When adding a new key, if we already have a Signer with the same public
key, we now replace it with the new one instead of duplicating it.
Before this change we had this:
$ ssh-add -l
3072 SHA256:bsBRHC/xgiqBJdSuvSTNpJNLTISP/G356jNMCRYC5Es nicola@p1 (RSA)
3072 SHA256:bsBRHC/xgiqBJdSuvSTNpJNLTISP/G356jNMCRYC5Es nicola@p1 (RSA-CERT)
$ ssh-add /home/nicola/ssh_certs/id_rsa
Identity added: /home/nicola/ssh_certs/id_rsa (nicola@p1)
Certificate added: /home/nicola/ssh_certs/id_rsa-cert.pub (myid)
$ ssh-add -l
3072 SHA256:bsBRHC/xgiqBJdSuvSTNpJNLTISP/G356jNMCRYC5Es nicola@p1 (RSA)
3072 SHA256:bsBRHC/xgiqBJdSuvSTNpJNLTISP/G356jNMCRYC5Es nicola@p1 (RSA-CERT)
3072 SHA256:bsBRHC/xgiqBJdSuvSTNpJNLTISP/G356jNMCRYC5Es nicola@p1 (RSA)
3072 SHA256:bsBRHC/xgiqBJdSuvSTNpJNLTISP/G356jNMCRYC5Es nicola@p1 (RSA-CERT)
Change-Id: Iad1b1a6dc94f68f53f05d7d1172f0017839976fc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/602955
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
on RHEL 9 OpenSSH does not support DSA keys and RSA keys with size less
than 2048 bits, furthermore signing with ssh-rsa (SHA-1 signatures) and
ssh-dss is not allowed, therefore:
1) replaced the 1024-bit RSA key used in the test with a new 2048-bit
one
2) removed DSA key from itegration tests
3) allowed signature errors using ssh-rsa in agent integration tests, we
also check SHA-2 variants that are not skipped
Fixesgolang/go#65581
Change-Id: I54bf997b61ef4d91d38eb624275737ba7291bb20
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/562755
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
This is a follow-up to CL 317169, which dropped go1.12 compatibility,
and made the golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519 package an alias / wrapper for
crypto/ed25519 in stdlib.
This patch updates uses within this repository to use stdlib instead of
depending on the wrapper. With this patch applied, the only remaining
use of the wrapper is in ed25519_test, which appears to be in place to
verify compatibility of the wrapper itself.
Change-Id: I0195396102a75ae20bdd82ca8ab59855c0eb5cea
GitHub-Last-Rev: 24dbec563cbd84bc47bdc7736b0245fc83dd3353
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#238
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/448238
Reviewed-by: Bryan Mills <bcmills@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Joedian Reid <joedian@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
CL 220037 had implemented support for host authentication using
rsa-sha2-256/512, but not client public key authentication. OpenSSH
disabled the SHA-1 based ssh-rsa by default in version 8.8 (after
pre-announcing it in versions 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7) although
some distributions re-enable it. GitHub will start rejecting ssh-rsa for
keys uploaded before November 2, 2021 on March 15, 2022.
https://github.blog/2021-09-01-improving-git-protocol-security-github/
The server side already worked, as long as the client selected one of
the SHA-2 algorithms, because the signature flowed freely to Verify.
There was however nothing verifying that the signature algorithm matched
the advertised one. The comment suggested the check was being performed,
but it got lost back in CL 86190043. Not a security issue because the
signature had to pass the callback's Verify method regardless, and both
values were checked to be acceptable.
Tested with OpenSSH 8.8 configured with "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes -ssh-rsa"
and no application-side changes.
The Signers returned by ssh/agent (when backed by an agent client)
didn't actually implement AlgorithmSigner but ParameterizedSigner, an
interface defined in an earlier version of CL 123955.
Updates golang/go#49269Fixesgolang/go#39885
For golang/go#49952
Change-Id: I13b41db8041f1112a70f106c55f077b904b12cb8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392394
Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
RFC 8332, Section 2 sets up two overlapping namespaces: public key
formats and public key algorithms.
* The formats are what we currently have KeyAlgo constants for, and they
appear in PublicKey.Type.
* The algorithms are the set of both KeyAlgo and SigAlgo constants, and
they appear in Signature.Format (amongst other places).
