Files
crypto/ssh/certs_test.go
T
Nicola Murino b61cf853a8 ssh: enforce user presence verification for security keys
Previously the library did not verify the "User Presence" (UP) bit in
signatures generated by FIDO/U2F security keys
(sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com and sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com).
This allowed signatures without physical interaction to be accepted
if the underlying hardware produced them, deviating from the default
secure behavior expected by the FIDO standards and OpenSSH.

skECDSAPublicKey.Verify and skEd25519PublicKey.Verify now enforce
the user-presence bit (0x01, constant flagUserPresence) by default.
Signatures whose flags byte has UP clear fail with the sentinel
errSKMissingUserPresence.

The server public-key authentication path honors the OpenSSH
"no-touch-required" extension as an opt-out. noTouchAllowed reports
true when the extension is present either in the Permissions
returned by PublicKeyCallback (authorized_keys-level opt-out) or in
the certificate's own Extensions (CA-level opt-out); in that case
skKeyWithoutUP is used to derive a clone of the SK public key (and,
for certificates, a clone of the wrapping Certificate whose inner
Key is the cloned SK key) whose Verify accepts UP-clear signatures.
The originals are never mutated, so a per-session opt-out cannot
leak across authentication attempts or connections. Matching
OpenSSH, the opt-out is read only from Extensions, never from
CriticalOptions.

skKeyWithoutUP is iterative and unwraps at most one level of
*Certificate: the SSH cert format forbids Certificate.Key from being
another Certificate (parseCert rejects it) but callers can still
construct such a value directly in Go, so a recursive descent would
be driven to unbounded depth by malformed or cyclic input. Any such
pathological *Certificate is returned unchanged.

CertChecker.CheckCert applies skKeyWithoutUP unconditionally to the
certificate's CA key before verifying the CA signature, matching
OpenSSH, which calls sshkey_verify with detailsp==NULL in
sshkey.c:cert_parse and never extracts or enforces UP/UV flags on
CA signatures. The UP bit on a CA signature reflects the CA
operator's presence at cert-issuance time, which has no bearing on
whether the user being authenticated is present now, so enforcing it
here would only break interop with certificates issued by
non-interactive SK CAs without a corresponding security benefit. The
skKeyWithoutUP call is a no-op for non-SK CA keys (the common case).

This change breaks backward compatibility for clients or keys that
generate user-authentication signatures without the User Presence
flag set. Previously those signatures were accepted by the server.
They will now be rejected with "ssh: signature missing required user
presence flag" unless the "no-touch-required" extension is
explicitly granted to the session by the server callbacks, or
carried by the user certificate.

This issue was found during a security audit by NCC Group
Cryptography Services, sponsored by Teleport.

Fixes golang/go#79566
Fixes CVE-2026-39831

Change-Id: I74b6de3bb6a2d7a0f34d7fa36bbbbf06f0b3fc6b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/781662
Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
2026-05-21 17:03:20 -07:00

