Files
crypto/ssh/agent/client.go
T
Nicola Murino e5306b2f3e ssh/agent: support parallel signing using request pipelining
Make NewClient automatically pipeline concurrent requests over its
connection when the supplied io.ReadWriter also implements io.Closer.
In this mode the client writes requests to the wire as soon as the
write path is available and dispatches responses back to callers in
FIFO order via a dedicated reader goroutine, instead of fully
serializing each call. Up to 32 requests may be in flight on a single
connection.

This lets an agent that load-balances signing across multiple backend
devices keep several of them busy concurrently without forcing callers
to maintain their own connection pool. Aggregate throughput scales
roughly linearly with the number of backend devices up to the
in-flight cap; the protocol's in-order response requirement means
slow requests still delay subsequent ones on the same connection,
which is unchanged.

The pipelined path requires io.Closer because, on a Write error, the
background reader goroutine must be unblocked by closing the
underlying connection; otherwise it would remain parked forever
waiting for a response that will never arrive, leaking the goroutine
and desynchronising the FIFO routing of responses for subsequent
successful writes. When the supplied transport does not implement
io.Closer, NewClient falls back to the previous fully-serialized
behavior: a single in-flight call at a time, with no background
goroutine.

Fixes golang/go#78473

Change-Id: Icf14e5e8ca897506d68fb32c14fc72c774cd97b2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/768483
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
2026-05-21 19:39:50 -07:00

1075 lines
31 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package agent implements the ssh-agent protocol, and provides both
// a client and a server. The client can talk to a standard ssh-agent
// that uses UNIX sockets, and one could implement an alternative
// ssh-agent process using the sample server.
//
// References:
//
// [PROTOCOL.agent]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-00
package agent
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/dsa"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
// SignatureFlags represent additional flags that can be passed to the signature
// requests an defined in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.5.1.
type SignatureFlags uint32
// SignatureFlag values as defined in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 5.3.
const (
SignatureFlagReserved SignatureFlags = 1 << iota
SignatureFlagRsaSha256
SignatureFlagRsaSha512
)
// Agent represents the capabilities of an ssh-agent.
type Agent interface {
// List returns the identities known to the agent.
List() ([]*Key, error)
// Sign has the agent sign the data using a protocol 2 key as defined
// in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 2.6.2.
Sign(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error)
// Add adds a private key to the agent.
Add(key AddedKey) error
// Remove removes all identities with the given public key.
Remove(key ssh.PublicKey) error
// RemoveAll removes all identities.
RemoveAll() error
// Lock locks the agent. Sign and Remove will fail, and List will empty an empty list.
Lock(passphrase []byte) error
// Unlock undoes the effect of Lock
Unlock(passphrase []byte) error
// Signers returns signers for all the known keys.
Signers() ([]ssh.Signer, error)
}
type ExtendedAgent interface {
Agent
// SignWithFlags signs like Sign, but allows for additional flags to be sent/received
SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureFlags) (*ssh.Signature, error)
// Extension processes a custom extension request. Standard-compliant agents are not
// required to support any extensions, but this method allows agents to implement
// vendor-specific methods or add experimental features. See [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7.
// If agent extensions are unsupported entirely this method MUST return an
// ErrExtensionUnsupported error. Similarly, if just the specific extensionType in
// the request is unsupported by the agent then ErrExtensionUnsupported MUST be
// returned.
//
// In the case of success, since [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 specifies that the contents
// of the response are unspecified (including the type of the message), the complete
// response will be returned as a []byte slice, including the "type" byte of the message.
Extension(extensionType string, contents []byte) ([]byte, error)
}
// ConstraintExtension describes an optional constraint defined by users.
type ConstraintExtension struct {
// ExtensionName consist of a UTF-8 string suffixed by the
// implementation domain following the naming scheme defined
// in Section 4.2 of RFC 4251, e.g. "foo@example.com".
ExtensionName string
// ExtensionDetails contains the actual content of the extended
// constraint.
ExtensionDetails []byte
}
// AddedKey describes an SSH key to be added to an Agent.
type AddedKey struct {
// PrivateKey must be a *rsa.PrivateKey, *dsa.PrivateKey,
// ed25519.PrivateKey or *ecdsa.PrivateKey, which will be inserted into the
// agent.
PrivateKey interface{}
// Certificate, if not nil, is communicated to the agent and will be
// stored with the key.
