Files
crypto/ssh/keys_test.go
T
Nicola Murino b61cf853a8 ssh: enforce user presence verification for security keys
Previously the library did not verify the "User Presence" (UP) bit in
signatures generated by FIDO/U2F security keys
(sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com and sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com).
This allowed signatures without physical interaction to be accepted
if the underlying hardware produced them, deviating from the default
secure behavior expected by the FIDO standards and OpenSSH.

skECDSAPublicKey.Verify and skEd25519PublicKey.Verify now enforce
the user-presence bit (0x01, constant flagUserPresence) by default.
Signatures whose flags byte has UP clear fail with the sentinel
errSKMissingUserPresence.

The server public-key authentication path honors the OpenSSH
"no-touch-required" extension as an opt-out. noTouchAllowed reports
true when the extension is present either in the Permissions
returned by PublicKeyCallback (authorized_keys-level opt-out) or in
the certificate's own Extensions (CA-level opt-out); in that case
skKeyWithoutUP is used to derive a clone of the SK public key (and,
for certificates, a clone of the wrapping Certificate whose inner
Key is the cloned SK key) whose Verify accepts UP-clear signatures.
The originals are never mutated, so a per-session opt-out cannot
leak across authentication attempts or connections. Matching
OpenSSH, the opt-out is read only from Extensions, never from
CriticalOptions.

skKeyWithoutUP is iterative and unwraps at most one level of
*Certificate: the SSH cert format forbids Certificate.Key from being
another Certificate (parseCert rejects it) but callers can still
construct such a value directly in Go, so a recursive descent would
be driven to unbounded depth by malformed or cyclic input. Any such
pathological *Certificate is returned unchanged.

CertChecker.CheckCert applies skKeyWithoutUP unconditionally to the
certificate's CA key before verifying the CA signature, matching
OpenSSH, which calls sshkey_verify with detailsp==NULL in
sshkey.c:cert_parse and never extracts or enforces UP/UV flags on
CA signatures. The UP bit on a CA signature reflects the CA
operator's presence at cert-issuance time, which has no bearing on
whether the user being authenticated is present now, so enforcing it
here would only break interop with certificates issued by
non-interactive SK CAs without a corresponding security benefit. The
skKeyWithoutUP call is a no-op for non-SK CA keys (the common case).

This change breaks backward compatibility for clients or keys that
generate user-authentication signatures without the User Presence
flag set. Previously those signatures were accepted by the server.
They will now be rejected with "ssh: signature missing required user
presence flag" unless the "no-touch-required" extension is
explicitly granted to the session by the server callbacks, or
carried by the user certificate.

This issue was found during a security audit by NCC Group
Cryptography Services, sponsored by Teleport.

Fixes golang/go#79566
Fixes CVE-2026-39831

Change-Id: I74b6de3bb6a2d7a0f34d7fa36bbbbf06f0b3fc6b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/781662
Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
2026-05-21 17:03:20 -07:00

1238 lines
38 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/dsa"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/testdata"
)
func rawKey(pub PublicKey) interface{} {
switch k := pub.(type) {
case *rsaPublicKey:
return (*rsa.PublicKey)(k)
case *dsaPublicKey:
return (*dsa.PublicKey)(k)
case *ecdsaPublicKey:
return (*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k)
case ed25519PublicKey:
return (ed25519.PublicKey)(k)
case *Certificate:
return k
}
panic("unknown key type")
}
func TestKeyMarshalParse(t *testing.T) {
for _, priv := range testSigners {
pub := priv.PublicKey()
roundtrip, err := ParsePublicKey(pub.Marshal())
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("ParsePublicKey(%T): %v", pub, err)
}
k1 := rawKey(pub)
k2 := rawKey(roundtrip)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(k1, k2) {
t.Errorf("got %#v in roundtrip, want %#v", k2, k1)
}
}
}
func TestParsePublicKeyWithSigningAlgoAsKeyFormat(t *testing.T) {
key := []byte(`rsa-sha2-256 AAAADHJzYS1zaGEyLTI1NgAAAAMBAAEAAAEBAJ7qMyjLXEJCCJmRknuCLo0uPi5GrPY5pQYr84lhlN8Gor5KVL2LKYCW4e70r5xzj7SrHHSCft1FMlYg1KDO9xrprJh733kQqAPWETmSuH0EfRtGtcH6EarKyVxk6As076/yNiiMKVBtG0RPa1L7FviTfcYK4vnCCVrbv3RmA5CCzuG5BSMbRLxzVb4Ri3p8jhxYT8N4QGe/2yqvJLys5vQ9szpZR3tcFp3DJIVZhBRfR6LnoY23XZniAAMQaUVBX86dXQ++dNwAwZSXSt9Og+AniOCiBYqhNVa5n3DID/H7YtEtG+CbZr3r2KD3fv8AfSLRar4XOp8rsRdD31h/kr8=`)
_, _, _, _, err := ParseAuthorizedKey(key)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("parsing a public key using a signature algorithm as the key format succeeded unexpectedly")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `signature algorithm "rsa-sha2-256" isn't a key format`) {
t.Errorf(`got %v, expected 'signature algorithm "rsa-sha2-256" isn't a key format'`, err)
}
}
func TestUnsupportedCurves(t *testing.T) {
raw, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P224(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateKey: %v", err)
}
if _, err = NewSignerFromKey(raw); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "only P-256") {
t.Fatalf("NewPrivateKey should not succeed with P-224, got: %v", err)
}
if _, err = NewPublicKey(&raw.PublicKey); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "only P-256") {
t.Fatalf("NewPublicKey should not succeed with P-224, got: %v", err)
}
}
func TestNewPublicKey(t *testing.T) {
for _, k := range testSigners {
raw := rawKey(k.PublicKey())
// Skip certificates, as NewPublicKey does not support them.
