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* Add threat-model-analyst skill: STRIDE-A threat modeling for repositories Add a comprehensive threat model analysis skill that performs security audits using STRIDE-A (STRIDE + Abuse) threat modeling, Zero Trust principles, and defense-in-depth analysis. Supports two modes: - Single analysis: full STRIDE-A threat model producing architecture overviews, DFD diagrams, prioritized findings, and executive assessments - Incremental analysis: security posture diff between baseline report and current code, producing standalone reports with embedded comparison Includes bundled reference assets: - Orchestrator workflows (full and incremental) - Analysis principles and verification checklists - Output format specifications and skeleton templates - DFD diagram conventions and TMT element taxonomy * Address PR review comments from Copilot reviewer - Fix SKILL.md description: use single-quoted scalar, rename mode (2) to 'Incremental analysis' with accurate description - Replace 'Compare Mode (Deprecated)' sections with 'Comparing Commits or Reports' redirect (no deprecated language for first release) - Fix skeleton-findings.md: move Tier 1 table rows under header, add CONDITIONAL-EMPTY block after END-REPEAT (matching Tier 2/3 structure) - Fix skeleton-threatmodel.md and skeleton-architecture.md: use 4-backtick outer fences to avoid nested fence conflicts with inner mermaid fences - Fix skeleton-incremental-html.md: correct section count from 9 to 8 - Fix output-formats.md: change status 'open' to 'Open' in JSON example, move stride_category warning outside JSON fence as blockquote - Fix incremental-orchestrator.md: replace stale compare-output-formats.md reference with inline color conventions - Regenerate docs/README.skills.md with updated description * Address second round of Copilot review comments - Fix diagram-conventions.md: bidirectional flow notation now uses <--> matching orchestrator.md and DFD templates - Fix tmt-element-taxonomy.md: normalize SE.DF.SSH/LDAP/LDAPS to use SE.DF.TMCore.* prefix consistent with all other data flow IDs - Fix output-formats.md: correct TMT category example from SQLDatabase to SQL matching taxonomy, fix component type from 'datastore' to 'data_store' matching canonical enum, remove DaprSidecar from inbound_from per no-standalone-sidecar rule - Fix 5 skeleton files: clarify VERBATIM instruction to 'copy the template content below (excluding the outer code fence)' to prevent agents from wrapping output in markdown fences - Genericize product-specific names in examples: replace edgerag with myapp, BitNetManager with TaskProcessor, AzureLocalMCP with MyApp.Core, AzureLocalInfra with OnPremInfra, MilvusVectorDB with VectorDB * Address third round of Copilot review comments - Fix diagram-conventions.md: second bidirectional two-arrow pattern in Quick Reference section now uses <--> - Fix incremental-orchestrator.md: renumber HTML sections 5-9 to 4-8 matching skeleton-incremental-html.md 8-section structure - Fix output-formats.md: add incremental-comparison.html to File List as conditional output for incremental mode - Fix skeleton-inventory.md: add tmt_type, sidecars, and boundary_kind fields to match output-formats.md JSON schema example
107 lines
6.2 KiB
Markdown
107 lines
6.2 KiB
Markdown
# Skeleton: 2-stride-analysis.md
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> **⛔ Copy the template content below VERBATIM (excluding the outer code fence). Replace `[FILL]` placeholders. The "A" in STRIDE-A is ALWAYS "Abuse" — NEVER "Authorization".**
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> **⛔ Exploitability Tiers table MUST have EXACTLY 4 columns: `Tier | Label | Prerequisites | Assignment Rule`. DO NOT merge into 3 columns. DO NOT rename `Assignment Rule` to `Description`.**
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> **⛔ Summary table MUST include a `Link` column: `Component | Link | S | T | R | I | D | E | A | Total | T1 | T2 | T3 | Risk`**
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> **⛔ N/A Categories MUST use a table (`| Category | Justification |`), NOT prose/bullet points.**
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---
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```markdown
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# STRIDE + Abuse Cases — Threat Analysis
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> This analysis uses the standard **STRIDE** methodology (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) extended with **Abuse Cases** (business logic abuse, workflow manipulation, feature misuse). The "A" column in tables below represents Abuse — a supplementary category covering threats where legitimate features are misused for unintended purposes. This is distinct from Elevation of Privilege (E), which covers authorization bypass.