Certificate *ssh.Certificate
// Comment is an optional, free-form string.
Comment string
// LifetimeSecs, if not zero, is the number of seconds that the
// agent will store the key for.
LifetimeSecs uint32
// ConfirmBeforeUse, if true, requests that the agent confirm with the
// user before each use of this key.
ConfirmBeforeUse bool
// ConstraintExtensions are the experimental or private-use constraints
// defined by users.
ConstraintExtensions []ConstraintExtension
}
// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 3.
const (
agentRequestV1Identities = 1
agentRemoveAllV1Identities = 9
// 3.2 Requests from client to agent for protocol 2 key operations
agentAddIdentity = 17
agentRemoveIdentity = 18
agentRemoveAllIdentities = 19
agentAddIDConstrained = 25
// 3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent
agentAddSmartcardKey = 20
agentRemoveSmartcardKey = 21
agentLock = 22
agentUnlock = 23
agentAddSmartcardKeyConstrained = 26
// 3.7 Key constraint identifiers
agentConstrainLifetime = 1
agentConstrainConfirm = 2
// Constraint extension identifier up to version 2 of the protocol. A
// backward incompatible change will be required if we want to add support
// for SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN which uses the same ID.
agentConstrainExtensionV00 = 3
// Constraint extension identifier in version 3 and later of the protocol.
agentConstrainExtension = 255
)
// maxAgentResponseBytes is the maximum agent reply size that is accepted. This
// is a sanity check, not a limit in the spec.
const maxAgentResponseBytes = 16 << 20
// Agent messages:
// These structures mirror the wire format of the corresponding ssh agent
// messages found in [PROTOCOL.agent].
// 3.4 Generic replies from agent to client
const agentFailure = 5
type failureAgentMsg struct{}
const agentSuccess = 6
type successAgentMsg struct{}
// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.5.2.
const agentRequestIdentities = 11
type requestIdentitiesAgentMsg struct{}
// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.5.2.
const agentIdentitiesAnswer = 12
type identitiesAnswerAgentMsg struct {
NumKeys uint32 `sshtype:"12"`
Keys []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.6.2.
const agentSignRequest = 13
type signRequestAgentMsg struct {
KeyBlob []byte `sshtype:"13"`
Data []byte
Flags uint32
}
// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.6.2.
// 3.6 Replies from agent to client for protocol 2 key operations
const agentSignResponse = 14
type signResponseAgentMsg struct {
SigBlob []byte `sshtype:"14"`
}
type publicKey struct {
Format string
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// 3.7 Key constraint identifiers
type constrainLifetimeAgentMsg struct {
LifetimeSecs uint32 `sshtype:"1"`
}
type constrainExtensionAgentMsg struct {
ExtensionName string `sshtype:"255|3"`
ExtensionDetails []byte
// Rest is a field used for parsing, not part of message
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 4.7
const agentExtension = 27
const agentExtensionFailure = 28
// ErrExtensionUnsupported indicates that an extension defined in
// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 is unsupported by the agent. Specifically this
// error indicates that the agent returned a standard SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message
// as the result of a SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION request. Note that the protocol
// specification (and therefore this error) does not distinguish between a
// specific extension being unsupported and extensions being unsupported entirely.
var ErrExtensionUnsupported = errors.New("agent: extension unsupported")
type extensionAgentMsg struct {
ExtensionType string `sshtype:"27"`
// NOTE: this matches OpenSSH's PROTOCOL.agent, not the IETF draft [PROTOCOL.agent],
// so that it matches what OpenSSH actually implements in the wild.
Contents []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// Key represents a protocol 2 public key as defined in
// [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.5.2.
type Key struct {
Format string
Blob []byte
Comment string
}
func clientErr(err error) error {
return fmt.Errorf("agent: client error: %v", err)
}
// String returns the storage form of an agent key with the format, base64
// encoded serialized key, and the comment if it is not empty.
func (k *Key) String() string {
s := string(k.Format) + " " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(k.Blob)
if k.Comment != "" {
s += " " + k.Comment
}
return s
}
// Type returns the public key type.
func (k *Key) Type() string {
return k.Format
}
// Marshal returns key blob to satisfy the ssh.PublicKey interface.
func (k *Key) Marshal() []byte {
return k.Blob
}
// Verify satisfies the ssh.PublicKey interface.
