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Author SHA1 Message Date
Gopher Robot 905d78a692 go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.

Change-Id: I19d5fc3e26b53fba06b4fbcf3817c44477265210
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/583355
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
2024-05-06 13:42:02 +00:00
Nicola Murino ebb717d630 ssh: validate key type in SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK response
According to RFC 4252 Section 7 the algorithm in SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
should match that of the request but some servers send the key type instead.
OpenSSH checks for the key type, so we do the same.

Fixes golang/go#66438
Fixes golang/go#64785
Fixes golang/go#56342
Fixes golang/go#54027

Change-Id: I2f733f0faece097e44ba7a97c868d30a53e21d79
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/573360
Auto-Submit: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Run-TryBot: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Joedian Reid <joedian@google.com>
2024-05-03 13:40:56 +00:00
cuishuang 0da2a6a1bb openpgp: fix function name in comment
Change-Id: Ic788ebe311fafa0f5d9750d5f7f25fb70dc0606d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/579175
Run-TryBot: shuang cui <imcusg@gmail.com>
Auto-Submit: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
2024-04-16 17:48:22 +00:00
Michael Munday 5defcc193a sha3: fix Sum results for SHAKE functions on s390x
Sum was taking the digest from the state which is correct for SHA-3
functions but not for SHAKE functions.

Updates golang/go#66804

Change-Id: If782464d773262075950e3168128c0d46e4a6530
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/578715
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@lowrisc.org>
2024-04-15 21:53:43 +00:00
Gopher Robot d042a396a6 go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.

Change-Id: Ib20227810c7e72942dd6fc33731fc613784aedec
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/576515
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
2024-04-04 16:59:43 +00:00
Nicola Murino b92bf9480d ssh: respect MaxAuthTries also for "none" auth attempts
Only the first "none" auth attempt is allowed without penality

Change-Id: Ibe776e968ba406445eeb94e8f1959383b88c98f7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/575995
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
2024-04-04 14:49:27 +00:00
Nicola MurinoandPeter Verraedt 6f79b5a20c ssh: add server side multi-step authentication
Add support for sending back partial success to the client while
handling authentication in the server. This is implemented by a special
error that can be returned by any of the authentication methods, which
contains the authentication methods to offer next.

This patch is based on CL 399075 with some minor changes and the
addition of test cases.

Fixes golang/go#17889
Fixes golang/go#61447
Fixes golang/go#64974

Co-authored-by: Peter Verraedt <peter.verraedt@kuleuven.be>
Change-Id: I05c8f913bb407d22c2e41c4cbe965e36ab4739b0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/516355
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
2024-04-03 07:40:24 +00:00
Jayanth Krishnamurthy 8d0d405eed x/crypto/chacha20: cleanup chacha_ppc64le.s
- Adding PCALIGN before the loops
- Changing WORD directive with corresponding Vector Merge EVEN/ODD word  instructions
- Replacing Branch Conditional (BC) with its extended mnemonic form  BDNZ
- VPERMXOR instruction usage in place of VXOR instructions followed by
  VRLW (rotate left) for cases of rotating in multiples of 8. This
  replacements give performace improvement both in time and space  of around 7%-8% as listed below
  using benchstat tool.

goos: linux
goarch: ppc64le
pkg: golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20
cpu: POWER10
                 | chacha20.prev.out |       chacha20.new.out            |
                 |      sec/op       |   sec/op     vs base              |
ChaCha20/64              171.9n ± 0%   156.6n ± 1%  -8.90% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/256             165.5n ± 0%   152.4n ± 0%  -7.92% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/10x25           505.8n ± 0%   504.3n ± 2%  -0.32% (p=0.589 n=6)
ChaCha20/4096            2.265µ ± 0%   2.052µ ± 0%  -9.40% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/100x40          5.359µ ± 3%   5.018µ ± 2%  -6.37% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/65536           35.71µ ± 0%   32.29µ ± 0%  -9.57% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/1000x65         44.63µ ± 0%   41.05µ ± 0%  -8.02% (p=0.002 n=6)
geomean                  2.235µ        2.073µ       -7.26%