if _, ok := raw.(*Certificate); ok {
continue
}
pub, err := NewPublicKey(raw)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("NewPublicKey(%#v): %v", raw, err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(k.PublicKey(), pub) {
t.Errorf("NewPublicKey(%#v) = %#v, want %#v", raw, pub, k.PublicKey())
}
}
}
func TestKeySignVerify(t *testing.T) {
for _, priv := range testSigners {
pub := priv.PublicKey()
data := []byte("sign me")
sig, err := priv.Sign(rand.Reader, data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Sign(%T): %v", priv, err)
}
if err := pub.Verify(data, sig); err != nil {
t.Errorf("publicKey.Verify(%T): %v", priv, err)
}
sig.Blob[5]++
if err := pub.Verify(data, sig); err == nil {
t.Errorf("publicKey.Verify on broken sig did not fail")
}
}
}
func TestKeySignWithAlgorithmVerify(t *testing.T) {
for k, priv := range testSigners {
if algorithmSigner, ok := priv.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); !ok {
t.Errorf("Signers %q constructed by ssh package should always implement the MultiAlgorithmSigner interface: %T", k, priv)
} else {
pub := priv.PublicKey()
data := []byte("sign me")
signWithAlgTestCase := func(algorithm string, expectedAlg string) {
sig, err := algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand.Reader, data, algorithm)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Sign(%T): %v", priv, err)
}
if sig.Format != expectedAlg {
t.Errorf("signature format did not match requested signature algorithm: %s != %s", sig.Format, expectedAlg)
}
if err := pub.Verify(data, sig); err != nil {
t.Errorf("publicKey.Verify(%T): %v", priv, err)
}
sig.Blob[5]++
if err := pub.Verify(data, sig); err == nil {
t.Errorf("publicKey.Verify on broken sig did not fail")
}
}
// Using the empty string as the algorithm name should result in the same signature format as the algorithm-free Sign method.
defaultSig, err := priv.Sign(rand.Reader, data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Sign(%T): %v", priv, err)
}
signWithAlgTestCase("", defaultSig.Format)
// RSA keys are the only ones which currently support more than one signing algorithm
if pub.Type() == KeyAlgoRSA {
for _, algorithm := range []string{KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512} {
signWithAlgTestCase(algorithm, algorithm)
}
}
}
}
}
func TestKeySignWithShortSignature(t *testing.T) {
signer := testSigners["rsa"].(AlgorithmSigner)
pub := signer.PublicKey()
// Note: data obtained by empirically trying until a result
// starting with 0 appeared
tests := []struct {
algorithm string
data []byte
}{
{
algorithm: KeyAlgoRSA,
data: []byte("sign me92"),
},
{
algorithm: KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
data: []byte("sign me294"),
},
{
algorithm: KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
data: []byte("sign me60"),
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
sig, err := signer.SignWithAlgorithm(rand.Reader, tt.data, tt.algorithm)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Sign(%T): %v", signer, err)
}
if sig.Blob[0] != 0 {
t.Errorf("%s: Expected signature with a leading 0", tt.algorithm)
}
sig.Blob = sig.Blob[1:]
if err := pub.Verify(tt.data, sig); err != nil {
t.Errorf("publicKey.Verify(%s): %v", tt.algorithm, err)
}
}
}
func TestParseRSAPrivateKey(t *testing.T) {
key := testPrivateKeys["rsa"]
rsa, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("got %T, want *rsa.PrivateKey", rsa)
}
if err := rsa.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Validate: %v", err)
}
}
func TestParseRSAModulusTooLarge(t *testing.T) {
rsa16384 := "ssh-rsa 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"
_, _, _, _, err := ParseAuthorizedKey([]byte(rsa16384))
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ParseAuthorizedKey accepted a 16384-bit modulus; expected it to be rejected")
}
expectedError := "rsa modulus too large"
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), expectedError) {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: got %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), expectedError)
}
}
func TestParseECPrivateKey(t *testing.T) {
key := testPrivateKeys["ecdsa"]
ecKey, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("got %T, want *ecdsa.PrivateKey", ecKey)
}
if !validateECPublicKey(ecKey.Curve, ecKey.X, ecKey.Y) {
t.Fatalf("public key does not validate.")
