Files
crypto/acme/autocert/internal/acmetest/ca.go
T
Alex Vaghin 0e8c3a9068 acme/autocert: support ACME RFC 8555
The Manager now uses RFC 8555 implementation of Let's Encrypt by default.
Existing users need not do any manual upgrades. If you vendor
acme/autocert, it is enough to just rebuild your binaries at this CL.

If there's an account key stored in Manager's cache which has been used
with an earlier Let's Encrypt implementation (aka v1 or draft-02),
it will be automatically re-registered with the new endpoint.

One notable change is the CAServer from internal/acmetest was amended
to simulate a CA implementing RFC 8555, replacing draft-02.
Support for both RFC and draft-02 seemed too complicated and not worth
the benefits: the old pre-RFC bits will be removed from both acme and
acme/autocert packages at some point.

Fixes golang/go#21081

Change-Id: Id530758ac612b1c20f9df51c4d10f770e5f41ecf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/199520
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2019-10-11 19:05:13 +00:00

553 lines
16 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package acmetest provides types for testing acme and autocert packages.
//
// TODO: Consider moving this to x/crypto/acme/internal/acmetest for acme tests as well.
package acmetest
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"path"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
)
// CAServer is a simple test server which implements ACME spec bits needed for testing.
type CAServer struct {
URL string // server URL after it has been started
Roots *x509.CertPool // CA root certificates; initialized in NewCAServer
rootKey crypto.Signer
rootCert []byte // DER encoding
rootTemplate *x509.Certificate
server *httptest.Server
challengeTypes []string // supported challenge types
domainsWhitelist []string // only these domains are valid for issuing, unless empty
mu sync.Mutex
certCount int // number of issued certs
domainAddr map[string]string // domain name to addr:port resolution
authorizations map[string]*authorization // keyed by domain name
orders []*order // index is used as order ID
errors []error // encountered client errors
}
// NewCAServer creates a new ACME test server and starts serving requests.
// The returned CAServer issues certs signed with the CA roots
// available in the Roots field.
//
// The challengeTypes argument defines the supported ACME challenge types
// sent to a client in a response for a domain authorization.
// If domainsWhitelist is non-empty, the certs will be issued only for the specified
// list of domains. Otherwise, any domain name is allowed.
func NewCAServer(challengeTypes []string, domainsWhitelist []string) *CAServer {
var whitelist []string
for _, name := range domainsWhitelist {
whitelist = append(whitelist, name)
}
sort.Strings(whitelist)
ca := &CAServer{
challengeTypes: challengeTypes,
domainsWhitelist: whitelist,
domainAddr: make(map[string]string),
authorizations: make(map[string]*authorization),
}
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("ecdsa.GenerateKey: %v", err))
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
Subject: pkix.Name{
Organization: []string{"Test Acme Co"},
CommonName: "Root CA",
},
NotBefore: time.Now(),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(365 * 24 * time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
IsCA: true,
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("x509.CreateCertificate: %v", err))
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("x509.ParseCertificate: %v", err))
}
ca.Roots = x509.NewCertPool()
ca.Roots.AddCert(cert)
ca.rootKey = key
ca.rootCert = der
ca.rootTemplate = tmpl
ca.server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(ca.handle))
ca.URL = ca.server.URL
return ca
}
// Close shuts down the server and blocks until all outstanding
// requests on this server have completed.
func (ca *CAServer) Close() {
ca.server.Close()
}
func (ca *CAServer) serverURL(format string, arg ...interface{}) string {
return ca.server.URL + fmt.Sprintf(format, arg...)
}
func (ca *CAServer) addr(domain string) (string, error) {
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
addr, ok := ca.domainAddr[domain]
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("CAServer: no addr resolution for %q", domain)
}
return addr, nil
}
func (ca *CAServer) httpErrorf(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, format string, a ...interface{}) {
s := fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)
log.Println(s)
http.Error(w, s, code)
}
// Resolve adds a domain to address resolution for the ca to dial to
// when validating challenges for the domain authorization.
func (ca *CAServer) Resolve(domain, addr string) {
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
ca.domainAddr[domain] = addr
}
type discovery struct {
NewNonce string `json:"newNonce"`
NewReg string `json:"newAccount"`
NewOrder string `json:"newOrder"`
NewAuthz string `json:"newAuthz"`
}
type challenge struct {
URI string `json:"uri"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Token string `json:"token"`
}
type authorization struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
Challenges []challenge `json:"challenges"`
domain string
}
type order struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
AuthzURLs []string `json:"authorizations"`
FinalizeURL string `json:"finalize"` // CSR submit URL
CertURL string `json:"certificate"` // already issued cert
leaf []byte // issued cert in DER format
}
func (ca *CAServer) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