                 | chacha20.prev.out |          chacha20.new.out         |
                 |       B/s         |     B/s       vs base             |
ChaCha20/64             355.1Mi ± 0%   389.8Mi ± 1%   +9.78% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/256            1.440Gi ± 0%   1.565Gi ± 0%   +8.62% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/10x25          471.3Mi ± 0%   472.8Mi ± 2%   +0.31% (p=0.589 n=6)
ChaCha20/4096           1.684Gi ± 0%   1.859Gi ± 0%  +10.38% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/100x40         711.8Mi ± 3%   760.3Mi ± 2%   +6.80% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/65536          1.709Gi ± 0%   1.890Gi ± 0%  +10.59% (p=0.002 n=6)
ChaCha20/1000x65        1.356Gi ± 0%   1.475Gi ± 0%   +8.72% (p=0.002 n=6)
geomean                 957.3Mi        1.008Gi        +7.83%
Change-Id: Ib31cb10a2a11eacdacf0272fbfd887eb5ccd8bcb
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/564797
Reviewed-by: Lynn Boger <laboger@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Run-TryBot: Paul Murphy <murp@ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Run-TryBot: Lynn Boger <laboger@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
2024-03-26 21:57:38 +00:00
cui fliter b91329d961 all: remove redundant words in comments and fix some typos
Change-Id: I3078492dc020770aca630e0b362df0212bd41e32
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/569156
Auto-Submit: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
2024-03-18 09:27:23 +00:00
Gopher Robot 7067223927 go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies
Update golang.org/x dependencies to their latest tagged versions.

Change-Id: I54256afe881714f60fc37c471cd65b060090d9d6
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/568816
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
2024-03-04 18:29:30 +00:00
Nicola Murino 0d2316b267 ssh/test: work around for TestCiphers failures on macOS
TestCiphers is already skipped on macOS when testing data received
from the server, so move the test for sending data after the
receiving one to work around this new integration test failure.