This is incoherent, because that means Signature.Format can be both a
KeyAlgo (like KeyAlgoECDSA256) or a SigAlgo (like SigAlgoRSASHA2256).
One solution would be to duplicate all the KeyAlgo constants into the
SigAlgo namespace, but that would be confusing because applications are
currently using KeyAlgos where they'd be supposed to use the new
SigAlgos (while we can't deprecate the KeyAlgos because they are still
necessary for the PublicKey.Type namespace).
Instead, drop the separate namespaces, and use KeyAlgos throughout.
There are simply some KeyAlgos that can't be a PublicKey.Type.
Take the opportunity to fix the stuttering SHA22565/SHA2512 names. It's
totally ok to call those hashes SHA-256 and SHA-512 without the family
infix.
For golang/go#49952
Change-Id: Ia1fce3912a7e60aa70a88f75ed311be331fd19d5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392354
Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
First, modify the test to report a better error by waiting for the
Marshal+Write goroutine to finish before returning from the test. If we
return too early, a failure inside that goroutine can generate a panic.
Second, we workaround plan9 not returning the actual number of bytes
written on the connection in case of a hangup (due to closed
connection). I've verified that syscall.Pwrite returns -1 on hangup in
this particular case even when some data did get written.
Fixesgolang/go#35888
Change-Id: I7998cff926295f0d577b125c137021a9adc1be5a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/209298
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Certain environment variables can influence the behavior of ssh-agent,
causing the test to fail. Avoid that influence by using a consistent
environment.
This fixes a locally-observed test failure for me.
Change-Id: I0f5e8d643199519f88e80825335ee8e6eb08e3af
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/207901
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
audited using ineffassign tool from
github.com/gordonklaus/ineffassign
go generate does not generate any changes
Change-Id: Iabbec9ec1aae39081289d503d79fd7b4caadf17b
GitHub-Last-Rev: acd17cce410e9c68ce3c87b5546261be9153e3ea
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#70
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/155942
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Make sure a meaningful error is returned when the SSH agent client receives
a response that is too big.
Change-Id: Ied68b2c559a61dede2f3112c4c8143babd385f48
GitHub-Last-Rev: ad65e1b423bb00f2501dfde84040469aef4ee2df
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#61
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/143058
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
This commit implements two new features. To preserve backwards
compatibility the new methods are added to an `ExtendedAgent` interface
which extends `Agent`. The client code implements `ExtendedAgent`
(which extends Agent) so you can call these additional methods against
SSH agents such as the OpenSSH agent. The ServeAgent method still
accepts Agent but will attempt to upcast the agent to `ExtendedAgent`
as needed, so if you supply an ExtendedAgent implementation you can
implement these additional methods (which keyring does).
The first feature is supporting the standard flags that can be passed to
SSH Sign requests, requesting that RSA signatures use SHA-256 or
SHA-512. See section 4.5.1 of the SSH agent protocol draft:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-02
The second feature is supporting calling custom extensions from clients
and implementing custom extensions from servers. See section 4.7 of the
SSH agent protocol draft:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-02
Change-Id: I0f74feb893762c27e921ec37604d3a46434ee6ef
GitHub-Last-Rev: 2e23fd01c0e95b664e8507682f0bd5bd61d4c146
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/crypto#53
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/123955
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Unlock compares the length of the passphrase with the given one before
calling subtle.ConstantTimeCompare. This is redundant, since
ConstantTimeCompare already perform a lengths check before doing
anything. Remove the check from Unlock.
Updates golang/go#25173
Change-Id: Ib5fec3a94392bddf2996f5c6bf5a414529e86f2f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/110068
Run-TryBot: Alberto Donizetti <alb.donizetti@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
None are "wrong" per se, but there are a lot of good suggestions and
in one case a docstring that was not present in godoc due to the
presence of an extra newline.
Changed "Id" in struct properties to "ID" in some non-exported
structs. Removed a trailing period from some error messages; I believe
the exact contents of error strings are not covered by the Go
compatibility promise.
Change-Id: I7c620582dc247396f72c52d38c909ccc0ec87b83
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/80145
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Dialing the 0.0.0.0 address (as returned by net.Addr().String() for a
net.Listen("tcp", ":1") address) is not yet guaranteed to work. It's
currently OS-dependent.
