RFC 8332, Section 2 sets up two overlapping namespaces: public key
formats and public key algorithms.
* The formats are what we currently have KeyAlgo constants for, and they
appear in PublicKey.Type.
* The algorithms are the set of both KeyAlgo and SigAlgo constants, and
they appear in Signature.Format (amongst other places).
This is incoherent, because that means Signature.Format can be both a
KeyAlgo (like KeyAlgoECDSA256) or a SigAlgo (like SigAlgoRSASHA2256).
One solution would be to duplicate all the KeyAlgo constants into the
SigAlgo namespace, but that would be confusing because applications are
currently using KeyAlgos where they'd be supposed to use the new
SigAlgos (while we can't deprecate the KeyAlgos because they are still
necessary for the PublicKey.Type namespace).
Instead, drop the separate namespaces, and use KeyAlgos throughout.
There are simply some KeyAlgos that can't be a PublicKey.Type.
Take the opportunity to fix the stuttering SHA22565/SHA2512 names. It's
totally ok to call those hashes SHA-256 and SHA-512 without the family
infix.
For golang/go#49952
Change-Id: Ia1fce3912a7e60aa70a88f75ed311be331fd19d5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/392354
Trust: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
This change adds support for RSA SHA-2 based signatures for host keys and certificates. It also switches the default certificate signature algorithm for RSA to use SHA-512. This is implemented by treating ssh.Signer specially when the key type is `ssh-rsa` by also allowing SHA-256 and SHA-512 signatures.
Fixesgolang/go#37278
Change-Id: I2ee1ac4ae4c9c1de441a2d6cf1e806357ef18910
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/220037
Trust: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Run-TryBot: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Fixesgolang/go#23194
During SSH Protocol Version Exchange, a client may send metadata lines
prior to sending the SSH version string. To conform to the RFC, all SSH
implementations must support this (minimally, clients can ignore the
metadata lines).
For example, this is valid:
some-metadata
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH
The current Go implementation takes the first line it sees as
the version string (in this case, some-metadata). Then, it uses
the next line (SSH-2.0-OpenSSH) as part of key exchange, which
is guaranteed to fail.
Unfortunately, this SSH feature is used by some vendors and is part
of the official RFC: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-4.2
Change-Id: I7be61700a07756353875bf43aad09a580ba533ff
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/86675
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Only show the SSH banner once, even if the client attempts
authentication with the "none" type and resets the authentication
attempts.
Change-Id: I1a7aacb50abf00233ed4d06c60808aaf51a9d7be
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/78544
Run-TryBot: Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
According to RFC 4252 section 5.4, the banner is sent between the
ssh-connection request and responding to user authentication.
Original support for server sending banner by joshua stein <jcs@jcs.org>
Fixesgolang/go#19567
Change-Id: I729b3c8e5fd2c0068609d1590b61e92f40d87ea4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/71790
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
According to RFC 4252 section 5.4, the banner is sent between the
ssh-connection request and responding to user authentication.
Original support for server sending banner by joshua stein <jcs@jcs.org>
Fixesgolang/go#19567
Change-Id: I68944a7f4711c0623759f6a59023e8e45a8781aa
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/65271
Reviewed-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
This change breaks existing behavior.
Before, a missing ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback would cause host key
checking to be disabled. In this configuration, establishing a
connection to any host just works, so today, most SSH client code in
the wild does not perform any host key checks.
This makes it easy to perform a MITM attack:
* SSH installations that use keyboard-interactive or password
authentication can be attacked with MITM, thereby stealing
passwords.
* Clients that use public-key authentication with agent forwarding are
also vulnerable: the MITM server could allow the login to succeed, and
then immediately ask the agent to authenticate the login to the real
server.
* Clients that use public-key authentication without agent forwarding
are harder to attack unnoticedly: an attacker cannot authenticate the
login to the real server, so it cannot in general present a convincing
server to the victim.
Now, a missing HostKeyCallback will cause the handshake to fail. This
change also provides InsecureIgnoreHostKey() and FixedHostKey(key) as
ready made host checkers.
A simplistic parser for OpenSSH's known_hosts file is given as an
example. This change does not provide a full-fledged parser, as it
has complexity (wildcards, revocation, hashed addresses) that will
need further consideration.
When introduced, the host checking feature maintained backward
compatibility at the expense of security. We have decided this is not
the right tradeoff for the SSH library.
Fixesgolang/go#19767
Change-Id: I45fc7ba9bd1ea29c31ec23f115cdbab99913e814
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/38701
Run-TryBot: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Filippo Valsorda
Hans Nielsen
povsister
Justin Gracenin
Sam Whited
Tugdual Saunier
Han-Wen Nienhuys
Adam Langley
JP Sugarbroad