func (k *Key) Verify(data []byte, sig *ssh.Signature) error {
pubKey, err := ssh.ParsePublicKey(k.Blob)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("agent: bad public key: %v", err)
}
return pubKey.Verify(data, sig)
}
type wireKey struct {
Format string
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
func parseKey(in []byte) (out *Key, rest []byte, err error) {
var record struct {
Blob []byte
Comment string
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
if err := ssh.Unmarshal(in, &record); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
var wk wireKey
if err := ssh.Unmarshal(record.Blob, &wk); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return &Key{
Format: wk.Format,
Blob: record.Blob,
Comment: record.Comment,
}, record.Rest, nil
}
// pipelineMaxInFlight is the maximum number of outstanding requests the
// client will pipeline to the agent before applying backpressure.
const pipelineMaxInFlight = 32
// client is a client for an ssh-agent process.
//
// Exactly one of pipeline / (mu, conn) is set, chosen by NewClient
// based on whether the underlying transport implements io.Closer.
type client struct {
// pipeline, if non-nil, dispatches requests over a pipelined
// connection: requests are written as soon as the wire is
// available and responses are routed back to per-call reply
// channels in FIFO order by a background reader goroutine.
pipeline *pipeline
// mu and conn are used in fully-serialized mode, when the
// transport does not implement io.Closer. Each call takes mu,
// writes its request, reads the matching response, and releases
// mu before returning. There is no background goroutine.
mu sync.Mutex
conn io.ReadWriter
}
// NewClient returns an Agent that talks to an ssh-agent process over
// the given connection.
//
// If rw also implements io.Closer (like *net.UnixConn and ssh.Channel
// do), the returned client pipelines concurrent requests over the
// connection: callers can issue Sign and other operations from
// multiple goroutines and they will be written to the agent as soon
// as the wire is available, rather than waiting for the previous
// responses. The ssh-agent protocol still requires responses to be
// returned in request order, so a slow request delays subsequent
// responses on the same connection (head-of-line blocking).
//
// Pipelining requires io.Closer because, on a Write error, the
// background reader goroutine must be unblocked by closing the
// underlying connection. When rw does not implement io.Closer
// this is not possible, so NewClient falls back to fully
// serializing each request: a single in-flight call at a time.
func NewClient(rw io.ReadWriter) ExtendedAgent {
if rwc, ok := rw.(io.ReadWriteCloser); ok {
return &client{pipeline: newPipeline(rwc)}
}
return &client{conn: rw}
}
// call sends an RPC to the agent. On success, the reply is
// unmarshaled into reply and replyType is set to the first byte of
// the reply, which contains the type of the message.
func (c *client) call(req []byte) (reply interface{}, err error) {
buf, err := c.callRaw(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
reply, err = unmarshal(buf)
if err != nil {
return nil, clientErr(err)
}
return reply, nil
}
// callRaw sends an RPC to the agent. On success, the raw
// bytes of the response are returned; no unmarshalling is
// performed on the response.
func (c *client) callRaw(req []byte) (reply []byte, err error) {
if c.pipeline != nil {
return c.pipeline.call(req)
}
return c.serialCall(req)
}
// serialCall implements the fully-serialized request/response path
// used when the transport is not an io.Closer. It writes req under mu
// and reads the matching response before returning.
func (c *client) serialCall(req []byte) (reply []byte, err error) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
msg := make([]byte, 4+len(req))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg, uint32(len(req)))
copy(msg[4:], req)
if _, err = c.conn.Write(msg); err != nil {
return nil, clientErr(err)
}
var respSizeBuf [4]byte
if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.conn, respSizeBuf[:]); err != nil {
return nil, clientErr(err)
}
respSize := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(respSizeBuf[:])
if respSize > maxAgentResponseBytes {
return nil, clientErr(errors.New("response too large"))
}
buf := make([]byte, respSize)
if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.conn, buf); err != nil {
return nil, clientErr(err)
}
return buf, nil
}
func (c *client) simpleCall(req []byte) error {
resp, err := c.call(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, ok := resp.(*successAgentMsg); ok {
return nil
}
return errors.New("agent: failure")
}
func (c *client) RemoveAll() error {
return c.simpleCall([]byte{agentRemoveAllIdentities})
}
func (c *client) Remove(key ssh.PublicKey) error {
req := ssh.Marshal(&agentRemoveIdentityMsg{
KeyBlob: key.Marshal(),
})
return c.simpleCall(req)
}
func (c *client) Lock(passphrase []byte) error {
req := ssh.Marshal(&agentLockMsg{
Passphrase: passphrase,
})
return c.simpleCall(req)
}
func (c *client) Unlock(passphrase []byte) error {
req := ssh.Marshal(&agentUnlockMsg{
Passphrase: passphrase,
})
return c.simpleCall(req)
}
// List returns the identities known to the agent.