}
}
func TestParseEncryptedPrivateKeysWithPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
data := []byte("sign me")
for _, tt := range testdata.PEMEncryptedKeys {
t.Run(tt.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(tt.PEMBytes, []byte("incorrect"))
if err != x509.IncorrectPasswordError {
t.Errorf("got %v want IncorrectPasswordError", err)
}
s, err := ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(tt.PEMBytes, []byte(tt.EncryptionKey))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase returned error: %s", err)
}
sig, err := s.Sign(rand.Reader, data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Signer.Sign: %v", err)
}
if err := s.PublicKey().Verify(data, sig); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify failed: %v", err)
}
_, err = ParsePrivateKey(tt.PEMBytes)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("ParsePrivateKey succeeded, expected an error")
}
if err, ok := err.(*PassphraseMissingError); !ok {
t.Errorf("got error %q, want PassphraseMissingError", err)
} else if tt.IncludesPublicKey {
if err.PublicKey == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected PassphraseMissingError.PublicKey not to be nil")
}
got, want := err.PublicKey.Marshal(), s.PublicKey().Marshal()
if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("error field %q doesn't match signer public key %q", got, want)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestParseEncryptedPrivateKeysWithUnsupportedCiphers(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range testdata.UnsupportedCipherData {
t.Run(tt.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(tt.PEMBytes, []byte(tt.EncryptionKey))
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected 'unknown cipher' error for %q, got nil", tt.Name)
// If this cipher is now supported, remove it from testdata.UnsupportedCipherData
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unknown cipher") {
t.Errorf("wanted 'unknown cipher' error, got %v", err.Error())
}
})
}
}
func TestParseEncryptedPrivateKeysWithIncorrectPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
pem := testdata.PEMEncryptedKeys[0].PEMBytes
for i := 0; i < 4096; i++ {
_, err := ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pem, []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d", i)))
if !errors.Is(err, x509.IncorrectPasswordError) {
t.Fatalf("expected error: %v, got: %v", x509.IncorrectPasswordError, err)
}
}
}
func TestParseDSA(t *testing.T) {
// We actually exercise the ParsePrivateKey codepath here, as opposed to
// using the ParseRawPrivateKey+NewSignerFromKey path that testdata_test.go
// uses.
s, err := ParsePrivateKey(testdata.PEMBytes["dsa"])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParsePrivateKey returned error: %s", err)
}
data := []byte("sign me")
sig, err := s.Sign(rand.Reader, data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dsa.Sign: %v", err)
}
if err := s.PublicKey().Verify(data, sig); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify failed: %v", err)
}
}
// Tests for authorized_keys parsing.
// getTestKey returns a public key, and its base64 encoding.
func getTestKey() (PublicKey, string) {
k := testPublicKeys["rsa"]
b := &bytes.Buffer{}
e := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, b)
e.Write(k.Marshal())
e.Close()
return k, b.String()
}
func TestMarshalParsePublicKey(t *testing.T) {
pub, pubSerialized := getTestKey()
line := fmt.Sprintf("%s %s user@host", pub.Type(), pubSerialized)
authKeys := MarshalAuthorizedKey(pub)
actualFields := strings.Fields(string(authKeys))
if len(actualFields) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("failed authKeys: %v", authKeys)
}
// drop the comment
expectedFields := strings.Fields(line)[0:2]
if !reflect.DeepEqual(actualFields, expectedFields) {
t.Errorf("got %v, expected %v", actualFields, expectedFields)
}
actPub, _, _, _, err := ParseAuthorizedKey([]byte(line))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cannot parse %v: %v", line, err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(actPub, pub) {
t.Errorf("got %v, expected %v", actPub, pub)
}
}
func TestParseDSAHugeQ(t *testing.T) {
P := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 1023)
Q := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 20000) // very large
// G and Y: Dummy values, just needs to be < P to pass that specific check
G := big.NewInt(2)
Y := big.NewInt(5)
rawKey := struct {
P, Q, G, Y *big.Int
}{
P: P,
Q: Q,
G: G,
Y: Y,
}
inputBytes := Marshal(&rawKey)
_, _, err := parseDSA(inputBytes)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("parseDSA accepted a DSA key with large Q")
}
expectedError := "ssh: unsupported DSA sub-prime size"
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), expectedError) {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: got %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), expectedError)
}
}
func TestParseDSAYOutOfRange(t *testing.T) {
// Valid 1024/160 parameters (values don't need to be a real DSA group,
// they only need to pass the checkDSAParams bit-length checks and the
// G < P / G > 0 checks).
P := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 1023)
P.SetBit(P, 0, 1) // make P odd so it can pass as a prime candidate shape
Q := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 159)
Q.SetBit(Q, 0, 1)
G := big.NewInt(2)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
Y *big.Int
}{
{"Y_zero", big.NewInt(0)},
{"Y_negative", big.NewInt(-1)},
{"Y_equals_P", new(big.Int).Set(P)},
{"Y_greater_than_P", new(big.Int).Add(P, big.NewInt(1))},
{"Y_much_greater_than_P", new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 20000)},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
rawKey := struct {
P, Q, G, Y *big.Int
}{P: P, Q: Q, G: G, Y: tc.Y}
_, _, err := parseDSA(Marshal(&rawKey))
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("parseDSA accepted a DSA key with Y=%s (P=%s)", tc.Y, P)
}
expectedError := "DSA public value Y out of range"
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), expectedError) {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: got %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), expectedError)
}
})
}
}
func TestMarshalPrivateKey(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
}{
{"rsa-openssh-format"},
{"ed25519"},
{"p256-openssh-format"},
{"p384-openssh-format"},
{"p521-openssh-format"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
expected, ok := testPrivateKeys[tt.name]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("cannot find key %s", tt.name)
}
block, err := MarshalPrivateKey(expected, "test@golang.org")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cannot marshal %s: %v", tt.name, err)
}
key, err := ParseRawPrivateKey(pem.EncodeToMemory(block))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cannot parse %s: %v", tt.name, err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(expected, key) {
t.Errorf("unexpected marshaled key %s", tt.name)
}
})
}
}
func TestMarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
}{
{"rsa-openssh-format"},
{"ed25519"},
{"p256-openssh-format"},
{"p384-openssh-format"},
{"p521-openssh-format"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
expected, ok := testPrivateKeys[tt.name]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("cannot find key %s", tt.name)
}
block, err := MarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(expected, "test@golang.org", []byte("test-passphrase"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cannot marshal %s: %v", tt.name, err)
}
key, err := ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pem.EncodeToMemory(block), []byte("test-passphrase"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cannot parse %s: %v", tt.name, err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(expected, key) {
t.Errorf("unexpected marshaled key %s", tt.name)
}
})
}
}
type testAuthResult struct {
pubKey PublicKey
options []string
comments string
rest string
ok bool
}
func testAuthorizedKeys(t *testing.T, authKeys []byte, expected []testAuthResult) {
rest := authKeys
var values []testAuthResult
for len(rest) > 0 {
var r testAuthResult
var err error
r.pubKey, r.comments, r.options, rest, err = ParseAuthorizedKey(rest)
r.ok = (err == nil)
t.Log(err)
r.rest = string(rest)
values = append(values, r)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(values, expected) {
t.Errorf("got %#v, expected %#v", values, expected)
}
}
func TestAuthorizedKeyBasic(t *testing.T) {
pub, pubSerialized := getTestKey()
line := "ssh-rsa " + pubSerialized + " user@host"
testAuthorizedKeys(t, []byte(line),
[]testAuthResult{
{pub, nil, "user@host", "", true},
})
}
func TestAuth(t *testing.T) {
pub, pubSerialized := getTestKey()
authWithOptions := []string{
`# comments to ignore before any keys...`,
``,
`env="HOME=/home/root",no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa ` + pubSerialized + ` user@host`,
`# comments to ignore, along with a blank line`,
``,
`env="HOME=/home/root2" ssh-rsa ` + pubSerialized + ` user2@host2`,
``,
`# more comments, plus a invalid entry`,
`ssh-rsa data-that-will-not-parse user@host3`,
}
for _, eol := range []string{"\n", "\r\n"} {
authOptions := strings.Join(authWithOptions, eol)
rest2 := strings.Join(authWithOptions[3:], eol)
rest3 := strings.Join(authWithOptions[6:], eol)
testAuthorizedKeys(t, []byte(authOptions), []testAuthResult{
{pub, []string{`env="HOME=/home/root"`, "no-port-forwarding"}, "user@host", rest2, true},
{pub, []string{`env="HOME=/home/root2"`}, "user2@host2", rest3, true},
{nil, nil, "", "", false},
})
}
}
func TestAuthWithQuotedSpaceInEnv(t *testing.T) {
pub, pubSerialized := getTestKey()
authWithQuotedSpaceInEnv := []byte(`env="HOME=/home/root dir",no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa ` + pubSerialized + ` user@host`)
testAuthorizedKeys(t, []byte(authWithQuotedSpaceInEnv), []testAuthResult{
{pub, []string{`env="HOME=/home/root dir"`, "no-port-forwarding"}, "user@host", "", true},
})
}
func TestAuthWithQuotedCommaInEnv(t *testing.T) {
pub, pubSerialized := getTestKey()
authWithQuotedCommaInEnv := []byte(`env="HOME=/home/root,dir",no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa ` + pubSerialized + ` user@host`)
testAuthorizedKeys(t, []byte(authWithQuotedCommaInEnv), []testAuthResult{
{pub, []string{`env="HOME=/home/root,dir"`, "no-port-forwarding"}, "user@host", "", true},
})
}
func TestAuthWithQuotedQuoteInEnv(t *testing.T) {
pub, pubSerialized := getTestKey()
