff: 63236,
certLength: 1525,
cn: "CN=Izenpe.com,O=IZENPE S.A.,C=ES",
sha256Hash: "2530cc8e98321502bad96f9b1fba1b099e2d299e0f4548bb914f363bc0d4531f",
certStartOff: 63236,
certLength: 1525,
distrustAfter: "2026-04-15T23:59:59Z",
},
{
cn: "CN=Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU,1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=#0c10696e666f40652d737a69676e6f2e6875",
cn: "CN=Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU,1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=info@e-szigno.hu",
sha256Hash: "3c5f81fea5fab82c64bfa2eaecafcde8e077fc8620a7cae537163df36edbf378",
certStartOff: 64761,
certLength: 1038,
@@ -652,13 +653,13 @@ var unparsedCertificates = []unparsedCertificate{
certLength: 1506,
},
{
cn: "CN=e-Szigno Root CA 2017,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU,2.5.4.97=#130e56415448552d3233353834343937",
cn: "CN=e-Szigno Root CA 2017,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU,2.5.4.97=VATHU-23584497",
sha256Hash: "beb00b30839b9bc32c32e4447905950641f26421b15ed089198b518ae2ea1b99",
certStartOff: 116668,
certLength: 580,
},
{
cn: "CN=e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU,2.5.4.97=#130e56415448552d3233353834343937",
cn: "CN=e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU,2.5.4.97=VATHU-23584497",
sha256Hash: "b49141502d00663d740f2e7ec340c52800962666121a36d09cf7dd2b90384fb4",
certStartOff: 117248,
certLength: 723,
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !go1.27
package bundle
import (
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/hex"
"regexp"
)
// subjectsEqual reports whether two RFC 2253 DN strings match.
//
// When testing with Go 1.27 or newer, it requires subjects to match exactly.
// When testing with Go 1.26, it tolerates the rendering difference introduced in Go 1.27,
// where string-typed attribute values for OIDs outside attributeTypeNames are rendered
// as strings rather than hex-encoded DER (see Go CL 773800).
//
// When Go 1.26 is no longer supported,
// the Go 1.26 version can be removed and
// the Go 1.27+ version can be inlined.
func subjectsEqual(a, b string) bool {
return a == b || normalizeHexValues(a) == normalizeHexValues(b)
}
// normalizeHexValues rewrites any "oid=#hex" to the equivalent "oid=value"
// rendering produced by Go 1.27+.
func normalizeHexValues(s string) string {
return hexAttrRE.ReplaceAllStringFunc(s, func(match string) string {
m := hexAttrRE.FindStringSubmatch(match)
der, err := hex.DecodeString(m[2])
if err != nil {
return match
}
var v string
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &v); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 {
return match
}
return m[1] + "=" + v
})
}
// hexAttrRE matches a "oid=#hex" attribute value in an RFC 2253 DN string.
var hexAttrRE = regexp.MustCompile(`([\d.]+)=#([[:xdigit:]]+)`)
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build go1.27
package bundle
// subjectsEqual reports whether two RFC 2253 DN strings match.
//
// When testing with Go 1.27 or newer, it requires subjects to match exactly.
// When testing with Go 1.26, it tolerates the rendering difference introduced in Go 1.27,
// where string-typed attribute values for OIDs outside attributeTypeNames are rendered
// as strings rather than hex-encoded DER (see Go CL 773800).
//
// When Go 1.26 is no longer supported,
// the Go 1.26 version can be removed and
// the Go 1.27+ version can be inlined.
func subjectsEqual(a, b string) bool {
return a == b
}
-33
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ package bundle
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/hex"
"regexp"
"testing"
)
@@ -32,34 +30,3 @@ func TestBundle(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// subjectsEqual reports whether two RFC 2253 DN strings match.
//
// It tolerates the rendering difference introduced in Go 1.27, where
// string-typed attribute values for OIDs outside attributeTypeNames are
// rendered as strings rather than hex-encoded DER (see Go CL 773800).
//
// This can be removed when Go 1.25/1.26 are no longer supported.
func subjectsEqual(a, b string) bool {
return a == b || normalizeHexValues(a) == normalizeHexValues(b)
}
// normalizeHexValues rewrites any "oid=#hex" to the equivalent "oid=value"
// rendering produced by Go 1.27+.
func normalizeHexValues(s string) string {
return hexAttrRE.ReplaceAllStringFunc(s, func(match string) string {
m := hexAttrRE.FindStringSubmatch(match)
der, err := hex.DecodeString(m[2])
if err != nil {
return match
}
var v string
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &v); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 {
return match
}
return m[1] + "=" + v
})
}
// hexAttrRE matches a "oid=#hex" attribute value in an RFC 2253 DN string.
var hexAttrRE = regexp.MustCompile(`([\d.]+)=#([[:xdigit:]]+)`)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
module golang.org/x/crypto/x509roots/fallback
go 1.25.0
go 1.26.0