func (c *client) List() ([]*Key, error) {
// see [PROTOCOL.agent] section 2.5.2.
req := []byte{agentRequestIdentities}
msg, err := c.call(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
switch msg := msg.(type) {
case *identitiesAnswerAgentMsg:
if msg.NumKeys > maxAgentResponseBytes/8 {
return nil, errors.New("agent: too many keys in agent reply")
}
keys := make([]*Key, msg.NumKeys)
data := msg.Keys
for i := uint32(0); i < msg.NumKeys; i++ {
var key *Key
var err error
if key, data, err = parseKey(data); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
keys[i] = key
}
return keys, nil
case *failureAgentMsg:
return nil, errors.New("agent: failed to list keys")
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: failed to list keys, unexpected message type %T", msg)
}
}
// Sign has the agent sign the data using a protocol 2 key as defined
// in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 2.6.2.
func (c *client) Sign(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
return c.SignWithFlags(key, data, 0)
}
func (c *client) SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureFlags) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
req := ssh.Marshal(signRequestAgentMsg{
KeyBlob: key.Marshal(),
Data: data,
Flags: uint32(flags),
})
msg, err := c.call(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
switch msg := msg.(type) {
case *signResponseAgentMsg:
var sig ssh.Signature
if err := ssh.Unmarshal(msg.SigBlob, &sig); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &sig, nil
case *failureAgentMsg:
return nil, errors.New("agent: failed to sign challenge")
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: failed to sign challenge, unexpected message type %T", msg)
}
}
// unmarshal parses an agent message in packet, returning the parsed
// form and the message type of packet.
func unmarshal(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) {
if len(packet) < 1 {
return nil, errors.New("agent: empty packet")
}
var msg interface{}
switch packet[0] {
case agentFailure:
return new(failureAgentMsg), nil
case agentSuccess:
return new(successAgentMsg), nil
case agentIdentitiesAnswer:
msg = new(identitiesAnswerAgentMsg)
case agentSignResponse:
msg = new(signResponseAgentMsg)
case agentV1IdentitiesAnswer:
msg = new(agentV1IdentityMsg)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: unknown type tag %d", packet[0])
}
if err := ssh.Unmarshal(packet, msg); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return msg, nil
}
type rsaKeyMsg struct {
Type string `sshtype:"17|25"`
N *big.Int
E *big.Int
D *big.Int
Iqmp *big.Int // IQMP = Inverse Q Mod P
P *big.Int
Q *big.Int
Comments string
Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
type dsaKeyMsg struct {
Type string `sshtype:"17|25"`
P *big.Int
Q *big.Int
G *big.Int
Y *big.Int
X *big.Int
Comments string
Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
type ecdsaKeyMsg struct {
Type string `sshtype:"17|25"`
Curve string
KeyBytes []byte
D *big.Int
Comments string
Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
type ed25519KeyMsg struct {
Type string `sshtype:"17|25"`
Pub []byte
Priv []byte
Comments string
Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// Insert adds a private key to the agent.
func (c *client) insertKey(s interface{}, comment string, constraints []byte) error {
var req []byte
switch k := s.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
if len(k.Primes) != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported RSA key with %d primes", len(k.Primes))
}
k.Precompute()
req = ssh.Marshal(rsaKeyMsg{
Type: ssh.KeyAlgoRSA,
N: k.N,
E: big.NewInt(int64(k.E)),
D: k.D,
Iqmp: k.Precomputed.Qinv,
P: k.Primes[0],
Q: k.Primes[1],
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
case *dsa.PrivateKey:
req = ssh.Marshal(dsaKeyMsg{
Type: ssh.InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
P: k.P,
Q: k.Q,
G: k.G,
Y: k.Y,
X: k.X,
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
nistID := fmt.Sprintf("nistp%d", k.Params().BitSize)
req = ssh.Marshal(ecdsaKeyMsg{
Type: "ecdsa-sha2-" + nistID,
Curve: nistID,
KeyBytes: elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y),
D: k.D,
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
case ed25519.PrivateKey:
req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519KeyMsg{
Type: ssh.KeyAlgoED25519,
Pub: []byte(k)[32:],
Priv: []byte(k),
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
// This function originally supported only *ed25519.PrivateKey, however the
// general idiom is to pass ed25519.PrivateKey by value, not by pointer.