authWithQuotedQuoteInEnv := []byte(`env="HOME=/home/\"root dir",no-port-forwarding` + "\t" + `ssh-rsa` + "\t" + pubSerialized + ` user@host`)
authWithDoubleQuotedQuote := []byte(`no-port-forwarding,env="HOME=/home/ \"root dir\"" ssh-rsa ` + pubSerialized + "\t" + `user@host`)
testAuthorizedKeys(t, []byte(authWithQuotedQuoteInEnv), []testAuthResult{
{pub, []string{`env="HOME=/home/\"root dir"`, "no-port-forwarding"}, "user@host", "", true},
})
testAuthorizedKeys(t, []byte(authWithDoubleQuotedQuote), []testAuthResult{
{pub, []string{"no-port-forwarding", `env="HOME=/home/ \"root dir\""`}, "user@host", "", true},
})
}
func TestAuthWithInvalidSpace(t *testing.T) {
_, pubSerialized := getTestKey()
authWithInvalidSpace := []byte(`env="HOME=/home/root dir", no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa ` + pubSerialized + ` user@host
#more to follow but still no valid keys`)
testAuthorizedKeys(t, []byte(authWithInvalidSpace), []testAuthResult{
{nil, nil, "", "", false},
})
}
func TestAuthWithMissingQuote(t *testing.T) {
pub, pubSerialized := getTestKey()
authWithMissingQuote := []byte(`env="HOME=/home/root,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa ` + pubSerialized + ` user@host
env="HOME=/home/root",shared-control ssh-rsa ` + pubSerialized + ` user@host`)
testAuthorizedKeys(t, []byte(authWithMissingQuote), []testAuthResult{
{pub, []string{`env="HOME=/home/root"`, `shared-control`}, "user@host", "", true},
})
}
func TestInvalidEntry(t *testing.T) {
authInvalid := []byte(`ssh-rsa`)
_, _, _, _, err := ParseAuthorizedKey(authInvalid)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("got valid entry for %q", authInvalid)
}
}
var knownHostsParseTests = []struct {
input string
err string
marker string
comment string
hosts []string
rest string
}{
{
"",
"EOF",
"", "", nil, "",
},
{
"# Just a comment",
"EOF",
"", "", nil, "",
},
{
" \t ",
"EOF",
"", "", nil, "",
},
{
"localhost ssh-rsa {RSAPUB}",
"",
"", "", []string{"localhost"}, "",
},
{
"localhost\tssh-rsa {RSAPUB}",
"",
"", "", []string{"localhost"}, "",
},
{
"localhost\tssh-rsa {RSAPUB}\tcomment comment",
"",
"", "comment comment", []string{"localhost"}, "",
},
{
"localhost\tssh-rsa {RSAPUB}\tcomment comment\n",
"",
"", "comment comment", []string{"localhost"}, "",
},
{
"localhost\tssh-rsa {RSAPUB}\tcomment comment\r\n",
"",
"", "comment comment", []string{"localhost"}, "",
},
{
"localhost\tssh-rsa {RSAPUB}\tcomment comment\r\nnext line",
"",
"", "comment comment", []string{"localhost"}, "next line",
},
{
"localhost,[host2:123]\tssh-rsa {RSAPUB}\tcomment comment",
"",
"", "comment comment", []string{"localhost", "[host2:123]"}, "",
},
{
"@marker \tlocalhost,[host2:123]\tssh-rsa {RSAPUB}",
"",
"marker", "", []string{"localhost", "[host2:123]"}, "",
},
{
"@marker \tlocalhost,[host2:123]\tssh-rsa aabbccdd",
"short read",
"", "", nil, "",
},
}
func TestKnownHostsParsing(t *testing.T) {
rsaPub, rsaPubSerialized := getTestKey()
for i, test := range knownHostsParseTests {
var expectedKey PublicKey
const rsaKeyToken = "{RSAPUB}"
input := test.input
if strings.Contains(input, rsaKeyToken) {
expectedKey = rsaPub
input = strings.Replace(test.input, rsaKeyToken, rsaPubSerialized, -1)
}
marker, hosts, pubKey, comment, rest, err := ParseKnownHosts([]byte(input))
if err != nil {
if len(test.err) == 0 {
t.Errorf("#%d: unexpectedly failed with %q", i, err)
} else if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), test.err) {
t.Errorf("#%d: expected error containing %q, but got %q", i, test.err, err)
}
continue
} else if len(test.err) != 0 {
t.Errorf("#%d: succeeded but expected error including %q", i, test.err)
continue
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(expectedKey, pubKey) {
t.Errorf("#%d: expected key %#v, but got %#v", i, expectedKey, pubKey)
}
if marker != test.marker {
t.Errorf("#%d: expected marker %q, but got %q", i, test.marker, marker)
}
if comment != test.comment {
t.Errorf("#%d: expected comment %q, but got %q", i, test.comment, comment)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(test.hosts, hosts) {
t.Errorf("#%d: expected hosts %#v, but got %#v", i, test.hosts, hosts)
}
if rest := string(rest); rest != test.rest {
t.Errorf("#%d: expected remaining input to be %q, but got %q", i, test.rest, rest)
}
}
}
func TestFingerprintLegacyMD5(t *testing.T) {
pub, _ := getTestKey()
fingerprint := FingerprintLegacyMD5(pub)
want := "b7:ef:d3:d5:89:29:52:96:9f:df:47:41:4d:15:37:f4" // ssh-keygen -lf -E md5 rsa
if fingerprint != want {
t.Errorf("got fingerprint %q want %q", fingerprint, want)
}
}
func TestFingerprintSHA256(t *testing.T) {
pub, _ := getTestKey()
fingerprint := FingerprintSHA256(pub)
want := "SHA256:fi5+D7UmDZDE9Q2sAVvvlpcQSIakN4DERdINgXd2AnE" // ssh-keygen -lf rsa
if fingerprint != want {
t.Errorf("got fingerprint %q want %q", fingerprint, want)
}
}
func TestInvalidKeys(t *testing.T) {
keyTypes := []string{
"RSA PRIVATE KEY",
"PRIVATE KEY",
"EC PRIVATE KEY",
"DSA PRIVATE KEY",
"OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY",
}
for _, keyType := range keyTypes {
for _, dataLen := range []int{0, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20} {
data := make([]byte, dataLen)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, data); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
pem.Encode(&buf, &pem.Block{
Type: keyType,
Bytes: data,
})
// This test is just to ensure that the function
// doesn't panic so the return value is ignored.