Fixes golang/go#65732

Change-Id: Ie0c614c5373735ae8aefdd7ded643579b130f4b3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/564457
Reviewed-by: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
2024-02-28 20:47:20 +00:00
15 changed files with 797 additions and 141 deletions
+52 -58
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
#define CONSTBASE R16
#define BLOCKS R17
// for VPERMXOR
#define MASK R18
DATA consts<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865
DATA consts<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32
DATA consts<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001
@@ -53,7 +56,11 @@ DATA consts<>+0x80(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574
DATA consts<>+0x88(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574
DATA consts<>+0x90(SB)/8, $0x0000000100000000
DATA consts<>+0x98(SB)/8, $0x0000000300000002
GLOBL consts<>(SB), RODATA, $0xa0
DATA consts<>+0xa0(SB)/8, $0x5566774411223300
DATA consts<>+0xa8(SB)/8, $0xddeeffcc99aabb88
DATA consts<>+0xb0(SB)/8, $0x6677445522330011
DATA consts<>+0xb8(SB)/8, $0xeeffccddaabb8899
GLOBL consts<>(SB), RODATA, $0xc0
//func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32)
TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40
@@ -70,6 +77,9 @@ TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40
MOVD $48, R10
MOVD $64, R11
SRD $6, LEN, BLOCKS
// for VPERMXOR
MOVD $consts<>+0xa0(SB), MASK
MOVD $16, R20
// V16
LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R0), VS48
ADD $80,CONSTBASE
@@ -87,6 +97,10 @@ TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40
// V28
LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R11), VS60
// Load mask constants for VPERMXOR
LXVW4X (MASK)(R0), V20
LXVW4X (MASK)(R20), V21
// splat slot from V19 -> V26
VSPLTW $0, V19, V26
@@ -97,7 +111,7 @@ TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40
MOVD $10, R14
MOVD R14, CTR
PCALIGN $16
loop_outer_vsx:
// V0, V1, V2, V3
LXVW4X (R0)(CONSTBASE), VS32
@@ -128,22 +142,17 @@ loop_outer_vsx:
VSPLTISW $12, V28
VSPLTISW $8, V29
VSPLTISW $7, V30
PCALIGN $16
loop_vsx:
VADDUWM V0, V4, V0
VADDUWM V1, V5, V1
VADDUWM V2, V6, V2
VADDUWM V3, V7, V3
VXOR V12, V0, V12
VXOR V13, V1, V13
VXOR V14, V2, V14
VXOR V15, V3, V15
VRLW V12, V27, V12
VRLW V13, V27, V13
VRLW V14, V27, V14
VRLW V15, V27, V15
VPERMXOR V12, V0, V21, V12
VPERMXOR V13, V1, V21, V13
VPERMXOR V14, V2, V21, V14
VPERMXOR V15, V3, V21, V15
VADDUWM V8, V12, V8
VADDUWM V9, V13, V9
@@ -165,15 +174,10 @@ loop_vsx:
VADDUWM V2, V6, V2
VADDUWM V3, V7, V3
VXOR V12, V0, V12
VXOR V13, V1, V13
VXOR V14, V2, V14
VXOR V15, V3, V15
VRLW V12, V29, V12
VRLW V13, V29, V13
VRLW V14, V29, V14
VRLW V15, V29, V15
VPERMXOR V12, V0, V20, V12
VPERMXOR V13, V1, V20, V13
VPERMXOR V14, V2, V20, V14
VPERMXOR V15, V3, V20, V15
VADDUWM V8, V12, V8
VADDUWM V9, V13, V9
@@ -195,15 +199,10 @@ loop_vsx:
VADDUWM V2, V7, V2
VADDUWM V3, V4, V3
VXOR V15, V0, V15
VXOR V12, V1, V12
VXOR V13, V2, V13
VXOR V14, V3, V14
VRLW V15, V27, V15
VRLW V12, V27, V12
VRLW V13, V27, V13
VRLW V14, V27, V14
VPERMXOR V15, V0, V21, V15
VPERMXOR V12, V1, V21, V12
VPERMXOR V13, V2, V21, V13
VPERMXOR V14, V3, V21, V14
VADDUWM V10, V15, V10
VADDUWM V11, V12, V11
@@ -225,15 +224,10 @@ loop_vsx:
VADDUWM V2, V7, V2
VADDUWM V3, V4, V3
VXOR V15, V0, V15
VXOR V12, V1, V12
VXOR V13, V2, V13
VXOR V14, V3, V14
VRLW V15, V29, V15
VRLW V12, V29, V12
VRLW V13, V29, V13
VRLW V14, V29, V14
VPERMXOR V15, V0, V20, V15
VPERMXOR V12, V1, V20, V12
VPERMXOR V13, V2, V20, V13
VPERMXOR V14, V3, V20, V14
VADDUWM V10, V15, V10
VADDUWM V11, V12, V11
@@ -249,48 +243,48 @@ loop_vsx:
VRLW V6, V30, V6
VRLW V7, V30, V7
VRLW V4, V30, V4
BC 16, LT, loop_vsx
BDNZ loop_vsx
VADDUWM V12, V26, V12
WORD $0x13600F8C // VMRGEW V0, V1, V27
WORD $0x13821F8C // VMRGEW V2, V3, V28
VMRGEW V0, V1, V27
VMRGEW V2, V3, V28
WORD $0x10000E8C // VMRGOW V0, V1, V0
WORD $0x10421E8C // VMRGOW V2, V3, V2
VMRGOW V0, V1, V0
VMRGOW V2, V3, V2
WORD $0x13A42F8C // VMRGEW V4, V5, V29
WORD $0x13C63F8C // VMRGEW V6, V7, V30
VMRGEW V4, V5, V29
VMRGEW V6, V7, V30
XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $0, VS33
XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $3, VS35
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS32
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS34
WORD $0x10842E8C // VMRGOW V4, V5, V4
WORD $0x10C63E8C // VMRGOW V6, V7, V6
VMRGOW V4, V5, V4
VMRGOW V6, V7, V6
WORD $0x13684F8C // VMRGEW V8, V9, V27
WORD $0x138A5F8C // VMRGEW V10, V11, V28
VMRGEW V8, V9, V27
VMRGEW V10, V11, V28
XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $0, VS37
XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $3, VS39
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS36
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS38
WORD $0x11084E8C // VMRGOW V8, V9, V8
WORD $0x114A5E8C // VMRGOW V10, V11, V10
VMRGOW V8, V9, V8
VMRGOW V10, V11, V10
WORD $0x13AC6F8C // VMRGEW V12, V13, V29
WORD $0x13CE7F8C // VMRGEW V14, V15, V30
VMRGEW V12, V13, V29
VMRGEW V14, V15, V30
XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $0, VS41
XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $3, VS43
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS40
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS42
WORD $0x118C6E8C // VMRGOW V12, V13, V12
WORD $0x11CE7E8C // VMRGOW V14, V15, V14
VMRGOW V12, V13, V12
VMRGOW V14, V15, V14
VSPLTISW $4, V27
VADDUWM V26, V27, V26
@@ -431,7 +425,7 @@ tail_vsx:
ADD $-1, R11, R12
ADD $-1, INP
ADD $-1, OUT
PCALIGN $16
looptail_vsx:
// Copying the result to OUT
// in bytes.
@@ -439,7 +433,7 @@ looptail_vsx:
MOVBZU 1(INP), TMP
XOR KEY, TMP, KEY
MOVBU KEY, 1(OUT)
BC 16, LT, looptail_vsx
BDNZ looptail_vsx
// Clear the stack values
STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R0)
+3 -3
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ go 1.18
require (
golang.org/x/net v0.21.0 // tagx:ignore
golang.org/x/sys v0.17.0
golang.org/x/term v0.17.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0
golang.org/x/term v0.20.0
)
require golang.org/x/text v0.14.0 // indirect
require golang.org/x/text v0.15.0 // indirect
+6 -6
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
golang.org/x/net v0.21.0 h1:AQyQV4dYCvJ7vGmJyKki9+PBdyvhkSd8EIx/qb0AYv4=
golang.org/x/net v0.21.0/go.mod h1:bIjVDfnllIU7BJ2DNgfnXvpSvtn8VRwhlsaeUTyUS44=
golang.org/x/sys v0.17.0 h1:25cE3gD+tdBA7lp7QfhuV+rJiE9YXTcS3VG1SqssI/Y=
golang.org/x/sys v0.17.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/term v0.17.0 h1:mkTF7LCd6WGJNL3K1Ad7kwxNfYAW6a8a8QqtMblp/4U=