For some reason it works on Go 1.8+, but it hasn't yet been defined to
work reliably.
Fix the tests for now (since we need to support older Go releases),
even if this might work in the future.
Updates golang/go#18806
Change-Id: I2f0476b1d4f2673ab64ffedfa733f2d92fceb6ff
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/42496
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
This change breaks existing behavior.
Before, a missing ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback would cause host key
checking to be disabled. In this configuration, establishing a
connection to any host just works, so today, most SSH client code in
the wild does not perform any host key checks.
This makes it easy to perform a MITM attack:
* SSH installations that use keyboard-interactive or password
authentication can be attacked with MITM, thereby stealing
passwords.
* Clients that use public-key authentication with agent forwarding are
also vulnerable: the MITM server could allow the login to succeed, and
then immediately ask the agent to authenticate the login to the real
server.
* Clients that use public-key authentication without agent forwarding
are harder to attack unnoticedly: an attacker cannot authenticate the
login to the real server, so it cannot in general present a convincing
server to the victim.
Now, a missing HostKeyCallback will cause the handshake to fail. This
change also provides InsecureIgnoreHostKey() and FixedHostKey(key) as
ready made host checkers.
A simplistic parser for OpenSSH's known_hosts file is given as an
example. This change does not provide a full-fledged parser, as it
has complexity (wildcards, revocation, hashed addresses) that will
need further consideration.
When introduced, the host checking feature maintained backward
compatibility at the expense of security. We have decided this is not
the right tradeoff for the SSH library.
Fixesgolang/go#19767
Change-Id: I45fc7ba9bd1ea29c31ec23f115cdbab99913e814
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/38701
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
If a key is added to an agent keyring with constraints, honor them.
This will remove keys when they've been on the keyring for
LifetimeSecs seconds or longer and will ask the user to confirm a
signing operation if ConfirmBeforeUse is set.
Change-Id: I633713c5f78b13a628a5d752f11b306b6e16a2ef
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/28956
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Added support for parsing the "new" openssh private key format.
(ed25519 keys only in this format for now)
Signing and verifying functions now work with ed25519 keys.
ed25519 can now be accepted by the server to authenticate a client.
ed25519 can now be accepted by a client as a server host key.
Related documentation used:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bjh21-ssh-ed25519-02.txt
Change-Id: I84385f24d666fea08de21f980f78623f7bff8007
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/22512
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
This allows the golang ssh-agent to support the full suite of keys
the library accepts.
Currently constraints are ignored.
Change-Id: I7d48c78e9a355582eb54788571a483a736c3d3ef
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/21536
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Some ssh-agent clients expect the server to support remove all messages
for protocols 1 & 2 and error if protocol 1 support is missing.
This adds a null-op implementation of the remove all message in similar
fashion to the existing list all message support.
Fixesgolang/go#15159
Change-Id: I9389885d89c9147f3e10850893bba6ed7d0a4e82
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/21468
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
The Remove method for the keyring sliced the internal keys list
incorrectly when removing a key. This caused the wrong key to be removed
or sometimes multiple keys were removed. Additionally, if the key to be
removed was the last key, the method never returned.
Fixesgolang/go#13628
Change-Id: I0facbcb8f8b65709222067ce37ea26e3fb5ba8e8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/17870
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The ssh-agent protocol allows the usage of keys and certs added to a
given agent to be constrained in certain ways. The only constraints
currently supported are lifetime (keys expire after some number of
seconds) and confirmation (the agent requires user confirmation before
performing any operations with the private key).
Change-Id: Idba5760db929805bf3da43fdcaca53ae6c479ca4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/12260
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@uber.com>
Nicola Murino
Filippo Valsorda
Sebastiaan van Stijn
cui fliter
Axel Wagner
edef
Russ Cox
HowJmay
Roland Shoemaker
Alex Gaynor
Fazlul Shahriar
Bryan C. Mills
Ian Haken
Michael Cook
Alberto Donizetti
Agniva De Sarker
Kevin Burke
namusyaka
Gh0u1L5
Brad Fitzpatrick
Han-Wen Nienhuys
Heschi Kreinick
Peter Moody
Martin Hamrle
Peter Moody
Dmitry Savintsev
Niall Sheridan
Martin Garton
Mark Severson