ParseRawPrivateKey(buf.Bytes())
}
}
}
func TestSKKeys(t *testing.T) {
for _, d := range testdata.SKData {
pk, _, _, _, err := ParseAuthorizedKey(d.PubKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseAuthorizedKey returned error: %v", err)
}
sigBuf := make([]byte, hex.DecodedLen(len(d.HexSignature)))
if _, err := hex.Decode(sigBuf, d.HexSignature); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hex.Decode() failed: %v", err)
}
dataBuf := make([]byte, hex.DecodedLen(len(d.HexData)))
if _, err := hex.Decode(dataBuf, d.HexData); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hex.Decode() failed: %v", err)
}
sig, _, ok := parseSignature(sigBuf)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("parseSignature(%v) failed", sigBuf)
}
// Test that good data and signature pass verification
if err := pk.Verify(dataBuf, sig); err != nil {
t.Errorf("%s: PublicKey.Verify(%v, %v) failed: %v", d.Name, dataBuf, sig, err)
}
// Invalid data being passed in
invalidData := []byte("INVALID DATA")
if err := pk.Verify(invalidData, sig); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s with invalid data: PublicKey.Verify(%v, %v) passed unexpectedly", d.Name, invalidData, sig)
}
// Change byte in blob to corrup signature
sig.Blob[5] = byte('A')
// Corrupted data being passed in
if err := pk.Verify(dataBuf, sig); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s with corrupted signature: PublicKey.Verify(%v, %v) passed unexpectedly", d.Name, dataBuf, sig)
}
}
}
// skTestHarness builds SK-formatted signatures over a fixed payload
// using a caller-supplied signing function, letting tests vary the UP
// flag byte without duplicating the wire-format scaffolding.
type skTestHarness struct {
format string
application string
data []byte
// sign takes the SHA-256 digest of the marshalled SK blob and
// returns the value to embed in Signature.Blob. For ECDSA keys the
// helper feeds the digest to ecdsa.Sign; for ed25519 the helper
// feeds the raw marshalled blob to ed25519.Sign.
signDigest func(digest []byte) []byte
signBlob func(blob []byte) []byte
}
func (h skTestHarness) sign(t *testing.T, flags byte) *Signature {
t.Helper()
hsh := sha256.New()
hsh.Write([]byte(h.application))
appDigest := hsh.Sum(nil)
hsh.Reset()
hsh.Write(h.data)
dataDigest := hsh.Sum(nil)
var counter uint32 = 1
blob := struct {
ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
Flags byte
Counter uint32
MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}{appDigest, flags, counter, dataDigest}
marshalled := Marshal(blob)
var sigBlob []byte
if h.signDigest != nil {
hsh.Reset()
hsh.Write(marshalled)
sigBlob = h.signDigest(hsh.Sum(nil))
} else {
sigBlob = h.signBlob(marshalled)
}
return &Signature{
Format: h.format,
Blob: sigBlob,
Rest: Marshal(struct {
Flags byte
Counter uint32
}{flags, counter}),
}
}
func TestSKUserPresence(t *testing.T) {
ecKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
h := skTestHarness{
format: "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com",
application: "ssh:",
data: []byte("test data"),
signDigest: func(digest []byte) []byte {
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, ecKey, digest)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return Marshal(struct{ R, S *big.Int }{r, s})
},
}
pk := &skECDSAPublicKey{
application: h.application,
PublicKey: ecKey.PublicKey,
}
// Valid signature with UP=1 should pass.
if err := pk.Verify(h.data, h.sign(t, flagUserPresence)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify failed with UP=1: %v", err)
}
// Valid signature with UP=0 should fail with the user-presence sentinel.
sigNoUP := h.sign(t, 0)
if err := pk.Verify(h.data, sigNoUP); !errors.Is(err, errSKMissingUserPresence) {
t.Errorf("expected errSKMissingUserPresence, got: %v", err)
}
// UV set but UP clear must still fail: we only waive UP, never UV-only.
if err := pk.Verify(h.data, h.sign(t, 0x04)); !errors.Is(err, errSKMissingUserPresence) {
t.Errorf("UV-only (flags=0x04): expected errSKMissingUserPresence, got: %v", err)
}
// With noTouchRequired, UP=0 passes; UP=1+UV=1 also passes.
pk.noTouchRequired = true
if err := pk.Verify(h.data, sigNoUP); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify with noTouchRequired failed: %v", err)
}
if err := pk.Verify(h.data, h.sign(t, flagUserPresence|0x04)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify UP|UV with noTouchRequired failed: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSKKeyWithoutUP(t *testing.T) {
ecKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
edPub, _, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
skEC := &skECDSAPublicKey{PublicKey: ecKey.PublicKey}
skED := &skEd25519PublicKey{PublicKey: edPub}
certEC := &Certificate{Key: &skECDSAPublicKey{PublicKey: ecKey.PublicKey}}
certED := &Certificate{Key: &skEd25519PublicKey{PublicKey: edPub}}
rsaKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rsaPub, err := NewPublicKey(&rsaKey.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
certRSA := &Certificate{Key: rsaPub}
// SK raw keys: return a clone with the flag set, original untouched.
