ssh: raise the RSA modulus limit to 16384 bits

the fix for CVE-2026-39829 capped the accepted RSA modulus at 8192 bits,
matching crypto/tls, to bound the CPU cost of verifying an
attacker-supplied key. That rejected keys OpenSSH generates: ssh-keygen
allows -b up to 16384. Raise the limit to 16384 so those keys interoperate,
both in the public key parser and the OpenSSH private key parser, and
correspondingly raise the prime-factor bound to 8192 bits (each prime is
about half the modulus). The agent's checkRSAKeyParams is updated to match.

Verifying a 16384-bit key costs roughly 3x an 8192-bit one.

Fixes golang/go#80075

Change-Id: Ib08ddd7b48552e692c48dbdf105bbc8579120bbc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/795421
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Junyang Shao <shaojunyang@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Nicola Murino
2026-07-13 20:33:21 -07:00
parent 0f039f3a4a
commit 10b54ffa51
3 changed files with 32 additions and 24 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -246,10 +246,10 @@ func setConstraints(key *AddedKey, constraintBytes []byte) error {
// on arbitrary inputs; the CRT coefficient recomputation is cubic in
// |p| and can consume excessive CPU on oversized keys.
func checkRSAKeyParams(N, E, P, Q *big.Int) error {
if N.BitLen() > 8192 {
if N.BitLen() > 16384 {
return errors.New("agent: RSA modulus too large")
}
if P.BitLen() > 4096 || Q.BitLen() > 4096 {
if P.BitLen() > 8192 || Q.BitLen() > 8192 {
return errors.New("agent: RSA prime too large")
}
if E.BitLen() > 24 {