* feat(instructions): update security, a11y, and performance to 2025-2026 standards
Security: OWASP 2025 (55 anti-patterns, AI/LLM section, 6 frameworks)
Accessibility: WCAG 2.2 AA (38 anti-patterns, legal context EAA/ADA, 4 frameworks)
Performance: CWV (50 anti-patterns, Next.js 16, Angular 20, modern APIs)
* fix(instructions): use globalThis.scheduler to prevent ReferenceError
Access scheduler via globalThis to safely handle environments where
the Scheduling API is not declared as a global variable.
* fix(instructions): correct regex patterns and harden SSRF example
- AU1: anchor jwt.verify lookahead inside parentheses
- AU2: anchor jwt.sign lookahead, add expiresIn alternative
- AU7: fix greedy .* before negative lookahead in OAuth state check
- I5: resolve all DNS records, add TOCTOU production note
- K2: add closing delimiters and multi-digit support to tabindex regex
* fix(instructions): enhance SSRF IP validation with IPv4-mapped IPv6
Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:127.0.0.1) before
checking private ranges, preventing bypass via mapped addresses.
* fix(instructions): add noscript fallback for deferred CSS pattern
Without JS, the media="print" + onload pattern leaves the stylesheet
inactive. The noscript tag loads it normally when JS is disabled.
* fix(instructions): add execFileSync to I3 command injection detection
The BAD example uses execFileSync but the regex only matched exec,
execSync, and execFile — missing the sync variant.
* fix(instructions): cover full IPv6 link-local range in SSRF check
fe80::/10 spans fe80-febf (fe8*, fe9*, fea*, feb*). Previous regex
only matched fe80::. Also use normalized variable for consistency.
* fix(instructions): adjust SSRF wording and downgrade reduced-motion severity
- SSRF: replace "full DNS/IP validation" with accurate wording that
acknowledges TOCTOU limitation
- V5: downgrade prefers-reduced-motion from IMPORTANT to SUGGESTION,
remove 2.2.2 (A) reference since it's an AAA enhancement
* fix(instructions): rename AU4 heading to include SHA-256
The heading said "Weak Password Hash (MD5/SHA1)" but the detection
regex and BAD example both use SHA-256. Renamed to "Fast Hash for
Passwords" which better describes the actual anti-pattern.
* fix(instructions): clarify WCAG 2.2 SC 4.1.1 status as obsolete
SC 4.1.1 Parsing is still present in the WCAG 2.2 spec but marked
as obsolete (always satisfied). Changed wording from "removed" to
"obsolete" for accuracy.
* fix(instructions): rename I1 example vars to avoid TS redeclaration
Copy-pasting the I1 SQL injection example as a single block failed with a
TypeScript redeclaration error because both BAD and GOOD snippets used
`const result`. Rename to `unsafeResult`/`safeResult` so the block remains
copy-pasteable into a single scope.
* fix(instructions): migrate I3 example to async execFile with bounds
The I3 command injection example used `execFileSync` in both BAD and GOOD
paths, which (a) redeclared `const output` in the same block and (b) blocks
the Node event loop in server handlers, amplifying DoS impact.
Switch the GOOD/BEST paths to a promisified `execFile` call with explicit
`timeout` and `maxBuffer` bounds, and rename variables to
`unsafeOutput`/`safeOutput` so the snippet stays copy-pasteable. Add a
trailing note recommending async child_process APIs for server code.
* fix(instructions): align AU6 heading with session fixation example
The AU6 heading claimed "Session Not Invalidated on Password Change" but
the mitigation example showed `req.session.regenerate`, which is the
canonical defense against session fixation on login rather than bulk
invalidation after a credential change.
Rename the anti-pattern to "Missing Session Regeneration on Login (Session
Fixation)" so it matches the example, and add a trailing note pointing to
the complementary practice of invalidating other active sessions for the
user on password change (e.g., via a `tokenVersion` counter).
* fix(instructions): make L1 critical CSS pattern CSP-compatible
The L1 "GOOD" snippet relied on an inline `onload="this.media='all'"`
handler on a `<link>` tag. Under a strict CSP that disallows
`'unsafe-inline'` / `script-src-attr 'unsafe-inline'`, inline event
handlers are blocked, so the stylesheet would never activate and users
would hit a styling regression.
Replace the pattern with build-time critical CSS extraction
(Critters/Beasties/Next.js `optimizeCss`) plus a normal
`<link rel="preload" as="style">` and standard `<link rel="stylesheet">`.
Add a trailing note explaining why the older inline-onload trick breaks
under strict CSP and how to defer non-critical CSS with an external
script when deferral is truly needed.
Updated accessibility instructions to improve clarity and specificity regarding coding practices for accessibility, including keyboard navigation and semantic structure.
* add instructions for accessibility
* update readme
* Added a description to the a11y instructions
* Fix spelling and formatting issues
* Fixing line ending
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Fairchild <mfairchild@microsoft.com>
Co-authored-by: Aaron Powell <me@aaron-powell.com>
