openpgp/packet: improve handling of short MPIs for RSA values
MPIs are (supposed to be) stripped of leading zeroes. Avoid passing such short values into crypto/rsa, even if it currently happens to work. Change-Id: I5a5f4813b8358e83fcc2deeda1272d2733814542 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/100844 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
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@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ func (e *EncryptedKey) Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
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// padding oracle attacks.
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// padding oracle attacks.
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switch priv.PubKeyAlgo {
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switch priv.PubKeyAlgo {
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case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
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case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
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b, err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(config.Random(), priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey), e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
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k := priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
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b, err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(config.Random(), k, padToKeySize(&k.PublicKey, e.encryptedMPI1.bytes))
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case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
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case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
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c1 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
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c1 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
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c2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI2.bytes)
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c2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI2.bytes)
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@@ -39,39 +39,44 @@ var encryptedKeyPriv = &PrivateKey{
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}
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}
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func TestDecryptingEncryptedKey(t *testing.T) {
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func TestDecryptingEncryptedKey(t *testing.T) {
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const encryptedKeyHex = "c18c032a67d68660df41c70104005789d0de26b6a50c985a02a13131ca829c413a35d0e6fa8d6842599252162808ac7439c72151c8c6183e76923fe3299301414d0c25a2f06a2257db3839e7df0ec964773f6e4c4ac7ff3b48c444237166dd46ba8ff443a5410dc670cb486672fdbe7c9dfafb75b4fea83af3a204fe2a7dfa86bd20122b4f3d2646cbeecb8f7be8"
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for i, encryptedKeyHex := range []string{
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const expectedKeyHex = "d930363f7e0308c333b9618617ea728963d8df993665ae7be1092d4926fd864b"
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"c18c032a67d68660df41c70104005789d0de26b6a50c985a02a13131ca829c413a35d0e6fa8d6842599252162808ac7439c72151c8c6183e76923fe3299301414d0c25a2f06a2257db3839e7df0ec964773f6e4c4ac7ff3b48c444237166dd46ba8ff443a5410dc670cb486672fdbe7c9dfafb75b4fea83af3a204fe2a7dfa86bd20122b4f3d2646cbeecb8f7be8",
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// MPI can be shorter than the length of the key.
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"c18b032a67d68660df41c70103f8e520c52ae9807183c669ce26e772e482dc5d8cf60e6f59316e145be14d2e5221ee69550db1d5618a8cb002a719f1f0b9345bde21536d410ec90ba86cac37748dec7933eb7f9873873b2d61d3321d1cd44535014f6df58f7bc0c7afb5edc38e1a974428997d2f747f9a173bea9ca53079b409517d332df62d805564cffc9be6",
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} {
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const expectedKeyHex = "d930363f7e0308c333b9618617ea728963d8df993665ae7be1092d4926fd864b"
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p, err := Read(readerFromHex(encryptedKeyHex))
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p, err := Read(readerFromHex(encryptedKeyHex))
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if err != nil {
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if err != nil {
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t.Errorf("error from Read: %s", err)
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t.Errorf("#%d: error from Read: %s", i, err)
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return
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return
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}
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}
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ek, ok := p.(*EncryptedKey)
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ek, ok := p.(*EncryptedKey)
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if !ok {
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if !ok {
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t.Errorf("didn't parse an EncryptedKey, got %#v", p)
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t.Errorf("#%d: didn't parse an EncryptedKey, got %#v", i, p)
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return
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return
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}
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}
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if ek.KeyId != 0x2a67d68660df41c7 || ek.Algo != PubKeyAlgoRSA {
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if ek.KeyId != 0x2a67d68660df41c7 || ek.Algo != PubKeyAlgoRSA {
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t.Errorf("unexpected EncryptedKey contents: %#v", ek)
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t.Errorf("#%d: unexpected EncryptedKey contents: %#v", i, ek)
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return
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return
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}
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}
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err = ek.Decrypt(encryptedKeyPriv, nil)
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err = ek.Decrypt(encryptedKeyPriv, nil)
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if err != nil {
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if err != nil {
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t.Errorf("error from Decrypt: %s", err)
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t.Errorf("#%d: error from Decrypt: %s", i, err)
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return
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return
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}
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}
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if ek.CipherFunc != CipherAES256 {
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if ek.CipherFunc != CipherAES256 {
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t.Errorf("unexpected EncryptedKey contents: %#v", ek)
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t.Errorf("#%d: unexpected EncryptedKey contents: %#v", i, ek)
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return
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return
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}
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}
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keyHex := fmt.Sprintf("%x", ek.Key)
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keyHex := fmt.Sprintf("%x", ek.Key)
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if keyHex != expectedKeyHex {
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if keyHex != expectedKeyHex {
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t.Errorf("bad key, got %s want %x", keyHex, expectedKeyHex)
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t.Errorf("#%d: bad key, got %s want %s", i, keyHex, expectedKeyHex)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -121,7 +126,7 @@ func TestEncryptingEncryptedKey(t *testing.T) {
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keyHex := fmt.Sprintf("%x", ek.Key)
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keyHex := fmt.Sprintf("%x", ek.Key)
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if keyHex != expectedKeyHex {
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if keyHex != expectedKeyHex {
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t.Errorf("bad key, got %s want %x", keyHex, expectedKeyHex)
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t.Errorf("bad key, got %s want %s", keyHex, expectedKeyHex)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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+22
-10
@@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ import (
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/des"