// We still support the pointer variant for backwards compatibility.
case *ed25519.PrivateKey:
req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519KeyMsg{
Type: ssh.KeyAlgoED25519,
Pub: []byte(*k)[32:],
Priv: []byte(*k),
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
default:
return fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported key type %T", s)
}
// if constraints are present then the message type needs to be changed.
if len(constraints) != 0 {
req[0] = agentAddIDConstrained
}
resp, err := c.call(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, ok := resp.(*successAgentMsg); ok {
return nil
}
return errors.New("agent: failure")
}
type rsaCertMsg struct {
Type string `sshtype:"17|25"`
CertBytes []byte
D *big.Int
Iqmp *big.Int // IQMP = Inverse Q Mod P
P *big.Int
Q *big.Int
Comments string
Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
type dsaCertMsg struct {
Type string `sshtype:"17|25"`
CertBytes []byte
X *big.Int
Comments string
Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
type ecdsaCertMsg struct {
Type string `sshtype:"17|25"`
CertBytes []byte
D *big.Int
Comments string
Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
type ed25519CertMsg struct {
Type string `sshtype:"17|25"`
CertBytes []byte
Pub []byte
Priv []byte
Comments string
Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// Add adds a private key to the agent. If a certificate is given,
// that certificate is added instead as public key.
func (c *client) Add(key AddedKey) error {
var constraints []byte
if secs := key.LifetimeSecs; secs != 0 {
constraints = append(constraints, ssh.Marshal(constrainLifetimeAgentMsg{secs})...)
}
if key.ConfirmBeforeUse {
constraints = append(constraints, agentConstrainConfirm)
}
for _, ext := range key.ConstraintExtensions {
constraints = append(constraints, ssh.Marshal(constrainExtensionAgentMsg{
ExtensionName: ext.ExtensionName,
ExtensionDetails: ext.ExtensionDetails,
})...)
}
cert := key.Certificate
if cert == nil {
return c.insertKey(key.PrivateKey, key.Comment, constraints)
}
return c.insertCert(key.PrivateKey, cert, key.Comment, constraints)
}
func (c *client) insertCert(s interface{}, cert *ssh.Certificate, comment string, constraints []byte) error {
var req []byte
switch k := s.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
if len(k.Primes) != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported RSA key with %d primes", len(k.Primes))
}
k.Precompute()
req = ssh.Marshal(rsaCertMsg{
Type: cert.Type(),
CertBytes: cert.Marshal(),
D: k.D,
Iqmp: k.Precomputed.Qinv,
P: k.Primes[0],
Q: k.Primes[1],
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
case *dsa.PrivateKey:
req = ssh.Marshal(dsaCertMsg{
Type: cert.Type(),
CertBytes: cert.Marshal(),
X: k.X,
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
req = ssh.Marshal(ecdsaCertMsg{
Type: cert.Type(),
CertBytes: cert.Marshal(),
D: k.D,
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
case ed25519.PrivateKey:
req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519CertMsg{
Type: cert.Type(),
CertBytes: cert.Marshal(),
Pub: []byte(k)[32:],
Priv: []byte(k),
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
// This function originally supported only *ed25519.PrivateKey, however the
// general idiom is to pass ed25519.PrivateKey by value, not by pointer.