533 lines
17 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"net"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/testdata"
)
func TestParseCert(t *testing.T) {
authKeyBytes := bytes.TrimSuffix(testdata.SSHCertificates["rsa"], []byte(" host.example.com\n"))
key, _, _, rest, err := ParseAuthorizedKey(authKeyBytes)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseAuthorizedKey: %v", err)
}
if len(rest) > 0 {
t.Errorf("rest: got %q, want empty", rest)
}
if _, ok := key.(*Certificate); !ok {
t.Fatalf("got %v (%T), want *Certificate", key, key)
}
marshaled := MarshalAuthorizedKey(key)
// Before comparison, remove the trailing newline that
// MarshalAuthorizedKey adds.
marshaled = marshaled[:len(marshaled)-1]
if !bytes.Equal(authKeyBytes, marshaled) {
t.Errorf("marshaled certificate does not match original: got %q, want %q", marshaled, authKeyBytes)
}
}
// Cert generated by ssh-keygen OpenSSH_6.8p1 OS X 10.10.3
// % ssh-keygen -s ca -I testcert -O source-address=192.168.1.0/24 -O force-command=/bin/sleep user.pub
// user.pub key: ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDACh1rt2DXfV3hk6fszSQcQ/rueMId0kVD9U7nl8cfEnFxqOCrNT92g4laQIGl2mn8lsGZfTLg8ksHq3gkvgO3oo/0wHy4v32JeBOHTsN5AL4gfHNEhWeWb50ev47hnTsRIt9P4dxogeUo/hTu7j9+s9lLpEQXCvq6xocXQt0j8MV9qZBBXFLXVT3cWIkSqOdwt/5ZBg+1GSrc7WfCXVWgTk4a20uPMuJPxU4RQwZW6X3+O8Pqo8C3cW0OzZRFP6gUYUKUsTI5WntlS+LAxgw1mZNsozFGdbiOPRnEryE3SRldh9vjDR3tin1fGpA5P7+CEB/bqaXtG3V+F2OkqaMN
// Critical Options:
//
// force-command /bin/sleep
// source-address 192.168.1.0/24
//
// Extensions:
//
// permit-X11-forwarding
// permit-agent-forwarding
// permit-port-forwarding
// permit-pty
// permit-user-rc
const exampleSSHCertWithOptions = `ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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`
func TestParseCertWithOptions(t *testing.T) {
opts := map[string]string{
"source-address": "192.168.1.0/24",
"force-command": "/bin/sleep",
}
exts := map[string]string{
"permit-X11-forwarding": "",
"permit-agent-forwarding": "",
"permit-port-forwarding": "",
"permit-pty": "",
"permit-user-rc": "",
}
authKeyBytes := []byte(exampleSSHCertWithOptions)
key, _, _, rest, err := ParseAuthorizedKey(authKeyBytes)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseAuthorizedKey: %v", err)
}
if len(rest) > 0 {
t.Errorf("rest: got %q, want empty", rest)
}
cert, ok := key.(*Certificate)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("got %v (%T), want *Certificate", key, key)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(cert.CriticalOptions, opts) {
t.Errorf("unexpected critical options - got %v, want %v", cert.CriticalOptions, opts)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(cert.Extensions, exts) {
t.Errorf("unexpected Extensions - got %v, want %v", cert.Extensions, exts)
}
marshaled := MarshalAuthorizedKey(key)
// Before comparison, remove the trailing newline that
// MarshalAuthorizedKey adds.
marshaled = marshaled[:len(marshaled)-1]
if !bytes.Equal(authKeyBytes, marshaled) {
t.Errorf("marshaled certificate does not match original: got %q, want %q", marshaled, authKeyBytes)
}
}
func TestValidateCert(t *testing.T) {
key, _, _, _, err := ParseAuthorizedKey(testdata.SSHCertificates["rsa-user-testcertificate"])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseAuthorizedKey: %v", err)
}
validCert, ok := key.(*Certificate)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("got %v (%T), want *Certificate", key, key)
}
checker := CertChecker{}
checker.IsUserAuthority = func(k PublicKey) bool {
return bytes.Equal(k.Marshal(), validCert.SignatureKey.Marshal())
}
if err := checker.CheckCert("testcertificate", validCert); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Unable to validate certificate: %v", err)
}
invalidCert := &Certificate{
Key: testPublicKeys["rsa"],
SignatureKey: testPublicKeys["ecdsa"],
ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
Signature: &Signature{},
}
if err := checker.CheckCert("testcertificate", invalidCert); err == nil {
t.Error("Invalid cert signature passed validation")
}
}
// signSKCert builds an SK-ECDSA signature over cert.bytesForSigning()
// using caKey as the simulated hardware token. The SK signing flags
// byte (UP bit and others) is caller-controlled so tests can exercise
// the user-presence enforcement paths. caApp is the SK application
// string (typically "ssh:").
func signSKCert(t *testing.T, cert *Certificate, caKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, caApp string, flags byte) {
t.Helper()
cert.SignatureKey = &skECDSAPublicKey{
application: caApp,
PublicKey: caKey.PublicKey,
}
cert.Nonce = make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(cert.Nonce); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
h := sha256.New()
h.Write([]byte(caApp))
appDigest := h.Sum(nil)
h.Reset()
h.Write(cert.bytesForSigning())
dataDigest := h.Sum(nil)
var counter uint32 = 1
blob := struct {
ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
Flags byte
Counter uint32
MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}{appDigest, flags, counter, dataDigest}
h.Reset()
h.Write(Marshal(blob))
digest := h.Sum(nil)