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"crypto/des"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/cast5"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors"
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"io"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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"math/big"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/cast5"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors"
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)
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)
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// readFull is the same as io.ReadFull except that reading zero bytes returns
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// readFull is the same as io.ReadFull except that reading zero bytes returns
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@@ -500,19 +502,17 @@ func readMPI(r io.Reader) (mpi []byte, bitLength uint16, err error) {
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numBytes := (int(bitLength) + 7) / 8
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numBytes := (int(bitLength) + 7) / 8
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mpi = make([]byte, numBytes)
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mpi = make([]byte, numBytes)
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_, err = readFull(r, mpi)
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_, err = readFull(r, mpi)
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return
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// According to RFC 4880 3.2. we should check that the MPI has no leading
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}
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// zeroes (at least when not an encrypted MPI?), but this implementation
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// does generate leading zeroes, so we keep accepting them.
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// mpiLength returns the length of the given *big.Int when serialized as an
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// MPI.
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func mpiLength(n *big.Int) (mpiLengthInBytes int) {
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mpiLengthInBytes = 2 /* MPI length */
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mpiLengthInBytes += (n.BitLen() + 7) / 8
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return
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return
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}
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}
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// writeMPI serializes a big integer to w.
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// writeMPI serializes a big integer to w.
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func writeMPI(w io.Writer, bitLength uint16, mpiBytes []byte) (err error) {
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func writeMPI(w io.Writer, bitLength uint16, mpiBytes []byte) (err error) {
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// Note that we can produce leading zeroes, in violation of RFC 4880 3.2.
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// Implementations seem to be tolerant of them, and stripping them would
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// make it complex to guarantee matching re-serialization.
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_, err = w.Write([]byte{byte(bitLength >> 8), byte(bitLength)})
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_, err = w.Write([]byte{byte(bitLength >> 8), byte(bitLength)})
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if err == nil {
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if err == nil {
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_, err = w.Write(mpiBytes)
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_, err = w.Write(mpiBytes)
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@@ -525,6 +525,18 @@ func writeBig(w io.Writer, i *big.Int) error {
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return writeMPI(w, uint16(i.BitLen()), i.Bytes())
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return writeMPI(w, uint16(i.BitLen()), i.Bytes())
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}
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}
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// padToKeySize left-pads a MPI with zeroes to match the length of the
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// specified RSA public.
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func padToKeySize(pub *rsa.PublicKey, b []byte) []byte {
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k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
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if len(b) >= k {
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return b
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}
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bb := make([]byte, k)
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copy(bb[len(bb)-len(b):], b)
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return bb
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}
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// CompressionAlgo Represents the different compression algorithms
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// CompressionAlgo Represents the different compression algorithms
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// supported by OpenPGP (except for BZIP2, which is not currently
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// supported by OpenPGP (except for BZIP2, which is not currently
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// supported). See Section 9.3 of RFC 4880.
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// supported). See Section 9.3 of RFC 4880.
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@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ func (pk *PublicKey) VerifySignature(signed hash.Hash, sig *Signature) (err erro
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switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
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switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
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case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
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case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
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rsaPublicKey, _ := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
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rsaPublicKey, _ := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
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err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, sig.RSASignature.bytes)
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err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, padToKeySize(rsaPublicKey, sig.RSASignature.bytes))
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if err != nil {
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if err != nil {
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return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
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return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
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}
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}
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@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ func (pk *PublicKey) VerifySignatureV3(signed hash.Hash, sig *SignatureV3) (err
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switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
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switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
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case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
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case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
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rsaPublicKey := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
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rsaPublicKey := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
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if err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, sig.RSASignature.bytes); err != nil {
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if err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, padToKeySize(rsaPublicKey, sig.RSASignature.bytes)); err != nil {
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return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
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return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
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}
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}
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return
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return
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