ssh: enforce user presence verification for security keys
Previously the library did not verify the "User Presence" (UP) bit in signatures generated by FIDO/U2F security keys (sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com and sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com). This allowed signatures without physical interaction to be accepted if the underlying hardware produced them, deviating from the default secure behavior expected by the FIDO standards and OpenSSH. skECDSAPublicKey.Verify and skEd25519PublicKey.Verify now enforce the user-presence bit (0x01, constant flagUserPresence) by default. Signatures whose flags byte has UP clear fail with the sentinel errSKMissingUserPresence. The server public-key authentication path honors the OpenSSH "no-touch-required" extension as an opt-out. noTouchAllowed reports true when the extension is present either in the Permissions returned by PublicKeyCallback (authorized_keys-level opt-out) or in the certificate's own Extensions (CA-level opt-out); in that case skKeyWithoutUP is used to derive a clone of the SK public key (and, for certificates, a clone of the wrapping Certificate whose inner Key is the cloned SK key) whose Verify accepts UP-clear signatures. The originals are never mutated, so a per-session opt-out cannot leak across authentication attempts or connections. Matching OpenSSH, the opt-out is read only from Extensions, never from CriticalOptions. skKeyWithoutUP is iterative and unwraps at most one level of *Certificate: the SSH cert format forbids Certificate.Key from being another Certificate (parseCert rejects it) but callers can still construct such a value directly in Go, so a recursive descent would be driven to unbounded depth by malformed or cyclic input. Any such pathological *Certificate is returned unchanged. CertChecker.CheckCert applies skKeyWithoutUP unconditionally to the certificate's CA key before verifying the CA signature, matching OpenSSH, which calls sshkey_verify with detailsp==NULL in sshkey.c:cert_parse and never extracts or enforces UP/UV flags on CA signatures. The UP bit on a CA signature reflects the CA operator's presence at cert-issuance time, which has no bearing on whether the user being authenticated is present now, so enforcing it here would only break interop with certificates issued by non-interactive SK CAs without a corresponding security benefit. The skKeyWithoutUP call is a no-op for non-SK CA keys (the common case). This change breaks backward compatibility for clients or keys that generate user-authentication signatures without the User Presence flag set. Previously those signatures were accepted by the server. They will now be rejected with "ssh: signature missing required user presence flag" unless the "no-touch-required" extension is explicitly granted to the session by the server callbacks, or carried by the user certificate. This issue was found during a security audit by NCC Group Cryptography Services, sponsored by Teleport. Fixes golang/go#79566 Fixes CVE-2026-39831 Change-Id: I74b6de3bb6a2d7a0f34d7fa36bbbbf06f0b3fc6b Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/781662 Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com> Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org> LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
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committed by
Neal Patel
parent
9c2cd33e8d
commit
b61cf853a8
@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ import (
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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"net"
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"reflect"
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"testing"
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@@ -128,6 +130,103 @@ func TestValidateCert(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// signSKCert builds an SK-ECDSA signature over cert.bytesForSigning()
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// using caKey as the simulated hardware token. The SK signing flags
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// byte (UP bit and others) is caller-controlled so tests can exercise
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// the user-presence enforcement paths. caApp is the SK application
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// string (typically "ssh:").
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func signSKCert(t *testing.T, cert *Certificate, caKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, caApp string, flags byte) {
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t.Helper()
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cert.SignatureKey = &skECDSAPublicKey{
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application: caApp,
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PublicKey: caKey.PublicKey,
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}
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cert.Nonce = make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := rand.Read(cert.Nonce); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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h := sha256.New()
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h.Write([]byte(caApp))
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appDigest := h.Sum(nil)
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h.Reset()
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h.Write(cert.bytesForSigning())
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dataDigest := h.Sum(nil)
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var counter uint32 = 1
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blob := struct {
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ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
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Flags byte
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Counter uint32
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MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
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}{appDigest, flags, counter, dataDigest}
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h.Reset()
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h.Write(Marshal(blob))
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digest := h.Sum(nil)
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r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, caKey, digest)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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cert.Signature = &Signature{
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Format: KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
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Blob: Marshal(struct{ R, S *big.Int }{r, s}),
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Rest: Marshal(struct {
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Flags byte
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Counter uint32
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}{flags, counter}),
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}
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}
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// TestCheckCertSKAuthorityNoUPRequired pins the OpenSSH-parity
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// behavior of CertChecker.CheckCert for SK CA signatures: a
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// certificate signed by an SK CA that produced a UP=0 signature is
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// accepted, because the UP bit on a CA signature has no bearing on
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// the current user authentication (see sshkey.c:cert_parse, which
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// passes detailsp==NULL to sshkey_verify). Without this, certs issued
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// by non-interactive SK CAs would fail to verify.
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func TestCheckCertSKAuthorityNoUPRequired(t *testing.T) {
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caKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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userKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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userPub, err := NewPublicKey(&userKey.PublicKey)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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mkCert := func(flags byte) *Certificate {
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c := &Certificate{
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CertType: UserCert,
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Key: userPub,
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ValidBefore: CertTimeInfinity,
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ValidPrincipals: []string{"user"},
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}
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signSKCert(t, c, caKey, "ssh:", flags)
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return c
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}
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checker := CertChecker{
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IsUserAuthority: func(k PublicKey) bool {
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caSK := &skECDSAPublicKey{application: "ssh:", PublicKey: caKey.PublicKey}
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return bytes.Equal(k.Marshal(), caSK.Marshal())
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},
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}
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// Both UP=0 and UP=1 CA signatures verify: UP is not enforced
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// here, matching OpenSSH.
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if err := checker.CheckCert("user", mkCert(0)); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("UP=0 CA signature must verify (OpenSSH parity): %v", err)
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}
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if err := checker.CheckCert("user", mkCert(flagUserPresence)); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("UP=1 CA signature must verify: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateCertTime(t *testing.T) {
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cert := Certificate{
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ValidPrincipals: []string{"user"},
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