// We still support the pointer variant for backwards compatibility.
case *ed25519.PrivateKey:
req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519CertMsg{
Type: cert.Type(),
CertBytes: cert.Marshal(),
Pub: []byte(*k)[32:],
Priv: []byte(*k),
Comments: comment,
Constraints: constraints,
})
default:
return fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported key type %T", s)
}
// if constraints are present then the message type needs to be changed.
if len(constraints) != 0 {
req[0] = agentAddIDConstrained
}
signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(s)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !bytes.Equal(cert.Key.Marshal(), signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) {
return errors.New("agent: signer and cert have different public key")
}
resp, err := c.call(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, ok := resp.(*successAgentMsg); ok {
return nil
}
return errors.New("agent: failure")
}
// Signers provides a callback for client authentication.
func (c *client) Signers() ([]ssh.Signer, error) {
keys, err := c.List()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var result []ssh.Signer
for _, k := range keys {
result = append(result, &agentKeyringSigner{c, k})
}
return result, nil
}
type agentKeyringSigner struct {
agent *client
pub ssh.PublicKey
}
func (s *agentKeyringSigner) PublicKey() ssh.PublicKey {
return s.pub
}
func (s *agentKeyringSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
// The agent has its own entropy source, so the rand argument is ignored.
return s.agent.Sign(s.pub, data)
}
func (s *agentKeyringSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
if algorithm == "" || algorithm == underlyingAlgo(s.pub.Type()) {
return s.Sign(rand, data)
}
var flags SignatureFlags
switch algorithm {
case ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256:
flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha256
case ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512:
flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha512
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported algorithm %q", algorithm)
}
return s.agent.SignWithFlags(s.pub, data, flags)
}
var _ ssh.AlgorithmSigner = &agentKeyringSigner{}
// certKeyAlgoNames is a mapping from known certificate algorithm names to the
// corresponding public key signature algorithm.
//
// This map must be kept in sync with the one in certs.go.
var certKeyAlgoNames = map[string]string{
ssh.CertAlgoRSAv01: ssh.KeyAlgoRSA,
ssh.CertAlgoRSASHA256v01: ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
ssh.CertAlgoRSASHA512v01: ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
ssh.InsecureCertAlgoDSAv01: ssh.InsecureKeyAlgoDSA,
ssh.CertAlgoECDSA256v01: ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA256,
ssh.CertAlgoECDSA384v01: ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA384,
ssh.CertAlgoECDSA521v01: ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA521,
ssh.CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01: ssh.KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
ssh.CertAlgoED25519v01: ssh.KeyAlgoED25519,
ssh.CertAlgoSKED25519v01: ssh.KeyAlgoSKED25519,
}
// underlyingAlgo returns the signature algorithm associated with algo (which is
// an advertised or negotiated public key or host key algorithm). These are
// usually the same, except for certificate algorithms.
func underlyingAlgo(algo string) string {
if a, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[algo]; ok {
return a
}
return algo
}
// Calls an extension method. It is up to the agent implementation as to whether or not
// any particular extension is supported and may always return an error. Because the
// type of the response is up to the implementation, this returns the bytes of the
// response and does not attempt any type of unmarshalling.
func (c *client) Extension(extensionType string, contents []byte) ([]byte, error) {
req := ssh.Marshal(extensionAgentMsg{
ExtensionType: extensionType,
Contents: contents,
})
buf, err := c.callRaw(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(buf) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("agent: failure; empty response")
}
// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 indicates that an SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message
// represents an agent that does not support the extension
if buf[0] == agentFailure {
return nil, ErrExtensionUnsupported
}
if buf[0] == agentExtensionFailure {
return nil, errors.New("agent: generic extension failure")
}
return buf, nil
}
// pipelineResult carries either a raw agent reply or an error back to a
// caller waiting on the response channel.
type pipelineResult struct {
reply []byte
err error
}
// pipeline implements request pipelining over a single agent connection.
//
// Writers serialize on writeMu to both register a reply channel in the
// pending FIFO queue and write the request bytes on the wire; the two
// must be atomic so the queue order matches the wire order. A single
// reader goroutine decodes responses from the connection and dispatches
// each one to the channel at the head of the queue.
//
// pending is a chan-of-chan acting as a FIFO queue with a fixed
// capacity of pipelineMaxInFlight. The outer channel provides ordering
// (reads happen in send order) and natural backpressure (a full queue
// blocks new writers). Each inner channel is buffered with capacity
// one and is sent to exactly once: either by the reader goroutine
// with the agent reply, or by shutdown with the terminal error during
// drain. The cap-one buffer makes the producer's send non-blocking,
// so the reader and shutdown never have to wait for the caller to be
// scheduled on the receive.