gotEC := skKeyWithoutUP(skEC)
if gotEC == skEC {
t.Error("skECDSAPublicKey: expected a clone, got the original pointer")
}
if !gotEC.(*skECDSAPublicKey).noTouchRequired {
t.Error("skECDSAPublicKey clone: noTouchRequired not set")
}
if skEC.noTouchRequired {
t.Error("skECDSAPublicKey: original mutated")
}
gotED := skKeyWithoutUP(skED)
if gotED == skED {
t.Error("skEd25519PublicKey: expected a clone, got the original pointer")
}
if !gotED.(*skEd25519PublicKey).noTouchRequired {
t.Error("skEd25519PublicKey clone: noTouchRequired not set")
}
if skED.noTouchRequired {
t.Error("skEd25519PublicKey: original mutated")
}
// Certificate wrapping SK: return a clone of the cert with a cloned
// SK key inside. Neither the original cert nor the original inner
// key must be mutated.
originalInnerEC := certEC.Key
gotCertEC := skKeyWithoutUP(certEC)
if gotCertEC == certEC {
t.Error("*Certificate(SK ecdsa): expected a clone, got the original pointer")
}
if got := gotCertEC.(*Certificate).Key.(*skECDSAPublicKey); !got.noTouchRequired {
t.Error("*Certificate(SK ecdsa): inner clone missing noTouchRequired")
}
if certEC.Key != originalInnerEC {
t.Error("*Certificate(SK ecdsa): original cert's Key pointer mutated")
}
if originalInnerEC.(*skECDSAPublicKey).noTouchRequired {
t.Error("*Certificate(SK ecdsa): original inner key mutated")
}
gotCertED := skKeyWithoutUP(certED)
if gotCertED == certED {
t.Error("*Certificate(SK ed25519): expected a clone, got the original pointer")
}
if got := gotCertED.(*Certificate).Key.(*skEd25519PublicKey); !got.noTouchRequired {
t.Error("*Certificate(SK ed25519): inner clone missing noTouchRequired")
}
// Non-SK key inside a cert: return original unchanged (nothing to clone).
if got := skKeyWithoutUP(certRSA); got != certRSA {
t.Error("*Certificate(RSA): expected the original pointer back")
}
// Plain non-SK key: return original unchanged.
if got := skKeyWithoutUP(rsaPub); got != rsaPub {
t.Error("rsaPublicKey: expected the original pointer back")
}
// Pathological: *Certificate whose Key is itself a *Certificate.
// The SSH cert format forbids this and parseCert rejects it, but
// a Go caller can still construct such a value. skKeyWithoutUP
// must not recurse into it (or panic); it returns the input
// unchanged. This also defends against a hypothetical cycle built
// from hand-constructed Certificate pointers.
nestedCert := &Certificate{Key: &Certificate{Key: skEC}}
if got := skKeyWithoutUP(nestedCert); got != nestedCert {
t.Error("*Certificate wrapping *Certificate: expected the original pointer back")
}
selfCycle := &Certificate{}
selfCycle.Key = selfCycle
if got := skKeyWithoutUP(selfCycle); got != selfCycle {
t.Error("self-referential *Certificate: expected the original pointer back")
}
}
func TestNoTouchAllowed(t *testing.T) {
ecKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sk := &skECDSAPublicKey{PublicKey: ecKey.PublicKey}
certNoExt := &Certificate{Key: sk}
certOptOut := &Certificate{
Key: sk,
Permissions: Permissions{Extensions: map[string]string{"no-touch-required": ""}},
}
// Non-empty value: OpenSSH writes "" but any value must be accepted
// because the check is presence-only.
certOptOutNonEmpty := &Certificate{
Key: sk,
Permissions: Permissions{Extensions: map[string]string{"no-touch-required": "yes"}},
}
// no-touch-required belongs in Extensions, never CriticalOptions.
// Putting it in CriticalOptions must NOT be treated as opt-out.
certCritOnly := &Certificate{
Key: sk,
Permissions: Permissions{CriticalOptions: map[string]string{"no-touch-required": ""}},
}
permsEmpty := &Permissions{}
permsOptOut := &Permissions{Extensions: map[string]string{"no-touch-required": ""}}
permsCritOnly := &Permissions{CriticalOptions: map[string]string{"no-touch-required": ""}}
cases := []struct {
name string
pub PublicKey
perms *Permissions
want bool
}{
{"nil perms, no cert", sk, nil, false},
{"empty perms, no cert", sk, permsEmpty, false},
{"perms opt-out, raw key", sk, permsOptOut, true},
{"nil perms, cert opt-out", certOptOut, nil, true},
{"nil perms, cert opt-out non-empty value", certOptOutNonEmpty, nil, true},
{"nil perms, cert no ext", certNoExt, nil, false},
{"perms opt-out, cert no ext", certNoExt, permsOptOut, true},
{"empty perms, cert opt-out", certOptOut, permsEmpty, true},
// Negative controls: CriticalOptions must not waive UP.