golang.org/x/term v0.17.0/go.mod h1:lLRBjIVuehSbZlaOtGMbcMncT+aqLLLmKrsjNrUguwk=
golang.org/x/text v0.14.0 h1:ScX5w1eTa3QqT8oi6+ziP7dTV1S2+ALU0bI+0zXKWiQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.14.0/go.mod h1:18ZOQIKpY8NJVqYksKHtTdi31H5itFRjB5/qKTNYzSU=
golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0 h1:Od9JTbYCk261bKm4M/mw7AklTlFYIa0bIp9BgSm1S8Y=
golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/term v0.20.0 h1:VnkxpohqXaOBYJtBmEppKUG6mXpi+4O6purfc2+sMhw=
golang.org/x/term v0.20.0/go.mod h1:8UkIAJTvZgivsXaD6/pH6U9ecQzZ45awqEOzuCvwpFY=
golang.org/x/text v0.15.0 h1:h1V/4gjBv8v9cjcR6+AR5+/cIYK5N/WAgiv4xlsEtAk=
golang.org/x/text v0.15.0/go.mod h1:18ZOQIKpY8NJVqYksKHtTdi31H5itFRjB5/qKTNYzSU=
+2 -2
View File
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ func CommandContext(t testing.TB, ctx context.Context, name string, args ...stri
// grace periods to clean up: one for the delay between the first
// termination signal being sent (via the Cancel callback when the Context
// expires) and the process being forcibly terminated (via the WaitDelay
// field), and a second one for the delay becween the process being
// terminated and and the test logging its output for debugging.
// field), and a second one for the delay between the process being
// terminated and the test logging its output for debugging.
//
// (We want to ensure that the test process itself has enough time to
// log the output before it is also terminated.)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
// Package md4 implements the MD4 hash algorithm as defined in RFC 1320.
//
// Deprecated: MD4 is cryptographically broken and should should only be used
// Deprecated: MD4 is cryptographically broken and should only be used
// where compatibility with legacy systems, not security, is the goal. Instead,
// use a secure hash like SHA-256 (from crypto/sha256).
package md4 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/md4"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func TestRevokedUserID(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestExternallyRevokableKey attempts to load and parse a key with a third party revocation permission.
// TestExternallyRevocableKey attempts to load and parse a key with a third party revocation permission.
func TestExternallyRevocableKey(t *testing.T) {
kring, err := ReadKeyRing(readerFromHex(subkeyUsageHex))
if err != nil {
+17 -2
View File
@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ func (s *asmState) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
// Read squeezes an arbitrary number of bytes from the sponge.
func (s *asmState) Read(out []byte) (n int, err error) {
// The 'compute last message digest' instruction only stores the digest
// at the first operand (dst) for SHAKE functions.
if s.function != shake_128 && s.function != shake_256 {
panic("sha3: can only call Read for SHAKE functions")
}
n = len(out)
// need to pad if we were absorbing
@@ -202,8 +208,17 @@ func (s *asmState) Sum(b []byte) []byte {
// Hash the buffer. Note that we don't clear it because we
// aren't updating the state.
klmd(s.function, &a, nil, s.buf)
return append(b, a[:s.outputLen]...)
switch s.function {
case sha3_224, sha3_256, sha3_384, sha3_512:
klmd(s.function, &a, nil, s.buf)
return append(b, a[:s.outputLen]...)
case shake_128, shake_256:
d := make([]byte, s.outputLen, 64)
klmd(s.function, &a, d, s.buf)
return append(b, d[:s.outputLen]...)
default:
panic("sha3: unknown function")
}
}
// Reset resets the Hash to its initial state.
+28
View File
@@ -188,6 +188,34 @@ func TestKeccak(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestShakeSum tests that the output of Sum matches the output of Read.
func TestShakeSum(t *testing.T) {
tests := [...]struct {
name string
hash ShakeHash
expectedLen int
}{
{"SHAKE128", NewShake128(), 32},
{"SHAKE256", NewShake256(), 64},
{"cSHAKE128", NewCShake128([]byte{'X'}, nil), 32},
{"cSHAKE256", NewCShake256([]byte{'X'}, nil), 64},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
s := test.hash.Sum(nil)
if len(s) != test.expectedLen {
t.Errorf("Unexpected digest length: got %d, want %d", len(s), test.expectedLen)
}
r := make([]byte, test.expectedLen)
test.hash.Read(r)
if !bytes.Equal(s, r) {
t.Errorf("Mismatch between Sum and Read:\nSum: %s\nRead: %s", hex.EncodeToString(s), hex.EncodeToString(r))
}
})
}
}
// TestUnalignedWrite tests that writing data in an arbitrary pattern with
// small input buffers.
func TestUnalignedWrite(t *testing.T) {
+9 -9
View File
@@ -367,21 +367,21 @@ func TestCertTypes(t *testing.T) {
func TestCertSignWithMultiAlgorithmSigner(t *testing.T) {
type testcase struct {
sigAlgo string
algoritms []string
sigAlgo string
algorithms []string
}
cases := []testcase{
{
sigAlgo: KeyAlgoRSA,
algoritms: []string{KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
sigAlgo: KeyAlgoRSA,
algorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
},
{
sigAlgo: KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
algoritms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
sigAlgo: KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
algorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
},
{
sigAlgo: KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
algoritms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSASHA256},
sigAlgo: KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
algorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSASHA256},
},
}
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ func TestCertSignWithMultiAlgorithmSigner(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.sigAlgo, func(t *testing.T) {
signer, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(testSigners["rsa"].(AlgorithmSigner), c.algoritms)
signer, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(testSigners["rsa"].(AlgorithmSigner), c.algorithms)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewSignerWithAlgorithms error: %v", err)
}
+11 -3
View File
@@ -404,10 +404,10 @@ func validateKey(key PublicKey, algo string, user string, c packetConn) (bool, e
return false, err
}
return confirmKeyAck(key, algo, c)
return confirmKeyAck(key, c)
}
func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, algo string, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
pubKey := key.Marshal()
for {
@@ -425,7 +425,15 @@ func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, algo string, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, err