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## Exploitability Tiers
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Threats are classified into three exploitability tiers based on the prerequisites an attacker needs:
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| Tier | Label | Prerequisites | Assignment Rule |
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|------|-------|---------------|----------------|
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| **Tier 1** | Direct Exposure | `None` | Exploitable by unauthenticated external attacker with NO prior access. The prerequisite field MUST say `None`. |
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| **Tier 2** | Conditional Risk | Single prerequisite: `Authenticated User`, `Privileged User`, `Internal Network`, or single `{Boundary} Access` | Requires exactly ONE form of access. The prerequisite field has ONE item. |
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| **Tier 3** | Defense-in-Depth | `Host/OS Access`, `Admin Credentials`, `{Component} Compromise`, `Physical Access`, or MULTIPLE prerequisites joined with `+` | Requires significant prior breach, infrastructure access, or multiple combined prerequisites. |
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<!-- ⛔ POST-TABLE CHECK: Verify this table has EXACTLY 4 columns (Tier|Label|Prerequisites|Assignment Rule). If you wrote 3 columns or named the 4th column 'Description' or 'Example' → FIX NOW before continuing. -->
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## Summary
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| Component | Link | S | T | R | I | D | E | A | Total | T1 | T2 | T3 | Risk |
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|-----------|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|----|----|----|------|
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[REPEAT: one row per component — numeric STRIDE counts, 0 is valid with N/A justification]
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| [FILL: ComponentName] | [Link](#[FILL: anchor]) | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL: sum] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL: Low/Medium/High/Critical] |
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[END-REPEAT]
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| **Totals** | | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | **[FILL]** | |
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<!-- ⛔ POST-TABLE CHECK: Verify this Summary table:
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1. Has 14 columns: Component | Link | S | T | R | I | D | E | A | Total | T1 | T2 | T3 | Risk
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2. The 2nd column is a SEPARATE 'Link' column with `[Link](#anchor)` values — do NOT embed links inside the Component column
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3. S+T+R+I+D+E+A = Total for every row
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4. T1+T2+T3 = Total for every row
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5. No row has ALL 1s in every STRIDE column (if so, the analysis is too shallow)
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6. The 'A' column header represents 'Abuse' not 'Authorization'
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If ANY check fails → FIX NOW before writing component sections. -->
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---
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[REPEAT: one section per component — do NOT include sections for external actors (Operator, EndUser)]
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## [FILL: ComponentName]
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**Trust Boundary:** [FILL: boundary name]
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**Role:** [FILL: brief description]
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**Data Flows:** [FILL: DF##, DF##, ...]
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**Pod Co-location:** [FILL: sidecars if K8s, or "N/A" if not K8s]
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### STRIDE-A Analysis
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#### Tier 1 — Direct Exposure (No Prerequisites)
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| ID | Category | Threat | Prerequisites | Affected Flow | Mitigation | Status |
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|----|----------|--------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------|
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[REPEAT: threat rows or "*No Tier 1 threats identified.*"]
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| [FILL: T##.X] | [FILL: Spoofing/Tampering/Repudiation/Information Disclosure/Denial of Service/Elevation of Privilege/Abuse] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL: DF##] | [FILL] | [FILL: Open/Mitigated/Platform] |
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[END-REPEAT]
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#### Tier 2 — Conditional Risk
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| ID | Category | Threat | Prerequisites | Affected Flow | Mitigation | Status |
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|----|----------|--------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------|
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[REPEAT: threat rows or "*No Tier 2 threats identified.*"]
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| [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] |
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[END-REPEAT]
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#### Tier 3 — Defense-in-Depth
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| ID | Category | Threat | Prerequisites | Affected Flow | Mitigation | Status |
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|----|----------|--------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------|
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[REPEAT: threat rows or "*No Tier 3 threats identified.*"]
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| [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] | [FILL] |
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[END-REPEAT]
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#### Categories Not Applicable
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| Category | Justification |
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|----------|---------------|
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[REPEAT: one row per N/A STRIDE category — use "Abuse" not "Authorization" for the A category]
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| [FILL: Spoofing/Tampering/Repudiation/Information Disclosure/Denial of Service/Elevation of Privilege/Abuse] | [FILL: 1-sentence justification] |
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[END-REPEAT]
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<!-- ⛔ POST-COMPONENT CHECK: Verify this component:
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1. Category column uses full names (not abbreviations like 'S', 'T', 'DoS')
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2. 'A' category is 'Abuse' (NEVER 'Authorization')
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3. Status column uses ONLY: Open, Mitigated, Platform
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4. All 3 tier sub-sections present (even if empty with '*No Tier N threats*')
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5. N/A table present for any STRIDE categories without threats
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If ANY check fails → FIX NOW before moving to next component. -->
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[END-REPEAT]
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```
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**STRIDE + Abuse Cases — the 7 categories are EXACTLY:**
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Spoofing | Tampering | Repudiation | Information Disclosure | Denial of Service | Elevation of Privilege | Abuse
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**Note:** The first 6 are standard STRIDE. "Abuse" is a supplementary category for business logic misuse (workflow manipulation, feature exploitation, API abuse). It is NOT "Authorization" — authorization issues belong under Elevation of Privilege (E).
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**Valid Status values:** `Open` | `Mitigated` | `Platform` — NO other values permitted.
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