{"critical-options only, raw key", sk, permsCritOnly, false},
{"critical-options only, cert", certCritOnly, nil, false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := noTouchAllowed(tc.pub, tc.perms); got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("noTouchAllowed = %v, want %v", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestSKUserPresenceEd25519(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
h := skTestHarness{
format: "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com",
application: "ssh:",
data: []byte("test data"),
signBlob: func(blob []byte) []byte {
return ed25519.Sign(priv, blob)
},
}
pk := &skEd25519PublicKey{
application: h.application,
PublicKey: pub,
}
if err := pk.Verify(h.data, h.sign(t, flagUserPresence)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify failed with UP=1: %v", err)
}
sigNoUP := h.sign(t, 0)
if err := pk.Verify(h.data, sigNoUP); !errors.Is(err, errSKMissingUserPresence) {
t.Errorf("expected errSKMissingUserPresence, got: %v", err)
}
pk.noTouchRequired = true
if err := pk.Verify(h.data, sigNoUP); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify with noTouchRequired failed: %v", err)
}
}
func TestNewSignerWithAlgos(t *testing.T) {
algorithSigner, ok := testSigners["rsa"].(AlgorithmSigner)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("rsa test signer does not implement the AlgorithmSigner interface")
}
_, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(algorithSigner, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Error("signer with algos created with no algorithms")
}
_, err = NewSignerWithAlgorithms(algorithSigner, []string{KeyAlgoED25519})
if err == nil {
t.Error("signer with algos created with invalid algorithms")
}
_, err = NewSignerWithAlgorithms(algorithSigner, []string{CertAlgoRSASHA256v01})
if err == nil {
t.Error("signer with algos created with certificate algorithms")
}
mas, err := NewSignerWithAlgorithms(algorithSigner, []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512})
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("unable to create signer with valid algorithms: %v", err)
}
_, err = NewSignerWithAlgorithms(mas, []string{KeyAlgoRSA})
if err == nil {
t.Error("signer with algos created with restricted algorithms")
}
}
func TestCryptoPublicKey(t *testing.T) {
for _, priv := range testSigners {
p1 := priv.PublicKey()
key, ok := p1.(CryptoPublicKey)
if !ok {
continue
}
p2, err := NewPublicKey(key.CryptoPublicKey())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewPublicKey(CryptoPublicKey) failed for %s, got: %v", p1.Type(), err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(p1, p2) {
t.Errorf("got %#v in NewPublicKey, want %#v", p2, p1)
}
}
for _, d := range testdata.SKData {
p1, _, _, _, err := ParseAuthorizedKey(d.PubKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseAuthorizedKey returned error: %v", err)
}
k1, ok := p1.(CryptoPublicKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("%T does not implement CryptoPublicKey", p1)
}
var p2 PublicKey
switch pub := k1.CryptoPublicKey().(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
p2 = &skECDSAPublicKey{
application: "ssh:",
PublicKey: *pub,
}
case ed25519.PublicKey:
p2 = &skEd25519PublicKey{
application: "ssh:",
PublicKey: pub,
}
default:
t.Fatalf("unexpected type %T from CryptoPublicKey()", pub)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(p1, p2) {
t.Errorf("got %#v, want %#v", p2, p1)
}
}
}
func TestParseCertWithCertSignatureKey(t *testing.T) {
certBytes := []byte(`-----BEGIN SSH CERTIFICATE-----
AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIPSp27hvNSB0
IotJnVhjC4zxNgNS8BHlUCxD0VJi4D/eAAAAIIJMi1e5qfx+IFuKD/p/Ssqcb3os
CpOw/4wBs1pQ53zwAAAAAAAAAAEAAAACAAAAAAAAABMAAAAPZm9vLmV4YW1wbGUu
Y29tAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAT0AAAAgc3NoLWVkMjU1
MTktY2VydC12MDFAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAg+sNYhCO35mQT1UBMpmMk8ey+culd
IU8vBlPEl4B07swAAAAggiv+RLnboS4znGCVl/n1jDg2uD0h15tW4s/04eS2mLQA
AAAAAAAAAQAAAAIAAAAAAAAAEwAAAA9mb28uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20AAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACCV2wETgLKL
Kt0bRl3YUnd/ZYSlq0xJMbn4Jj3cdPWykQAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABA
WOdbRGEzyRAhiIK227CLUQD5caXYMV8FvSIB7toEE2M/8HnWdG9H3Rsg/v3unruQ
JrQldnuPJNe7KOP2+zvUDgAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAm3bIPp85ZpIe
D+izJcUqlcAOri7HO8bULFNHT6LVegvB06xQ5TLwMlrxWUF4cafl1tSe8JQck4a6
cLYUOHfQDw==
-----END SSH CERTIFICATE-----
`)
block, _ := pem.Decode(certBytes)
if block == nil {
t.Fatal("invalid test certificate")
}
if _, err := ParsePublicKey(block.Bytes); err == nil {
t.Fatal("parsing an SSH certificate using another certificate as signature key succeeded; expected failure")
}
}