Permissions and Tokens

Every workflow run gets an automatic GITHUB_TOKEN. Its scope is the blast radius if a step is compromised, so scope it to the minimum.

The Default Is Too Broad

If a workflow has no permissions: block, it inherits the repository/organization default. On older or permissive repos that default is read/write to most scopes. A single injected command or malicious dependency then runs with the ability to push code, publish releases, or approve PRs.

Least-Privilege Recipe

Set a restrictive default at the top level, then elevate per job only where needed.

# Deny by default
permissions: {}

jobs:
  build:
    permissions:
      contents: read          # checkout only
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps: [...]

  comment:
    permissions:
      contents: read
      pull-requests: write    # this job posts a comment; nothing else
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps: [...]

Common scopes: contents, pull-requests, issues, actions, packages, id-token, deployments, checks, statuses. Each is read, write, or none.

Findings to Flag

No permissions: block anywhere → MEDIUM (inherits possibly-broad default).
permissions: write-all → HIGH.
A write scope the job's steps never use → HIGH (drop it).
Top-level write that should live on one job → MEDIUM (move it down).

OIDC Instead of Long-Lived Cloud Secrets

Storing static cloud keys (AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, etc.) as repo secrets means a leak is permanent until manually rotated. Prefer OpenID Connect: the workflow requests a short-lived token the cloud provider trusts, scoped to that repo/branch, expiring in minutes.

permissions:
  id-token: write     # required to request the OIDC token
  contents: read
jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@<sha>
        with:
          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/my-ci-role
          aws-region: us-east-1
      # no AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY secrets needed

The same pattern exists for Azure (azure/login), GCP (google-github-actions/auth), HashiCorp Vault, and others. On the cloud side, scope the trust policy to the specific repo and ideally a specific branch/environment so a fork or another repo cannot assume the role.

Secret Hygiene

Reference secrets only in the jobs that need them.
Never echo a secret or enable shell tracing (set -x) in a step that handles one.
Don't pass secrets into third-party actions you haven't pinned and reviewed.
Remember fork pull_request runs get no secrets — don't try to "fix" that by switching to pull_request_target (see triggers-and-privilege.md).

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