}
if msg.Algo != algo || !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) {
// According to RFC 4252 Section 7 the algorithm in
// SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK should match that of the request but some
// servers send the key type instead. OpenSSH allows any algorithm
// that matches the public key, so we do the same.
// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/86bdd385/sshconnect2.c#L709
if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(key.Type()), msg.Algo) {
return false, nil
}
if !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) {
return false, nil
}
return true, nil
+1 -1
View File
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func ExampleCertificate_SignCert() {
}
mas, err := ssh.NewSignerWithAlgorithms(signer.(ssh.AlgorithmSigner), []string{ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256})
if err != nil {
log.Fatal("unable to create signer with algoritms: ", err)
log.Fatal("unable to create signer with algorithms: ", err)
}
certificate := ssh.Certificate{
Key: publicKey,
+120 -50
View File
@@ -426,6 +426,35 @@ func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string {
return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]"
}
// ServerAuthCallbacks defines server-side authentication callbacks.
type ServerAuthCallbacks struct {
// PasswordCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PasswordCallback].
PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error)
// PublicKeyCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback].
PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error)
// KeyboardInteractiveCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback].
KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error)
// GSSAPIWithMICConfig behaves like [ServerConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig].
GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig
}
// PartialSuccessError can be returned by any of the [ServerConfig]
// authentication callbacks to indicate to the client that authentication has
// partially succeeded, but further steps are required.
type PartialSuccessError struct {
// Next defines the authentication callbacks to apply to further steps. The
// available methods communicated to the client are based on the non-nil
// ServerAuthCallbacks fields.
Next ServerAuthCallbacks
}
func (p *PartialSuccessError) Error() string {
return "ssh: authenticated with partial success"
}
// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no
// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal
// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries
@@ -439,8 +468,18 @@ func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, err
var perms *Permissions
authFailures := 0
noneAuthCount := 0
var authErrs []error
var displayedBanner bool
partialSuccessReturned := false
// Set the initial authentication callbacks from the config. They can be
// changed if a PartialSuccessError is returned.
authConfig := ServerAuthCallbacks{
PasswordCallback: config.PasswordCallback,
PublicKeyCallback: config.PublicKeyCallback,
KeyboardInteractiveCallback: config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback,
GSSAPIWithMICConfig: config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig,
}
userAuthLoop:
for {
@@ -471,6 +510,11 @@ userAuthLoop:
return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service)
}
if s.user != userAuthReq.User && partialSuccessReturned {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: client changed the user after a partial success authentication, previous user %q, current user %q",
s.user, userAuthReq.User)
}
s.user = userAuthReq.User
if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil {
@@ -491,20 +535,18 @@ userAuthLoop:
switch userAuthReq.Method {
case "none":
if config.NoClientAuth {
noneAuthCount++
// We don't allow none authentication after a partial success
// response.
if config.NoClientAuth && !partialSuccessReturned {
if config.NoClientAuthCallback != nil {
perms, authErr = config.NoClientAuthCallback(s)
} else {
authErr = nil
}
}
// allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty
if authFailures == 0 {
authFailures--
}
case "password":
if config.PasswordCallback == nil {
if authConfig.PasswordCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured")
break
}
@@ -518,17 +560,17 @@ userAuthLoop:
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password)
perms, authErr = authConfig.PasswordCallback(s, password)
case "keyboard-interactive":
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured")
break
}
prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s}
perms, authErr = config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge)
perms, authErr = authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge)
case "publickey":
if config.PublicKeyCallback == nil {
if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured")
break
}
@@ -562,11 +604,18 @@ userAuthLoop:
if !ok {
candidate.user = s.user
candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData
candidate.perms, candidate.result = config.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey)
if candidate.result == nil && candidate.perms != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" {
candidate.result = checkSourceAddress(
candidate.perms, candidate.result = authConfig.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey)
_, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError)
if (candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError) &&
candidate.perms != nil &&
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil &&
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" {
if err := checkSourceAddress(
s.RemoteAddr(),
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption])
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption]); err != nil {
candidate.result = err
}
}
cache.add(candidate)
}
@@ -578,8 +627,8 @@ userAuthLoop:
if len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
if candidate.result == nil {
_, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError)
if candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError {
okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{
Algo: algo,
PubKey: pubKeyData,
@@ -629,11 +678,11 @@ userAuthLoop:
perms = candidate.perms
}
case "gssapi-with-mic":
if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil {
if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured")
break
}
gssapiConfig := config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig
gssapiConfig := authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig
userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload)
if err != nil {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
@@ -689,49 +738,70 @@ userAuthLoop:
break userAuthLoop
}
authFailures++
if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries {
// If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the
// final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are
// no more authentication methods which can be attempted,
// and this message may cause the client to re-attempt
// authentication while we send the disconnect message.
// Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of
// the loop.
//
// The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this,
// RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure
// be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
// message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect
// after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which
// message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure
// message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to
// disconnect, should we only send that message.)
//
// Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last
// failed authnetication attempt, and given they are typically
// considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable
// to match that behavior.
continue
var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg
if partialSuccess, ok := authErr.(*PartialSuccessError); ok {
// After a partial success error we don't allow changing the user
// name and execute the NoClientAuthCallback.
partialSuccessReturned = true
// In case a partial success is returned, the server may send
// a new set of authentication methods.
authConfig = partialSuccess.Next
// Reset pubkey cache, as the new PublicKeyCallback might
// accept a different set of public keys.
cache = pubKeyCache{}
// Send back a partial success message to the user.
failureMsg.PartialSuccess = true
} else {
// Allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty.
if authFailures > 0 || userAuthReq.Method != "none" || noneAuthCount != 1 {
authFailures++
}
if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries {
// If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the
// final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are
// no more authentication methods which can be attempted,
// and this message may cause the client to re-attempt
// authentication while we send the disconnect message.
// Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of
// the loop.
//
// The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this,
// RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure
// be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
// message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect
// after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which
// message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure
// message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to
// disconnect, should we only send that message.)
//
// Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last
// failed authentication attempt, and given they are typically
// considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable
// to match that behavior.
continue
}
}
var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg
if config.PasswordCallback != nil {
if authConfig.PasswordCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password")
}
if config.PublicKeyCallback != nil {
if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey")
}
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive")
}
if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil &&
config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil {
if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil &&
authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic")
}
if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods available")
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil {
+412
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func doClientServerAuth(t *testing.T, serverConfig *ServerConfig, clientConfig *ClientConfig) ([]error, error) {
c1, c2, err := netPipe()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
}
defer c1.Close()
defer c2.Close()
var serverAuthErrors []error
serverConfig.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
serverConfig.AuthLogCallback = func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error) {
serverAuthErrors = append(serverAuthErrors, err)
}
go newServer(c1, serverConfig)
c, _, _, err := NewClientConn(c2, "", clientConfig)
if err == nil {
c.Close()
}
return serverAuthErrors, err
}
func TestMultiStepAuth(t *testing.T) {
// This user can login with password, public key or public key + password.
username := "testuser"
// This user can login with public key + password only.
usernameSecondFactor := "testuser_second_factor"
errPwdAuthFailed := errors.New("password auth failed")
errWrongSequence := errors.New("wrong sequence")
serverConfig := &ServerConfig{
PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
if conn.User() == usernameSecondFactor {
return nil, errWrongSequence
}
if conn.User() == username && string(password) == clientPassword {
return nil, nil
}
return nil, errPwdAuthFailed
},
PublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
if bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
if conn.User() == usernameSecondFactor {
return nil, &PartialSuccessError{
Next: ServerAuthCallbacks{
PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
if string(password) == clientPassword {
return nil, nil
}
return nil, errPwdAuthFailed
},
},
}
}
return nil, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("pubkey for %q not acceptable", conn.User())
},
}
clientConfig := &ClientConfig{
User: usernameSecondFactor,
Auth: []AuthMethod{
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
Password(clientPassword),
},
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
serverAuthErrors, err := doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client login error: %s", err)
}
// The error sequence is:
// - no auth passed yet
// - partial success
// - nil
