chore: publish from main

extensions/sentry-triage/escape.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+// Shared HTML-escaping helpers. All Sentry / MCP / agent-derived values are
+// interpolated into HTML string templates, so every dynamic text or attribute
+// value MUST pass through here before it reaches the webview.
+
+const HTML_ENTITIES = {
+  '&': '&',
+  '<': '&lt;',
+  '>': '&gt;',
+  '"': '&quot;',
+  "'": '&#39;',
+}
+
+/** Escape a value for use as HTML text or a double/single-quoted attribute. */
+export function escapeHtml(value) {
+  if (value == null) return ''
+  return String(value).replace(/[&<>"']/g, (ch) => HTML_ENTITIES[ch])
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return a safe href: only http(s) URLs are allowed through, everything else
+ * (javascript:, data:, malformed, etc.) collapses to '#'. The result is still
+ * attribute-escaped for embedding.
+ */
+export function safeHref(value) {
+  if (value == null) return '#'
+  const raw = String(value).trim()
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(raw)
+    if (url.protocol === 'http:' || url.protocol === 'https:') {
+      return escapeHtml(url.href)
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // not an absolute URL — fall through
+  }
+  return '#'
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serialize a value as JSON safe to embed inside an inline <script> block.
+ * Escapes the characters that can terminate the script element or break the
+ * JS string context (`<`, `>`, U+2028, U+2029).
+ */
+export function jsonForScript(value) {
+  return JSON.stringify(value)
+    .replace(/</g, '\\u003c')
+    .replace(/>/g, '\\u003e')
+    .replace(/\u2028/g, '\\u2028')
+    .replace(/\u2029/g, '\\u2029')
+}
+
+/**
+ * Neutralize a piece of untrusted, Sentry-derived text before it is embedded in
+ * an agent prompt that can create issues / spawn code-writing sessions. A
+ * crafted Sentry title or message is prompt-injection input, so we:
+ *   - collapse newlines and control characters to spaces, so it cannot introduce
+ *     its own instruction lines, fenced blocks, or fake tool directives;
+ *   - strip Markdown/emphasis and backtick fences that could restructure the
+ *     prompt;
+ *   - cap the length so a huge payload can't bury the real instructions.
+ * This is defense-in-depth on top of treating the values as labeled data — not a
+ * substitute for keeping untrusted content out of executable instructions.
+ */
+export function sanitizeForPrompt(value, maxLen = 300) {
+  let text = value == null ? '' : String(value)
+  text = text.replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f\u2028\u2029]+/g, ' ')
+  text = text.replace(/[`]+/g, "'")
+  text = text.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim()
+  if (text.length > maxLen) text = text.slice(0, maxLen - 1).trimEnd() + '…'
+  return text
+}