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, caKey, digest)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cert.Signature = &Signature{
Format: KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
Blob: Marshal(struct{ R, S *big.Int }{r, s}),
Rest: Marshal(struct {
Flags byte
Counter uint32
}{flags, counter}),
}
}
// TestCheckCertSKAuthorityNoUPRequired pins the OpenSSH-parity
// behavior of CertChecker.CheckCert for SK CA signatures: a
// certificate signed by an SK CA that produced a UP=0 signature is
// accepted, because the UP bit on a CA signature has no bearing on
// the current user authentication (see sshkey.c:cert_parse, which
// passes detailsp==NULL to sshkey_verify). Without this, certs issued
// by non-interactive SK CAs would fail to verify.
func TestCheckCertSKAuthorityNoUPRequired(t *testing.T) {
caKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
userKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
userPub, err := NewPublicKey(&userKey.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
mkCert := func(flags byte) *Certificate {
c := &Certificate{
CertType: UserCert,
Key: userPub,
ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
ValidPrincipals: []string{"user"},
}
signSKCert(t, c, caKey, "ssh:", flags)
return c
}
checker := CertChecker{
IsUserAuthority: func(k PublicKey) bool {
caSK := &skECDSAPublicKey{application: "ssh:", PublicKey: caKey.PublicKey}
return bytes.Equal(k.Marshal(), caSK.Marshal())
},
}
// Both UP=0 and UP=1 CA signatures verify: UP is not enforced
// here, matching OpenSSH.
if err := checker.CheckCert("user", mkCert(0)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("UP=0 CA signature must verify (OpenSSH parity): %v", err)
}
if err := checker.CheckCert("user", mkCert(flagUserPresence)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("UP=1 CA signature must verify: %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidateCertTime(t *testing.T) {
cert := Certificate{
ValidPrincipals: []string{"user"},
Key: testPublicKeys["rsa"],
ValidAfter: 50,
ValidBefore: 100,
}
cert.SignCert(rand.Reader, testSigners["ecdsa"])
for ts, ok := range map[int64]bool{
25: false,
50: true,
99: true,
100: false,
125: false,
} {
checker := CertChecker{
Clock: func() time.Time { return time.Unix(ts, 0) },
}
checker.IsUserAuthority = func(k PublicKey) bool {
return bytes.Equal(k.Marshal(),
testPublicKeys["ecdsa"].Marshal())
}
if v := checker.CheckCert("user", &cert); (v == nil) != ok {
t.Errorf("Authenticate(%d): %v", ts, v)
}
}
}
// TODO(hanwen): tests for
//
// host keys:
// * fallbacks
func TestHostKeyCert(t *testing.T) {
cert := &Certificate{
ValidPrincipals: []string{"hostname", "hostname.domain", "otherhost"},
Key: testPublicKeys["rsa"],
ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
CertType: HostCert,
}
cert.SignCert(rand.Reader, testSigners["ecdsa"])
checker := &CertChecker{
IsHostAuthority: func(p PublicKey, addr string) bool {
return addr == "hostname:22" && bytes.Equal(testPublicKeys["ecdsa"].Marshal(), p.Marshal())
},
}
certSigner, err := NewCertSigner(cert, testSigners["rsa"])
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("NewCertSigner: %v", err)
}
for _, test := range []struct {
addr string
succeed bool
certSignerAlgorithms []string // Empty means no algorithm restrictions.
clientHostKeyAlgorithms []string
}{
{addr: "hostname:22", succeed: true},
{
addr: "hostname:22",
succeed: true,
certSignerAlgorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
clientHostKeyAlgorithms: []string{CertAlgoRSASHA512v01},
},
{
addr: "hostname:22",
succeed: false,
certSignerAlgorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
clientHostKeyAlgorithms: []string{CertAlgoRSAv01},
},
{
addr: "hostname:22",
succeed: false,
certSignerAlgorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
clientHostKeyAlgorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA512}, // Not a certificate algorithm.
},
{addr: "otherhost:22", succeed: false}, // The certificate is valid for 'otherhost' as hostname, but we only recognize the authority of the signer for the address 'hostname:22'
{addr: "lasthost:22", succeed: false},
} {
c1, c2, err := netPipe()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
}
defer c1.Close()
defer c2.Close()
errc := make(chan error)
go func() {
conf := ServerConfig{
NoClientAuth: true,
}
if len(test.certSignerAlgorithms) > 0 {
mas, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(certSigner.(AlgorithmSigner), test.certSignerAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
errc <- err
return
}
conf.AddHostKey(mas)
} else {
conf.AddHostKey(certSigner)
}
_, _, _, err := NewServerConn(c1, &conf)
errc <- err
}()
config := &ClientConfig{
User: "user",
HostKeyCallback: checker.CheckHostKey,
HostKeyAlgorithms: test.clientHostKeyAlgorithms,
}
_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, test.addr, config)
if (err == nil) != test.succeed {
t.Errorf("NewClientConn(%q): %v", test.addr, err)
}
err = <-errc
if (err == nil) != test.succeed {
t.Errorf("NewServerConn(%q): %v", test.addr, err)
}
}
}
type legacyRSASigner struct {
Signer
}
func (s *legacyRSASigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