log.Printf("%s %s", r.Method, r.URL)
w.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", "nonce")
// TODO: Verify nonce header for all POST requests.
switch {
default:
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unrecognized r.URL.Path: %s", r.URL.Path)
// Discovery request.
case r.URL.Path == "/":
resp := &discovery{
NewNonce: ca.serverURL("/new-nonce"),
NewReg: ca.serverURL("/new-reg"),
NewOrder: ca.serverURL("/new-order"),
NewAuthz: ca.serverURL("/new-authz"),
}
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("discovery response: %v", err))
}
// Nonce requests.
case r.URL.Path == "/new-nonce":
// Nonce values are always set. Nothing else to do.
return
// Client key registration request.
case r.URL.Path == "/new-reg":
// TODO: Check the user account key against a ca.accountKeys?
w.Header().Set("Location", ca.serverURL("/accounts/1"))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
w.Write([]byte("{}"))
// New order request.
case r.URL.Path == "/new-order":
var req struct {
Identifiers []struct{ Value string }
}
if err := decodePayload(&req, r.Body); err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
o := &order{Status: acme.StatusPending}
for _, id := range req.Identifiers {
z := ca.authz(id.Value)
o.AuthzURLs = append(o.AuthzURLs, ca.serverURL("/authz/%s", z.domain))
}
orderID := len(ca.orders)
ca.orders = append(ca.orders, o)
w.Header().Set("Location", ca.serverURL("/orders/%d", orderID))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(o); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
// Existing order status requests.
case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/orders/"):
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
o, err := ca.storedOrder(strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/orders/"))
if err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(o); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
// Identifier authorization request.
case r.URL.Path == "/new-authz":
var req struct {
Identifier struct{ Value string }
}
if err := decodePayload(&req, r.Body); err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
z := ca.authz(req.Identifier.Value)
w.Header().Set("Location", ca.serverURL("/authz/%s", z.domain))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(z); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("new authz response: %v", err))
}
// Accept tls-alpn-01 challenge type requests.
case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/challenge/tls-alpn-01/"):
domain := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/challenge/tls-alpn-01/")
ca.mu.Lock()
_, exist := ca.authorizations[domain]
ca.mu.Unlock()
if !exist {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "challenge accept: no authz for %q", domain)
return
}
go ca.validateChallenge("tls-alpn-01", domain)
w.Write([]byte("{}"))
// Get authorization status requests.
case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/authz/"):
domain := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/authz/")
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
authz, ok := ca.authorizations[domain]
if !ok {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusNotFound, "no authz for %q", domain)
return
}
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authz); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("get authz for %q response: %v", domain, err))
}
// Certificate issuance request.
case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/new-cert/"):
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
orderID := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/new-cert/")
o, err := ca.storedOrder(orderID)
if err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
if o.Status != acme.StatusReady {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusForbidden, "order status: %s", o.Status)
return
}
// Validate CSR request.
var req struct {
CSR string `json:"csr"`
}
decodePayload(&req, r.Body)
b, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(req.CSR)
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(b)
if err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
names := unique(append(csr.DNSNames, csr.Subject.CommonName))
if err := ca.matchWhitelist(names); err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, err.Error())
return
}
if err := ca.authorized(names); err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, err.Error())
return
}
// Issue the certificate.
der, err := ca.leafCert(csr)
if err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "new-cert response: ca.leafCert: %v", err)
return
}
o.leaf = der
o.CertURL = ca.serverURL("/issued-cert/%s", orderID)
o.Status = acme.StatusValid
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(o); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
// Already issued cert download requests.
case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/issued-cert/"):
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
o, err := ca.storedOrder(strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/issued-cert/"))
if err != nil {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
if o.Status != acme.StatusValid {
ca.httpErrorf(w, http.StatusForbidden, "order status: %s", o.Status)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pem-certificate-chain")
pem.Encode(w, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: o.leaf})
pem.Encode(w, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: ca.rootCert})
}
}
// matchWhitelist reports whether all dnsNames are whitelisted.
// The whitelist is provided in NewCAServer.