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[1].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected partial success error, got: %v", serverAuthErrors[1])
}
// Now test a wrong sequence.
clientConfig.Auth = []AuthMethod{
Password(clientPassword),
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
}
serverAuthErrors, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("client login with wrong sequence must fail")
}
// The error sequence is:
// - no auth passed yet
// - wrong sequence
// - partial success
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if serverAuthErrors[1] != errWrongSequence {
t.Fatal("server not returned wrong sequence")
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[2].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected partial success error, got: %v", serverAuthErrors[2])
}
// Now test using a correct sequence but a wrong password before the right
// one.
n := 0
passwords := []string{"WRONG", "WRONG", clientPassword}
clientConfig.Auth = []AuthMethod{
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
RetryableAuthMethod(PasswordCallback(func() (string, error) {
p := passwords[n]
n++
return p, nil
}), 3),
}
serverAuthErrors, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client login error: %s", err)
}
// The error sequence is:
// - no auth passed yet
// - partial success
// - wrong password
// - wrong password
// - nil
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 5 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[1].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatal("server not returned partial success")
}
if serverAuthErrors[2] != errPwdAuthFailed {
t.Fatal("server not returned password authentication failed")
}
if serverAuthErrors[3] != errPwdAuthFailed {
t.Fatal("server not returned password authentication failed")
}
// Only password authentication should fail.
clientConfig.Auth = []AuthMethod{
Password(clientPassword),
}
serverAuthErrors, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("client login with password only must fail")
}
// The error sequence is:
// - no auth passed yet
// - wrong sequence
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if serverAuthErrors[1] != errWrongSequence {
t.Fatal("server not returned wrong sequence")
}
// Only public key authentication should fail.
clientConfig.Auth = []AuthMethod{
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
}
serverAuthErrors, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("client login with public key only must fail")
}
// The error sequence is:
// - no auth passed yet
// - partial success
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[1].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatal("server not returned partial success")
}
// Public key and wrong password.
clientConfig.Auth = []AuthMethod{
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
Password("WRONG"),
}
serverAuthErrors, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("client login with wrong password after public key must fail")
}
// The error sequence is:
// - no auth passed yet
// - partial success
// - password auth failed
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[1].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatal("server not returned partial success")
}
if serverAuthErrors[2] != errPwdAuthFailed {
t.Fatal("server not returned password authentication failed")
}
// Public key, public key again and then correct password. Public key
// authentication is attempted only once because the partial success error
// returns only "password" as the allowed authentication method.
clientConfig.Auth = []AuthMethod{
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
Password(clientPassword),
}
serverAuthErrors, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client login error: %s", err)
}
// The error sequence is:
// - no auth passed yet
// - partial success
// - nil
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[1].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatal("server not returned partial success")
}
// The unrestricted username can do anything
clientConfig = &ClientConfig{
User: username,
Auth: []AuthMethod{
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
Password(clientPassword),
},
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
_, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unrestricted client login error: %s", err)
}
clientConfig = &ClientConfig{
User: username,
Auth: []AuthMethod{
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
},
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
_, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unrestricted client login error: %s", err)
}
clientConfig = &ClientConfig{
User: username,
Auth: []AuthMethod{
Password(clientPassword),
},
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
_, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unrestricted client login error: %s", err)
}
}
func TestDynamicAuthCallbacks(t *testing.T) {
user1 := "user1"
user2 := "user2"
errInvalidCredentials := errors.New("invalid credentials")
serverConfig := &ServerConfig{
NoClientAuth: true,
NoClientAuthCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata) (*Permissions, error) {
switch conn.User() {
case user1:
return nil, &PartialSuccessError{
Next: ServerAuthCallbacks{
PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
if conn.User() == user1 && string(password) == clientPassword {
return nil, nil
}
return nil, errInvalidCredentials
},
},
}
case user2:
return nil, &PartialSuccessError{
Next: ServerAuthCallbacks{
PublicKeyCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
if bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), testPublicKeys["rsa"].Marshal()) {
if conn.User() == user2 {
return nil, nil
}
}
return nil, errInvalidCredentials
},
},
}
default:
return nil, errInvalidCredentials
}
},
}
clientConfig := &ClientConfig{
User: user1,
Auth: []AuthMethod{
Password(clientPassword),
},
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
serverAuthErrors, err := doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client login error: %s", err)
}
// The error sequence is:
// - partial success
// - nil
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[0].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatal("server not returned partial success")
}
clientConfig = &ClientConfig{
User: user2,
Auth: []AuthMethod{
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
},
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