v, ok := s.Signer.(AlgorithmSigner)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signer")
}
return v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, KeyAlgoRSA)
}
func TestCertTypes(t *testing.T) {
algorithmSigner, ok := testSigners["rsa"].(AlgorithmSigner)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("rsa test signer does not implement the AlgorithmSigner interface")
}
multiAlgoSignerSHA256, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(algorithmSigner, []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to create multi algorithm signer SHA256: %v", err)
}
// Algorithms are in order of preference, we expect rsa-sha2-512 to be used.
multiAlgoSignerSHA512, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(algorithmSigner, []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSASHA256})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to create multi algorithm signer SHA512: %v", err)
}
var testVars = []struct {
name string
signer Signer
algo string
}{
{CertAlgoECDSA256v01, testSigners["ecdsap256"], ""},
{CertAlgoECDSA384v01, testSigners["ecdsap384"], ""},
{CertAlgoECDSA521v01, testSigners["ecdsap521"], ""},
{CertAlgoED25519v01, testSigners["ed25519"], ""},
{CertAlgoRSAv01, testSigners["rsa"], KeyAlgoRSASHA256},
{"legacyRSASigner", &legacyRSASigner{testSigners["rsa"]}, KeyAlgoRSA},
{"multiAlgoRSASignerSHA256", multiAlgoSignerSHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA256},
{"multiAlgoRSASignerSHA512", multiAlgoSignerSHA512, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
{InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01, testSigners["dsa"], ""},
}
k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("error generating host key: %v", err)
}
signer, err := NewSignerFromKey(k)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("error generating signer for ssh listener: %v", err)
}
conf := &ServerConfig{
PublicKeyCallback: func(c ConnMetadata, k PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
return new(Permissions), nil
},
}
conf.AddHostKey(signer)
for _, m := range testVars {
t.Run(m.name, func(t *testing.T) {
c1, c2, err := netPipe()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("netPipe: %v", err)
}
defer c1.Close()
defer c2.Close()
go NewServerConn(c1, conf)
priv := m.signer
cert := &Certificate{
CertType: UserCert,
Key: priv.PublicKey(),
}
if err := cert.SignCert(rand.Reader, priv); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("error signing certificate: %v", err)
}
certSigner, err := NewCertSigner(cert, priv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("error generating cert signer: %v", err)
}
if m.algo != "" && cert.Signature.Format != m.algo {
t.Errorf("expected %q signature format, got %q", m.algo, cert.Signature.Format)
}
config := &ClientConfig{
User: "user",
HostKeyCallback: func(h string, r net.Addr, k PublicKey) error { return nil },
Auth: []AuthMethod{PublicKeys(certSigner)},
}
_, _, _, err = NewClientConn(c2, "", config)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("error connecting: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestCertSignWithMultiAlgorithmSigner(t *testing.T) {
type testcase struct {
sigAlgo string
algorithms []string
}
cases := []testcase{
{
sigAlgo: KeyAlgoRSA,
algorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
},
{
sigAlgo: KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
algorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA512},
},
{
sigAlgo: KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
algorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSASHA256},
},
}
cert := &Certificate{
Key: testPublicKeys["rsa"],
ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
CertType: UserCert,
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.sigAlgo, func(t *testing.T) {
signer, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(testSigners["rsa"].(AlgorithmSigner), c.algorithms)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewSignerWithAlgorithms error: %v", err)
}
if err := cert.SignCert(rand.Reader, signer); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SignCert error: %v", err)
}
if cert.Signature.Format != c.sigAlgo {
t.Fatalf("got signature format %q, want %q", cert.Signature.Format, c.sigAlgo)
}
})
}
}
func TestCertSignWithCertificate(t *testing.T) {
cert := &Certificate{
Key: testPublicKeys["rsa"],
ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
CertType: UserCert,
}
if err := cert.SignCert(rand.Reader, testSigners["ecdsa"]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SignCert: %v", err)
}
signer, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(testSigners["rsa"].(AlgorithmSigner), []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
certSigner, err := NewCertSigner(cert, signer)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCertSigner: %v", err)
}
cert1 := &Certificate{
Key: testPublicKeys["ecdsa"],
ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
CertType: UserCert,
}
if err := cert1.SignCert(rand.Reader, certSigner); err == nil {
t.Fatal("successfully signed a certificate using another certificate, it is expected to fail")
}
}