func (ca *CAServer) matchWhitelist(dnsNames []string) error {
if len(ca.domainsWhitelist) == 0 {
return nil
}
var nomatch []string
for _, name := range dnsNames {
i := sort.SearchStrings(ca.domainsWhitelist, name)
if i == len(ca.domainsWhitelist) || ca.domainsWhitelist[i] != name {
nomatch = append(nomatch, name)
}
}
if len(nomatch) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("matchWhitelist: some domains don't match: %q", nomatch)
}
return nil
}
// storedOrder retrieves a previously created order at index i.
// It requires ca.mu to be locked.
func (ca *CAServer) storedOrder(i string) (*order, error) {
idx, err := strconv.Atoi(i)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storedOrder: %v", err)
}
if idx < 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storedOrder: invalid order index %d", idx)
}
if idx > len(ca.orders)-1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storedOrder: no such order %d", idx)
}
return ca.orders[idx], nil
}
// authz returns an existing authorization for the identifier or creates a new one.
// It requires ca.mu to be locked.
func (ca *CAServer) authz(identifier string) *authorization {
authz, ok := ca.authorizations[identifier]
if !ok {
authz = &authorization{
domain: identifier,
Status: acme.StatusPending,
}
for _, typ := range ca.challengeTypes {
authz.Challenges = append(authz.Challenges, challenge{
Type: typ,
URI: ca.serverURL("/challenge/%s/%s", typ, authz.domain),
Token: challengeToken(authz.domain, typ),
})
}
ca.authorizations[authz.domain] = authz
}
return authz
}
// authorized reports whether all authorizations for dnsNames have been satisfied.
// It requires ca.mu to be locked.
func (ca *CAServer) authorized(dnsNames []string) error {
var noauthz []string
for _, name := range dnsNames {
authz, ok := ca.authorizations[name]
if !ok || authz.Status != acme.StatusValid {
noauthz = append(noauthz, name)
}
}
if len(noauthz) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("CAServer: no authz for %q", noauthz)
}
return nil
}
// leafCert issues a new certificate.
// It requires ca.mu to be locked.
func (ca *CAServer) leafCert(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (der []byte, err error) {
ca.certCount++ // next leaf cert serial number
leaf := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(int64(ca.certCount)),
Subject: pkix.Name{Organization: []string{"Test Acme Co"}},
NotBefore: time.Now(),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(90 * 24 * time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
DNSNames: csr.DNSNames,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
}
if len(csr.DNSNames) == 0 {
leaf.DNSNames = []string{csr.Subject.CommonName}
}
return x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leaf, ca.rootTemplate, csr.PublicKey, ca.rootKey)
}
// TODO: Only tls-alpn-01 is currently supported: implement http-01 and dns-01.
func (ca *CAServer) validateChallenge(typ, identifier string) {
var err error
switch typ {
case "tls-alpn-01":
err = ca.verifyALPNChallenge(identifier)
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("validation of %q is not implemented", typ))
}
ca.mu.Lock()
defer ca.mu.Unlock()
authz := ca.authorizations[identifier]
if err != nil {
authz.Status = "invalid"
} else {
authz.Status = "valid"
}
log.Printf("validated %q for %q; authz status is now: %s", typ, identifier, authz.Status)
// Update all pending orders.
// An order becomes "ready" if all authorizations are "valid".
// An order becomes "invalid" if any authorization is "invalid".
// Status changes: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.1.6
OrdersLoop:
for i, o := range ca.orders {
if o.Status != acme.StatusPending {
continue
}
var countValid int
for _, zurl := range o.AuthzURLs {
z, ok := ca.authorizations[path.Base(zurl)]
if !ok {
log.Printf("no authz %q for order %d", zurl, i)
continue OrdersLoop
}
if z.Status == acme.StatusInvalid {
o.Status = acme.StatusInvalid
log.Printf("order %d is now invalid", i)
continue OrdersLoop
}
if z.Status == acme.StatusValid {
countValid++
}
}
if countValid == len(o.AuthzURLs) {
o.Status = acme.StatusReady
o.FinalizeURL = ca.serverURL("/new-cert/%d", i)
log.Printf("order %d is now ready", i)
}
}
}
func (ca *CAServer) verifyALPNChallenge(domain string) error {
const acmeALPNProto = "acme-tls/1"
addr, err := ca.addr(domain)
if err != nil {
return err
}
conn, err := tls.Dial("tcp", addr, &tls.Config{
ServerName: domain,
InsecureSkipVerify: true,
NextProtos: []string{acmeALPNProto},
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if v := conn.ConnectionState().NegotiatedProtocol; v != acmeALPNProto {
return fmt.Errorf("CAServer: verifyALPNChallenge: negotiated proto is %q; want %q", v, acmeALPNProto)
}
if n := len(conn.ConnectionState().PeerCertificates); n != 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("len(PeerCertificates) = %d; want 1", n)
}
// TODO: verify conn.ConnectionState().PeerCertificates[0]
return nil
}
func decodePayload(v interface{}, r io.Reader) error {
var req struct{ Payload string }
if err := json.NewDecoder(r).Decode(&req); err != nil {
return err
}
payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(req.Payload)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return json.Unmarshal(payload, v)
}
func challengeToken(domain, challType string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("token-%s-%s", domain, challType)
}
func unique(a []string) []string {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var res []string
for _, s := range a {
if s != "" && !seen[s] {
seen[s] = true
res = append(res, s)
}
}
return res
}