cryptobyte: fix panic due to malformed ASN.1 inputs on 32-bit archs
When int is 32 bits wide (on 32-bit architectures like 386 and arm), an overflow could occur, causing a panic, due to malformed ASN.1 being passed to any of the ASN1 methods of String. Tested on linux/386 and darwin/amd64. This fixes CVE-2020-7919 and was found thanks to the Project Wycheproof test vectors. Change-Id: I8c9696a8bfad1b40ec877cd740dba3467d66ab54 Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/645211 Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katiehockman@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/216677 Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
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Katie Hockman
parent
530e935923
commit
69ecbb4d6d
+3
-2
@@ -470,7 +470,8 @@ func (s *String) ReadASN1GeneralizedTime(out *time.Time) bool {
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// It reports whether the read was successful.
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func (s *String) ReadASN1BitString(out *encoding_asn1.BitString) bool {
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var bytes String
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if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.BIT_STRING) || len(bytes) == 0 {
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if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.BIT_STRING) || len(bytes) == 0 ||
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len(bytes)*8/8 != len(bytes) {
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return false
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}
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@@ -740,7 +741,7 @@ func (s *String) readASN1(out *String, outTag *asn1.Tag, skipHeader bool) bool {
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length = headerLen + len32
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}
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if uint32(int(length)) != length || !s.ReadBytes((*[]byte)(out), int(length)) {
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if int(length) < 0 || !s.ReadBytes((*[]byte)(out), int(length)) {
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return false
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}
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if skipHeader && !out.Skip(int(headerLen)) {
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