//
// When the reader goroutine exits (on read error or protocol
// violation), it closes exitCh to wake any writer blocked on the
// pending queue, then serializes with any in-flight writer to close
// the pending channel, and finally drains the remaining entries
// delivering the terminal error to each waiting caller. The
// pipeline relies on conn implementing io.Closer so a writer that
// hits a Write error can close the connection to unblock the reader
// goroutine; NewClient is responsible for only constructing a
// pipeline when this guarantee holds.
type pipeline struct {
conn io.ReadWriteCloser
writeMu sync.Mutex
// pending is the FIFO queue of reply channels with capacity
// pipelineMaxInFlight. See type-level documentation.
pending chan chan pipelineResult
exitCh chan struct{}
// err carries the terminal error to callers blocked on a closed
// pipeline. It is stored exactly once by the reader goroutine
// before exitCh is closed; every read happens after observing
// exitCh closed, so the load synchronises through the close and
// is guaranteed to return the stored value (never nil).
err atomic.Pointer[error]
}
func newPipeline(conn io.ReadWriteCloser) *pipeline {
p := &pipeline{
conn: conn,
pending: make(chan chan pipelineResult, pipelineMaxInFlight),
exitCh: make(chan struct{}),
}
go p.readLoop()
return p
}
// readLoop decodes responses from conn and dispatches them in FIFO order
// to reply channels in pending. On any failure it invokes shutdown.
func (p *pipeline) readLoop() {
var finalErr error
for {
var sizeBuf [4]byte
if _, err := io.ReadFull(p.conn, sizeBuf[:]); err != nil {
finalErr = err
break
}
respSize := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(sizeBuf[:])
if respSize > maxAgentResponseBytes {
finalErr = errors.New("response too large")
break
}
buf := make([]byte, respSize)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(p.conn, buf); err != nil {
finalErr = err
break
}
// Successful writes always enqueue before sending bytes, so
// pending has a waiting channel for this response.
ch := <-p.pending
// The reply channel is buffered with capacity 1 and is only
// ever written to once, so this send cannot block.
ch <- pipelineResult{reply: buf}
}
p.shutdown(clientErr(finalErr))
}
// shutdown is called exactly once, from readLoop, when the reader is
// terminating. It unblocks pending writers and fails all in-flight
// requests with finalErr.
func (p *pipeline) shutdown(finalErr error) {
// Publish the terminal error before closing exitCh so any
// writer that subsequently observes exitCh closed sees err.
p.err.Store(&finalErr)
// Wake any writer blocked waiting for a slot in the pending queue.
close(p.exitCh)
// Wait for any writer currently inside its critical section to
// complete. After this lock, no new writer can reach the send on
// pending: they will observe exitCh closed in the select and bail
// out before attempting the send.
p.writeMu.Lock()
close(p.pending)
p.writeMu.Unlock()
// Drain entries that were enqueued but never answered, delivering
// the terminal error to their waiting callers. The reply channels
// are buffered (cap 1) and written to exactly once, so these sends
// cannot block.
for ch := range p.pending {
ch <- pipelineResult{err: finalErr}
}
}
// call sends req to the agent and returns the matching raw response.
func (p *pipeline) call(req []byte) ([]byte, error) {
replyCh := make(chan pipelineResult, 1)
p.writeMu.Lock()
// Priority check: if the reader has already finished shutdown,
// pending is closed and sending to it would panic. Bail out now.
// Once we pass this check while holding writeMu, shutdown cannot
// complete close(pending) until we release writeMu, so the send
// below is safe against concurrent closure.
select {
case <-p.exitCh:
p.writeMu.Unlock()
return nil, *p.err.Load()
default:
}
// Enqueue the reply channel before writing the request, so FIFO
// order on the wire matches FIFO order in the pending queue. The
// exitCh arm handles the case where the reader errors while we
// block on a full queue.
select {
case p.pending <- replyCh:
case <-p.exitCh:
p.writeMu.Unlock()
return nil, *p.err.Load()
}
msg := make([]byte, 4+len(req))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg, uint32(len(req)))
copy(msg[4:], req)
_, werr := p.conn.Write(msg)
p.writeMu.Unlock()
if werr != nil {
// The connection is in an undefined state. Close it so the
// reader unblocks promptly and triggers shutdown for every
// other in-flight caller. NewClient guarantees conn is a
// real io.Closer when the pipeline is in use.
p.conn.Close()
return nil, clientErr(werr)
}
res := <-replyCh
return res.reply, res.err
}