serverAuthErrors, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client login error: %s", err)
}
// The error sequence is:
// - partial success
// - nil
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[0].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatal("server not returned partial success")
}
// user1 cannot login with public key
clientConfig = &ClientConfig{
User: user1,
Auth: []AuthMethod{
PublicKeys(testSigners["rsa"]),
},
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
serverAuthErrors, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("user1 login with public key must fail")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no supported methods remain") {
t.Errorf("got %v, expected 'no supported methods remain'", err)
}
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[0].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatal("server not returned partial success")
}
// user2 cannot login with password
clientConfig = &ClientConfig{
User: user2,
Auth: []AuthMethod{
Password(clientPassword),
},
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
serverAuthErrors, err = doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("user2 login with password must fail")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no supported methods remain") {
t.Errorf("got %v, expected 'no supported methods remain'", err)
}
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if _, ok := serverAuthErrors[0].(*PartialSuccessError); !ok {
t.Fatal("server not returned partial success")
}
}
+129
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@
package ssh
import (
"errors"
"io"
"net"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -62,6 +64,133 @@ func TestClientAuthRestrictedPublicKeyAlgos(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestMaxAuthTriesNoneMethod(t *testing.T) {
username := "testuser"
serverConfig := &ServerConfig{
MaxAuthTries: 2,
PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
if conn.User() == username && string(password) == clientPassword {
return nil, nil
}
return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
},
}
c1, c2, err := netPipe()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
}
defer c1.Close()
defer c2.Close()
var serverAuthErrors []error
serverConfig.AddHostKey(testSigners["rsa"])
serverConfig.AuthLogCallback = func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error) {
serverAuthErrors = append(serverAuthErrors, err)
}
go newServer(c1, serverConfig)
clientConfig := ClientConfig{
User: username,
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
clientConfig.SetDefaults()
// Our client will send 'none' auth only once, so we need to send the
// requests manually.
c := &connection{
sshConn: sshConn{
conn: c2,
user: username,
clientVersion: []byte(packageVersion),
},
}
c.serverVersion, err = exchangeVersions(c.sshConn.conn, c.clientVersion)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to exchange version: %v", err)
}
c.transport = newClientTransport(
newTransport(c.sshConn.conn, clientConfig.Rand, true /* is client */),
c.clientVersion, c.serverVersion, &clientConfig, "", c.sshConn.RemoteAddr())
if err := c.transport.waitSession(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to wait session: %v", err)
}
c.sessionID = c.transport.getSessionID()
if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceRequestMsg{serviceUserAuth})); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to send ssh-userauth message: %v", err)
}
packet, err := c.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgExtInfo {
packet, err = c.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
var serviceAccept serviceAcceptMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &serviceAccept); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for i := 0; i <= serverConfig.MaxAuthTries; i++ {
auth := new(noneAuth)
_, _, err := auth.auth(c.sessionID, clientConfig.User, c.transport, clientConfig.Rand, nil)
if i < serverConfig.MaxAuthTries {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
continue
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("client: got no error")
} else if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "too many authentication failures") {
t.Fatalf("client: got unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
for _, err := range serverAuthErrors {
if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoAuth) {
t.Errorf("go error: %v; want: %v", err, ErrNoAuth)
}
}
}
func TestMaxAuthTriesFirstNoneAuthErrorIgnored(t *testing.T) {
username := "testuser"
serverConfig := &ServerConfig{
MaxAuthTries: 1,
PasswordCallback: func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) {
if conn.User() == username && string(password) == clientPassword {
return nil, nil
}
return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
},
}
clientConfig := &ClientConfig{
User: username,
Auth: []AuthMethod{
Password(clientPassword),
},
HostKeyCallback: InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
}
serverAuthErrors, err := doClientServerAuth(t, serverConfig, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client login error: %s", err)
}
if len(serverAuthErrors) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected number of server auth errors: %v, errors: %+v", len(serverAuthErrors), serverAuthErrors)
}
if !errors.Is(serverAuthErrors[0], ErrNoAuth) {
t.Errorf("go error: %v; want: %v", serverAuthErrors[0], ErrNoAuth)
}
if serverAuthErrors[1] != nil {
t.Errorf("unexpected error: %v", serverAuthErrors[1])
}
}
func TestNewServerConnValidationErrors(t *testing.T) {
serverConf := &ServerConfig{
PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms: []string{CertAlgoRSAv01},
+5 -5
View File
@@ -357,11 +357,6 @@ func testOneCipher(t *testing.T, cipher string, cipherOrder []string) {
numBytes := 4096
// Exercise sending data to the server
if _, _, err := conn.Conn.SendRequest("drop-me", false, make([]byte, numBytes)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SendRequest: %v", err)
}
// Exercise receiving data from the server
session, err := conn.NewSession()
if err != nil {
@@ -377,6 +372,11 @@ func testOneCipher(t *testing.T, cipher string, cipherOrder []string) {
if len(out) != numBytes {
t.Fatalf("got %d bytes, want %d bytes", len(out), numBytes)
}
// Exercise sending data to the server
if _, _, err := conn.Conn.SendRequest("drop-me", false, make([]byte, numBytes)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SendRequest: %v", err)
}
}
var deprecatedCiphers = []string{