ssh: enforce user presence verification for security keys

Previously the library did not verify the "User Presence" (UP) bit in
signatures generated by FIDO/U2F security keys
(sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com and sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com).
This allowed signatures without physical interaction to be accepted
if the underlying hardware produced them, deviating from the default
secure behavior expected by the FIDO standards and OpenSSH.

skECDSAPublicKey.Verify and skEd25519PublicKey.Verify now enforce
the user-presence bit (0x01, constant flagUserPresence) by default.
Signatures whose flags byte has UP clear fail with the sentinel
errSKMissingUserPresence.

The server public-key authentication path honors the OpenSSH
"no-touch-required" extension as an opt-out. noTouchAllowed reports
true when the extension is present either in the Permissions
returned by PublicKeyCallback (authorized_keys-level opt-out) or in
the certificate's own Extensions (CA-level opt-out); in that case
skKeyWithoutUP is used to derive a clone of the SK public key (and,
for certificates, a clone of the wrapping Certificate whose inner
Key is the cloned SK key) whose Verify accepts UP-clear signatures.
The originals are never mutated, so a per-session opt-out cannot
leak across authentication attempts or connections. Matching
OpenSSH, the opt-out is read only from Extensions, never from
CriticalOptions.

skKeyWithoutUP is iterative and unwraps at most one level of
*Certificate: the SSH cert format forbids Certificate.Key from being
another Certificate (parseCert rejects it) but callers can still
construct such a value directly in Go, so a recursive descent would
be driven to unbounded depth by malformed or cyclic input. Any such
pathological *Certificate is returned unchanged.

CertChecker.CheckCert applies skKeyWithoutUP unconditionally to the
certificate's CA key before verifying the CA signature, matching
OpenSSH, which calls sshkey_verify with detailsp==NULL in
sshkey.c:cert_parse and never extracts or enforces UP/UV flags on
CA signatures. The UP bit on a CA signature reflects the CA
operator's presence at cert-issuance time, which has no bearing on
whether the user being authenticated is present now, so enforcing it
here would only break interop with certificates issued by
non-interactive SK CAs without a corresponding security benefit. The
skKeyWithoutUP call is a no-op for non-SK CA keys (the common case).

This change breaks backward compatibility for clients or keys that
generate user-authentication signatures without the User Presence
flag set. Previously those signatures were accepted by the server.
They will now be rejected with "ssh: signature missing required user
presence flag" unless the "no-touch-required" extension is
explicitly granted to the session by the server callbacks, or
carried by the user certificate.

This issue was found during a security audit by NCC Group
Cryptography Services, sponsored by Teleport.

Fixes golang/go#79566
Fixes CVE-2026-39831

Change-Id: I74b6de3bb6a2d7a0f34d7fa36bbbbf06f0b3fc6b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/781662
Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
This commit is contained in:
Nicola Murino
2026-05-21 17:03:20 -07:00
committed by Neal Patel
parent 9c2cd33e8d
commit b61cf853a8
6 changed files with 651 additions and 12 deletions
+26
View File
@@ -901,11 +901,25 @@ type skFields struct {
Counter uint32
}
// flagUserPresence is the "user present" bit (UP) in the SK signature
// flags, matching the FIDO CTAP2 authenticatorData UP flag. See
// openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f.
const flagUserPresence = 0x01
// errSKMissingUserPresence is returned by SK key Verify methods when
// the signature does not assert user presence and the key was not
// marked as no-touch-required.
var errSKMissingUserPresence = errors.New("ssh: signature missing required user presence flag")
type skECDSAPublicKey struct {
// application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH.
// see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details.
application string
ecdsa.PublicKey
// noTouchRequired, when true, disables the default user-presence
// check in Verify. It is set by skKeyWithoutUP on a clone of the
// key, never on an instance shared across authentication attempts.
noTouchRequired bool
}
func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Type() string {
@@ -991,6 +1005,10 @@ func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return err
}
if skf.Flags&flagUserPresence == 0 && !k.noTouchRequired {
return errSKMissingUserPresence
}
blob := struct {
ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
Flags byte
@@ -1024,6 +1042,10 @@ type skEd25519PublicKey struct {
// see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details.
application string
ed25519.PublicKey
// noTouchRequired, when true, disables the default user-presence
// check in Verify. It is set by skKeyWithoutUP on a clone of the
// key, never on an instance shared across authentication attempts.
noTouchRequired bool
}
func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Type() string {
@@ -1098,6 +1120,10 @@ func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return err
}
if skf.Flags&flagUserPresence == 0 && !k.noTouchRequired {
return errSKMissingUserPresence
}
blob := struct {
ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
Flags byte